"The superiority she [Europe] has long maintained, has tempted her to plume herself as the mistress of the world, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. ... Facts have too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the European: it belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the Thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connexion between the old and the new world!Diet Senghaas uses that quotation from Federalist #11 (Publius/Alexander Hamilton) to argue that Europe needs to adopt a kind of city-on-a-hill strategy in world politics of leading by example. (Von Donald Trump bis Xi Jinping: Der neue Kampf innerhalb der Kulturen Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 12/2017)
He does this in the context of considering the current international scene from the viewpoint of "geo-cultural" tendencies. This view understands the Cold War was as defined by the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States encompassing military, economic and cultural aspects, the latter taken as values, broadly speaking. "Europa war in jeder Hinsicht – also geopolitisch, geoökonomisch und geokulturell – im Zentrum eines Weltkonflikts positioniert und extrem exponiert: zweigeteilt auf beide Lager und ohne nennenswerte Grauzone." ("Europe in this respect - that is, geopolitically, geo-economically and geo-culturally - positioned at the center of a world conflict and extremely exposed: split between both camps and without any gray zone to speak of.")
Senghaas argues that conflict within cultures are now far more a defining factor in the international behavior of states and blocs than during the Cold War. His use of "culture" seems to play off the meaning "civilization" in Samuel Huntington's controversial but influential concept of the Clash of Civilizations. The article runs 10 pages, so obviously it can provide only a general sketch for an overview of international politics for the world.
So, to sketch his sketch, he argues like pretty much all foreign policy analysts and scholars that China is seeking a more important world leadership role. And while the current Communist Party leadership seems very focused on maintaining its monopoly of power, it nevertheless faces internal political conflicts, even though they aren't expressed in the way they appear in parliamentary democracies. And while military clashes with the US in places like the South China Sea are a real possibility, Senghaas puts considerable weight on the observation that China's dealings with other countries have a heavily pragmatic orientation without a notable emphasis on spreading their political ideology. (Yanis Varoufakis has made a similar observation about Chinese proposals for business deal with Greece.) He concludes that China is more focused on its internal challenges and conflicts, which he describes as a "clash within civilization" than on foreign expansionism and intervention. Its assertive foreign policy, he argues, is "allerdings nicht der Ausgangspunkt für eine geokulturell verursachte Weltstrukturbildung à la Ost-West-Konflikt, also beispielsweise für einen China-West/USA-Konflikt – zumindest auf absehbare Zeit noch nicht" ("in any case not the springboard for a geo-cultural-based creation of a world structure à la an East-West conflict - like a China-West/US conflict, for instance - at least not for the foreseeable future.")
Senghaas takes the 2013 Chinese Communist Party Document Number Nine is a particularly useful source on the current Chinese policy orientation.
He sees Russia's policy under Putin as being based on Russian ethno-nationalism, though he doesn't use that term. Specifically, he argues that Russia takes a particular interest in relations with states that were part of the former Soviet Union. An obvious but important point. Yet it's nevertheless one that neocons and "humanitarian hawks" tend to regard with sputtering outrage, real or feigned. In Senghaas' terms, Russia's politically and military aggressiveness in neighboring countries like Georgia and Ukraine can be understood as part of a "geo-cultural" posture. (See Nuland, Victoria.) But, he argues, "Die eigene, russische Politik im eurasischen Raum wird als von
„identitärer Toleranz“ motiviert begriffen." ("The actual Russian policy in the Eurasian area should be understood as motivated by 'identitarian tolerance'.")The term "identitarian tolerance" is presumably an allusion to the far-right, xenophobic "identitarian" movement. (See: Identitarian movement - Germany's 'new right' hipsters Deutsche Welle 23.06.2017)
Senghaas doesn't address the issue of Russian interference in the 2016 US Presidential election. As more of the scope of that project is reliably documented in the public record, it could show a more interventionist orientation in Russian policy toward the US. But based on what we know at this writing, it seems to be more likely that the Russians assumed that Hillary Clinton would win the Presidency and they wanted to weaken her hand in pursuing policies opposed to Russian actions in those borderlands like Georgia and Ukraine, in particular. That picture is largely what emerges from the Frontline documentary Putin's Revenge (2017), for example.
He sees the conflict with Islamists as a mixture of internal cultural conflicts and "geo-cultural" ones. This makes sense. While Islamist militancy and terrorism can have dramatic impact in Western countries (the 9/11 attacks most notably), the focus of the Islamists is on predominately Islamic countries, where the geo-cultural aspects are more predominate. But in this article, the section on Islamic movements highlights more than any other the weaknesses of viewing Islam as a distinct "culture." The internal vs. geo-cultural distinction seems particularly questionable here.
His short article lumps together the US and Europe as the Western culture. He passes over Latin America altogether, and mentions Africa only in passing. (It is only a 10-page piece!) He views authoritarian tendencies as constituting the major conflict relevant to foreign policy considerations. He singles out the current forms of "illiberal democracy" that are in place and/or under development in Hungary, Poland and Turkey. Senghaas also sees conflict within Western culture as particularly evident in the obvious contemporary examples of Trumpism in the US, Brexit, the AfD getting elected to Parliament in Germany, and the Kurz/Strache alliance in Austria. The latter of which is still trying to form a government.
Like Samuel Huntington's conception, any worldview built around a clash of civilizations (or cultures) viewpoint has serious limitations for understanding international relations. To take an example from his article, it's not at all clear that Putin's actual political strategy is so committed to the ideology of "Eurasionism" identified with Alexander Dugin as Senghaas implies.
His idea of Europe leading by example and influencing the world primarily through its soft power is an appealing one. And I do think that making the European Union a further success is the most powerful thing European countries can do to protect their interest and exert their influence effectively on the international scene. Hopefully more constructively than otherwise!
But to do that, the Union will have to democratize itself. And the individual countries will have to Europeanize themselves enough so that voters and leaders can and do effectively contend over EU policies that effect them in major ways. The EU will have to abandon austerity economics. And even then, the Union will have to play an assertive and active role well beyond their borders. Relations with Russia will be a permanent issue for all of Europe, not just Russia's bordering countries. Obviously, the NATO alliance locks Europe into active engagement with the United States.
And as long as wars keep springing up in the Greater Middle East, there will be a refugee crisis in Europe, which climate change is also making an effectively permanent condition. It's hard to see how that can be effectively managed without some combination of active European peacemaking and development-assistance activities in the Middle East and northern Africa. As well as systematic absorption and integration of refugees as actual permanent immigrants in Europe.
I'm just not sure how much a "geo-cultural" framework helps European voters and policymakers get there.
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