Social Europe has just published an English translation, For A Democratic Polarisation: How To Pull The Ground From Under Right-Wing Populism 11/17/2016.
The interview begins with Habermas reflecting back on the "end of history" moment that Franccis Fukayama famously announced around the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Soviet Union in his book The End of History and the Last Man (1992). His initial essay titled "The End of History?" was first published in the Summer 1989 issue of The National Interest.
He saw that the world was then looking at the "total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism" and the kind of consumerism associated with American and European capitalist societies. And therefore we were looking at " the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an 'end of ideology' or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism."
It addresses the rise of the rightwing populist parties and movements in Europe and the US, including the Trump campaign. Habermas focuses on the widespread adoption of a very similar neoliberal economic/cultural outlook by both center-left and center-right parties particularly since the early 1990s. Because the neoliberal gospel of deregulation, privatization, reduction of government services other than military, security and intelligence (and even significant privatization there), depolitization of economic policy to be "technical" questions not appropriate for public debate, chronic austerity policies (for the 99%), growing extemes of maldistribution of wealth, liberating the wealthiest from the terrible burden of paying taxes to support their countries and communities, weakening the bargaining power of labor, reduction of public and private pensions - this produces a more restricted life for the majority, and real distress for large portions of the population. And, as we saw in the 2008 crash and its aftermath, it removes much of the political and institutional safeguards that prevented such a crash in the Northern Atlantic countries since the Great Depression.
Much of economic and social policy in this approach comes under the scope of the Margaret Thatcher/Angela Merkel approach of "There Is No Alternative" (TINA). And therefore no discussion must be allowed, even if, as in the case of Greece, it means maintaining brutal and destructive neoliberal policies that means overriding the democratic choices of the people.
What Habermas wants for the immediate future is to see the left parties create a more explicit political debate over economic and social policy:
Man müsste also politische Gegensätze wieder kenntlich machen, auch den Gegensatz zwischen der – im politischen und kulturellen Sinne „liberalen“ – Weltoffenheit der linken und dem ethnonationalen Mief der rechten Globalisierungskritik. Kurzum: Die politische Polarisierung müsste sich wieder zwischen den etablierten Parteien um sachliche Gegensätze kristallisieren. Parteien, die dem Rechtspopulismus Aufmerksamkeit statt Verachtung widmen, dürfen von der Zivilgesellschaft nicht erwarten, dass sie rechte Parolen und rechte Gewalt ächtet. Für die größere Gefahr halte ich deshalb jene ganz andere Polarisierung, zu der der harte Kern der Opposition innerhalb der CDU zu tendieren scheint, wenn diese auf die Zeit nach Merkel schielt. Sie erkennt in Alexander Gauland den Flügelmann des Dregger-Flügels der alten Hessen-CDU wieder, also Fleisch vom eigenen Fleische, und kokettiert mit dem Gedanken, die verlorenen Wähler auf dem Weg einer Koalition mit der AfD zurückzugewinnen.
One would therefore have to make contrasting political programmes recognisable again, including the contrast between the – in a political and cultural sense – “liberal” open-mindedness of the left, and the nativist fug of right-wing critiques of an unfettered economic globalization. In a word: political polarisation should be re-crystallised between the established parties on substantive conflicts. Parties that grant right-wing populists attention rather than contempt should not expect civil society to disdain right-wing phrases and violence. Therefore, I regard as the greater danger a very different polarisation towards which the hard-core opposition within the CDU is moving when it casts a leery eye on the post-Merkel period. In Alexander Gauland it recognises anew the pivotal figure of the Dregger wing of the old Hesse CDU, or flesh of its own flesh, and toys with the idea of winning back lost voters by way of a coalition with the AfD.I would have translated that first setence as, "One must therefore make political differences recognizable again, including the opposition between the - in political and cultural senses "liberal" - tolerance (Weltoffenheit) of the left criticism of globalization [neoliberalism] and the ethnic-nationalist version of the right."
He also says, "Leuten, die solchen Parolen nachlaufen, eigentlich nur eine Lehre ziehen: Sie sollten diese Art von „besorgten Bürgern“, statt um sie herumzutanzen, kurz und trocken als das abtun, was sie sind – der Saatboden für einen neuen Faschismus." ("The only lesson democratic parties should draw as regards handling people who are keen on such terms is: they should stop pussyfooting around with these “concerned citizens” and dismiss them curtly for what they are – the breeding ground for a new fascism.") I find the Social Europe translation off just enough to be annoying.
The title phrase "For a democratic polarization," even though it's in quotes, doesn't appear in exactly that form in the published text of the interview. But it's a fair characterization of Habermas' position.
He views the big picture for Western countries this way:
Man kann sich fragen, warum die linken Parteien den Kampf gegen soziale Ungleichheit nicht offensiv, auf dem Weg zu einer supranational koordinierten Zähmung der unregulierten Märkte führen wollen. Als vernünftige Alternative – sowohl zum Status quo des verwilderten Finanzmarktkapitalismus wie zum Programm des „völkischen“ oder des linksnationalen Rückzugs in die vermeintliche Souveränität längst ausgehöhlter Nationalstaaten – bietet sich aus meiner Sicht nur eine supranationale Zusammenarbeit an, die das Ziel einer sozialverträglichen politischen Gestaltung der wirtschaftlichen Globalisierung verfolgt. Dafür reichen internationale Vertragsregime nicht aus; denn ganz abgesehen von deren zweifelhafter demokratischer Legitimation können politische Entscheidungen über verteilungsrelevante Fragen nur in einem festen institutionellen Rahmen implementiert werden. Daher bleibt nur der steinige Weg einer institutionellen Vertiefung und Verankerung einer demokratisch legitimierten Zusammenarbeit über nationale Grenzen hinweg. Die Europäische Union war einmal ein solches Projekt – und die Politische Euro-Union könnte es immer noch sein. Aber dafür sind die Hürden der innenpolitischen Willensbildung eben sehr hoch.
Die Sozialdemokratien sind seit Clinton, Blair und Schröder auf eine im ökonomischen Sinne systemkonforme Linie eingeschwenkt, weil das im politischen Sinne „systemkonform“ war oder zu sein schien: Im „Kampf um die Mitte“ glaubten diese politischen Parteien, Mehrheiten nur auf dem Weg der Anpassung an den neoliberalen Kurs gewinnen zu können. Dafür haben sie die Tolerierung der langfristig wachsenden sozialen Ungleichgewichte in Kauf genommen. Inzwischen ist offenbar dieser Preis – das wirtschaftliche und soziokulturelle „Abhängen“ immer größerer Bevölkerungsteile – so weit gestiegen, dass sich die Reaktion darauf nach rechts entlädt. Wohin auch sonst? Wenn eine glaubwürdige und offensiv vertretene Perspektive fehlt, bleibt dem Protest nur noch der Rückzug ins Expressive und Irrationale.
The question is why left-wing parties do not go on the offensive against social inequality by embarking upon a co-ordinated and cross-border taming of unregulated markets. As a sensible alternative – as much to the status quo of feral financial capitalism as to the agenda for a “völkisch” or left-nationalist retreat into the supposed sovereignty of long-since hollowed-out nation states – I would suggest there is only a supranational form of co-operation that pursues the goal of shaping a socially acceptable political reconfiguration of economic globalisation. International treaty regimes are insufficient here; for, putting aside completely their dubious democratic legitimacy, political decisions over questions of redistribution can only be carried out within a strict institutional framework. That leaves only the stony path to an institutional deepening and embedding of democratically legitimised co-operation across national borders. The European Union was once such a project – and a Political Union of the Eurozone could still be one. But the hurdles within the domestic decision-making process are rather high for that.
Since Clinton, Blair and Schröder[,] social democrats have swung over to the prevailing neoliberal line in economic policies because that was or seemed to be promising in the political sense: in the “battle for the middle ground” these political parties thought they could win majorities only by adopting the neoliberal course of action. This meant taking on board toleration of long-standing and growing social inequalities. Meantime, this price – the economic and socio-cultural “hanging out to dry” of ever-greater parts of the populace – has clearly risen so high that the reaction to it has gone over to the right. And where else? If there is no credible and pro-active perspective, then protest simply retreats into expressivist, irrational forms.
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