War in Pakistan

William Arkin cautions about the US blundering into an ill-conceived military intervention in Pakistan (Don't open a third front in Pakistan Early Warning blog 01/28/08):

The danger of the U.S. military becoming more engaged in Pakistan now is not only that once again we are walking into a new country and a new culture that we don't understand, but also that we are leading with our military, thus connoting, no matter how modulated and sensitive that force will be, that we are on the path to yet another occupation, yet the other irony of our back to the future strategy to focus on Pakistan is also that militarily we will hardly commit the number of forces needed to make any short-term difference.

The administration's increasingly public expressions of concern about Pakistan reflect intelligence reports of a gathering storm. Ultimately though, our best military strategy is getting out of the way and assisting Pakistan to deal with the problem. If Washington wants to put more resources into the fight, than bolster the U.S. presence at the border in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda is not waiting in some trench line to fight us; they are waiting for us to blunder into yet another country so that they can once again scatter, while proving America's military crusade.

He also reminds us that the Afghanistan War was a failure early on and the triumphant claims from the Cheney-Bush administration about how great things went there were almost completely phony:

In late 2001, with the Taliban government in Afghanistan surprisingly and easily defeated, and with al Qaeda on the run, Rumsfeld and company, and the U.S. military particularly in the form of Gen. Tommy Franks, came to the conclusion that the "military" mission was over. So delighted were they with dodging a Soviet-style quagmire and so impressed were they with their lightning military success, they truly believed that the mop up was both minor and easy. No one at the top of the military food chain then believed that there was a long war ahead, and if anyone thought that that "war" was going to need the full participation of the non-military side of American power, no one was clearly articulating it. These were the days when Donald Rumsfeld's description of American fighting a new kind of war focused on Special Forces riding on horseback using laptops to call in air strikes not democracy and other slogans that would later emerge.

The bottom line was a poor assessment of the enemy and an error in understanding our own military achievement.

Tags: afghanistan war, pakistan, william arkin