Proportionality in war

Michael Walzer's article which I discussed in a previous post isn't the only one in the Spring 2009 Parameters that attacks the whole concept of proportionality in looking at civilian casualties. Jonathna Keiler in The End of Proportionality also makes an argument, with particular references to Israel's Lebanon War of 2006 and the Gaza campaign of a few months ago, that no concept of proportionality should apply to the provocation that initiates a war and the amount of damage done. Including the number of civilians killed.

But these arguments are not simply restricted to Israel. As Keiler writes, "There is little difference in the operational practices used by the Israeli and American militaries, which not only share many weapon systems but also elements of tactics and training."

He might have added, the US military and political elite have taken Israel's conduct in its conflicts with the Palestinians and Hizbullah as a model approach to dealing with Middle Eastern terrorists and guerrilla fighters.

Keiler describes one of the two main problems he sees with the concept of proportionality in war is that it has a basis in international law! He writes that "some of the most restrictive and logically twisted interpretations of the doctrine have a legitimate grounding in existing — albeit damaging — international law." (my emphasis)

And he goes on to use a most unfortunate historical example for why he thinks proportionality shouldn't apply: "After the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914 the doctrine of proportionality did not limit Austria-Hungary to counterregicide in response." No. But the war that began there wound up killing millions of people and brought down four empires: the Austro-Hungarian, the German, the Russian and the Ottoman. This doesn't strike me as an especially persuasive example of why it would be beneficial for the US and Israel and the rest of the world to throw the notion of proportional response to the winds.

But then, he thinks war is a rational enterprise:

It does not make sense to waste military effort by applying more force than appears necessary to reach military objectives at an acceptable cost. Given that caveat, the doctrine of proportionality is sensible, but it is also close to self-regulating.

Again: the Austro-Hungarian, the German, the Russian and the Ottoman Empires fell - because Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated. The notion of "acceptable cost" completely passed those emperors by. I'm starting to wonder how this one made it past the editors.

He elaborates:

Armies occasionally violate this principle, but do so to their own disadvantage. When they do it is usually in efforts that turn out to be mistakes. For example, the Allied carpet-bombing of Caen during the Normandy campaign was largely counterproductive.

No doubt, the self-regulating nature of military proportionality was a great comfort to the people of Caen. The survivors, anyway. Although in reality, the example doesn't fit with the argument on proportionality he's making.

He also virtually equates Israel's approach to the Lebanon War of 2006 to NATO's approach in the Kosovo War:

The Israeli bombing campaign in Lebanon closely mirrored NATO’s action in Kosovo, which was not generally criticized as disproportionate. At its outset the Kosovo campaign had no greater likelihood of success than the IDF campaign. The force used was greater than the opponent could muster, infrastructure was intensively targeted, civilian casualties were equal to or greater than in Lebanon, and the duration of the campaign was much longer (78 days as compared to 30). Indeed, there is little to distinguish the two campaigns, except that Kosovo ended in a NATO victory, while Lebanon may be characterized as an Israeli defeat.

Nothing to distinguish them except one was successful and the other was not, he says. Well, there was that little thing about NATO in Kosovo fighting a conventional war against a conventional military force while Israel was fighting a well-prepared guerrilla group in Lebanon.

Keiler's argument is an expansion of Walzer's. Walzer argues for disregarding enemy civilian casualties. Keiler argues that a nation should have the right and freedom to apply overwhelming force in response to even the smallest provocation to war:

Proportionality as a law of war concept for good reason [according to Keiler!] has had limited applicability and usefulness during the last century. It deserves to be disposed of entirely.

This guy could have been an advisor to Kaiser Franz Josef in 1914. Or to Kaiser Bill in Germany. Or the Czar of Russia. Or the Ottoman sultan.

Tags: laws of war