It's worth asking with the welter of claims we hear about "Al Qa'ida" to look closely at what a particular author means when he or she talks about it. Sidney Blumenthal (Cooking the intelligence, again Salon 07/19/07) notes of the recently-released National Intelligence Estimate summary:
The latest NIE, however, is a strange product. According to highly reliable sources in the intelligence community, no new intelligence at all is reflected in the NIE. Its conclusions, on one level, are a rehash of obvious facts that anyone who reads a daily newspaper could glean, such as the protected status of al-Qaida in frontier regions of Pakistan. Other conclusions lack contextual analysis, partly because of the continuing pressure from the administration to politicize information and cherry-pick intelligence. The NIE, for example, does not explain that al-Qaida in Iraq, while lethal, is a very small part of the Sunni insurgency, and that a number of Sunni insurgent groups are its sworn enemies. Nor did the NIE note how few foreign fighters are in Iraq and what a small percentage of insurgents they constitute. (A Los Angeles Times story published on July 15 reported that of the 19,000 Iraqi prisoners held by the U.S. military there, only 135 are foreign fighters, and nearly half are Saudis.) The NIE is utterly devoid of political analysis. (my emphasis)At the risk of sounding like Joe Lieberman whining about the evils of partisanship, I do wish that partisan ideology hadn't drenched every aspect of public discussions of terrorism. But that's the world in which we live.
Hoffman does think Al Qa'ida is a significant threat still and that the core organization has rebuilt its capabilities since the Afghanistan War began in 2001. He summarizes his main conclusions:
Defeating al-Qaeda suggests first and foremost that our assessments and analyses must be anchored firmly to sound empirical judgment and not blinded by conjecture, mirror-imaging, politically partisan prisms and wishful thinking. Second is the need to refocus our attention and efforts back to South Asia - to Pakistan and Afghanistan, specifically - where it was following 9/11 and when al-Qaeda was indeed on the run. Third is the recognition that al-Qaeda cannot be defeated with military means alone. As one U.S. intelligence officer with vast experience in this realm told me over two years ago: "We just don't have enough bullets to kill them all." (my emphasis)I must admit I did a double-take, though, when I saw this sentence: "Although America, of course, encountered many frustrations during the Vietnam conflict, a lack of understanding of our adversary was not among them." That's not exactly the picture I have of that war.
But fighting terrorism is not the Vietnam War. And Hoffman argues plausibly that the enormous focus of time, money, attention and personnel on Iraq has had the tremendous opportunity cost (as the accountants say) of leaving US intelligence, military and law enforcement with less knowledge of Al Qa'ida than would otherwise have been expected:
In retrospect, it thus appears that Iraq has further blinded us to the possibility of an al-Qaeda renaissance. America and Britain's entanglement in that country the past four years and our overwhelming preoccupation first with an escalating insurgency and now with an incipient civil war consumed the attention and resources of our respective countries' military and intelligence communities - at precisely the time that Bin Laden, al Zawahiri and other senior al-Qaeda commanders were in their most desperate straits and stood to benefit most from this distraction. Iraq has thus had a pernicious effect on both our counterterrorism policies and perceptions of national security. As the situation in that country deteriorated, one could take solace in the president's argument that we were "fighting terrorists over there, so that we don't have to fight them here." The plots and attack plans against the United States previously described along with the Madrid and London attacks effectively challenge that once comforting, but now patently discredited, argument. (my emphasis)Personally, I never took much comfort from that argument of Bush's because it was always hokey. But I see what it means.
It is worth noting, though, that its not only in retrospect that his point there is obvious. That was one of the main arguments that opponents of the Iraq War made in 2002 and 2003 before the invasion. It was obvious beforehand that neglect of Al Qa'ida and the Afghanistan/Pakistan situation would be an inevitable result of invading Iraq. Even the preparations for invading Iraq in 2002 were already having that effect.
Hoffman makes a useful distinction between four categories of Al Qa'ida influence. One he calls Al Qa'ida Central, Bin Laden's core organization that does detailed planning for the most spectacular attacks, like the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa and 9/11:
It is believed that this hardcore remains centered in or around the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders and continues to exert actual coordination, if not some direct command-and-control capability, in terms of commissioning attacks, directing surveillance, collating reconnaissance, planning operations, and approving their execution. (my emphasis)A second category he calls Al Qa'ida Affiliates and Associates. These are groups that are primarily focused on local grievances but "over the years have benefited from Bin Laden's largesse and/or spiritual guidance and/or have received training, arms, money and other assistance from al-Qaeda." It's worth noting his list of organizations falling into that category, which includes "Al Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI)", which he calls "al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia" here:
This category includes groups such as al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), the late Abu Musab Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (formerly Jamaat al Tawhid wal Jihad), Asbat al-Ansar, Ansar al Islam, Islamic Army of Aden, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Jemaah Islamiya (JI), Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), and the various Kashmiri Islamic groups based in Pakistan - e.g., Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Laskar-e-Tayyiba (LET), and Laskar i Jhangvi (LiJ). Both the number and geographical diversity of these entities is proof of al-Qaeda's continued influence and vitality.Most of these groups are not any direct threat to the US, despite their Al Qa'ida affiliations of one kind or another.
He calls a third category Al Qa'ida Locals. This one includes what are often called self-starters. He mentions Ahmed Ressam, who was arrested in Washington State in December 1999 on his way to bomb Los Angeles International Airport, who had a previous background in the brutal Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA). He also includes the "7/7" London bombers of 2005, who did not have a specific terrorist background but were attracted to the Al Qa'ida version of jihad. In both Ressam's case and the 7/7 bombers, Al Qa'ida is thought to have given some general direction and assistance.
The final category Hoffman calls the Al Qa'ida Network, in which "the relationship with al-Qaeda is more inspirational than actual". He places Mohammed bouyen who killed Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands in that category.
Hoffman mentions a number of cases that were initially thought to be jihadists operating more-or-less on their own that later investigation indicated had significant Al Qa'ida involvement or direction. The details are really case-specific, so I'm not entirely sure what to make of these claims. He mentions the 7/7 bombers, two of which were in Pakistan and likely were trained by Al Qa'ida; that one seems credible to me and has been widely reported.
I was more surprised by his comment that "Spanish authorities now intimate that evidence is accumulating that al-Qaeda was behind the march 2004 Madrid bombings". That seems plausible enough. But I haven't been following that story closely enough to be able to make any kind of more informed judgment on it.
In other words, although he says the first two categories present the "most salient threat", but the last two categories could present an increasingly deadly threat. He defines the overall Al Qa'ida threat this way:
Thus, al-Qaeda's goal remains as it has always been: to inspire radicalized Muslims across the globe to join the movement's holy fight. Not only does al-Qaeda retain its core operational and command-and-control capabilities, it has shown remarkable resiliency and a stubborn capacity for renewal and regeneration. Even though its personnel may be dispersed, al-Qaeda remains a hierarchal organization: capable of ordering, planning and implementing bold terrorist strikes. Issues of classification and sensitive collection, as well as the British government's gathering of evidence for a number of criminal cases that remain sub judice, have prevented further, full, public disclosure of al-Qaeda's active involvement in the London attacks - and virtually every other major terrorist plot unmasked in the UK since 2003. However, suffice it to say that what is publicly known and has been reported in unclassified sources clearly points to such involvement. (my emphasis)That is the sort of thing that people are used to seizing upon and reading it for their own partisan line of the moment.
But Hoffman's analysis does not seem to me any reason to panic. He makes it clear that the international jihadist threat must be countered primarily through intelligence and police work, not by bombing Middle Eastern countries.
And he certainly is not using his estimation of the Al Qa'ida threat as a justification to continue the Iraq War into the indefinite future. "The Bush administration's new strategy to "surge" 21,000 American troops into Iraq is the latest fundamental misreading of our enemy's mindset and intentions", he writes.
Tags: bruce hoffman, iraq war, terrorism
No comments:
Post a Comment