The current New York Times Magazine has a long article by David Rieff about the genesis of the problems currently facing the occupation in Iraq: Blueprint for a Mess. Much of it is a summary of events that have been previously reported, but it does have some original material, as well. (The NYT has taken to charging for articles more than a week old, so if you want to see it free, do it before next Saturday!)
Rieff summarizes the major problems in six categories, some of which not surprisingly overlap, and each of which he discusses at some length:
1. Over-reliance on exile leader Ahmed Chalabi
2. Shutting the State Department out from practical influence on reconstruction planning
3. Too little planning, too late, for the stablization and reconstruction phase
4. Inadequate numbers of troops without training or orders appropriate to occupation duties
5. Neglecting the official occupation structure authority. This is an especially interesting section of Rieff's article, describing how the "nation-building" authority set up in the Pentagon was neglected in practice by military officers whose active participation was necessary to make it work effectively.
6. Ignoring the Shiites Rieff also cites the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report (.pdf file), which is available online at an Army Web site, even though the document is marked "For Official Use Only." It's often interesting to see how internal Army professional analysts summarizes successes and failures. It's often quite a different approach that those you find in partisan commentaries.
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