Iraq War: The 3I's After Action Report

The Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report (.pdf file) I mentioned in a previous post has some good observations about how the lack of preparation for the stabilization/occupation/counterinsurgency phase of the Iraq War affected how badly the occupation started, if you can translate the military jargon (my emphasis):

In preparation for SASO [Support and Stability Operations], units should continue to train civil-military operations (CMO) as part of their full spectrum operations training. The use of CMO situational training exercises (STX) training lanes incorporating detailed scenarios supports this home station training effort. The division as a whole did not focus on CMO training prior to the beginning of combat operations, instead focusing on mid intensity [conventional war] operations. Given that there are situations that mandate decentralized execution by our soldiers, a requirement exists to train the soldiers on a variety of scenarios.

As the division transitioned to SASO, it did not have sufficient forces or effective rules of engagement (ROE) to control civilian looting and rioting throughout the city [Baghdad].
Looting by the local civilians was a significant obstacle to the reestablishment of order in such a heavily populated area. Units were not able to dedicate resources to stop initial looting due to ongoing combat operations. However, once the enemy situation permitted, companies were able to focus on looting and began to detain and process looting civilians as EPWs [enemy prisoners of war]. The problem quickly diminished to a condition that a local organized "neighborhood watch" [i.e., private armed militias] could control.

Looting and rioting are one of the many competing priorities that commanders must plan for early in the transition to SASO. Employment of non-lethal munitions should be planned and resourced to allow a graduated response and minimize civilian casualties.

The After Action Report gives some indication of what a challenge the transition to occupation and counterinsurgency has been (my emphasis):

The Law of Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention require U.S. forces to protect specific targets such as hospitals, schools, population centers, and religious sites. [Notice that this Army report shows rather more concern for international law than the Secretary of Defense does.] Accurate IPB [intelligence prepartion of the battlefield] is important to identify these sites and adequately protect them.

Information about the infrastructure of the AO [area of operations] is critical for planning and prioritizing SASO [Support and Stability Operations]. Restoring any lost services after the cessation of hostilities is critical to establishing and legitimizing coalition control. Knowing the electrical, gas, water, and sewage distribution systems and how they are interconnected is essential to getting them functioning. Often, the facilities are intact, but not operating; knowing what facilities to restart is over half the battle.

The IPB must also identify the key locations for restoring a functioning society that will need protection such as banks, government buildings, public records, fire stations, police stations, court houses, jails/prisons and any other location that will have a significant impact on restoring the functions of a city/society. This identification enables commanders to determine risk and to allocate resources.

The report observes, "The transition from warfighting to SASO is a huge shift in priorities and focus for the entire division from the soldier in the street up to the division commander. The IPB for this transition needs to begin much earlier than the change itself." A major point of David Rieff's analysis mentioned in an earlier post is that lack of planning for "SASO" as the Army calls it compounded problems that were going to be serious in the best of circumstances.

Tags: iraq war