Wednesday, January 07, 2009

A Holocaust memoir that turned out to be wrong

Bob Somerby's Daily Howler column of 01/06/09 alerted me to a story that hadn't registered on my consciousness before. But it's the kind of story that particularly interests me because it involves the effort to get the facts of a story right and the possible negative consequences of failing to do so.

I grumped in a number of posts back in 2007 about Ken Burns' PBS documentary The War, about Americans during the Second World War. The subjects of the interviews were elderly. Anyone old enough to vote in 1945 (at age 21) would have been at least 81 in 2005. And they were relating events from six decades before. The documentary provided little if any information on whether the stories had been individually verified in some way. One woman seemed downright dingie, even though she was presented in a very sympathetic light. Another guy told a story that had the feel of "too good to be true" about staving off his imminent execution in a POW camp by a bluff involving a claim about an evil spirit, a story that could have been checked at least to some degree.

I checked one account myself, of a guy talking about the motivations of kamikaze suicide pilots late in the war. From a view minutes researching in my home library and in the digital Encyclopedia Britannica, I concluded that what he said on that subject was very unlikely. And the motivation of the kamikazes was not a matter of which he had any direct wartime experience. He had seen a kamikaze plane crash into a ship, but he had not (so far as the film told us) been involved in interrogating would-be kamikaze pilots. It would have been helpful to know whether some of these stories had been vetted through normal historical research. (There was one story the film followed that did have contemporary documentation in the form of a diary kept by the girl they were describing.)

I've often said something to the effect that the only type of story I know of that's possibly less reliable than men bragging about their sexual accomplishments would be women bragging about theirs. People make up stuff. Even when we're not consciously confabulating something, we misremember things, mix up the details, embellish the story get the dates wrong, forget some of the participants, doctor the story to avoid relating something embarrassing that someone did or said at the time (usually ourselves), and so on. Eyewitness testimony is notoriously fallible. And as time goes on, it becomes more so.

The story that Somerby mentions is a case of an elderly Jewish man who was in the Buchenwald concentration camp outside Weimar, Germany, as a boy. His story was about a little girl that brought him an apple every day - during the winter - by tossing it over the fence of the camp. The girl was the daughter of (apparently) Polish slave laborers who had been brought there to work. They were Jewish but were passing for Christian.

Years later, after the war and after emigrating to America, he went on a blind date with another Jewish immigrant. After talking for a while, they discovered that they were the same boy and girl of the Buchenwald story! They married and lived happily ever after. Or at least stayed married for a long time.

The story got a lot of publicity, was featured on Oprah, and became an e-mail chain-letter favorite. The guy had a book of his story about to be published, a movie was set to be made.

But what I've related of the story already should have raised a few questions. Apples in the dead of winter? Did the concentration camp guards routinely let visitors stroll up the fence? Were prisoners allowed close enough to the fence to chat with outsiders and get food from them? Is it plausible that a Jewish family trying to pass for Christian in Nazi Germany during the middle of the war would let their nine-year-old daughter stroll down to the Buchenwald camp every day?

The story of what happened with the book is discussed in these two articles: The Greatest Love Story Ever Sold by Gabriel Sherman The New Republic 12/25/08; and, False Memoir of Holocaust Is Canceled by Motoko Rich and Joseph Berger 12/28/08,

Historian Deborah Lipstadt has posted about it several times on her blog, obscurely titled Deborah Lipstadt's Blog. This post of 12/31/08, for instance, reproduces an article of hers from The Forward that describes her issues with the story. The book has apparently found another publisher, even though the accuracy of the story has been effectively debunked. The title of the book, the first run of which the previous publisher had ready to release when it was cancelled, was Apples At The Fence by Herman Rosenblat.

Some basic research by an historian who knew what he was doing was what eventually killed the book's publication, though the publisher and prospective filmmaker were initially very defensive over any such criticism. As the Times reports:

The primary sleuth in unmasking his fabrication of the apple story was Kenneth Waltzer, director of Jewish studies at Michigan State University. He has been working on a book on how 904 boys — including the Nobel Peace Prize winner Elie Wiesel — were saved from death by an underground rescue operation inside Buchenwald, and has interviewed hundreds of survivors, including boys from the ghetto at Piotrkow in Poland who were taken with the young Herman Rosenblat to the camp.

When Dr. Waltzer asked other survivors who were with Mr. Rosenblat about the tossed apple story, they said the story couldn’t possibly be true.

In his research of maps drawn by ex-prisoners, Dr. Waltzer learned that the section of Schlieben [a sub-camp of the main Buchenwald camp] where Mr. Rosenblat was housed had fences facing other sections of the camp and only one fence — on the south — facing the outside world. That fence was adjacent to the camp’s SS barracks and the SS men there would have been able to spot a boy regularly speaking to a girl on the other side of the fence, Dr. Waltzer said. Moreover, the fence was electrified and civilians outside the camp were forbidden to walk along the road that bordered the fence.

Dr. Waltzer also learned from online documentation that Ms. Radzicki, her parents and two sisters were hidden as Christians at a farm not outside Schlieben but 210 miles away near Breslau.
Lipstadt's criticism focuses on how fabricated account can affect the general understanding of the events of the Holocaust and on how Holocaust deniers exploit erroneous, careless or falsified accounts of events. In her Forward article, she explains:

There are various lessons to be learned from this: Facts about the Holocaust must be checked. Historians should never build their understanding of events based on one story from one person. But Rosenblat had enablers. His publisher, agent and movie producer pounced on his story. Reporters never bothered to check it out. They all seemingly wanted a story that made the Holocaust heartwarming, even though, as Waltzer aptly put it, the "Holocaust experience is not heartwarming, it is heart rending."

[Harris] Salomon [who is still planning to do a film of the story though designating it as fiction] believed that this kind of "candy-coated message” would reach “Middle America” and “do more to teach people about the Jewish experience during the Holocaust in a way nothing before has done." Jewish sources also allowed themselves to be co-opted. Aish HaTorah featured the story on its Web site. A Chabad rabbi, whose relatives died in the Holocaust, was swept off his feet by this phony tale and arranged a belated bar mitzvah for Herman, garnering even more publicity for the Rosenblats and himself.

I have spent much of my academic career studying Holocaust denial. But the much greater danger to our collective memory of the event is posed by Holocaust trivialization and romanticization. What the Rosenblats and their enablers did was create yet another obstacle for the remaining survivors to convince others that their stories are true.

Rosenblat claims that all he wanted to do was make people love each other more. The Chabad rabbi probably thought the story would inspire faith. Salomon wanted to teach Middle America about the Holocaust.

These may be worthy goals. But the Holocaust should not be reduced to a means for trying to fulfill these or any other ends. The instrumentalization of the Holocaust, the use of it to fulfill something else, is the ultimate degradation of the event. If Holocaust deniers were smart, they would sit back and let the Rosenblats, Salomons, Berkley Books and the like peddle their wares. Within a short time, no one would know what was truth and what was fiction. [my emphasis in bold]
It's probably too much to expect that the Holocaust won't be instrumentalized. People have a huge need to draw meaning and lessons events. And when someone settles on what they take as "the lessons of the Holocaust" or "the lessons of Munich" or whatever, they are sorely tempted to use it to justify their own arguments.

But, as a specialist in the field, Lipstadt may be applying a more precise academic meaning of "instrumentalization" that I would. There are whole volume written on the nuances of the "representation" of the Holocaust and I can't pretend to be extensively acquainted with it.

In the New Republic article, Lipstadt explains how Holocaust deniers exploit false or mistaken claims:

Deborah Lipstadt, the Dorot Professor of Modern Jewish and Holocaust Studies at Emory University, who was appointed by President Clinton in 1994 to the United States Holocaust Memorial Council, says she first heard Herman's story while on a research trip to Auschwitz about the same time Waltzer started examining the narrative. Someone had read her an email chain that they had printed out that recounted Herman's amazing love story. "I said, 'I don't believe it,'" she told me, recalling the episode.

Lipstadt, who wrote the 1993 book, Denying the Holocaust, is troubled by the possibility that Herman's love story is fabricated, because she believes it could be co-opted by the Holocaust denial movement. "If you make up things about parts, you cast doubts on everything else," Lipstadt told me. "When you think of the survivors who meticulously tell their story and are so desperate for people to believe, then if they're making stories up about this, how do you know if Anne Frank is true? How do you know Elie Wiesel is true?"

In addition to the impossibility of being able to approach the fence, Lipstadt disputes other details of Herman's story. "Based on what I have seen thus far, I would say that this story is not exactly a shining example of verisimilitude [i.e, accuracy]," she wrote on her blog on December 15.
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Tuesday, January 06, 2009

Obama on the Gaza offensive

Was the Obama team reading Tankwoman's Blue Voice post this morning?

Even if they weren't, this sounds to me like good news, from Obama breaks silence on Gaza, calls civilian deaths 'a deep concern' Haaretz 01/06/08.

Barack Obama, who takes over as U.S. president from George W. Bush on January 20, broke his silence about the violence in the Gaza Strip on Tuesday, calling the loss of civilian lives in Gaza and in Israel a "source of deep concern for me."

Obama added he would adhere to his principle that only Bush should be the voice of U.S. foreign policy at this time but he would have plenty to say after his inauguration in two weeks.

Nonetheless, Obama said that he is "not backing at all from what I've said during the campaign we're going to engage effectively and consistently in the peace process."

"We've got plenty to say about Gaza, and on January 20, you'll hear directly from me," he added. [my emphasis]
I'm actually surprised that he spoke out directly on this before Inauguration Day. Cheney and Bush are still in charge, and the Republicans are likely to trash him for saying anything.

But it looks significant to me, optimist that I am for this brief moment in time, that his reference to civilian casualties in "in Gaza and in Israel" could be a signal of a return to at least a nominally independent stance that could allow the US to be a credible mediator. And reiterating his support for the peace process is a positive sign.

Billmon also points to some significant changes that look to be for the better that Obama's team is insisting upon at the Pentagon in A Final Communique From the Neocon Bunker Daily Kos diary 12/31/08. There are real reasons for the Democratic base to be optimistic - cautiously and critically, but still optimistic - about the incoming administration.

Compare that with the sad, superficial performance of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid on Meet the Press on Sunday, being interviewed by the even sadder and more superficial David Gregory:

MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you about the ground invasion into Gaza. Do you think on the part of this Israeli--of the Israelis this was offensive or defensive?

SEN. REID: I spoke to Prime Minister Olmert a couple of days ago. He indicated that they would do the ground activities. Let's understand the background. For eight years they've been firing rockets into Israel. They've become more intense the last few months. Israelis have been killed, maimed and injured. Sometimes more than 200 a day coming into Israel. If this were going on in the United States from Vancouver, Canada, into Seattle, would we react? Course we do. We would have to. I think what the Israelis are doing is very important. I think this terrorist organization, Hamas, has got to be put away. They've got to come to their senses. The Fatah group, which is--makes up part of Palestinian group, has a peace arrangement with Israel. Hamas should do the same.

MR. GREGORY: And they're in power in the West Bank.

SEN. REID: That's right. And, and, and Israel, for--since 1967, controlled Gaza. They gave it to the Palestinians as a gesture of peace. And all they got are a bunch of rockets in return.

MR. GREGORY: So you think that Israel ought to move forward and try to remove Hamas from power?

SEN. REID: They have to. I, I'm not concerned about removing Hamas from power, I'm concerned about stopping the rocket fire and the mortar fire into Israel. That is the key, and that's what Israel's up to according to the prime minister.

MR. GREGORY: Should there be an immediate cease-fire?

SEN. REID: If the Hamas organization will agree and there is some degree of certainty that they will follow through. They, in the past, have simply not lived up to what they said they would do. If there's a way of enforcing this cease-fire, then yes. Otherwise, Israel has to continue till they stop the rockets and mortars coming into Israel, maiming, injuring...

MR. GREGORY: Right.

SEN. REID: ...and killing Israelis.

MR. GREGORY: So you, you're in sync with the Bush administration on this point?

SEN. REID: Yes, I am.

MR. GREGORY: OK. [my emphasis]
It sounded poor enough listening to it. When I start looking closely at the words, it sounds even stranger. Did I miss something, in particular the fact that Al Fatah has "a peace arrangement with Israel"? Did Reid just let something confidential slip?

I'm more concerned about his reflexive and one-sided position defending the Israeli offensive in Gaza without reservation. If Obama intends to place the US in a more mediating postion - which was the US position before Cheney and Bush took over - then I don't see how Reid's statement helps that a bit.

The incoming Obama administration certainly has some political flexibility among the public and the Democratic base on an Israeli-Palestinian peace, though you wouldn't know it from listening to Harry Reid in that appearance. Glenn Greewald recently reported on opinion poll results (More oddities in the U.S. "debate" over Israel/Gaza Salon 01/02/08):

This Rasmussen Reports poll -- the first to survey American public opinion specifically regarding the Israeli attack on Gaza -- strongly bolsters the severe disconnect I documented the other day between (a) American public opinion on U.S. policy towards Israel and (b) the consensus views expressed by America's political leadership. Not only does Rasmussen find that Americans generally "are closely divided over whether the Jewish state should be taking military action against militants in the Gaza Strip" (44-41%, with 15% undecided), but Democratic voters overwhelmingly oppose the Israeli offensive -- by a 24-point margin (31-55%). By stark constrast, Republicans, as one would expect (in light of their history of supporting virtually any proposed attack on Arabs and Muslims), overwhelmingly support the Israeli bombing campaign (62-27%).
And the question of proportionality can't be ignored. Juan Cole adds some important persective in that regard in a post that looks at ways in which the credibility gap that Cheney, Bush, Rummy and the neocons created in the US over the Iraq War is also affecting the credibility of Israeli claims about Gaza (Have Bush and the Neocons Ruined it for the Israelis? Informed Comment blog 01/05/08):

Israelis point to thousands of rocket attacks by Hamas on Israel, without mentioning that no Israelis had been killed by them during the truce stretching from mid-June, 2008 until December 26. That is, the prelude to the most violent Israeli attack on Gaza since 1967 was . . . not a single Israeli death at the hands of Hamas in the preceding half-year. And in 8 years, Hamas had killed about 15 Israelis with those home made rockets, during which time the Israelis had killed nearly 5000 Palestinians, nearly 1000 of them minors. The rockets were small, handmade affairs for the most part and most landed uselessly. Some did damage to property and a few wounded or killed people. That would be a legitimate assertion. But the quotation of "thousands" of rockets is a half-truth and intentionally misleading.

Another half-truth is that Israel is involved in a "peace process" or supports Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, when in fact it has gone on stealing Palestinian land in the West Bank and making Palestinian lives miserable and colonizing them.
Cole doesn't seem to know about that "peace arrangement" between Fatah and Israel either.

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Iraq War triumphalism

It's not really new. The Cheney-Bush administration, including all our glorious and infallible generals, has said all along that things were going wonderfully in Iraq, that we were winning and winning and winning some more. Of course, after The Surge started, everybody in the administration started saying that we had been on the verge of disaster, though the Republicans had been spewing accusations of treason and such at anyone who was saying that in real time. But as always when they speak in present tense, everything is going wonderfully in Iraq.

It is a significant turning point (finally!) that the Iraqi government and their close ally Iran insisted on an agreement for an American withdrawal with a firm timetable that excludes the option of permanent American bases. If we go back to the partly-unstated but well known intentions of the Cheney-Bush administration in 2003, they were going to overthrown Saddam, get rid of the non-existent "weapons of mass destruction", install a democratic model regime with a model neoliberal economy, make Iraq into an ally of Israel, and maintain permanent military bases in Iraq as the jumping-off point for further wars in the Middle East.

Now, they are essentially claiming victory because a hideous situation created by the US invasion itself is now more stabilized. And Iraq has a Shi'a-theocratic government that is closely allied with Iran and has practiced massive sectarian cleansing to win (at least the first major round of) their civil war with the Sunnis. Four and a half million refugees have been uprooted from their homes as a result of the violence and the sectarian cleansing. Something like a million or more Iraqis have died as the result of the war and the conditions it created. The economy is devastated, the infrastructure is wrecked with little actual development having been accomplished under the American occupation, and provision of electricity has never made it back to the level it was under Saddam's regime.

Oh, and the war made Iran into the predominant power in the Middle East.

I would call that record a "heckuva job", a phrase that the Katrina disaster instantly turned into an insult rather than praise. But to celebrate it as a success is just a prelude to a stab-in-the-back view of the war: our brilliant generals and the steadfast Republicans "won it" but then the Democrats came in and everything went to hell.

Right now, they're working mainly on their the-Republicans-won-it theory. After what we've seen the last eight years, it's not surprising that they would try. But do Democratic leaders have to help them do it?

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid was on Meet the Press Sunday 01/04/08, spending about half his time making Republican points and the other half making Democratic points, the latter pretty poorly. I was struck by this exchange with his empty-suit interviewer, David Gregory:

MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you about the war in Iraq. In April of 2007, this is what you said: "I believe myself that ... this war is lost and the surge is not accomplishing anything." Were you wrong?

SEN. REID: David, I first met General David Petraeus in Iraq. He was training the Iraqi forces at that time. At that time, he knew it wasn't working. After he became the commander in Iraq, he and I sat down and talked. He said to me, and he said within the sound of everyone's voice, "The war cannot be won militarily." I said it differently than he did. But it needed a change in direction. Petraeus brought that about. He brought it about--the surge helped, of course it helped. But in addition to that, the urging of me and other people in Congress and the country dictated a change, and that took place. So...

MR. GREGORY: But you said the surge was not accomplishing anything. Even Barack Obama said last fall that it exceeded everyone's expectations and succeeded beyond our wildest dreams.

SEN. REID: Listen, at that--the time that statement was made, the surge--they weren't talking about the surge. Petraeus added to the surge some very, very interesting things that changed things. He said a lot--just simply numbers of troops is not going to do the deal. What we need to do is work with the Iraqi people, which we haven't done before. That's where the Awakening Councils came about, as a result of David Petraeus' genius. He's done--he will be written about in the history books for years to come. My original statement was in keeping what David Petraeus said; that is, the war cannot be won militarily.

MR. GREGORY: Do you believe that the war in Iraq has been lost?

SEN. REID: I don't think at this stage we can talk about that with any degree of sensibility. That has to be something that will talked about in the history books to come. We...

MR. GREGORY: So you spoke to soon in 2007?

SEN. REID: David Petraeus and Harry Reid spoke at the same time. David Petraeus said that the war cannot be won militarily, I said what I said. Who, who phrased it the best is...

MR. GREGORY: You said that the war is lost. Today, in 2009, that's no longer your view?

SEN. REID: David, listen, someone else will have to determine that as the years go on. What has the war done? It's brought about--it's destabilized the Middle East. We have a civil war going on in Israel. We have a civil war in Iraq, as indicated today, more than 50 people killed with a bomb in Iraq today. We have Lebanon, a civil war there. We have Iran thumbing their nose with every, everyone. And if that weren't bad enough, our standing in the world community is so far down as a result of this war, so--and that doesn't take into consideration the tens of thousands who have been injured...

MR. GREGORY: Mm-hmm.

SEN. REID: ...and the thousands have been killed in the war. So it's, it's--historians will have to talk about what the war in Iraq did. But I think historians today indicate, as I have, the outline that I've given. [my emphasis]
Not to let the airhead interviewer off the hook, Gregory's questions there were directed toward eliciting a "gotcha" moment; he didn't probe Reid on how the horrendous results could be considered anything other than a loss or a disaster.

Even when Reid tried to point out some of the downsides, he could only come up with a fumbling reference to American casualties an muddled references to continuing violence in Iraq and the enhanced position of Iran, though it wasn't as coherent as my summary might suggest. Also, "We have a civil war going on in Israel." What? That's the first time I recall anyone referring to the Israel-Palestine conflict as a civil war. It's hard to guess what if anything he may have meant by that, though presumably he's talking about the current Gaza offensive.

The Democrats let the stab-in-the-back narrative on the Vietnam War keep them on the defensive for decades. The boys and girls of our punditocracy are already heavily invested in the notion of wimpy Democrats vs. studly, manly Republicans. They will likely eat up the Republicans' stab-in-the-back story on the Iraq War. The Dems need to be working now to spike that one. Not praising "David Petraeus' genius" like a starry-eye sports fan.

There's something actually pathetic about senior officials in a democracy thinking they need to hide behind the skirts of some general to state their opinion about the Iraq War. It's one more sign of the unhealthy degree to which our political culture has become militarized. Genius or not, Petraeus allowed himself to become the political spokesman for the Cheney-Bush administration's Iraq War policies in a way that generals shouldn't.

Juan Cole did a couple of year-end lists at his Informed Comment blog. One of them was Top Ten Myths about Iraq, 2008 12/31/08. One of them he describes as follows, having to do with The Surge:

6. The sole explanation for the fall in the monthly death rate for Iraqi civilians was the troop excalation [sic] or surge of 30,000 extra US troops in 2007. In fact, troop levels had been that high before without major effect. The US military did good counter-insurgency in 2007. The major reason for the fall in the death toll, however, was that the Shiites won the war for Baghdad, ethnically cleansing hundreds of thousands of Sunnis from the capital, and turning it into a city with a Shiite majority of 75 to 80 percent. (When Bush invaded, Baghdad was about 50/50 Sunni and Shiite). The high death tolls in 2006 and 2007 were a by-product of this massive ethnic cleansing campaign. Now, a Shiite militiaman in Baghdad would have to drive for a while to find a Sunni Arab to kill.
Robert Perry also reminds us of the need to counter Iraq War rightwing revisionism in Two Dangerous Bush-Cheney Myths ConsortiumNews.com 12/26/08. Among several important points about the reality of The Surge, he includes:

--Concrete walls built between Sunni and Shiite areas made “death-squad” raids more difficult but also "cantonized" much of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities, making everyday life for Iraqis even more exhausting as they sought food or traveled to work.

--An expanded U.S. policy of rounding up so-called "military age males" locked up tens of thousands in prison.
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Monday, January 05, 2009

Obama appointments and the chances for justice


How will all this look if Jeb becomes President?

Glenn Greenwald is hard to please when it comes to any appointment that will be dealing with the torture policy. So it's a very good sign that he is very pleased to hear about two recent appointments: Leon Panetta as CIA head and Dawn Johnsen as head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). (Obama's impressive new OLC chief Salon 01/05/08)

The chances for a real legal and political reckoning with the torture policy and war crimes are looking better. Just this past year, she wrote of the criminality of the Cheney-Bush administration:

We must avoid any temptation simply to move on. We must instead be honest with ourselves and the world as we condemn our nation's past transgressions and reject Bush's corruption of our American ideals. Our constitutional democracy cannot survive with a government shrouded in secrecy, nor can our nation's honor be restored without full disclosure. (Restoring Our Nation's Honor Slate 03/18/08)
There's an informative article about the torture policy now available at the New York Review of Books site, What to Do About the Torturers? by David Cole 12/17/08 (01/15/09 issue).

But I've begun to find it almost bizarre when someone describes the seriousness of the torture policy but then seems to blithely dismiss even the possibility of prosecuting the high-level perpetrators, as Cole does:

At home, the Justice Department's "torture memo" would be a legal defense for any but the lawyers who wrote it, and Congress, in the Military Commissions Act, granted retrospective immunity to officials involved in the interrogation of al-Qaeda suspects in the wake of September 11.
The retroactive immunity may be a real obstacle to prosecution. But my understanding is that just because Bush's people wrote Mob-lawyer-style legal opinions to justify their actions, that wouldn't shield anyone from prosecution by itself.

And in any case, Cole's suggestion is to appoint a commission, which would all but inevitably turn out to be a "bipartisan" snow job that would conclude that bad things were done but nobody is really to blame. And the Republicans would howl in outrage even at that. Only if there are real criminal investigations and prosecutions will there be any deterrent to further such lawbreaking in the Jeb Bush administration.

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Obama's predecessors on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict


God Shows Moses the Promised Land by Luca Signorelli

Hussein Agha and Robert Malley wrote in a review of three books by experienced Middle East hands, How Not to Make Peace in the Middle East New York Review of Books 12/17/08, before the current Israeli offensive in Gaza began, about the general approach of the Cheney-Bush administration to Israeli-Palestinian peace and of the Clinton administration before it. They disagree sharply with the common criticism that George W. Bush as President has been "disengaged" from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

It is a curious charge, at once too mild and off-target. It suggests a passive, flaccid, laissez-faire attitude that could hardly be further from the historical truth and that would have been far preferable to it. Bush's policies did not reflect disengagement; they were the outcome of a uniquely ambitious, often brutal, and always intensely engaged effort to reshape the Middle East. At its core, Bush's Middle East strategy was as intrusive and interventionist as one could imagine.

Almost from the outset, the administration clumsily intervened in Palestinian politics, helped rewrite the Palestinian Basic Law, proclaimed Arafat a pariah, anointed its own favorite substitute leaders, insisted on Palestinian internal reform as a precondition for peace, took positions on a final agreement in a 2004 letter from Bush to then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that tilted the playing field, encouraged confrontation between the nationalist Fatah and Islamist Hamas, imposed sanctions on Syria, and discouraged the resumption of Israeli–Syrian talks. Throughout, the Bush administration misread local dynamics, ignored the toxicity of its embrace, overestimated the influence of money and military assistance, and neglected the impact of conviction, loyalty, and faith.

On the dubious premise that talking to an enemy is a reward, the administration cut itself off from, and left itself with little leverage over, the region's more dynamic actors, whether Islamist organizations, Syria, or Iran. It propped up local Palestinian and Lebanese allies, who mimic the West's language, depend upon the US for resources and support, yet lack an effective domestic base. In short, it helped them in ways that hurt. How much more the US could have achieved by doing much less. [my emphasis]
Referring to the books they are reviewing, they write of Clinton's policy on the Israeli-Palestinian issues:

For all its positive qualities, the books argue, the Clinton approach was excessively undisciplined; it privileged process to the detriment of substance, and too often failed to hold parties accountable. [Martin] Indyk argues that as Clinton's presidency came to a close, he projected his timetable on Israelis and Palestinians who lacked his sense of urgency. He assumed they were driven by the sort of American pragmatism for which they had little appetite. [Daniel] Kurtzer and [Aaron David] Miller complain that the US kept potential Arab and European allies at arm's length and sought to resolve the conflict step by step rather than aim for a final resolution. They also regret the insularity of an American peace team whose insufficient balance and diversity led it to see things, according to Miller, "mainly from an Israeli perspective." Mostly, they fault the Clinton administration for lacking a coherent strategy that would have enabled it to promote its own ideas rather than be subject to the parties' will and whims. [my emphasis]
Martin Indyk is a close adviser of incoming Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Daniel Kurtzer is one of President-elect Obama's main advisers on the Middle East.

And the authors in question also take issue with the general American view that Yasser Arafat was primarily to blame for the failure of the Camp David Summit during the Clinton administration:

Outwardly, Miller, Kurtzer, and Indyk do not claim to take part in the debate over who lost Camp David, though, practically speaking, they close it. They castigate Arafat and the Palestinians for excessive passivity and an inability or unwillingness to seize the moment. But they do not stop there. Miller, who attended the summit, contradicts the accepted view with a detailed account demonstrating that each party bears heavy responsibility. Barak eroded the Palestinians' confidence during the months preceding the summit by renegotiating past agreements and reneging on promises. The Israeli proposals at Camp David, says Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israel's foreign minister at the time, "fell far short of even modest Palestinian expectations." The Americans had "no sustained strategy," did not put a negotiating text on the table, and caved in when faced with the parties' objections. They did not consult with other Arab countries and, in deciding to blame Arafat at Barak's request, betrayed a prior commitment not to do so and also jeopardized hopes for a peaceful aftermath of the conference.

Likewise, Kurtzer and Lasensky describe the US as "unprepared," lacking its own positions on fundamental issues, and, eager to embrace "Barak's priorities...but also Barak's tactics," ultimately "ced[ing] effective control over US policy to the Israelis." Even Indyk, the harshest of the three toward Arafat, disputes the conventional wisdom. "Camp David," he writes, "was hardly a good laboratory" for Barak's proposition that the Palestinian leader was unwilling to reach a historic deal, because no Arab statesman could have accepted what had been presented. [my emphasis]
That position is surprising to hear from Indyk, a former US Ambassador to Israel, who has a reputation as a pro-Israeli hardliner.

Agha and Malley observe, "There is a long tradition of former US Middle East officials retroactively bemoaning the strategies they once helped shape. Retrospective hand-wringing, far from an anomaly, has become something of a job hazard."

Agha and Malley suggest that the Obama administration approach his predecessors' past efforts at US-sponsored bilateral negotiations between Israel and Palestinian representatives with a healthy skepticism. They haven't been successful in producing peace, after all. And they note some of the more recent changes affecting the conflict:

... the region into which the new president is being pressed to plunge has changed dramatically over the past decade. During recent years, the transformations include the death of Arafat, father of Palestinian nationalism, and the incapacitation of Sharon, Israel's last heroic leader; the spread and further entrenchment of Israeli settlements; Hamas's electoral triumph; Israel's withdrawal from Gaza; the Palestinian internal conflict and Hamas's seizure of Gaza; the withering away of Fatah; Israel's failure in the 2006 Lebanon war; US setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan; Iran's increased influence; and the growing role of other regional actors like Turkey and Qatar. This is not a mere change in scenery. It is a new world. [my emphasis]
And they point out the diminishing enthusiasm among Palestinians for a two-state solution. The Israelis may have succeeded in postponing that option long enough that it is no longer viable. The alternative in the not-so-long term being a single Jewish and Palestinian state among the present-day Israel and the occupied territories. A state that would either have to cease being a Jewish state or cease being a democratic state.

Like most such advice seems to wind up being, Agha and Malley caution Obama about putting forward another two-state solution peace plan right away and try to understand the situation better. "Obama could do worse than consider some simple advice. Don't rush. Take time, take a deep breath, and take stock."

Maybe he could appoint a commission.

Fortunately for us and the world, in just about two weeks Dick Cheney and George Bush will be private citizens again. And we'll see what President Obama has in mind, on the Middle East and a lot of other things.

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Sunday, January 04, 2009

A brief story of the Sagrada Familia Church in Barcelona


Church of la Sagrada Familia, Barcelona Spain (2008)

The following quotation is a brief anonymous discussion of Gaudi's Sagrada Familia Church in Barcelona, Spain. (English Web site here.) It mentions some of the very real problems the Catholic Church in Spain had to deal with in the 1930s. It doesn't discuss the politics of those problems. But it seems to me that it manages to recognize the suffering of priests and members of religious orders without in any way trying to justify the widespread support by the Catholic Church of Franco's fascist rebels during the Spanish Civil War.

This is from the 12/28/08 bulletin of Corpus Christi Church in Piedmont CA:

There's no more unusual setting to celebrate today's Feast of the Holy Family than Barcelona, Spain and the towering unfinished sandcastle known officially as the Temple Expiatori de la Sagrada Familia. In 1882, the plan was hatched to build a vast place of worship in reparation for the revolutionary and liberal leanings of the city. The modern artist Antoni Gaudi dedicated his life to the project, living in the building, attending Mass daily and giving up his personal wealth. When people pressed him to pick up the pace, he responded, "My client is not in a hurry." (Gaudi's cause for beatification is moving along, and he could be the first professional artist and architect to be beatified.) The Spanish Civil War, a disaster for the Catholic Church in which thousands of priests, brothers, and nuns were murdered, halted work in 1935. In the 1950s work began anew, speeded up by computers in the 1980s. Still, the final stage of construction is not due to end until 2026. If the original methods had stayed in place, it would take several hundred more years to complete the plan. So far there are eight towers, with four to go. The highest steeple is three feet shorter than the nearest hill, since the architect didn't want his work to surpass God's artistry. The three faces of the basilica each have three doors, with the faces named Passion, Nativity, and Grace. The interior is crammed with geometric figures that almost seem to spin, crazy-quilt windows, spiral staircases, and jumbles of statues and figures. Although inspired by ancient Gothic cathedrals, the style is called Expressionist, and very little is left unexpressed by the masonry. If you can't afford a visit, Sagrada Familia maintains a Web site, and virtual visits are free.

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Gaza offensive


Let There be Peace by Elke Behrens

Israel has greatly esclated its Gaza offensive with a ground incursion: Israel launches ground invasion of Gaza by Richard Boudreaux Los Angeles Times 01/03/09; Livni: Cease-fire in Gaza would grant Hamas legitimacy by Barak Ravid 01/01/09; Israel Looking to Silence Hamas Forever by Jerrold Kessel and Pierre Klochendler, Inter Press Service 12/31/08. As Boudreaux reports, the Israelis are apparently hoping for some sort of lighting victory:

Israeli officials said the aim in Gaza was not to overthrow Hamas or even to eliminate its capacity to fire rockets, but rather to crush its motivation for doing so. Some Israeli analysts and experts said this could be accomplished by a brief but powerful ground operation.

"Since the name of the game is killing and destruction, the ground operation has to be quick, with a lot of firepower at friction points with Hamas," Alex Fishman, military analyst of the newspaper Yediot Aharonot, wrote Friday. "The goal is to exact a high price in the early stages of the ground operation and to end it quickly."
This is a bad situation for the United States. It's a very rough issue for Obama to have to take up in the first days of his Presidency. But it's also one that could bring some high benefits in terms of his foreign policy.

The Republican Party has aligned itself with the thinking and rhetoric of Likud hardliners in Israel. Kadima and Labour are the ones prosecuting the current Gaza offensive: Likud takes even more extreme positions.

The following will sound very familiar to those of us who have been listening to our Republican war lovers justify torture, preventive war, and general contempt for the laws of war, not to mention any kind of sense of proportionality or of what constitutes just war: Gaza 2009 - To win, all Israel has to do is survive by Bradley Burston Haaretz 01/03/09. Burston's argument reflected in the title is a reflection of the general Israeli posture - which I assume is genuinely felt by a large number of Israelis - that their nation is constantly in danger of destruction. That they live in "existential danger", as the diplomats say, the danger that their country's existence is threatened.

In any reasonable military sense, that is not the case. The fact that many Israelis and Israeli leaders understand their situation that way is in itself a fact that other countries have to take into account. But there is no good reason for the United States to base its foreign policy on such an assumption. Israel has a modern army well-supplied with US weapons and it has its own nuclear arsenal. No external force, certainly not Palestinian guerrillas in Gaza or the West Bank, can militarily conquer Israel. And both their conventional war capabilities and the nuclear weapons are very strong deterrents to anyone even attempting to do so.

Burston all but revels in the deaths of civilian noncombatants. Referring to the targeted killing of Hamas leader Nizar Ghayan (or Rayyan) along with members of his family, he writes:

Something has changed in the Mideast equation, and the killing of Ghayan [pronounced like Ryan with a hard R], is a telling indication of that change.

Knowing Israel (having listened to the Israeli far-right as it condemned the IDF as an army of pansies afraid to fight, and to the Israeli far-left as it sympathized only with Gaza casualties and not those in Sderot), Ghayan knew that he could surround himself with the human shields of four wives and 11 children and survive this war.

Knowing the UN and the international community, Ghayan knew that if he used mosques for Hamas armed wing headquarters and storage armories for longer-range rockets from Iran and China, Israeli military planners would not dare to attack them, fearing a grave diplomatic and public outcry.

Knowing that the Israeli Air Force (in his view, demonstrating the Jew's essential weakness) had begun warning Gazans of impending attacks, Ghayan refused to have his family take to the roof to cause Israel to call off the bombing. The human shield would suffice.

In a matter of 24 hours, two mosques serving as Hamas military bases were destroyed, and Ghayan and his family killed.

The world? The world has taken much more interest in New Years.
The Palestinians? A central fact of the Mideast equation may, at long last, be dawning on them:

To win, all that Israel has to do, is survive.
The latter being a tautology. If you define Israel's surviving as winning, then Israel will win even if the Gaza offensive turns out to be as big a disaster for Israel as the 2006 Lebanon War was.

Incidentally, the strategy of targeting individual leaders for assassination which Burston praises so highly needs to be seen for the risks as well as the opportunities involved. If we're talking about some small radical group or a street gang, knocking off the two or three key leaders may effectively cripple the group. With a larger group like Hamas that has substantial backing among the local population, individual assassinations of leaders can certainly weaken the group in the short run. But they also deprive their opponents of leaders who have the stature to make agreements that might lead to a lasting peace. The latter appears to be fine with Ehud Olmert's government, at present. Barak Ravid reports says:

[Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi] Livni told her French counterpart Bernard Kouchner that Hamas must must not be given the opportunity to gain any sort of legitimacy within a renewal of a truce. ...

Israel's offensive in the Gaza Strip has damaged Hamas and will not end until Israel no longer deems the Palestinian Islamist faction a threat, Livni told reporters in Paris. ...

On Wednesday, Israel rejected the proposal for a 48-hour humanitarian truce as unreasonable. "We did not go into the Gaza operation only to end it while rocket fire continues," Olmert told cabinet ministers during a special session.
How many times will Israel and the Palestinians - and US foreign policy - have to go through this brutal ritual? It's not pretty: U.S. Branch of Amnesty Calls on Rice to Drop "Lopsided" Stance by Jim Lobe, Inter Press Service 01/02/08.

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Saturday, January 03, 2009

Terrorism then and now

Astrid Proll in custody, 1973

I came across a useful comparison between the jihadist terrorism we associate with Al Qa'ida and the kind of domestic terrorism a number of countries experienced in the 1970s, including Germany, Japan, the US, Italy, Spain and Argentina. It comes from a book by Astrid Proll, Hans und Grete: Bilder der RAF 1967-1977 (2004 edition). The author has some experience in the subject. She was one of the original members of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), aka, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, who managed to spread considerable terror in Germany during the 1970s, although remnants of the group remained into the 1990s.

The formation of the RAF can be dated to May 14, 1970, when Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ennslin and others, including Proll, sprang Andreas Baader from police custody. Baader, Gudrun, Astrid's brother Thorwald, and Horst Söhnlein firebombed a department store in Frankfurt in 1968 as a political protest. The bombs went off at night; no one was injured though the store burned down. Baader was in custody in 1970 in relation to that bombing.

One official was severely wounded in freeing Baader, Astrid says by a hired gun the group brought along with them. She herself was arrested on May 6, 1971, which effectively ended her participation in the group's actions, before most of their more notorious and deadly actions began, although she considered herself part of the group for another couple of years.

Her comparison of the RAF's brand of terrorism to the kind the word invokes today, as in the Oklahoma City bombing or the 9/11 attacks, is as follows. The text of this edition of the book is a parallel text in German and English:

To me, the production of this book was a way of getting close to my own history as well as the history of the RAF, which has been distorted by myths. And yet, appraising this type of 1970s terrorism in West Germany has become much more difficult since Al Quaida showed their murderous contempt for human life on 11 September 2001. Compared with the commandos who flew jet planes into the World Trade Center in New York, we were troubled amateurs, tormented by moral scruples. While Islamic assassins not only accept the death of civilians but attempt to kill as many as possible, we had long discussions about the issue of legitimate goals. When 17 workers were unintentionally hurt in a bomb attack on the headquarters of the Springer media corporation in Hamburg in May 1972, there was serious criticism about it and heavy tension within the group.

In making this comparison I do not want to, nor can I, deny our responsibility, but I wish to point out nevertheless that the term terrorism has undergone a change of meaning and is now understood in a different context than it was in the seventies. The media revolution through the Internet, satellite TV and 24-hour news channels around the world, creating the possibility of messages from all corners of the world, give the terrorists of today a power and visual impact which we never had.

Today, the propaganda methods we used seem completely antiquated. Andreas Baader did not pose for a video camera like Osama Bin Laden, Kalashnikov in hand, to recruit new comrades. In Ulrike Meinhof we had an excellent, professional journalist, but our press releases were always reduced to brief, formulaic commando-like declarations. We never really tried to use the power of pictures. [my emphasis]
Not that the RAF's history is without violence against people and deliberate killings, quite the contrary. Actions like bombing American bases in Germany were intended to kill people, and did.

And when fanaticism takes hold, whether it comes in a religious or secular cast, the definition of who are innocents can become very broad. Bodyguards? The RAF killed them. Civilian prosecutors? Targeted for assassination. And so on.

In the case of Salafi Sunni extremists like Osama bin Laden, they typically embraced something like the theory of Sayyid Qutb, who classified not just non-Muslims or even non-Sunnis as infidels, but included anyone who was not an adherent of true Islam as defined by those of like mind to himself. In Qutb's case, that would have been the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Astrid Proll circa 2008

But Astrid Proll is right to distinguish between different types of terrorism. Bush's favorite formula that terrorists are the embodiment of evil who kill because "they hate our values" makes them sound like near-mindless nihilists. But it hinders rather than helps trying to actually understand what those groups do. And some level of understanding is obviously required to protect innocent people against them. One of the most bizarre things about today's Republican ideology is that they take the notion of trying to understand what terrorists are doing as the equivalent of sympathy. Truly weird.

Terrorism is a technique of warfare, not an ideology. But it's also important to distinguish between the types of groups using it. Pro-Allied partisans in France, Yugoslavia and Russia during the Second World War practiced bombings, sabotage and assassination. But they didn't simply try to kill large numbers of civilians. They certainly wanted to terrorize the German occupiers and any local sympathizers. But they wanted the support of the local population, not their hostility.

Deliberate mass killing of civilians is typically not practiced against a group's own population base of support, although I'm sure there are exceptions. The Irish Republican Army were willing to indulge in random killing of English civilians. Leaving aside the morality of it for a moment, that at least makes more sense than, say, Timmy McVeigh blowing up the federal building in Oklahoma City and killing hundreds of people, including white people who theoretically should have been potential participants in the theocratic-Christian White Power revolution McVeigh imagined.

But morality is part of war, however much today's Republicans may despite the very notion of law or morality in war, except to assume that Our Side is justified in doing whatever Dear Leader tells us - as long as Dear Leader is a Republican, of course. And deliberate killing of civilians, or even careless disregard for the safety of civilian noncombatants, is wrong. Whether its a terrorist group or a government on Our Side doing it.

She also offers these descriptions of the thinking of RAF members in the 1970s:

We wanted to be part of the world-wide youth revolt in the late 190s, and we wanted to be its vanguard. We were shocked and enraged by the images of the war in Vietnam, such as the photograph of the Saigon Head of Police who killed a captured Vietcong on a open road by shooting him in the head. Most Germans accepted the Vietnam War without taking action - we, by contrast, identified with Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara and the liberation movements in the Third World. In Nazi Germany our parents had been stranded in an ugly, despicable place in history. We wanted to escape their guilt and their nightmare, as well as their continuing love of law and order.
So far as I'm aware, the RAF didn't promote any Jewish conspiracy theories or anything like that. But their revolutionary purity from the sins of their parents' generation didn't stop them from going for military training to a Al Fatah Palestinian guerrilla camp in Jordan. (This was long before Al Fatah became a sometime ally of Israel as it is in the Gaza attack going on now.) And they certainly considered Israel as an enemy of the world revolution of which they wanted to be a part.

We wanted to be radical, courageous, pioneers, we considered ourselves to be a vanguard. We overestimated ourselves excessively, indulging in the illusion that revolution was possible in the prosperous German Federal Republic [West Germany]. In this light we were self-timers [i.e., self-justifying] who acted cut off from reality in a void. We lived a kind of armed existentialism. The men were ready to get going. While they were busy affectionately cleaning their guns, the women did the major part of organising and thinking. The women did bank raids, too, but more carefully and reluctantly. I also carried a gun, though I would have tried everything else to defend myself before using it. The weapon was the membership card of the RAF which we, in accordance with the [American] Black Panthers, would only use in self-defence, if it was really necessary.
While this may relate her own experience accurately, it could also be misleading in another sense. The RAF from the start aimed at a violent revolution in West Germany and was certainly willing to take actions that could hardly be called self-defence. (The Black Panthers would be a different story, though in practice they didn't see armed action as strictly a matter of self-defence, either.)

It's also worth noting that women later were not only active but in leadership positions in the RAF. As one commenter said, the men of the RAF were very macho. But the women were more macho than the men.

After her arrest in 1971, Astrid was brought to prison in Cologne-Ossendorf. She was kept for a time in extreme isolation, something that has been a part of the torture techniques of the Cheney-Bush administration. She describes her experience as follows:

At first in Cologne I was kept isolated in a normal prison block. Then I was taken to an empty wing, a dead wing, where I was the only prisoner. Ulrike Meinhof later called it the "Silent Wing". The shocking experience was that I could not hear any noises apart from the ones that I generated myself. Nothing. Absolute silence. I went through states of excitement and was haunted by visual and acoustic hallucinations, extreme concentration disturbances, horrible weakness and fatigue. I had no idea how long this would go on for. I had a terrible fear of going mad.
The history of the RAF is an important part of recent German history in itself. And it does have some similarities to more recent terrorist events.

But differences do matter between the various groups. A Marxist-Leninist group like the RAF does not have the same goals or worldview as a white supremacist like Tim McVeigh, heavily influenced by Christian Identity religious doctrine. And violent Sunni Salafi extremists are different still. To pretend that they are all just some nihilist killers with no goals other than to kill people, destroy property and make life difficult for Americans is absurd.

Astrid Proll, by the way, after being released from jail went underground again in England for several years. She was eventually re-arrested and served part of her sentence. She was released early, though she doesn't detail the particular terms of her release. She went back to school and became a professional photographer, working for major publications including Der Spiegel and the London Independent, and even for Time magazine. So far as I'm aware, she has not been noted for having an urge to commit nihilistic violence.

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Friday, January 02, 2009

The Christian Republican White People's Party


Nobel laureate Paul Krugman describes it well in his first New York Times column of the year Bigger Than Bush 01/02/08:

Forty years ago the G.O.P. decided, in effect, to make itself the party of racial backlash. And everything that has happened in recent years, from the choice of Mr. Bush as the party’s champion, to the Bush administration’s pervasive incompetence, to the party’s shrinking base, is a consequence of that decision.

If the Bush administration became a byword for policy bungles, for government by the unqualified, well, it was just following the advice of leading conservative think tanks: after the 2000 election the Heritage Foundation specifically urged the new team to "make appointments based on loyalty first and expertise second."

Contempt for expertise, in turn, rested on contempt for government in general. "Government is not the solution to our problem," declared Ronald Reagan. "Government is the problem." So why worry about governing well?

Where did this hostility to government come from? In 1981 Lee Atwater, the famed Republican political consultant, explained the evolution of the G.O.P.’s “Southern strategy,” which originally focused on opposition to the Voting Rights Act but eventually took a more coded form: "You’re getting so abstract now you're talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is blacks get hurt worse than whites." In other words, government is the problem because it takes your money and gives it to Those People. [my emphasis]
I've been going on the assumption for several years now that understanding today's Republican Party and how it got to be the way it is requires two things: follow the segregationists, and follow Dick Cheney. And you get to today's Republican Party. You'll encounter a lot of other stuff along the way, e.g., Milton Friedman economics, neoconservative foreign policy theories. But those two lines of development, segregationists and Dick Cheney, ultimately tell the story about today's Christian Republican White People's Party.

Krugman also makes an important observation about the differences between the Democrats' political position in 1993 when Bill Clinton took office as President and today:

But America in 1993 was a very different country — not just a country that had yet to see what happens when conservatives control all three branches of government, but also a country in which Democratic control of Congress depended on the votes of Southern conservatives. Today, Republicans have taken away almost all those Southern votes — and lost the rest of the country. It was a grand ride for a while, but in the end the Southern strategy led the G.O.P. into a cul-de-sac. [my emphasis]
The Democrats, like the music recording business, are stuck in a model of proceeding that's about 20 years out of date. The Dems got so used to bobbing and weaving to keep those Southern conservative Dems with them that they find it hard to stop. One result of that approach has been the perceived need to select Democratic majority leaders in Congress from states and districts that are very contested, as opposed to leaders from solid Democratic districts who are less likely to find their re-elections endangered by being an aggressive partisan.

Watching Harry Reid, flounder around over the Rod Blagojevich's appointment of Roland Burris to Obama's former Senate seat is an example of what can happen. Digby posts about that developing fiasco here and Jane Hamsher here and here. Reid spent years knuckling under to Bush and the Republicans when he should have stood and fought. And now he's taking a stand over something that's less than a substantial issue. But he's afraid if he doesn't, the Beltway press corps will keep milking the Blogojevich scandal. Which they're going to do anyway.

Nancy Pelosi could and should have fought harder over ending the Iraq War. But picking her as Speaker of the House embraces the right idea. Because her San Francisco district is solidly Democratic, she's more likely to see her re-election endangered as a result of not being partisan enough. As opposed to the more contested Nevada, where Reid has to be cautious about coming off as excessively partisan. Exactly what you don't need in a majority leader.

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Thursday, January 01, 2009

"1968" in Germany


Rudi Dutschke, the most famous leader of the German student movement in 1968

Der diskrete Charme der Rebellion: Ein Leben mit den 68ern (2008) von Reinhard Mohr

Unser Kampf: 1968 - ein irritierter Blick zurück (2008) von Götz Aly

The now-departed year 2008 was the fortieth anniversary of the legendary "1968", which has become a symbol for the political and cultural upheavals that affected much of the world during that time. I've made a few "anniversary" type posts myself, including a review of German historian Norbert Frei's book 1968 (2008), which gives special attention to the German experience but also explains those events in the larger world context of "the 1960s".

Both books discussed here focus more particularly on events in Germany. And both involve some autobiography. Reinhard Mohr's book title, The Discrete Charm of the Rebellion in English, captures the perspective of his book well. Mohr relates some his experiences in the alternative scene in Frankfurt in the 1970s, where he knew some stars of the "68ers" like Daniel Cohn-Bendit, aka, Dany the Red, and Joschka Fischer. From Mohr's perspective as a young man in the Frankfurt scene, the experiences of what in America we call "the Sixties" were already something of a mythical past. His book doesn't sentimentalize that period. But his focus is on showing to readers of today why so many people found the experiences of that time charming and appealing to their sentiments and passions. That part of the story can get lost.

Götz Aly is one of Germany's leading historians, known in particular for his histories of the Third Reich and the Holocaust. His book focuses on both the key events that were most politically significant in that period and also is a kind of personal reckoning. Aly relates having been a leftwing activist of college age during that time. At times his book almost sounds like an American neoconservative villifying "the Sixties" while trying not to sound like a Christian fundamentalist or holy-roller. But that's not what he's doing.

Still, Aly's account does have some of the feel of a "god that failed" story. And self-analysis is certainly not a bad thing. As another one-time leftwing activist, Spain's Javier Solano, once put it, only idiots never change their minds. Yet it does seems to me at places in the book that Aly is a bit too hard on himself for once having been young.

The events that have come to symbolize "1968" in Germany are generally agreed upon: the anti-Shah protests of 1967 that included the police murder of a young protester named Benno Ohnesorg; the political role of groups like the German student organization SDS and its most famous leader Rudi Dutschke; the attempted assassination of Dutschke in 1968 by a young nationalist fanatic; the Grand Coalition (SPD and CDU/CSU) government of 1966-69; the Notstandsgesetz (emergency law) and the protests against it; the outrage of the now-adult children of those who were adults during the Nazi period at the failures of their parents and their parents' generation; the 1968 bombing of a department store in Frankfurt that first made two young revolutionaries named Andreas Baader and Gundrin Ensslin famous, the pair who along with Ulrike Meinhof and a few others would found the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), aka, the Baader-Meinhof Gang; the practice of terrorism in various forms mostly notoriously that of the RAF but also others like the Tupamaros Westberlin and the Bewegung 2.Juni; protests nonviolent and otherwise against the Axel Springer press empire; the sexual revolution and the appearance of alternative lifestyles scenes, such as the legendary Kommune 1 in Berlin.

Shocking the comfortable: the most popular German SDS poster, showing Marx, Engels and Lenin with the slogan, "Everybody talks about the weather. Not us."

It strikes me from today's perspective that one advantage that the 68er movement bequeathed to later decades was the fact that directly protesting against the press, particularly the Axel Springer papers of which the Bild-Zeitung was the most significant. The Bild-Zeitung was and is more of a sensational tabloid than part of the "quality press".

But while there was certainly a fourishing "underground" press in the United States, there was not the broad perception in America that there was among the German movement that the press itself was seriously flawed in a way that was a menace to freedom. Southern segregationists' railed against the alleged failure of the Yankee press to report how well the whites and the "nigras" got along with each other in the segregated South. The Republican Party under Nixon and Spiro Agnew picked up that theme and broaden it to accuse the press of being unpatriotic in its reporting on the Vietnam War and domestic protests, to the point where complaining about the Liberal Press! Liberal Press! Liberal Press! has beome part of the Party's DNA. With Nixon and Agnew on the warpath against the press, and with a mainstream press that still practiced actual journalism as with the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case and the Washington Post with the Watergate scandal, leftwing dissident groups were more likely to look on the Establishment press as at least a sometime ally.

Sexual revolution in Germany

That experience partially explains the fact that so many Democrats, both former "68ers" as well as others, failed to recognize for years how badly the national political press had begun to malfunction by 1992 with the Whitewater pseudo-scandals. Even today, it can be like pulling teeth to get liberal Dems to acknowledge that the national press is a serious, big-time mess.

Part of the challenge for anyone writing about a series of events as vaguely defined as "1968" or "the Sixties" is determining a focus. When people talk about "1968" in Germany, it's largely events and trends like those described above that come to mind. But one could make an argument that the birth control pill, the widespread diffusion of television sets, and the "economic miracle" in western Germany in the 1950s were more important in determining the direction of German society. Even more strictly in the realm of politics, it can certainly be plausibly argued that the beginning of Willi Brandt's Ostpolitik to ease tensions with the eastern European Communist bloc and the SPD leading a government under Brandt's Chancellorship were more significant events.

And the latter was not a direct result of the activism of the "68ers", though most of them presumably marginally preferred an SPD government to a hidebound conservative one. But the Social Democrats were attacked by many New Left activists as no longer being a revolutionary party, something which the SPD hadn't much pretended to be since 1918, at the latest.

But the activists of the 1960s challenged aspects of German society - such as authoritarian university practices, the excessive influence of ex-Nazi jurists in the judicial system, sexual practices, gender roles, reflexive support of American policies like the Vietnam War, passive attitudes toward politics, the ham-handed brutality that municipal police often displayed - that needed to be challenged. Ther ewas no New Left party at the time that was able to take any kind of direct political power, by electoral means or otherwise. But it can scarcely be said that the protests had no effect on the mainstream parties, on lifestyles, and even churches.

One characteristic of the youth movements of the German New Left and alternative-lifestyle movements was that they were largely youth movements. Certainly there were older people like the Frankfurt School philosopher Herbert Marcuse who were well-regarded by the movement. But even so, the influence of older and more experienced politicians on the Movement of the late 1960s was very limited. The German SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentendbund) was orginally the student group of the SDS. It eventually broke with the SPD altogether because the SDS assumed a more militant ideology and was highly critical of the political course the SPD had assumed with the Godesburg Program of 1959. Even Marcuse's Frankfurt School collaborator Max Horkheimer became a bogey-man of the young militants for his criticism of their dogmatic revolutionary rhetoric.

There were several effects of this youth focus. One is that they often placed too high a value on the essentially adolescent joys of shocking the stereotypical good solid citizens for the sake of shocking them. Now, protest movements are, well, protest movements. It's almost by definition their role to shock or at least annoy people into thinking differently about the aim of the protest. But when protesters adopted popular slogans like "Frei sein, high sein, Terror muss dabei sein" (be free, get high, and you have to have terrorism along with it"; it rhymes in German and doesn't sound so clunky), it mostly sounded charmingly shocking only to those using it. To others it was more likely just disgusting.

"Gewalt gegen Sachen" (Violence Against Things) by Kai Uwe Niephaus

And terrorism is inevitably part of the story. It would be false to see the terrorism of the RAF, which created a genuine political crisis in Germany in 1977, as some inevitable, teleological product of the protest movements of the 1960s. But it's also a fact that the terrorist groups did emerge from the "68er" scene. It's part of the story. And both Aly and Mohr include that aspect in their accounts. Mohr provides a bit more insight into the tragic aspects of it, Aly focuses more on the grim aspects of it. But with a fairly narrow definition of who the "68ers" were, any meaningful look at the terrorist phenomenon in Germany in the 1970s would have to recognize that it drew sympathy only from a limited segment of even those who considered themselves radical, although the RAF in particular has to be counted as group that made a significant mark on German history.

Aly focuses more on some of the questions that would particularly concern professional historians. And he makes some very thought-provoking observations about the 68er movement and its notions about existing Marxist governments, the Prague Spring of 1968, and the continuing historical burden of the Third Reich and the Holocaust. On these subjects, he sometimes sounds like a grumpy neoconservative wagging his finger at the alleged shameful hypocrisy of the Left. But, for the most part, he raises some valid issues, though his particular analysis isn't always convincing.

For instance, he takes himself and other young "rebels" to tasks for being naive about the Great Chinese Culture Revolution. As presented by Chinese propaganda, the Cultural Revolution was a process by which the Chinese Revolution was breaking new ground, fighting against the kind of bureacratic socialism which the Western New Left tended to see in the Soviet Union. In reality, it was a mass movement that Mao promoted to tighten his control over the Chinese Communist Party. And there's the body count, which Aly puts at a minimum of three million people dying between 1966 and 1976 as a result of the Cultural Revolution. And Aly argues that based on reliable information available in Germany at the time, the young German radicals could have known this.

There are a couple of problems, though, with his argument as presented in Unser Kampf. One is that it's not at all clear just how widespread this alleged admiration for the Chinese Cultural Revolution was among German activists. He cites some who were. And here's where the vagueness of an historical concept like "the Sixties" becomes an issue. If you define the 68ers as those who adhered to some full-blown revolutionary ideology, it's easy to imagine (though even then he doesn't really demonstrate) that admiration for the Cultural Revolution was typical. If you define the Movement in broader terms, it becomes more doubtful.

And he also plays a bit of a rhetorical trick here. It's one thing to criticize someone who's writing history for failing to appreciate the significance of the best German sources on the Cultural Revolution. It's another to look at what the Cultural Revolution symbolized in the minds of those German activists who did find it attractive in some way. Very few of the young people today who wear some kind of Che Guevara logo are likely to be able to give you an exposition of Marxist dialectical materialism, if they even know that Che was some kind of Marxist. His iconic image is a symbol of rebellion. And for the German 68ers who actually did find the Cultural Revolution symbolically appealing, it was very likely more as a symbol of rebellion, with the added shock value of it being something happening in the Communist world. China was an exotic, far-away place to most Germans. And with both the US and the Soviet Union carrying on propaganda wars against China in the 1960s, anyone who didn't have a healthy dose of skepticism about claims of the horrors of Communism in China probably wasn't thinking very hard about the subject.

Yes, those youthful admirers of Mao's Cultural Revolution were often wrong about it. And they were committing the sin of being young. But it hardly represents some kind of widespread callousness toward mass murder, which conclusion a reader might easily choose to draw from Aly's account.

Aly is on stronger ground when he argues that in terms of long-term historical signficance, the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a more consequential historical event than the protests in Germany or even the May-June revolt in Paris that same year. But his account also does carry the weight of the impression he leaves that most West German activists were indifferent to it or unsympathetic to it. In fact, the New Left in Europe and America was not generally attracted to the Soviet model of society, nor especially sympathetic to the Soviet Union. For adherents of the Soviet line, the New Left was largely "anti-Communist".

But what the New Left had to deal with, as did any mainstream critics of particular Cold War policies, was the fact that all sorts of military and political policies were justified by the US and its allies as necessary to combat Communism. Anyone serious about bringing about drastic changes in Western foreign policies would need to be very hesitant about helping promote attitudes and analyses that would reinforce their governments' Cold War positions. That context doesn't really come through in Aly's arguments along those lines. Here, I get the impression that his own need to renounce the less edifying aspects of his own youthful ideas gets in the way of his historical account.

Free speech poster by Ina Weiss

I find his thoughts on the relationship of the radicals of "1968" to the memory of the Third Reich far more valuable. The memory of the Third Reich and the Holocaust is a subject on which Aly is an actual expert. From Aly's as well as other accounts, it's clear that the skepticism of the younger generation about their elders' role during the Third Reich provided an important background to the events of the Sixties in Germany.

But the actual issues the movement raised from 1967 on had very little to do with the working out of remaining issues of the Nazi past. He argues that some of the revolutionary purism of the militants was in part a way of declaring themselves innocent of the sins of their parents' generation during the Third Reich. And he has a good case in noting that reflexive embrace of the Palestinian cause by many militants after the Six-Day War of 1967 was often taken with little thought of the complex relation of Germany to Middle Eastern affairs as a result of the Holocaust.

He cites a couple of actions by leftist activists that showed a particularly bone-headed attitude toward the anti-Semitism of the Nazi period. Activists associated with the Tupamaros West-Berlin group planted a firebomb in 1969 in Jewish Community House in West Berlin. It was meant to explode on November 9, the anniversary of the Kristallnacht pogrom action of 1938. Fortunately, it failed to explode.

In June of 1969, Israel had sent its first Ambassador to the Federal Republic (West Berlin), Asher Ben-Natan. Soon after his posting, he was invited to speak on June 9 at Frankfurt University on the topic, "Peace in the Near East". Leftist demonstrators protested his appearance with chants of "Ha, ha, ha - Al Fatah ist da" (Ha, ha, ah, Al Fatah is there) and "Zionisten raus aus Deutschland" (Zionists out of Germany).

Again, it's important to be careful about overly-broad generalizations about a vaguely-defined movement. But occurrences like this do give some reason to think that young German activists sometimes assumed a revolutionary purity without much thought of the extent to which they were affected by old-fashioned anti-Semitism or much reflection on the responsibilities of contemporary Germany in relation to the crimes of the Third Reich.

The fascination of the events of the Sixties is still with us. Maybe it's more of a Baby Boomer phenomenon than anything else. But there's no question that the events of the Sixties shook up most Western societies to one degree or another. For all the movement's faults, not least of them the terrorist offshoots, it did represent what Jerry Brown calls a "democratic moment" for Germany, in which citizen activism asserted itself without the initiative of the political elites.

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John Maynard Keynes, legend of the year 2008?

Revista Noticias (Argentina) made an interesting choice for their 2008 "personality of the year", the economist John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946): John Keynes, la leyenda que resucitó la crisis por Tristan Loredo (accessed 12/31/08).

John Maynard Keynes, 1908 - drawing by Gwen Raverat

Keynes is probably best known for his advice for governments to use their spending and taxing power to manage aggregate demand in capitalist economies and thereby mitigate the severity of cyclical recessions. "Keynesianism" was the dominant mode of economic thought among American economists in the post-Second World War decades, until the late 1970s or so, after which more conservative prophets of the "free market" became more prevalent.

Now that the world's financial system has seized up due to the negative consequences of those conservative bromides being enacted into policy on a wide scale, Keynes' ideas have suddenly regained a new respectability. Particularly the notion associated with him that government deficit spending can be used to lift economies out of recession.

Actually his notion of demand management involved more than just deficit spending. Recessions may be triggered by different events. But what makes a recession is the reduction of aggregate demand. Supply of goods and services at the height of an expansion starts to significantly exceed demand. This presses on company profits and production is reduced. Workers are laid off. This reduces demand further. And a self-reinforcing downward trend is underway.

Eventually supply and demand will come back into equilibrium - the market "clears" in economic terms - and demand then begins to press on supply, companies crank up production, more workers are hired, and a self-reinforcing healthy trend begins.

But the fact that recessions may satisfy the charts and graphs of neoclassical economics in that way doesn't say how deep the recessions will be, how much damage they will do and to whom, and what longer-term economic or security interests will be compromised if the business cycle is allowed to run this "natural" course, "natural" at least in the supply-and-demand graphs on which economics relies.

Keynes argued that in a recession, the government should go into deficit spending mode by some combination of increased spending and decreasing taxes. Theoretically, government could decrease spending and taxes, as long as the result was government spending exceeding tax receipts. This would mean that the government was putting more money into the private economy to generate aggregate demand, either by directly demanding resources for its spending projects or by putting more money into the hands of consumers.

The experience of the Great Depression made the notion of deficit spending to combat recession respectable, really for the first time. Roosevelt's New Deal practiced the deficit-spending aspect of Keynesian economics. But FDR apparently never lost his faith in balanced budgets. As Paul Krugman has been insistently pointing out these last few months, Roosevelt's insistence on balancing the budget in 1937 had the effect of slamming the still-ailing economy into recession. That happened because the reduction in government contributions to aggregate demand allowed another downward spiral to start.

Keynes advocated that governments manage demand in both recessions and expansions. As expansions continued, he advocated that the government should run surpluses, either by decreasing spending or increasing taxes. That would reduce aggregate demand and slow the economy down enough to prevent or at least delay what economists and financial journalists like to call "overheating", i.e., getting to the point where a new recession is likely.

As one of the most famous Keynesians, John Kenneth Galbraith, pointed out in his famous book, The Affluent Society (1958), there was a basic problem with this prescription. Not an economic problem, the economics of the idea make good sense. The problem is political.

And we've seen the reasons why many times over in the 50 years since the book appeared. Everyone likes to have their taxes decreased. Nobody likes having them raised. Everyone likes seeing their favorite government programs funded. No one likes seeing them cut back. So the raise-spending/cut-taxes part works politically for recessions; the lower-spending/raise-taxes part for restraining expansions is far more politically problematic.

Keynesian economics was lacking in another respect, too. As Galbraith pointed out in The Age of Uncertainty (1977), "The Keynesian remedy was asymmetrical; it would work against unemployment and depression but not in reverse against inflation." That limitation became a major concern in the 1970s. At the moment, it is not an urgent problem for the American economy, to put it mildly.

Kenneth Galbraith's son James points out in The Predatory State: How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too (2008) that something important has also changed since the early 1970s. Keynes looked at governments manipulating aggregate demand in the context of a world economy where national governments could effectively regulate aggregate demand in their own countries. The version of "free trade" that became ascendant after the end of the Bretton Woods currency system in 1973 and that became the gospel of "neoliberalism" and the "Washington Consensus" means that few countries any longer have such a capability to the same degree as before. With the current level of globalization, counter-cyclical measures have to be effective on an international as well as national scale.

And, in the post-Bretton Woods world, US federal budget deficits are now essentially a chronic condition, not subject to the kind of manipulation that was possible in the 1950s and 1960s. Although Galbraith notes that the "Washington discussion circuit" continues to treat budget balancing as a sacred goal and makes the false assumption that deficits are "the product of domestic policy decisions taken in the context of balanced trade and full employment".

Harry Dexter White (l) and John Maynard Keynes 03/08/1946

In the real world, the only way that balanced trade will be possible for the United States is for the dollar to lose its status as the world's reserve currency. "For practical purposes, the realized budget deficit no longer depends on federal budget policy decisions, but rather on international trade and the financial position of the private sector". (I posted about this issue at greater length in Obama's economic program, American jobs and the myth of the balanced budget 11/30/08.)

That's not to say that Keynes' ideas are no longer relevant. On the contrary. But it does mean that the international context of managing aggregate demand has changed and has thus become more complicated.

Keynes had quite an interesting life. He was a British representative at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. His particular proposals were rejected in favor of those fashioned by the American Treasury Department's chief economist Harry Dexter White. The proposals that White had largely shaped became the basis for the International Money Fund (IMF) and the currency system that so greatly benefited the US in the period of 1945-73. James Boughton in Harry Dexter White and the International Monetary Fund Finance & Development Sept 1998, described the differences between the approaches at Bretton Woods of Keynes and White:

To Keynes, what the world needed was an independent countervailing balance to American economic power, a world central bank that could regulate the flow of credit both in the aggregate and in its distribution. To White, what was needed was an adjunct to American economic power, an agency that could promote the balanced growth of international trade in a way that preserved the central role of the U.S. dollar in international finance.
President Truman appointed White as the first Executive Director of the IMF, but he was soon accused of having been a Communist and an agent of the Soviet Union. White denied the charges intensely. As Boughton writes, "His spirited defense of his loyalty to the United States and its values, made at hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities of the U.S. House of Representatives in August 1948, left him exhausted. He died three days afterwards."

Those allegations against White, based on what relatively little I've seen on the subject, seem very improbable. But it's a weird irony of history that one of the main architects and the first head of IMF, an institution that is still attacked (and by no means only by Communists!) as a key instrument of American imperialism, should have come under such accusations.

Keynes most famous book, the one in which he elaborated the economic theories for which he is especially remembered, was The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1935–36). But he is also remembered for an especially prescient book, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), in which he criticized the economic penalities that the Treaty of Versailles imposed on defeated Germany. He predicted that the financial burdens imposed were so great that Germany would not be able to meet them and they would therefore contribute more to endangering rather than insuring the peace in Europe. This is hardly controversial now. But it was at the time he wrote it. And he therefore earned the wrath reserved for those who are prematurely correct about such an important issue. (The link give has the full text of the book.)

Although Keynes had sexual experiences with both sexes, he married a Russian ballerina named Lydia Lopokovo. A ditty at the time, as recalled by the elder Galbraith, ran:

Was there ever such a union of beauty and brains
As when the lovely Lopokova married John Maynard Keynes?
And the elder Galbraith, always alert to the ironies of life, recalled Lord Keynes (he was eventually knighted) this way in The Age of Uncertainty:

Those who are comfortable with things as they are, conservatives in the literal sense, have often and rightly been suspicious of intellectuals and have thought them troublemakers, unable to leave well enough alone, more reprehensible by any measure than the poor or discontented whom so unnecessarily they arouse. Intellectuals have usually thought themselves disliked because others were jealous of their brains. More often it's because they make trouble.

But intellectuals can render conservative as well as radical service. Before and after World War II, their ideas did much, for a time, to save the reputation of capitalism. As the ideas of socialism did not come from the masses, those that saved capitalism did not come from businessmen, bankers or owners of shares whose value had gone with the wind. They came principally from John Maynard Keynes. His fate was to be regarded as peculiarly dangerous by the class he rescued.
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