Showing posts with label abu bakr. Show all posts
Showing posts with label abu bakr. Show all posts

Monday, November 02, 2009

Abū Bakr, ‛Abd al-Hamid Ibn Badis and Muslim political theory


‛Abd al-Hamid Ibn Badis (1889-1940)

I've written before about the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the first four caliphs following the Prophet Muhammad as leader of the Muslim community (umma). They were, with the time of their caliphates: Abū Bakr (632-634 CE); ‛Umar ibn al-Khaţţāb (634-644); ‛Uthmān ibn Άffān (644-656); and, ‛Alī ibn abī Tālib (656-661).

These four caliphs are assumed especially in the Sunni tradition to have established important precedents for Islāmic conduct. All four of them had known the Prophet and had worked closely with him, and were thus known as being among the "Companions of the Prophet". Naturally, their association with the Prophet added to the authority of their precedents as rulers.

The Shi'a, the "partisans of ‛Alī", recognized only ‛Alī among the four as a legitimate caliph. The Shi'a tendency emerged from the first Muslim civil war (Fitnah), which began during ‛Alī. Today about 10% of the world's Muslims being Shia. For centuries, the Shia would be intermixed in the same communities as the majority Sunni. The present-day geographical concentrations of Shia in Iran and certain areas of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon was a later development.

The following speech attributed to Abū Bakr from 632, "The Principles of Governing in Islam" appears in Oxford Islamic Studies Online. It is an English translation taken from al-Hihab (The Meteor) of January 1938, a newspaper of an Algerian Islamic reformer, ‛Abd al-Hamid Ibn Badis (1889-1940). The translation from the Arabic is by Emad Eldin Shahin. Shahin says in his introduction that the article, which apparently consisted almost completely of Abū Bakr's speech, "reflects Ibn Badis's nonconventional response to the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate [as a consequence of the First World War], which he held responsible for the repression and injustice of Muslim societies."

I've bolded passages that refer to requirements of rulers to act justly and to the need for the people to provide legitimacy and consent to the rulers based on the justice of their actions. The italicized passages are in the Oxford Islamic Studies Online original:

O People. I was entrusted as your ruler, although I am not better than any one of you.

Support me as long as you see me following the right path, and correct me when you see me going astray.

Obey me as long as I observe God in your affairs. If I disobey Him, you owe me no obedience.


The weak among you are powerful [in my eyes] until I get them their due. The powerful among you are weak [in my eyes] until I take away from them what is due to others.

I say that and seek God's forgiveness for myself and for you.

The First Principle

No one has the right to assume any of the affairs of the umma [Muslim community] without their consent. It is the people that have the right to delegate authority to the leaders and depose them. No one can rule without the consent of the people. Rule cannot be bequeathed nor be based on personal considerations. This principle is derived from [Abu Bakr's] statement, “I was entrusted as your ruler.” In other words, I was entrusted by others; and that is “you.”

The Second Principle

He who manages an affair of the Muslim community should be the most qualified in this matter and not the best in behavior. If two persons share good behavior and qualifications, but one is better in good behavior and the other is more qualified for this matter, the one who is better qualified should be entrusted with this matter. Undoubtedly, qualification varies with the circumstance and the position. Someone might be qualified in a specific matter and position for possessing the characteristics suitable for that position. In this case, he should be entrusted with that post. On this basis, the Prophet appointed ‘Amr ibn al-‘Asi [died 663] to lead the army of Dhat al-Salasil and supported him with Abu Bakr, ‘Umar [ibn al-Khattab, died 644], and Abu ‘Ubayda ibn al-Jarra [circa 581–639], who were all under his command, though they were better than him. He also appointed Usama ibn Zayd [died circa 673] as a commander of an army that included Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. This principle is based on the statement, “although I am not better than any one of you.”

The Third Principle

Assuming the affairs of the people does not make the ruler better than anyone else. Preference is achieved through merit and deeds. If Abu Bakr was better, this was not due to his rule over them but because of his deeds and stances. This principle is also derived from the statement, “although I am not better than any one of you.”

The Fourth Principle

The people have the right to monitor those in charge because they are the source of their authority and preserve the right to appoint or depose them.

The Fifth Principle

The responsibility of the people toward the ruler lies in offering assistance to him as long as they see him following the righteous path. They must support him, as they share with him the responsibility. This principle, as the previous one, is derived from the statement, “Support me as long as you see me following the right path.”

The Sixth Principle

The responsibility of the people also lies in advising and guiding the ruler and pointing the righteous path to him when he deviates. The people must correct him if he misbehaves. This principle is based on the statement, “correct me when you see me going astray.”

The Seventh Principle

The people have the right to question the rulers, hold them accountable for their actions, and make them follow the choice of the nation, not their own. The people have the final word, not the rulers. This is a result of the people's right to hold the rulers accountable and correct them when they are convinced that the rulers are not following the right path, and cannot convince the people otherwise. This is derived form the statement, “correct me when you see me going astray.”

The Eighth Principle

Any one who assumes an affair of the people should declare the plan he is going to follow, so that the people become aware of and agree to it. He is not allowed to lead the people as he pleases, but as they please. This principle is based on the statement, “Obey me as long as I observe God in your affairs.” His plan is the obedience of God. The people knew what the obedience of God in Islam entailed.

The Ninth Principle

The people will not be governed except by the law they voluntarily adopt, the law that realizes their interest. The rulers only implement the will of the people, who obey the law because it emanates from them, not because it is imposed on them by any other authority, be it of an individual or of a group. This makes the people feel free to manage their affairs on their own. Everyone in society will share this feeling. Freedom and sovereignty are a natural and legitimate right of every individual in society. This principle is derived from the statement, “Obey me as long as I observe God in your affairs. If I disobey Him, you owe me no obedience.” Thus, they do not obey the ruler per se, but they obey God by following the law that He has revealed and that they have accepted for themselves. The ruler is delegated by them to apply this law to everyone, including himself. Therefore, if he deviates, he forsakes their obedience.

The Tenth Principle

All are equal before the law, regardless of their strength or weakness. The law should apply to the strong without any fear of their strength and to the weak without leniency for their weakness.

The Eleventh Principle

[The state] should protect the rights of the individuals and groups in society. The rights of the weak should not be forsaken because of their weakness, and the strong should not usurp the right of anyone because of their strength.

The Twelfth Principle

[The state] should maintain a balance in society when protecting the rights of its members. The dues should be fairly taken from the strong without transgression or weakening them. The rights of the weak should be granted to them without favor due to their weakness, so that they do not transgress against others. This principle and the two previous ones are derived from the statement, “The weak among you are powerful [in my eyes] until I get them their due. The powerful among you are weak [in my eyes] until I take away from them what is due to others.”

The Thirteenth Principle

There should be a realization of a mutual responsibility of the ruler and the ruled in reforming society. They should always feel the need to continue working strenuously and seriously, and seek forgiveness from God, who oversees them. This is based on the statement, “I say that and seek God's forgiveness for myself and for you.”
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Wednesday, February 16, 2005

The Rightly Guided Caliphs: ‛Umar

After Abū Bakr's death in 634, his formally designated successor ‛Umar ibn al-Khaţţāb became caliph. On the formal succession planning, Hans Küng in Der Islam (2004) writes, "One had learned something from the crisis after the death of the Prophet."

‛Umar (also called ‛Umar I)set out to give greater emphasis to the Islamic nature of the caliphate. He did this be selecting close associates of Muhammad for high governmental positions. He also declared himself to be not only the Deputy of the Prophet but the Commander of the Faithful. This combination bound him "as caliph with the traditional authority of the elected tribal leader and the new authority as the top official of the Muslim community." (Küng) The elites of Mecca and Medina were still the dominant leadership group in the caliphate, and Medina was still the seat of the caliphate.

‛Umar built Abū Bakr's on the victory over Byzantium at Ağnādain in 634 by pressing the Muslim conquests further. He seized the Syrian capital of Damascus in 635. He took Jerusalem in 638; Byzantium would later recapture it, but could only hold it for a few years. In 641, Muslim forces seized Egypt from the Byzantian Empire. Byzantium continued as a power in Europe, but its eastern territories were now largely reduced to Anatolia (present-day Turkey).

In combat with the Sasanian (Persian) empire, ‛Umar seized their capital, Ctesiphon and other Persian cities including Isfahan. His conquests extended as far as Aserbadjan. Although the caliphate fought over various principalities for decades still, the great Sasanian Empire was destroyed by ‛Umar's forces.

How could the Muslims do it?

Küng stresses how remarkable it was that by the the time ‛Umar's death in 644, the two great empires of the area, Byzantium and the Sasanian Empire, were defeated and lost such large amounts of territory to the Muslim movement, whose existence dates from Muhammad's first revelations in 610. Up until Muhammad, the Arab tribes were were a weak collection of tribes squeezed between the two great empires next to them.

Relying in particular on Fred McGraw Donner's 1981 Early Islamic Conquests, Küng thinks that the traditional Muslim historiography is basically right when they give credit to Islam as a motivating and unifying force which made possible this historically rapid and far-reaching shift in regional power relations. The Islamic provided a common ideology and inspiration, and the political structures and leadership of Muhammad and the first two caliphs created a practical governmental form that made such conquests achievable by the heretofore scattered Arab tribes.

It's worth noting that Küng's reading of the role of the Islamic religion contrasts with that expressed by Karen Armstrong in her Islam (2000):

It is important, however, to be clear that when the Arabs burst out of Arabia they were not impelled by the ferocious power of "Islam." Western people often assume that Islam is a violent, militaristic faith which imposed itself on its subject peoples at sword-point This is an inaccurate interpretation of the Muslim wars of expansion. There was nothing religious about these campaigns, and Umar did not believe that he had a divine mandate to conquer the world. The objective of Umar and his warriors was entirely pragmatic: they wanted plunder and a common activity that would preserve the unity of the ummah. For centuries the Arabs had tried to raid the richer settled lands beyond the peninsula; the difference was that this time they had encountered a power vacuum. Persia and Byzantium had both been engaged for decades in a long and debilitating series of wars with one another. Both were exhausted. In Persia, there was factional strife, and flooding had destroyed the country's agriculture. Most of the Sassanian troops were of Arab origin and went over to the invaders during the campaign. In the Syrian and North African provinces of Byzantium, the local population had been alienated by the religious intolerance of the Greek Orthodox establishment, and were not disposed to come to their aid when the Arabs attacked, though Muslims could make no headway in the Byzantine heartlands ofAnatolia.
Küng's book also deals with the weakness of the two large empires against which the Muslim armies were fighting. But he gives a stronger weight to the contribution of Islam as such to making those conquests happen. And I'm inclined to agree with him, at this stage of my own knowledge about that period. And I'll even go out on a limb and speculate a bit about why Küng's reading differs from Armstrong's.

The main reason is probably that Armstrong is relying more on the Western liberal tradition of historiography. To digress a bit, historians in the nineteenth century started giving much more weight than their predecessors to economic and social considerations in looking at the causes of wars. And in the European context, the efforts to establish democratic institutions had to contend with the power of the institutionalized state Christian churches, both Catholic and Protestant. Part of the result was that religious explanations for events, including the traumatic and extremely destructive Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), were given much more intensive scrutiny.

This tradition has carried over into present-day historiography, which tends to de-emphasize religious motivations in political conflicts and to view such expressed motivations as superficial justifications for deeper-lying causes. And such caution in giving credence to official explanations for wars is certainly in order. Americans in 2005 shouldn't really need any reminders about that, given what we know know about the nonexistent "weapons of mass destruction" in Iraq.

But religious belief is also an historical fact. And today's accounts of the Thirty Years War are more willing to look at the religious conflicts that were involved. In fact, the century following the Protestant Reformation saw the set of conflicts in Europe now known as the Wars of Religion and then the Thirty Years War, which began with the revolt of Bohemian Protestants (Bohemia is part of today's Czech Republic) in defense of their right to practice Protestantism. It's also clear that other key events of the early modern period in Europe - the witch hunts, the settlement of the Americas, the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492 (yes, the same year that "Columbus sailed the ocean blue" financed the the Spanish "Catholic Monarchs" Ferdinand and Isabella), the Spanish Inquisition - clearly involved religious motivations, whatever other forces may also have been at work. All of North America was first explored by Jesuit missionaries, the shock-troops of the Pope in the Counter-Reformation, because they were willing to go to the most God-forsaken corners of theNorth American wilderness to win the souls of the heathen savages for Jesus and the Catholic Church.

And a big part of Küng's approach is to try to take an honest and realistic look at the role religion plays in historical events.

I suspect another factor is that Karen Armstrong is trying hard to present the most benign face of Islam to her readers, especially in Islam, which is part of the Modern Library Chronicles series, which tries to provide readers with a brief and "popular" but substantial overview of the current state of scholarship in the various topics covered. Don't get me wrong. Armstrong is a serious and respected religious scholar, and I would highly recommend her books to anyone interested in Islam or the other subjects she covers. And her ecumenical outlook certainly compatable with Hans Küng's. In the passage I quoted, for instance, she's at pains not to give ammunition to those who try to paint Islam as a "violent religion."

But I do think on this particular question, Küng's view which gives much greater weight to the religious factor is the more realistic one.

But Küng also makes clear, as Armstrong does, that the Muslim expansion in this period was not a matter of, in her words criticizing such a view, "a violent, militaristic faith" imposing "itself on its subject peoples at sword-point " In fact, Küng also gives credit to the Muslims' relatively accomodating attitude toward the conquered populations as an important factor in the successful expansion. There was no question that the Muslim Arabs ruled in those situations, and the people of the conquered territories had to recognized their authority and provide tax revenue for them. But they also did not force conversions among the conquered populations. In fact, at this stage, conversions to Islam were not particularly welcomed, in part because non-Muslims had to pay taxes from which Muslims were exempt. As he puts it:

Islam was understood at this time primarily as an Arab religion, a religion for Arabs. And it was thought that it should remain so. ...

And the missionary-religious zeal to convert others? The Arabs hardly developed any such thing. There are nowhere reports [from either Muslim historians or Western ones] of the conversion of wholecities, villages or regions, and certainly none of forced conversions.
Given Küng's ecumenical outlook, it's not surprising that he takes particular note of the fact that the new Muslim rulers were more tolerant of Jewish and dissident Christian communities and their religious observances than the previous Byzantine Christian empire had been. He writes that Jews in Palestine as well as the Coptic Christians in Egypt and Nestorian Christians in Iraq experienced the new Muslim rule as a genuine improvement from the previous restrictions placed on them. Muslims also allowed Jews to live in Jerusalem, which Byzantium had not. The Muslims regarded adherents of other monotheistic religions - Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians - as "people of the book" who would be protected as long as they recognized Muslim political supremacy in the conquered lands.

The past isn't even past (as Faulkner once wrote)

The following is an interesting example of how the actions of the Rightly Guided Caliphs are used by contemporary Muslims to reflect on the Islamic approach to issues. The The Taliban, the Buddhas, and Islamic Teaching by Azizah al-Hibri, Beliefnet.com (which has an annoying habit of not providing the dates for articles; this one is apparently from the first half of 2001). She refers here to ‛Umar as the third caliph, apparently counting Muhammad as the first, though normally Muhammad is not counted as a caliph.

For centuries, Islam has preserved and even maintained all prior cultural expressions, including the Egyptian Sphinx, the Persian Persepolis, ancient houses of worship belonging to other religions, and the pictures, images, artifacts and possessions housed in those sanctuaries. In fact, had it not been for Islamic protection, these structures and artifacts may not have survived. Khalifah 'Umar, a companion of the Prophet and the third Muslim Caliph, provides an excellent example. Upon entering Jerusalem in the seventh century, he prohibited the destruction of any Christian images or places of worship.
The point of reference was the plan of Aghanistan's former rulers, the Taliban, to demolish two historic giant statues of Buddha,a plan which they carried out.

‛Umar was killed in 644, as Küng puts it, "murdered by a, so it is said, discontented slave. The "Successor to the Messenger of God"and the "Commander of the Faithful," violently killed by a slave! That is for Muslims a shocking experience. It would not remain the only political murder of a caliph ..." (The ellipse is Küng's.)

The traditional reading of ‛Umar's death, which the Persian slave carried out in the mosque of Medina, was that it resulted from a personal grudge. Küng clearly doesn't buy it. He refers to explicitly as a "political murder." Maybe that was an early version of what today we might call a "lone gunman" theory. (Although I do believe that Oswald was acting alone, but that's a whole other discussion.)

There would be no question about the political nature of the ultimate fates of the final two Rightly Guided Caliphs. And both the political and religious implications of them still reverberate in the world today.

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Wednesday, February 09, 2005

The Rightly Guided Caliphs: Abū Bakr

The first of the "rightly guided caliphs" was Abū Bakr, who had been one of Muhammad's earliest followers. Like his three successors in the caliphate, he was considered one of the "Companions of the Prophet." His rule lasted only two years (632-634). But his two years were very important in establishing the instituiton of the caliphate and in holding the Arab tribes together while expanding the power of the Muslims with new conquests.

Abū Bakr's daughter ‛Ā'iša was one of Muhammad's wives, making Abū Bakr the Prophet's father-in-law. Though the partisans of Άli, the fourth caliph, would later claim that Muhammad had designated Άli as his successor, there was no clear process or public declaration of a mode of succession. Muhammad had selected Abū Bakr to be in charge of his final pilgrimage to Mecca and had designated him an "imām," or leader of prayer, shortly before he died. He was also from the Quyrash tribe and was one of the "emigrants" who had followed Muhammad to Mecca in the hiğra.

Whatever Muhammad's intention, Abū Bakr took on the leadership role, which he evidently assumed peacefully with no major opposition.

Hans Küng in Der Islam (2004) calls atention to a couple of distinctive aspects of the caliphate at this stage:

(1) The caliph was seen as the deputy of the Prophet, not as a leader by virtue of any direct divine revelation. "There was no longer any self-renewing legitimation by new divine revelations."

(2) The establishment of the caliphate represented the substitution of a leadership office for the charismatic leadership the Prophet had exercised.

The caliph became the political leader, but the Prophet himself was still seen as the religious leader. Abū Bakr declared that he sought to emulate the "sunna," the exemplary standard set by Muhammad. The "sunna" also referred to the Prophet's relatives, who initially carried on an important religious function in the community. As Küng says, the Qur'ān, the collection of Muhammad's divine revelations, became "in the long run the ultimate religious (but indirectly also the political) authority."

Hans Küng takes the conventional Sunni viewof the meaning of the caliphal title. But Patricia Crone in God's Caliph (1986) argues that the title used by the rightly guided caliphs and the Umayyads was khalifāt Allāh, or deputy of God. She says that during the Άbbasid caliphate, the title khalifāt rasūl Allāh, or successor of the messenger of God, also came to be used. In traditional Sunni historiography, the rightly guided caliphs were said to have used khalifāt rasūl Allāh, and that it was the first Umayyad caliph Mu'āwiya I who first adopted khalifāt Allāh. But she discounts this, arguing that the evidence indicates that the rightly guided caliphs used it, as well. This title would imply a greater authority to speak on religious matters than the khalifāt rasūl Allāh title.

Abū Bakr continued to unite the Arab tribes, including Beduins who began to fall away from the Muslim umma (community) after the Prophet's death. And he led them in successful military drives against neighboring tribes. Most of Arabia was thus brought into the Islamic camp. And Abū Bakr led the first Muslim war against the Byzantine Empire, which ended in Muslim victory at the battle of Ağnādain in 634.

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