Tuesday, July 07, 2009

Newsweek on "populism"

The 06/30/09 03/30/09 issue of Newsweek featured several essays on "populism". I was intrigued to see how various participants defined it.

Rick Perlstein:

The habit of messily dividing the world into "the people" and "the elite" - whether it's left calling out right, or right calling out left - is distinctively, ineluctably American. It's not going away. And there's much more to it than the name-calling of angry political factions. It is the governing folk wisdom of a nation without an inherited aristocracy, distrustful of privilege that is not "earned." It is our American common sense.
Michael Kazin:

At its core, populism in the United States remains what it has always been: a protest by ordinary people who want the system to live up to its stated ideals—fair and honest treatment in the marketplace and a government tilted in favor of the unwealthy masses. The best way for big men, and big women, to respond to such protests is to try to do what is moral, as well as popular—and treat Americans as partners in the grand enterprise of governance.
Joel Kotkin seems to think that "populism" is just another word for anger in politics:

The notion of a populist outburst raises an archaic vision of soot-covered industrial workers waving placards. Yet populism is far from dead, and represents a force that could shape our political future in unpredictable ways.

People have reasons to be mad, from declining real incomes to mythic levels of greed and excess among the financial elite. Confidence in political and economic institutions remains at low levels, as does belief in the future.
Robert Samuelson isn't necessarily trying to define populism. Instead, he seems to think that there is a mass wave of demand to abolish capitalism altogether:

The story of American capitalism is, among other things, a love-hate relationship. We go through cycles of congratulation, revulsion and revision. Just when the latest episode of revulsion and revision began is unclear. Was it when Lehman Brothers failed? Or when General Motors pleaded for federal subsidies? Or now, when AIG's bonuses stir outrage? No matter. Capitalism is under siege, its future unclear.

Joseph Schumpeter, one of the 20th century's eminent economists, believed that capitalism sowed the seeds of its own destruction. Its chief virtue was long term—the ability to raise wealth and living standards. But short-term politics would fixate on its flaws—instability, unemployment, inequality. Capitalist prosperity also created an oppositional class of "intellectuals" who would nurture popular discontents and disparage values (self-enrichment, risk-taking) necessary for economic success. [my emphasis]
Fareed Zakaria also doesn't try to define populism, he just knows it leads to limits on "free trade", one of the sacrosanct concepts among the Beltway Village:

I'm certainly not going to defend those AIG bonuses. But the trouble with populist outrage is that it bubbles over, sweeping from one justifiable issue across to many others. Waves of populism are now working their way through the American government on several fronts. The area I'm most worried about is trade, where populism leads to protectionism. The scandal of the moment, the bailout bonuses, will pass; in a year or two (one hopes) the U.S. government will no longer own banks and insurance companies. But protectionism and trade wars, once started, are hard to reverse.
Niall Ferguson frets about those picked-on financiers being pushed around by politicians (as if!):

Nothing would be easier than to blame everything on the bankers. I blame them for much of what has gone wrong, but I blame the politician more. It's just too easy to heap opprobrium on Wall Street. And if you noticed, that's exactly what the politicians do. Could it be that they're trying to divert our attention away from Washington's own responsibility for the debacle?
John Steele Gordon pretty much agrees:

Wall Street is not an institution, it's a collection of individuals, inherently susceptible to the madness of crowds. Blaming Wall Street is like blaming the atmosphere for thunderstorms. It's going to happen. Washington is supposed to be the guys with the striped shirts. They make up the rules and enforce them. And then they sometimes change the rules to accommodate some of their friends.
Robert Frank thinks that whatever the market does about executive pay is something akin to divine guidance:

Executive pay is much higher in big companies because those executives' decisions—good and bad—matter more. Despite the occasional mistake, the people they choose are a remarkably talented lot. The highest-paid people in each domain are paid such large amounts because they are worth that much to the organizations that employ them. That's good for them and for the country, too. Capping executive pay would just encourage talented potential managers to choose careers as personal-injury lawyers or hedge-fund managers.
Especially, he says, "Anger at AIG must not cause us to lash out at those whose talent and effort have made the country so wealthy."

Glenn Greenwald at Salon (The virtues of public anger and the need for more 03/21/09) has his own take on the current bout of "populism" that so disturbs our Beltway pod pundits:

Obviously, mass rage can entail its own excesses and, and if unchecked, can lead to mob rule, a form of majoritarian tyranny (as Armando notes, its isolated, unrepresentative excesses (death threats!) are already being exaggerated to discredit the underlying anger itself). But we are far, far, far away from the point where unchecked public sentiment plays too great of a role in how our political institutions function. Rather: we're a country that, for the last decade, acquiesced meekly and quietly as our Government transferred huge amounts of national wealth to a tiny elite; launched a devastating war based on purely false pretenses; tortured, spied on us and literally claimed the right to invalidate law and the Constitution; and turned itself over to the highest bidders.

The overarching question is not: why is there so much public rage? The overarching question is: why has there been so little? A political establishment that can function without any fear of the citizenry will inevitably trample on its interests. That is what has been happening more than anything else. And it is why we need far more public outrage, and fear of that outrage more deeply implanted in the minds of our political and financial elites.
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Sarah Palin: the media needs to get beyond their "dumb" script

Being more-or-less hostile to Sarah Palin is one instance in which the dysfunctionality of our American press corps actually worked in the Democrats' favor. At least in the short term, during the last months of the 2008 Presidential campaign.

The media's many problems generally do more damage to the Democrats than to the Republicans. And so when one of their dysfunctional habits works in the Dems' favor, the Dems should be thinking of it along the lines of, "With friends like these, who needs enemies?"

The press corps sets up "scripts" for various public figures, e.g., John McCain is a Maverick, Al Gore is a big ole liar. Then they work hard to squeeze any information about that person into their consensus script. The results are not infrequently painful to behold. When Maverick McCain acts like a nasty old Republican rightwinger, which is most of the time, the media script has it that it deeply pains the Maverick to have to act that way because he's really a very honorable Maverick at heart and so someone must be forcing him to act that way.

Now, Sarah Palin certainly looked shockingly unfamiliar with the issues one could have expected to be part of the Presidential campaign. So the press corps fastened onto the notion that she's dumb. So, "news" shows treated Tina Fey's comedy routines about her as though they were the definitive political commentary on Palin's candidacy. But the one time I heard Tina talking on TV about Palin outside of her comedy routine, she actually made Palin sound like an appealing, engaging personality. As I recall, she said that Palin is "the real deal", and she clearly meant it as a compliment.

And, since fashion is one thing they like to focus on and it doesn't strain their minds too much, the press played up the issue about Palin's campaign clothing budget.

That freed them from pursuing more serious and relevant matters which were central to Palin's political identity: her reliance on cronyism in administration, disturbing irregularities in her conduct around the state trooper who was her former brother-in-law and still involved in legal battles with Palin's sister, Todd Palin's role in state administration, the involvement of both Palin's with the far-right neo-Confederate Alaska Independence Party, and her commitment to the Third Wave Pentecostal movement which involves strong authoritarian tendencies as well as a highly emotional and superstitious approach to Christianity. I'm afraid in some of those areas, she is the "real deal".

Geoffrey Dunn at the Huffington Post raises a new such question in Palin Pallin' Around with Scientologists: Todd & Sarah & John & Greta 03/21/09. His story also involves the close ties of FOX News specifically to the Republican Party.

Palin could still be a serious candidate for President in 2012, though her unexpected resignation as Alakan Governor has raised new doubts about that. She is obviously very popular among the Christian Right, the main voting base of the Republican Party. If our press corps were actually in the business of journalism instead of infotainment, they would have been taking Palin a little more seriously and investigating more substantial issues in her role as a public figure. And not trying to out-mock Tina Fey.

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This can't be good

From Borzou Daragahi, Iran's Revolutionary Guard takes command Los Angeles Times 07/06/09

The top leaders of Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard publicly acknowledged they had taken over the nation's security and warned late Sunday that there was no middle ground in the ongoing dispute over the reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a threat against a reformist wave led by Mir-Hossein Mousavi.

Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the elite military branch, said the Guard's takeover of the country had led to "a revival of the revolution and clarification of the value positions of the establishment at home and abroad."

"These events put us in a new stage of the revolution and political struggles, and all of us must fully comprehend its dimensions," he said at a Sunday press conference, according to reports that surfaced today.
It's not really clear to me what this means, and may not be clear to the Revolutionary Guard, either. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is still in charge. Presumably this means that the military will not direct the police rather than the civil government doing so. But even that isn't clear from the article.

Gary Sick a few days ago in The Thugs Who Lead Iran's Supreme Leader The Daily Beast 06/27/09 makes it sound like The Revolutionary Guard had been pretty much calling the shots in national policy, including economic policy, for a long time anyway. And he actually knows a lot about Iran.

Meanwhile, Robert Perry reminds us that prolonged dissension within Iran over the results on the recent presidential election there could delay progress on peace negotiations, in Obama's Iran Peace Talk Dilemma ConsortiumNews.com 07/07/09.

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Monday, July 06, 2009

Obama and Latin America

I didn't catch this until today. But Tom Hayden reported on July 2 at TPM Cafe on The Possibility of an Obama-Chavez Understanding. Referring to the April Trinidad conference, he writes:

What has not been reported is that Obama, leaving his advisers behind, held lengthy private conversations with Chavez where only an interpreter was present.

It is not known what occurred in the secret talks. But sources in Caracas say that Chavez has become fascinated with Obama, seeking to understand the new US president and the forces around him, partly with advice from Brazil's president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.
I definitely have my criticisms of Obama, particularly on the Afghanistan War and prosecuting the torture perpetrators. But there is no question that his foreign policy has already shown some major improvement over the Cheney-Bush rolling disaster. Just returning to a situation where diplomacy is considered to be something more than the use of military threats to get other countries to do what the US wants is a huge improvement.

Obama's administration does seem to be taking a straightforward anti-coup, pro-democracy stance on the Honduran crisis. Latin America under democratic regimes is getting more and more serious about protecting democracy and maintaining international peace in their region. We saw that in the general Latin American reactions to Colombia's military strike on Ecuadorian territory and to the separatist violence in Bolivia. It makes very good sense for the US to align ourselves with those basic goals and not allow American government agencies or businesses to mess around with promoting coups or separatist movements or wars in Latin America.

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Heinrich Heine's Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland


Heinrich Heine (1797-1856)

Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland by Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) is an informative and entertaining description of recent trends in German philosophy and theology in the early 19th century. Yes, entertaining. Originally written as a series of articles in a French newspaper, it's purpose was to explain its topic to a contemporary French audience. He compiled it into book form in 1834.

He focuses on figures like the following, some of them the "usual suspects" today, other not: Martin Luther (1483-1546), who not only kicked off the Protestant Reformation but whose vernacular translation of the Bible "created the German language", as Heine puts it; Philippus Aureolus Paracelsus, given name Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim (1493-1541); Jakob Böhme (1575-1624); Réne Descartes (1596–1650) of the cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am); John Locke (1632-1704); Baruch (Benedictus) de Spinoza (1632-1677); Philipp Jacob Spener (German link) (1635-1705); Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von Leibnitz (1646-1716); August Hermann Francke (1663-1727); Christian Freiherr von Wolff, aka, Christian von Wolfius (1679-1754), whose "spiritual rule" lasted "more than half a century" in Germany; Voltaire (1694-1778), who Heine calls "the bookseller Nikolai" (?!); Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778); Immanuel Kant (1724–1804); Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786); Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781); Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), of whom Heine doesn't seem to be terribly fond; Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825); Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814); Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling(1775-1854); and, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), who Heine says "closed the great circle" of German philosophy.

I was surprised to find no mention of the Protestant theologian Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834), who the ecumenical Christian theologian Hans Küng considers to be among the greatest of all Christian theologians.

Heine elaborates a theory of questionable historical provenance but perhaps some conceptual value that argues that German concepts of religion are more heavily influenced by a pre-Christian concept of a spiritual world populated by various forces that act on the material world in observable ways. And he argues that German philosophical-religious thinking is dominated by a kind of spiritual dogmatism that assumes that doesn't take adequate account of the limitations of the material world. He describes this in terms of a spiritual concept in contrast to a sensual one.

Heine gets entertaining mileage out of the young Fichte's efforts to pal around with Kant. And he tells a funny anecdote about Hegel on his deathbed saying, "Nur einer hat mich verstanden. Und der hat mich auch nicht verstanden." (Only one person has understood me. And he also didn't understand me.")

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Sunday, July 05, 2009

Review of Vietnam in Iraq: Tactics, lessons, legacies and ghosts


Vietnam in Iaq: Tactics, lessons, legacies and ghosts, edited by John Dumbrell and David Ryan, has a publication date of 2007. But the 11 essays in this collection predate the announcement of The Surge. But there is real value to looking at contemporary commentary on the Iraq War. Because just as with the Vietnam War, later claims of new perspectives and revisionist history on the war in general can be checked against publications like this.

As the title indicates, the book explores the similarities and differences between the Vietnam War and the Iraq War. One striking thing about both is both involved nation-building and counter-insurgency efforts for which the military were not prepared. Overestimation of American power in those particular situation was a particular problem in the initiation of both wars. Sadly, even with the lessons of the Tonkin Gulf incident and other situations in front of them, the Congress of 2002-3 was just as deferential to Presidential claims, though the falsehoods involved with the Cheney-Bush buildup to the Iraq War make the Tonkin Gulf claims look almost honest. At least there actually were enemy boats in the water in the Tonkin Gulf! A contrast to the non-existence of the Iraqi "weapons of mass destruction" and the equally non-existent operational ties between Saddam and Al Qa'ida.

Trevor McCrisken of the University of Warwick (UK) has an essay on "No More Vietnams: Iraq and the analogy conundrum" that reminds us that making foreign policy by analogy can be a very perilous business, common as it is. The "Munich analogy" as it has been simplified to near-meaningless in the American political vocabulary has become especially treacherous. McCrisken calls attention a very meaningful lesson from the Vietnam War now there to be relearned from Iraq (and, in 2009, from the escalating "AfPak" War):

If there is an ultimate lesson of the Iraq War it is that it reiterates one of the central lessons of the Vietnam War: there are limits to the power of the United States, particularly in terms of the utility of the use of force.
This is a criticism that both military planners and civilian officials need to take very seriously. Not all of them will.

David Ryan Of University College, Ireland, explores a related problem in "'Vietnam', Victory Culture and Iraq: Struggling with lessons, constraints and credibility from Saigon to Falluja". But Ryan is far too impressed with the underlying assumptions of the so-called Weinberger Doctrine, better known as the Powell Doctrine, that aimed at setting prudent conditions for American military intervention. He doesn't seem to grasp that, in practice, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine was largely a justification for the Pentagon to focus its training, equipment and planning on fighting the Soviet Union - even after the USSR no longer existed - and avoiding future counterinsurgency wars. Worse, he seems to buy the assumption that American public opinion is the great weakness of American military might, and that the Powell Doctrine assumption of short, quick wars is still basically the solution to that perceived problem. He at least notices some of its weaknesses, such as the fact that in the "shock and awe" approach at the beginning of the Iraq War, "US tactics and use of overwhelming force on the ground and from the air was counterproductive." If the goal involves the complete conquest and reconstruction of a country, the military strategy has to take that fully into account.

Marilyn Young concludes her essay, "The Vietnam Laugh Track", with an observation about the idea that ending a war short of total victory somehow dishonors the dead:

A final thought: in Iraq, as in Vietnam, many people are convinced that only victory gives meaning to the (American) lives lost. To stop fighting short of victory is to render meaningless the deaths and maiming suffered thus far. More deaths, more grievous wounds are required to one end only: the making meaningful of the deaths and wounding already suffered. After the war, William Ehrhart asked a Vietnamese general what he thought of the Americans as warriors. After politely praising their bravery, the general named what he saw as their military shortcomings: fixed positions, dependency on air support, and ignorance of the country. 'Would it have mattered if we had done things differently?' Ehrhart asked. No, the general replied, 'Probably not. History was not on your side. We were fighting for our homeland. What were you fighting for?' Ehrhart answered, 'Nothing that really mattered'. George Swiers, returning directly from the battlefield to San Francisco in 1970, remembered how he had 'set out to speak to his Fellow Americans. To share with them his hideous secrets, to tell them what went on daily in their names'. For a short time, the message Swiers and other veterans like him brought home to America, aka the Vietnam syndrome, served as a prophylactic against another Vietnam. In the decades that have passed since Swiers' return home, the hideous secrets have been forgotten, or worse, transformed into memories of virtue, sacrifice and service.'

Americans, the late Gloria Emerson wrote, have 'always been a people who dropped the past and then could not remember where it had been put'. This time, they've put it in Iraq. [my emphasis]
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Biden talking carelessly on Israel and Iran?

Helena Cobban thinks so: Joe Biden's loose lips Just World News 07/05/09. She criticizes the Vice President for seeming to repeatedly declare his indifference to a military strike by Israel on Iran in a weekend interview with George Stephanopoulos. "Whether we agree or not," Biden said. They're entitled to do that. Any sovereign nation is entitled to do that..."

Helena spells out three problems with that idea:

  1. The hardware the IDF would use to strike Israel would certainly include US-supplied items, all of which are supplied on the basis of explicit agreements that they will be used only for defensive purposes.
  2. As Stephanopoulos was smart enough to point out, the US controls the air-space in Iraq, Saudi, Arabia, and other countries that Israel would need to overfly in any air-launched attack on Iraq.
  3. Finally-- and this for me is the clincher--It is US forces, not Israeli forces, that are "on the front-lines" against Iran. If Israel attacks Iran, the Iranian government can justifiably assume, based in part on points 1 and 2 above, that it did so with at least US collusion, if not active US partnership. On this basis Iran would be entitled to respond to any Israeli attack by counter-attacking against not only Israel but also the many, very vulnerable military assets that the US has very near Iran's borders and coastline-- whether in Iraq, in and around the Gulf, or in Afghanistan.
With our troops in Iraq, the United States is part of the neighborhood. And what happens there that affects our position in Iraq is very definitely an American concern.

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Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566)

Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566) was a Dominican friar and theologian who is remembered today for his eloquent protests over the treatment of the aboriginal populations in what the Spanish conquerers called the New World. A prolific writer, his best-known of many works on the subject is Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias [Very Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies] of 1552 (written in 1539), the Indies in this case referring to the Caribbean Islands who were the first in the New World to received the decidedly mixed blessings of European Christianity.


The fact that Las Casas and other Dominicans denounced Spanish practices like making unjust war on the aboriginal peoples, forced conversion to Christianity, and the encomienda system, which was the main instrument in Las Casas' time by which the Spanish colonizers subjugated the native peoples into political submission and forced labor, is a powerful reminder that there were Europeans from the start of the settlement of the New World who criticized the practices of the colonizers. And, in the case of Las Casas, made such criticisms over decades and in increasingly sharp terms. So it was possible by the standards of European Christianity in the early-modern decades ("modern" is conventionally dated from 1492) to object to those practices in Spain. And the Spanish version of those standards weren't known for their extreme tolerance, to put it mildly. Las Casas lived during the heyday of the Spanish Inquisition, the height of Spanish imperial power and expansion, and the Counter-Reformation.

The works of Las Casas are of particular historical interest because of his presence in the New World during much of the first century of European colonization and because of his sympathetic view of the native inhabitants. He first went to the Caribbean in 1502-1507, returned as a chaplain to the Spanish forces that conquered Cuba in 1512 remaining until 1515, made a brief return to the Caribbean in 1517, and then was present in 1522-1540, returned again to the New World where he was selected as Bishop of Chiapas, returned to Spain in 1547 where he participated in a famous coloquium of theologians in which his views on the New World were criticized by Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1490-1573), and died in Spain in 1566. During his time in the New World, he lived in what is now México, Central America and Peru. Adriano de Utrecht, who became Pope Adrian VI, described Las Casas as "protector universal de todos los indios de las Indias" (universal protector of the Indians of the Indies).

Though the Brevísima relación is his most famous work, he wrote much longer works elaborating the theological and practical bases of his positions on the treatment of the Indians and his opposition to slavery, including Historia de las Indias, Del único modo de atraer a todos los pueblos a la verdadera religión, Dieciseis remedios, Historia de las Indias, and Apologética historia sumaria. The December 1974 edition of the Spanish philosophical-literary journal Revista de Occidente was devoted to various essays on the philosophical and theological assumption of the defender of the peoples of the New World.

The essay by André Saint-Lu, "Significación de la denuncia lascasiana", addresses the polemical style of his famous criticisms of Spanish policy in the New World. Defensive historians of Spain have accused Las Casas of gross exageration, but Saint-Lu argues that even though some of the figures he used for populations and geography were too high, that his basic claims were correct and that Las Casas was not deliberately falsifying his data. After all, there was scarcely anything like a comprehensive pre-Columbus census of the native people of the Americas. And there are parts of the continents that remained uncharted well into the 20th century. The criticisms from Las Casas were scarcely embraced by the Spanish monarchs. But they also were neither entirely unwelcome nor completely ineffective. The Spanish military leaders in the New World were a potential source of opposition to the Spanish kings, having as they did access to immense wealth in the conquered territories. His criticisms were influential in the promulgation of the Leyes Nuevas (New Laws) of 1542 which aimed at abolishing slavery and forced labor by the Indians in the Spanish domains.

John Phelan in "El imperio cristiano de Las Casas, el imperio espanol de Sepúlveda y el imperio milennario de Mendieta" focuses on an aspect that other writers in the Revista agree was central to Las Casas' thought. Las Casas believed that the mission to convert the native people of the Americas to Christianity was the main task of the Spanish and the chief blessing of the discovery of the New World. Although Las Casas specifically opposed the forced conversion of the Indians and argued against the prevailing consensus that Christian nations were justified in conquering pagan nations on the basis of the superiority of the Christian religion. This central focus of the views of Las Casas points once again to the tragic aspects of the European conquest of America, alongside those that were rightly regarded by critics like Las Casas as sinful, wrong and criminal. If views like those of Las Casas had prevailed on Spanish policy after 1492, it would presumably have meant that they would have established colonies in the New World with the aim of trading with the Indian peoples, of which the Incas were the most highly developed in European terms.

But the European diseases to which the native people had no immunity and for which they had no effective medicines would still have likely taken a tremendous toll. Those were the main source of the dying out of much of the native populations in the Americas. That alone would have provoked military clashes between the natives and the colonizers. On top of that, there were the European notions of property and sovereignty, eventual competition by other expansionist European kingdoms, and just plain greed. Add to that the strongly-felt imperative by many Spaniards - including Las Casas and other clerical critics of the Spanish methods - to Christianize the natives.

Las Casas seemed to be persuaded by the notion that many of the Indian peoples were quite receptive to Christianity, and even had knowledge of some primitive version of the True Faith. In this, he was probably deceived as many other Europeans were by the syncretism of so much of native religion, in which accepting Christian baptism or attending Christian services was by no means considered inconsistent with practicing their traditional "pagan" religions. Francis Parkman, one of the few American historians of the 19th century who actually knew a great deal about Indian religions, customs and social structures, has described this huge gap in understanding between the Europeans and the natives of North America in his books like The Jesuits in North America. Las Casas' principled opposition to forced conversion could have given the Spanish conquerers and the Church a way to live more peacefully with the pagan civilizations of the Indians. But these alternative scenarios are so far from what actually happened that a "lascasian" alternative seems downright utopian.

And in philosophical terms, his thought was utopian, as the Revista essays make very clear. Utopian thinking was heavily influential among European Christians at the time. Thomas Moore's De optimo reipublicae statu de que nova insula Utopia was first published in 1516. José Antonio Maravall notes in "Utopía y primitivism en Las Casas" that Las Casas never cites Moore's work, but he also argues that the ideas of Las Casas were closer to those of Moore than perhaps any other thinker. Whether it was by direct influence, indirect influence, common sources of understanding or just the ideas being "in the air" is hard to say. Maravall observes that the inspiration for both came from the very early experience of Spanish colonization in America. Moore objected to the kind of exploitation he saw developing in the New World in the emerging capitalist order, though it wasn't called that until later. Las Casas proposed alternatives to the colonial practices which he considered capable of adoption, based on what Maravall calls the "quasi-natural" mode of agriculture practiced by poor farmers in Spain. He describes Las Casas' vision for New World societies "basadas en la agricultura y sin más que los elementos minimamente necessarios para mantenerlas" (based on agriculture and without more than the minimally necessary elements to maintain them).

This was not a realistic vision. And it was also a vision based on creating societies of (voluntarily) Christianized natives in the Americas organized along a brand of European model, although one less brutal and avaricious than the encomiendo system. The great positive contribution of utopian thinking has been to critique existing or emerging social and political realities in the light of a model that rejects that worst aspects. But since the 16th century, we've had quite a number of examples of utopian thinking degenerating into dystopias of violence and oppression. It doesn't mean that utopian thinking is inherently bad. To borrow a well-known phrase, utopias don't create dystopias, dystopians do. It's just that utopian thinking needs to be handled with the care a loaded gun deserves.

Utopian thinking in Las Casas' time was closely related to eschatologial (End Times) thinking, which was very widespread and influential at the time. Apocalyptic thinking influenced the actions of people and rulers, and influenced the interpretations they put on events. And western Christian Europe had some shattering events in the 1500s, such as the Protestant Reformation, the subsequent Wars of Religion, and the Peasant War in Germany. The discovery and colonization of America was also interpreted as a hopeful sign of the Last Days and the associated Last Judgment. Of course, that didn't stop the Christian monarchs of Europe from lusting after the long-term advantages of colonies in the New World. But such terrestrial considerations could and did coexist with apocalyptic understandings of current history.

Maravall draws on the later concept of Martin Buber to distinguish between eschatology and utopian thinking. The concept of the end of the world in the Jewish and Christian traditions views the approaching end of the world as a consummation brought about by God which produces an exit from history as we know it. (The notion of the "end of history" played an unfortunate role in American foreign policy in recent years, but that's several centuries after Las Casas' time.) Utopian thought envisions a just and peaceful society within the context of human history, where human possibilities produce a society free of the evils of an existing one. Maravall observes that utopian criticisms that are founded in backward-looking ideas from a departing or departed past time can nevertheless produce useful and forward-looking criticisms. And he suggests that the work of Las Casas falls into that category. A more recent example of this phenomenon would be the Christian philosopher Ivan Illich (1926-2002).

Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias (1552)

John Phelan's essay shows some of the ways that worked with Las Casas. Describing the famous debate in Valladolid in 1550-1551 between Las Casas and Sepúlveda, Phelan argues that Las Casas defended a medieval outlook in his late-modern-sounding plea for the fundamental equality of all and his opposition to forced conversion. Those were ideas based in the Aristotelian thinking of Thomas Aquinas. Sepúlveda also based his ideas on Thomist thought, but came to very different conclusion. Sepúlveda, Phelan argues, was actually more modern in his argument in that context, because he defended a notion of the Spanish mission that reflected an emerging Spanish nationalism. (The modern system of nation-states is commonly dated from the Treat of Westfalia in 1848.) Another leading contemporary Spanish theologian, Gerónimo de Mendieta (1525-1604), offered a very different vision. His notion was based on a mystical version of Christianity. But his mysticism led him to argue for the forced conversion of the American natives on the grounds that their conversion would initiate the apocalyse. By contrast, Las Casas used eschatological notions to warn the Spaniards that their misconduct toward the Indians would bring divine judgment onto their heads.

Whether one wishes to regard Sir Francis Drake and Elizabeth I of England as the hammers of God in delivering that judgment is a different matter that I won't attempt to explore here. But that prophetic aspect of the work of Las Casas is the focus of Marcel Bataillon in "Las Casas, ¿un profeta?". Bataillon argues that, at least in his later phase dating from the Vallodolid disputation, Las Casas viewed himself in more political than in religious terms, Phelan argues, though he viewed his role in petitioning the Spanish crown for changes in New World policies toward the Indians as being in the tradition of the religious prophets of the Hebrew Bible. The Hebrew warned their rulers of the consequences of their injustices in the real world of policy toward the poor and weak in their kingdoms, in particular.

A third important element of the lascasian outlook was the notion of the natives of the Americas as examples of the "bien salvaje", the good savage or the good primitive. "Noble savage" is probably a better English translation because that's the form in which the concept is more familiar in the Anglo-Saxon world. The concept didn't begin with Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). It actually goes back to classical Greco-Roman philosophy. Las Casas viewed the Indians of the Americas as noble savages. He drew humane conclusions from that idealization of the native peoples. But the concept also probably inevitably carries an element of paternalistic condescension in thought. And when a group of people are viewed as some utopian idea and then they turn out to be just as ignoble and "savage" as the civilized peoples are, idealization can easily transform into demonization instead. But this concept of the Americas as an unspoiled land populated by noble savages was a very widespread and influential one in Europe, and heavily influenced Las Cosas.

The essay by Jose Ignacio Tellechea Idígoras, Las Casas y Carranza: fe y utopía" compares the thinking of Las Casas and one of his contemporary partisans, Bartolomé Carranza (1503-1576), who endured a long heresy trial over his Comentarios sobre el catecismo cristiano (1558), which focused on issues of Church governance and practice. Carranza was eventually acquitted, but was required to renounce portions of that work. Carranza's experience is yet another example of the limits of dissent, even for prominent Churchmen in that time. Las Casas passionately defended his friend Carranza to the Inquisition. Tellechea Idígoras makes a comment that is reflective of the prophetic nature of Las Cazas' life's work: "Su voz es incómoda, entonces y ahora" (His voice is uncomfortable, then and now). Comforting the comfortable was definitely not the mission to which Bartolomé de las Casas devoted his life.

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Thursday, July 02, 2009

That sure didn't take long!

"Give 'Em Whine Harry" Reid, alleged Democratic Majority Leader in the Senate, is already rolling out his excuses for why he can't get Democratic programs through even with a "veto-proof" majority of 60. From What’s So Super About a Supermajority? by Carl Hulse New York Times 07/01/09:

“We have 60 votes on paper,” Senator Harry Reid, the majority leader, said Wednesday in an interview. “But we cannot bulldoze anybody; it doesn’t work that way. My caucus doesn’t allow it. And we have a very diverse group of senators philosophically. I am not this morning suddenly flexing my muscles.”
If we could get a real Senate Majority Leader in his place, I'd gladly hand Give-'Em-Whine Harry to the Republicans. That would give the Dems "only" a 59-vote majority. But anyone who was willing to act like a real partisan leader could get pretty much all the Democratic programs through, including Obama's appointments, with a majority like Reid has had this year. Then they wouldn't have to whine. Or promise not to flex their "muscles", a statement premised on the claim that Reid actually has any real Democratic "muscles" to flex.

The batty notion that the Dems should choose majority leaders from marginal Democratic states is just nuts. The Nancy Pelosi model is much better. As a Democrat from San Francisco, the only electoral challenge she would really have to worry about would come if she weren't partisan and progressive enough.

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Wednesday, July 01, 2009

The coup in Honduras


Ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya

There was a military coup late last week on Sunday in Honduras. The military outsted President Manuel Zelaya (Liberal Party) because he intended to hold a popular referendum on whether he should be allowed to be re-elected for a second term. The referendum was scheduled for this past Sunday. The Honduran Congress last week passed a bill to cancel the referendum. Zelaya announced it would proceed anyway and immediately fired Romeo Vásquez, the head of the armed forces, to forestall any coup attempt. The coup happened anyway. Zelaya was arrested on Sunday and unceremoniously expelled to Costa Rica. The Congress quickly installed another member of the Liberal Party, Roberto Micheletti, as interim President until this coming November's scheduled election.

The US, the European Union and the Organization of American States (OAS) are all opposing the coup and demanding Zelaya's return as the legitimate head of government.
And furious diplomacy is under way to that end. Zelaya had said he would return to Honduras on Thursday, Micheletti had threatened to arrest him if he did, and he now says he's going to delay his return by 72 hours at the request of the OASA to give diplomacy a chance to proceed. (Zelaya esperará 72 horas para regresar a su país, a pedido de la OEA Página 12 01.07.2009) If the situation is not resolved satisfactorily soon, among other problems it could cause it delaying the arrangement of an important trade agreement between the EU and the countries of Central America; the EU suspended the talks for now in response to the coup.

Pro-Zelaya protester

M. Á. Bastenier in Golpe contra el chavismo El País 01.07.2009 speculates that Zelaya may have set a trap for his opponents. On the one hand, the US, the EU and some members the OAU were less than pleased by his diplomatic and political closeness to Venezuela. But they also are opposed to seeing Latin America slide back to the bad old days of elected governments being overthrown by militaries doing the bidding of economic elites who are being discomforted by popular reforms. Framing the basic issue as "chavism" versus anti-chavism, he argues that the anti-chavists may have shot themselves in the foot by staging a coup. Because whatever reservations the democracies of the Europe and the Americas may have about Hugo Chávez' and "chavism" in other countries, the Honduran chavists seem to have made it much more difficult to show any kind of favoritism to their cause. Chavism, in the case, is very much on the side of democracy against a military coup.

Tom Hayden argues that a failure by the Obama administration to back Zelaya in this crisis would badly damage his chances of improving relations with Latin America (Honduras Crisis Forces Obama to Focus on Latin America The Nation Online 06/30/09):

The Obama position is complicated by the history of US training of the Honduras armed forces, past involvement with shadowy death squads, and concern over Zelaya's alliance with the [Venezuelan-led] Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas. In the background are memories of US complicity in the attempted coup against Venezuela's Hugo Chávez in 2002. [my emphasis]
An involvement about which most Americans heard little or nothing, thanks to the sad state of the American news media. Gabriel Puricelli makes a similar analysis in 72 Hours “Before Actions Kick In” on Honduras Coup by Al Giordano The Field 07/01/09.

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Palin: a "little shop of horrors"? Or too deep for our lightweight press corps to grasp?


The Republicans' White Princess, Sarah Palin

I can't say I'm thrilled with Todd Purdum's very critical Vanity Fair profile of Sarah Palin, It Came From Wasilla (Aug 2009 issue; accessed 06/30/09). There's plenty of complaints from McCain campaigns staffers on the record and off, and lots of focus on her personal quirks.

It can easily be a cheap shot to criticize what wasn't said. But sometimes it's not. But it's striking to me that this long article on the Alaska Governor's faults manages not to mention her and her husband's close association with the rightwing extremist, neo-Confederate Alaska Independence Party (AIP) or her deep involvement with the Christian nationalist Third Wave Pentecostal movement. Those aspects of her career are far more important than how many hours some senior staffer spent coaching her for her debate with Joe Biden. Purdum even managed to work Monica Lewinsky into the story! As Bob Somerby says of the press corps and Monica: they can't stop loving her.

Near the beginning of the piece, Purdum frames his story as follows:

What does it say about the nature of modern American politics that a public official who often seems proud of what she does not know is not only accepted but applauded?
This is scarcely a new phenemenon in American politics. And it has been a characteristic of "movement conservative" electioneering on the national level since 1964. It's a valid question but not a novelty of Sarah Palin's admirers.

What does her prominence say about the importance of having (or lacking) a record of achievement in public life?
It's certainly meaningful to ask how well Palin's particular experience had prepared her for national office in 2008, or later. But, again, how is that new? Neither Ronald Reagan nor Arnold Schwarzenegger had governmental experience before they were elected governor of the country's most populous state. Dick Cheney had long experience in the public sector when he ran for Vice President in 2000, and there's no one I can think of who should be kept farther away from public power than that man. How does Palin's situation pose that question any differently than every election does?

Why did so many skilled veterans of the Republican Party - long regarded as the more adroit team in presidential politics - keep loyally working for her election even after they privately realized she was casual about the truth and totally unfit for the vice-presidency?
Again, nothing new. See: Dick Cheney.

I can't help be struck by the Beltway Village tribal assumptions here. First of all, when Village journalists use a phrase like "long regarded as...", they typically mean that the national press corps regard things that way. The national Republican tickets lost the elections of 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2008. So just why would Purdum and his fellow Villagers regard them as "the more adroit team in presidential politics"?

Perhaps most painful, how could John McCain, one of the cagiest survivors in contemporary politics - with a fine appreciation of life’s injustices and absurdities, a love for the sweep of history, and an overdeveloped sense of his own integrity and honor - ever have picked a person whose utter shortage of qualification for her proposed job all but disqualified him for his?
One thing John McCain clearly has accomplished in his political career: he managed to create a remarkable degree of admiration and adoration of himself among the addled crew who make up our national political press. On the face of it, this sounds suspiciously like a complaint from a McCain fanboy that she did their man wrong.

Don't get me wrong, here. I think Palin is a lightweight, and a hardline rightwinger. She would make a terrible President.

But Purdum's hit piece on her strikes me as shabby journalism. I would much rather see a prominent report on Palin look into her political and religious crackpot associates and affiliations and put those into some kind of realistic context. Instead, we get typical press corps reciting of favored scripts. Here is Purdum on the Great Statesman and Maverick again:

McCain has delivered his own postmortem on Palin with the patented brand of winking-and-nodding ironic detachment that he usually reserves for painful political questions, an approach that simultaneously seeks to confess his sin and presume absolution for it. In November, he told Jay Leno he was proud of Palin and did not blame her for his defeat, but by April, when Leno asked him about who was running the Republican Party, McCain declined to mention Palin: “We have, I’m happy to say, a lot of choices out there: Bobby Jindal, Tim Pawlenty, Huntsman, Romney, Charlie Crist—there's a lot of governors out there who are young and dynamic.” McCain went on, “There’s a lot of good people out there, and I’ve left out somebody’s name and I’m going to hear about it.” When I ask Mark Salter, McCain’s longtime speechwriter and co-author, about that comment, he says simply, “McCain always talks unscripted,” and adds that he has heard “not one word of regret” about Palin ever pass McCain’s lips. McCain’s daughter Meghan, who has continued the blog she began on the campaign last year, has said that Palin is the one topic on which she will have no public comment. [my emphasis]
This kind of silliness is so common among McCain's press fan club that it's easy to overlook it. Purdum quotes McCain saying nothing at all about Palin in an April appearance on Jay Leno and describes his position as "an approach that simultaneously seeks to confess his sin and presume absolution for it." Since he didn't say anything in what Purdum gives of that quote about what Purdum regards as the "sin" in question - picking Palin as his running mate - this doesn't make any kind of sense. But for our star journalists, reciting the preferred press script about the greatness of the Great Maverick takes priority over event he most elemental reasoning or analysis.

There are a couple of especially egregious parts that stand out in a egregious article. Both involve malicious pop psychology:

Some top aides worried about her mental state: was it possible that she was experiencing postpartum depression? (Palin’s youngest son was less than six months old.) Palin maintained only the barest level of civil discourse with Tucker Eskew, the veteran G.O.P. operative who had been made her chief minder. A third party had to shuttle between them to convey even the most rudimentary messages. "She started to hedge her bets," the same McCain friend says. "Frequently, she would be concerned about how something would play in Alaska. What? You’re worried about your backside in Alaska when there are hundreds of millions of dollars being spent?" One longtime McCain friend and frequent companion on the trail was heard to refer to Palin as "Little Shop of Horrors."
Giving people anonymity to spew insults is just tacky, but standard in the infotainment writing that our press corps today tries to pass off as journalism. Since presumably most readers will know as much about Tucker Eskew as I do, i.e., nothing beyond what I read in that paragraph, it's impossible to make any judgment about this. I've occasionally encountered people with whom the only really appropriate kind of discourse would be to smack them in the face. It's not hard for me to imagine that a "veteran G.O.P. operative" would be a real prick. Purdum here is just passing on gossip from some coward hiding behind anonymity. But this anonymous label of Palin as a "little shop of horrors" is played up in the article; in fact, at the main article link above it would appear to be the article's title. (The print version shows the title I used there.)

In a similar vein:

More than once in my travels in Alaska, people brought up, without prompting, the question of Palin’s extravagant self-regard. Several told me, independently of one another, that they had consulted the definition of “narcissistic personality disorder” in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders — “a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy” — and thought it fit her perfectly. When Trig was born, Palin wrote an e-mail letter to friends and relatives, describing the belated news of her pregnancy and detailing Trig’s condition; she wrote the e-mail not in her own name but in God’s, and signed it “Trig’s Creator, Your Heavenly Father.” [my emphasis]
This passage led Media Mattters' Eric Boehlert to express rare agreement with neocon pundit and Palin fan Bill Kristol, who is normally right less than the proverbial stopped clock (which is accurate at least twice a day): Hell freezes over: I agree with Bill Kristol's media critique 06/30/09. As Boehlert puts it, "this doesn't pass the smell test." If Purdum's reporting is technically accurate, that he heard this independently from several people, it would most likely be something people were getting from a common source, like a chain e-mail among McCain partisans. Any lay person who actually has looked at the DSM has probably quickly realized that it's difficult to distinguish one clinical condition from another without some more knowledge of their signs and symptoms than a non-medical person is likely to possess.

The DSM-IV is available online. The definition found there for narcissistic personality disorder reads as follows:

The symptoms of narcissistic personality disorder revolve around a pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration, and sense of entitlement. Often individuals feel overly important and will exaggerate achievements and will accept, and often demand, praise and admiration despite worthy achievements. They may be overwhelmed with fantasies involving unlimited success, power, love, or beauty and feel that they can only be understood by others who are, like them, superior in some aspect of life.

There is a sense of entitlement, of being more deserving than others based solely on their superiority. These symptoms, however, are a result of an underlying sense of inferiority and are often seen as overcompensation. Because of this, they are often envious and even angry of others who have more, receive more respect or attention, or otherwise steal away the spotlight. [my emphasis]
The definition Purdum quotes says, "a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy". Did Purdum get his quote directly from some version of the DSM? Or from a copy of some chain e-mail? Or from the mouth of some McCain partisan running down Palin? His paragraph certainly leaves the impression it's a quote from the DSM.

After extensively quoting her enemies on how inept she is as a campaigner, Purdum slips in this paragraph, which suggests a different set of possibilities, based on her actual career rather than backstage gossip from her critics:

Palin’s victory that November was one of the flukiest successes in modern American politics. Rebecca Braun, the publisher of the Alaska Budget Report, a respected nonpartisan newsletter, describes the result as something "far beyond anything you could explain in terms of intellect or training." But Palin had promised three big things, and with the help of Bitney, who became her liaison with the legislature, and Mike Tibbles, her chief of staff, she achieved them. She increased oil taxes; she won the legislative framework for a gas pipeline, though not the one Hickel wanted; and she signed significant ethics reforms. In all three efforts she won strong cooperation from Democrats. “She had an easy go of it,” says Larry Persily, a former editorial-page editor of the Anchorage Daily News, who went to work in Palin’s Washington office but is now a critic of the governor’s. “The Democrats were in love with her. She slew the oil-company Gorgon, and came in on the magic carpet of oil-tax reform and ethics. The Democrats were intoxicated because she wasn’t Frank Murkowski.” Rising oil prices provided an added lift. Palin was able to increase the annual distribution from the state’s Permanent Fund to about $3,000 per resident, almost double the amount received the previous year. She could be a fiscal conservative and a big spender all at the same time.
In other words, she has demonstrated a touch for the bipartisan appeal that press devotees of High Broderism worship.

This actually raises some questions that would be interesting and important in political journalism, but don't fit so well in the infotainment mode. How does her reported fight with the oil companies over raising their taxes and this supposed enthusiasm among Alaska's legislative Democrats square with the far-right approach of the Alaska Independence Party and the Third Wave Pentecostal theocrats? But since Purdum has "disappeared" her neo-Confederate and fanatical religious affiliations, that comparison wouldn't exactly fit.

That disappearing is a warning for Democrats. The frat boys and sorority girls of our press corps right now enjoying their script of Palin as a dumb beauty queen. But we've already had indications that this could easily flip into portraying her as a down-home tribune of the ordinary folks. Expensive dresses on the campaign's dime and bitchy clashes with staffers and former allies are celebrity gossip that can easily be reframed as charming eccentricities. The press corps fixates on fashion and style issues, so expensive dresses become a really significant item for them. But close association with a fringe neo-Confederate group like the AIP and deep involvement with a theocratic religious movement so out-there that the main Pentecostal denomination in the US, the Assemblies of God, formally considers it heresy, those are more substantial issues. And far more troubling. But they're too complicated to be easily covered in the space of a Twitter comment or two, so the press prefers to chase office gossip.

By the way, there are real journalists who actually cover this stuff, e.g., Max Blumenthal and David Neiwert, Meet Sarah Palin's radical right-wing pals Salon 10/10/08; Ruth at TalktoAction blog, Palin's churches and the Third Wave 09/05/08; Bruce Wilson, also of TalktoAction, Palin's Churches and the New Apostolic Reformation 09/05/08; Lisa Webster, Witches, Fine... Does Sarah Palin Believe in Religious Tolerance? Religious Dispatches 09/29/09.

A final point. Our alleged journalists enjoy pointing to Tina Fey's inspired spoofs of Palin as though they are some reflection on Palin herself. Purdum is no exception: "The swift journey from her knockout convention speech to Tina Fey’s dead-eyed incarnation of her as Dan Quayle with an updo played out in real time, no less for the bewildered McCain campaign than for the public at large."

But Tina Fey is a professional comedienne. She's supposed to be funny. Both Palin and McCain appeared with Tina Fey in her Palin role on Saturday Night Live. So presumably they didn't think her portrayal of Palin was insulting, inappropriate or damaging. In the SNL skit about the Biden-Palin debate, I actually laughed more at the portrayal of Biden, which cleverly captured his garrolous tendency to insert his foot into his mouth. And I saw an interview with Tina Fey herself that I thought was quite interesting. She talked about meeting Palin and how she actually found her an impressive person in that brief interaction. She said Palin was "the real deal", meaning that Palin's pleasant persona that she projects came off as genuine.

At least our comedians can still separate their portrayals of a character from that character's reality. Our so-called journalists have a hard time grasping that distinction.

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Is the past in front or behind?


Zoltán Balázs makes an intriguing point at the Telos blog in 1968: The Birth of Secular Eternity 01/28/08. I have the impression that the political tilt of that blog is pretty much neoconservative. But Balázs deals with a theme that fascinates me, the perception of time.

The ancient Greeks had a similar view of the past and present as Balázs describes here:

One of the most idiosyncratic features of human communities is the way they think of time, even though there has been little reflection on that in political theory. To mention just one example that indicates how different the collective experience of time may be, I allude to the South American Aymara people, who associate the past with the spatial front, and the future with the spatial back. That is, past is ahead of us, and future is behind us. In this framework progress in time makes perhaps less sense, since the very concept of progress is, at its root, advance in space, and we can hardly move back to the past. (In science fiction, time travel to the past is a problem just because we presuppose that in the past we would be as free to act as we are in the present, and shall be in the future—that is, we take our present back with us to the past!)
In terms of methaphors of position, there is a definite physical, spatial logic to this. We can see what is in front of us, and we can see the past. We can't see the future, and we can't see what is physically behind us.

Balázs observes, "The dominant Western vision of time is, obviously, the opposite. We look forward and constantly move to the future, whereas the past becomes more and more distant."

Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset in his betst-known work, La rebellión de las masas [Revolt of the Masses] (1929-30), also discussed changes in the European perception of time. People of ancient Europe saw their own time as a progressive diminution in the quality of society from an earlier Golden Age. He quotes Horace's Odes describing successive generations becoming progressively more depraved. in the 19th century, Europeans developed a strong view of the times progressively improving. This optimistic future-oriented viewpoint was shattered by the Great War of 1914-18.

Ortega described the postwar attitude as one in which Europeans no longer expect infinite progress. Instead, a more complex and pessimistic attitude prevails, which also provides a sense of liberation from previous certainties. Europeans feel, he wrote, as though they "had escaped, and are going forth anew beneath the stars of the authentic world, a deep, terrible, unpredictable and inexhaustible world where everything, everything is possible: the best and the worst." The feeling of the new era was like the joy and excitement "of kids who have escaped from school".

He identified this feeling as a dissociation from the past, a perspective "that the dead didn't die in a joke, but rather completely; that they can't support us". And therefore we must rely on present resources as never before in solving the problems of the time. And yet pride in their own power sometimes alternates with insecurity about the destiny. Postwar Europeans, he argued, felt the present to be "more than other times and inferior to itself". (Philosophers write that way.)

But Ortega also believed a strong orientation toward the future is necessary. To live is to act, and to thereby orient oneself toward the future. He even believed that the essence of national patriotism was such a future orientation. "When we defend the nation we are defending our tomorrow, not our yesterday."

Balázs argues that the view of progress that became part of the Western view of seeing the future as in front of us was shared widely in political theory. Liberals and conservatives accepted it, and the Communist offshoot of democratic theory as embodied in the Soviet Union accepted it.

He then makes this suggestion:

This is, I think, what the 1968 revolutionaries failed to see at first. Contrary to their presuppositions, the forces of the past did not exist any more. Contrary to their perceptions, the present was not pregnant any more. Hence, and this is my thesis, put inevitably in rough terms, 1968, at least in Europe, essentially changed the conception of time and introduced the present as the ultimate category of political thinking. However, this is not a present related to the past or to the future, that is, a present favored against past or future, yet still understood in their terms. This is an eternal present, characterized by a consciousness cleansed from any reference either to the past or to the future. (my emphasis)
Although 1968 is viewed as a highly eventful year in the US, in Europe it is probably seen as a more decisive period. The May-June uprising in Paris and the "Prague Summer" in Czechoslovakia were the two most outstanding political events there.

Balázs then proceeds to make an argument which I don't understand that somehow the proposed new Constitution for the European Union failed because EU leaders failed to relate it sufficiently to the new, prevailing sense of time:

But politics is made within time, it presupposes time, being a joint business of past, present, and future. In the eternal present, however, time is unreal, and there is no room for politics, for collective action. European governments look more and more like ghosts on the stage of world politics, and whereas they have agreed upon a constitution that proclaims its independence from past and future, they simply lacked the political power to tie it up with the present.
He also makes a point that I think is important, "We, the heirs of 1968, are fully accustomed to the comforts of modern life, and rarely think we enjoy them."

That latter point is one that Herbert Marcuse - an Hegelian philosopher that was published and commented upon in the Telos journal - also stressed. In An Essay on Liberation (1969), he wrote:

This same trend of production and consumption, which makes for the affluence and attraction of advanced capitalism, makes for the perpetuation of the struggle for existence, for the increasing necessity to produce and consume the non-necessary: the growth of the so-called "discretionary income" in the United States indicates the extent to which income earned is spent on other than "basic needs." Former luxuries become basic needs, a normal development which, under corporate capitalism, extends the competitive business of living to newly created needs and satisfactions. The fantastic output of all sorts of things and services defies the imagination, while restricting and distorting it in the commodity form, through which capitalist production enlarges its hold over human existence. And yet, precisely through the spread of this commodity form, the repressive social morality which sustains the system is being weakened. The obvious contradiction between the liberating possibilities of the technological transformation of the world, the light and free life on the one hand and the intensification of the struggle for existence on the other, generates among the underlying population that diffused aggressiveness which, unless steered to hate and fight the alleged national enemy, hits upon any suitable target: white or black, native or foreigner, Jew or Christian, rich or poor. This is the aggressiveness of those with the mutilated experience, with the false consciousness and the false needs, the victims of repression who, for their living, depend on the repressive society and repress the alternative. Their violence is that of the Establishment and takes as targets figures which, rightly or wrongly, seem to be different, and to represent an alternative.
Balázs also points out that the notion of the present as eternity also reinforces the strong European support for the social state, which is far stronger and more effective in Europe than in the US:

... in eternity there cannot be suffering. The dominant, that is, essentially 1968-type of liberalism tends to think that cruelty and coercion are the greatest vices for they cause suffering which is absolutely intolerable and unacceptable. The main purpose of society is to minimize or avoid suffering. The classical liberal maxim, the harm principle, which permits everything for everybody provided that no harm to others is caused, is now generally thought to be inefficient. The political community has a primary duty to alleviate or terminate suffering, without regard to its causes and circumstances, and without regard to the scope and depth of intervention. The ground for it is that suffering and pain dehumanizes and thus makes us unfit for eternity. They are not simply bad, they are outrageous. The right for euthanasia is most firmly grounded in the emotions the sight of suffering elicits in us. (my emphasis)
In a vaguer point, Balázs says that the European sense of the present-as-eternity is also connected to "the idea that human rights, and especially human dignity, overrides any other moral and political value".

And he writes:

... we tend to favor the present in everyday practices, too. Again, this is not a hedonistic and individualistic feeling of carpe diem. This is a collective, rather than an individual, obsession with time, or with being up-to-date. Unlike Faust, we do not want to stop time because our goals have been achieved. We are already lords of time, hence we must make it pass. Our communication means, mobile phones, Internet access, reality shows, news channels, digital and web cameras, our passion for watching sporting events, especially those where new records can be expected, serve this collective purpose: to make time pass together, and prove to be masters of time.
And, as philosophers are inclined to do, he raises a question about the implications of this view:

This is why anguish and sadness fills the earthly eternal present, lurking behind the joy of the saved. The inhabitants of the earthly eternal present are nowhere. They are not anxious and agitated by fear. Rather, they are sad and anguished by their powerlessness. For those living in the eternal present lack the basic human political, i.e., community-creating, capacities, recorded by Hannah Arendt: the power to forgive and the power to make promises. By forgiving, we have power over the past. By promises, we have power over the future. But in order to forgive, we need the past; and to make promises, we need the future. Without them, we lose our power. And since we have no past, we cannot remember, we cannot enliven it, we cannot forgive - we cannot act. Since we have no future, we cannot make plans and anticipations, we cannot justify our actions, we cannot make promises - again, we cannot act. Only God, who alone is Lord of Eternity, knows where the way back to time lies. (my emphasis)
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