US policy in the age of the "soft coup" in Latin America

In the grand scheme of things, it's hard not to think that removing elected governments by a "soft coup" like those in Paraguay in 2013 and in Brazil 2016 is preferable to the military brand of coup, of which Brazil 1964, Chile 1973 and Argentina 1976 are some of the more dramatic recent examples.

Honduras 2009 is sometimes cited as an example of the "soft coup." But it took the form of a military coup, though civilian government was quickly restored. And even obvious military coups also have a significant civilian political component. The Argentine coup of 1976 is also referred to commonly as a civilian-military coup. Just as the 1955 Argentine coup that styled itself the Revolución Libertadora involved substantial involvement at all stages from the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) and the Socialist and Communist Parties.

And even the famous nonviolent "regime change" operation promoted by the CIA in Iran and 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 had long-range effects that call into serious question the judgment of the Eisenhower Administration promoting those coups against what in retrospect were, at worst, mildly annoying regimes for Washington. The quick-and-easy coup in Honduras has left an ugly legacy of social violence that continues over five years later. (Thelma Mejía, Journalism in Honduras Trapped in Violence Inter Press Service 11/28/2016)Latin America in 2016: The Resurgence of the Right Continues The Real News 12/31/2016:

Latin America in 2016: The Resurgence of the Right Continues (2/2) 01/02/2017:

Emire Sader describes in Macri, Temer y Peña Nieto, huérfanos de Clinton Página/12 25.11.2016 the Obama-Clinton policy in effect in Latin America. Despite the pragmatic opening to Cuba, the Obama Administration's policy toward Latin America has been fundamentally conservative. Conservative in the sense of supporting conservative government's with less than enthusiastic commitments to democracy over democratic governments committed to progressive economic policies instead of the neoliberalism demanded by the Washington Consensus.

The Obama Administration supported the military coup that ousted Honduras' elected government in 2011 and the "soft coup" of 2013 in Paraguay, which was down by means of a cynically politicized impeachment of President Fernando Lugo, a supporter of liberation theology who was the candidate of the center-right Liberal Party. The hard right Colorado Party had not lost a national election since 1947, a period that included the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner during 1954–89.

Argentina elected Mauricio Macri President in 2015. He ran at the head of an electoral alliance called Cambiemos, which primarily consisted of Macri's own PRO party and the UCR, the latter party commonly referred to as "the radicals," although they have been a conservative oligarchic party for decades, arguably since 1945 and certainly since 1955.

In 2016, Dilma Rousseff was ousted from the Presidency by an utterly cynical impeachment with no basis that could be considered legitimate for a democracy. The new President, Michel Temer, isn't actually eligible to run for elected office in Brazil as part of his penalty on a corruption conviction. The "soft coup" impeachment against Dilma makes the frivolous impeachment of Bill Clinton by a rabidly partisan Republican House in the US in the 1990s look like a model of legal and democratic conduct.

Sader writes that Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State was responsible for:

la destrucción del gobierno de Manuel Zelaya en Honduras, después de que el último intento de golpe militar clásico en Venezuela, en 2002, hubiera fracasado. Ella y su gobierno apoyaron el golpe en contra de Fernando Lugo, que siguió el mismo guión, así como Hillary y Obama se callaron, de forma cómplice, frente al golpe en Brasil.

[the destruction of Manuel Zelaya's government in Honduras, after the previous attempt at a classic military coup in Venezuela in 2002 had failed. {The 2002 coup attempt was crassly supported by the Cheney-Bush Administrtion.} She and her go0vernment supported the {soft} coup against Fernando Lugo that followed the same guide, just as Hillary and Obama were silent in a complicit form in face of the {soft} coup in Brazil.]

Obama also made his first Presidential trip to Argentina in 2016 to show his support for the rightwing government of Mauricio Macri and "y anunciar una nueva época en las relaciones entre los dos gobiernos, felicitando al presidente argentino por los primeros pasos dados en dirección del viejo modelo neoliberal." ("to announce a new era in the relations between the two governments, congratualting the Argentine President for the first steps taken in the direction of the old neoliberal model.")

Sader sees the Obama-Clinton strategy in Latin America as being based around using the committed neoliberal government of Enrique Peña Nieto in Mexico with the heavyweight Brazil-Argentina combination to impose the neoliberal model onto recalcitrant governments and electorates like those in Bolivia, Ecuador and (of course!) Venezuela. But he notes that the Trump Family Business Administration's likely hostility to Mexico in particular could complicate this plan. "México entró en pánico con la elección de Trump y sus amenazas. De nada sirvió la grotesta invitación que hizo Peña Nieto a que lo visitara, con efectos negativos para la imagen del ya desgastado presidente mexicano." ("Mexico went into a panic over the election of Trump and his threats. The grotesque invitation that Peña Nieto made for him to visit was useless, with negative effective for the already eroded image of the Mexican President.") He also notes that if Trump carries through on his campaign skepticism about corporate-deregulation trade treaties, it could complicate the plans of the current Argentine and Brazilian government to forge a relationship to the United States as subordinate as that of Mexico, in Sader's formulation.

Part of the plan presumably favored by the Obama Administration and being implemented by the Macri and Temer governments was a weakening of the South American trade alliance Mercosur. (Alberto Müller, Erosionar la integración Página/12 24.12.2016) Mercosur has functioned under the leadership of the so-called "Pink Tide" left-leaning governments of the last decade or so as an institution representing continental cooperation among South American government to establish independent regional power and influence against the neoliberal agenda. It has functioned in some of the spirit of the Patria Grande thinkers who encourage such regional cooperation against imperialist influences.

The Administration of current Argentine President Mauricio Macri, currently busily making friends with the American President-elect, has been giving Argentina and the world a textbook example of the damage neoliberal economic policies can do since taking office in December 2015. (GDP falls 3.8% in third quarter as investment remains elusive Buenos Aires Herald 12/23/2016; Leandro Renou, ‘The lower middle classes are heavily reducing consumption’ Buenos Aires Herald 12/23/2016)

His government is the kind that left nationalists in Argentina refer to as capayo (sepoy), referring to politicians and governments that are subservient to foreign interests, particularly economic interest. (It's not meant as a compliment!)

Even during the left-Peronist governments of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández (2003-2009), the conservative opposition kept up a steady stream of accusations of massive corruption and authoritarian tendencies, most of them with little or no real content.

The Macri regime is trying to use such accusation now against Cristina and her Partido Justicialista (PJ) and well as the social movements and groups that are a critical part of the kirchnerista base. The case of activist Milagro Sala has received attention from international human rights groups. "The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention ruled in October [2016] that her detention was arbitrary and ordered Argentina's government to free her immediately. However, the Macri administration considered the decision non-binding." (Argentina Human Rights Hero Milagro Sala Sentenced to 3 Years TeleSur 12/28/2016; Sala receives first sentence Buenos Aires Herald 12/30/2016)

See also:

Edgardo Mocca, El caso Milagro Sala Página/12 04.12.2016
Cruces en el massismo por Milagro Sala Página/12 02.01.2017
Luis Bruschtein, Milagros demonizados Página/12 02.01.2017

Macri's government is also going after former President Cristina Fernández on a corruption charge that looks contrived. And on another charge, with which I'm far more familiar and which is about as bogus as they come.

The courts have brought a formal indictment against her on the former charge. (In second push, CFK indicted for public works graft Buenos Aires Herald 12/30/2016)

The other charge is a revival of a case that former prosecutor Alberto Nisman tried to bring against her over her handling of the still-ongoing investigation into the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires. I blogged about this back in 2015 as the original case was unfolding. The case is ludicrous. Very short version: Nisman was accusing her of doing something that wasn't illegal and for which there is no good evidence she did and very substantial material in the public record to show she did not do it. Nisman himself died of a gunshot wound that by all publicly known indications was a suicide, although the official investigation is still open. But at the time of the likely suicide, his case against the then-President was rapidly coming apart publicly, which could have been a contributing cause of the suicide. (Nisman AMIA complaint against CFK re-opened Buenos Aires Herald 12/30/2016; A history of the judicial back and forth, almost two years in the making Buenos Aires Herald 12/30/2016)

Other articles on the Nisman charge include the following, some of which show signs of the many uses to which the AMIA case has been put, not least because it's a key part of the American claim that Iran has an advanced ability to project substantial terrorist action in the Western Hemisphere, although lots has changed in 24 years. The case itself has never been solved, though Argentina's official theory of the case is that Iran was behind it. And Cristina herself pursued that theory as President. She was aggressive as a Senator in pursuing the investigation into the attack. For background, see The Unsolved Terror Attack At The Center Of Argentina’s Political Crisis World Post 01/30/2015.

Argentine court rules ex-president may have covered up Iranian bombing of Jewish center Jewish Telegraph Agency 12/30/2016; this is actually a poor report on the charge
Argentine ex-president Kirchner faces new probe over bombing AFP/Yahoo! News ; the headline does not reflect the report and looks purely propagandistic. The article itself reports, "Four lower courts had thrown the case out on grounds there was no evidence a crime had been committed."
“Es el uso y abuso de los muertos de la AMIA” Página/12 30.12.2016
Excusaciones y recusaciones Página/12 11.11.2016

Aljazeera also features a sloppy report on Cristina's situation, taking the conservative government's highly politicized accusations of Macri's conservative government, Former Argentine president Cristina Kirchner faces court 01/01/2017. One of the people this report quotes is Marioano Obarrio, identified only as a "journalist." That's true. He's a journalist for La Nación, the rightwing government which has repeatedly over the decades supported military governments and has been the journalistic voice for the Argentine oligarchy since it was founded by former President Bartolomé Mitre in 1870. (Except for a period during Juan Perón's first government when the paper was seized by the government.

It's concerning to see Aljazeera presenting a report made with such credulity to rightwing charges that one would have to be very generous to describe as highly questionable. So far, they look downright frivolous.

Brazil's "soft coup" against Dilma Rousseff completed last week

Jonathan Watts Donna Bowater summarize the story of former Brazilian President Dilms Rousseff's impeachment in Brazil's Dilma Rousseff impeached by senate in crushing defeat 09/01/2016. This is the biggest example so far of what has come to be known as a "soft coup":

For more than 10 months, the leftist leader fought efforts to impeach her for frontloading funds for government social programmes and issuing spending budget decrees without congressional approval ahead of her reelection in 2014. The opposition claimed that these constituted a “crime of responsibility”. Rousseff denies this and claims the charges – which were never levelled at previous administrations who did the same thing – have been trumped up by opponents who were unable to accept the Workers’ party’s victory.

Speaking to her supporters from the presidential palace after the vote, Rousseff pledged to appeal her impeachment, which she called a parliamentary coup. The ousted president also called on her supporters to fight the conservative agenda now bolstered by her removal from office.

“Right now, I will not say goodbye to you. I am certain I can say, ‘See you soon,’” she told supporters in Brasilia.

In keeping with her pledge to fight until the end for the 54 million voters who put her in office, Rousseff – a former Marxist guerrilla – ended her presidency this week with a gritty 14-hour defence of her government’s achievements and a sharply worded attack on the “usurpers” and “coup-mongers” who ejected her from power without an election.

The "soft coup" in Brazil goes after Lula de Silva

Eric Nepomuceno looks at development in the ongoing "soft coup" in Brazil. (Lula es el verdadero blanco del golpe Página/12 29.08.2016)

The headline is a word play on "golpe blanco" (soft coup), also called golpe en blanco. Blanco also means "target." So the headline reads, Lula is the real blanco of the coup.

Elected President Dilma Rousseff (PT, Partido dos Trabalhadores) of the Workers Party was removed from office in impeachment proceedings driven by the opposition on trumped-up corruption charges. The credibility of the whole proceeding isn't enhanced by the fact that the interim President Michel Temer is currently restricted banned from running for any public office in Brazil as part of a legal penalty related to corruption charges.

Nepomuceno reports on a new development in which the Policía Federal, the Brazilian version of the FBI, has made a report implicating former President Lula de Silva in what sounds like another very shaky corruption charge having to do with an apartment he and his wife had bought while it was being constructed. According to Nepomuceno's report, Lula had pulled out of the arrangement and his attorneys had asked the construction company to recover the money. Since apparently Lula and his wife stood to lose money on the deal, it's kind of hard on the face of it to see how this functions as some kind of a bribe for him. In this way, it's reminiscent of the Whitewater pseudoscandal in the 1990s in the United States.

The successive governments of Lula and Dilma were part of what has been called the "pink tide" of left governments in Latin America which challenged the neoliberal "Washington Consensus" in various ways. Lula was President 2003-2011, succeeded by Dilma until she was removed from office in this year's "soft coup."

Corruption is a part of life in business and in government, but that's certainly no reason to be complacent about it, much less accepting.

Corruption accusations are also part of politics. And accusations of corruption are not the same as real corruption. The long history of pseudoscandals is an excellent reminder of that.

But politics is also involved in even legitimate investigations of corruption, particularly when it involves the head of government. The impeachment of Bill Clinton is a great example of that, too. The charges against him were essentially trivial in the end. And the partisan motivations were painfully obvious. Which is why a solid majority of the public supported him in his fight against impeachment.

The other Presidential impeachment in the US, that of Andrew Johnson, was also intensely political and partisan. The underlying political issue there was a substantial one. Johnson's opponents were seeking to have a democratic Reconstruction in the occupied South that would protect the right of black citizens instead of the planter-friendly "Presidential Reconstruction" Johnson had implemented. The formal charge against him is still debated. But, at best, it involved a big judgment call on the part of those Senators voting unsuccessfully for his removal from office related to the Tenure-of-Office law which Johnson was impeached for allegedly violating.

John Kennedy in his 1957 Profiles in Courage, written before he had his touch encounters as President with the intransigence of Southern segregationist Governors like Ross Barnett and George Wallace, selected Kansas Republican Sen. Edmund Ross (1826–1907) for one of his profiles based on his voting against convicting Johnson in the Senate. It was a decisive vote, since conviction failed by only one vote.

In the Brazilian case, there are real problems with corruption, many of them stemming from the state oil company Petrobras. Brazil isn't as exclusively a petrostate as Venezuela. But it is a petrostate. And corruption is one of their chronic problems.

Still, the superficial and strained nature of the corruption charges against both Lula and Dilma is an indication of how insubstantial the actual evidence against them is. The conservative parties in South America share a common program of opposing left governments and defending the neoliberal political and ideological project.

And "soft coups" have become a common approach to unseating left governments. (See my post The art of the "soft coup" 04/12/2016 for more details.) Paraguay served as a kind of test case for a golpe blanco in 2012. Outside of Latin America, Ukraine in 2014 also experienced a "soft coup" with a destructive upshot in the conflict with Russia. That is one of the options being attempted by the opposition in Venezuela.

What the exact American role was in those coups, we probably won't know for years. But in Paraguay and Ukraine, and apparently now in Brazil, the Obama Administration has been sympathetic to the soft coups. And presumably would be sympathetic to one in Venezuela, as well.

The goal of the "soft coup" in Brazil

Emir Sader, El asalto al poder en Brasil Pâgina/12 30.05.2016 on the goals of the "soft coup" that just ousted the elected gobernment of Dilma Rousseff of the Workers' Party (PT) in Brazil:

La cuestión de fondo al remover los gobiernos del PT es el restablecimiento del modelo neoliberal en Brasil, como ocurre en Argentina.

[The basic question in removing the governments of the PT is the reestablishment of the neoliberal model in Brazil, as has occurred in Argentina.]

At least in Argentina, this was accomplished through the normal democratic process, not by an illegitimate overturning of election results.

The soft coup in Brazil and the so-called Pink Tide governments

Argentine political theorist Atilio Boron writes about the "soft coup/institutional coup" in Brazil, Salto al poder en Brasil Página/12 13.05.2016.

Boron calls the soft coup in Brazil, a "serious setback for all of Latin America," of which Brazil is the most populous country.

He means this in two senses. One is for what we might call democracy in general. The Brazilian opposition used the impeachment process for illegitimate purposes, and barely even put up any pretence there was any legal substance to their action. The other is more specifically for the democratic left parties and movements, including elected Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff's Workers' Party (PT), that have come to power during the last two decades and have successfully implemented development and social policies at odds with the neoliberal orthodoxy of the IMF and the World Bank known as the "Washington Consensus."

This is referred to in the American press as the "pink tide," kind of a throwback to Cold War lingo of "pinko" referring to non-Communist leftists. It's not a very meaningful label. And often carelessly described, e.g., Linette Lopez, We may be witnessing the downfall of an international political revolution Business Insider 12/07/2015. "Post-neoliberal" would be a more appropriate term. Although it doesn't refer to a group of parties formally connected like the social-democratic Socialist International. It generally is used to include these South American governments:

• Argentina: the governments of the post-2001-crisis, especially the "kirchernista" governments of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015). Defeated by the hardline neoliberal electoral coalition behind current President Mauricio Macri.
• Bolivia: The Evo Morales government of 2006-present; Morales' party is the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS-IPSP)
• Brazil: The Workers' Party (PT) governments of 2003-2016, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016)
• Chile: The current President Michelle Bachelet beginning in 2014; her center-left/left Nueva Mayoría electoral coalition even includes the Communist Party, whose most famous member and now a Deputy (Member) of the Chilean Parliament is the former student leader Camila Vallejo Dowling.
• Ecaudor: The government of current President Rafael Correa, first elected in 2007; his electoral coalition is the Alianza País (AP).
• Paraguay: The government of former Catholic bishop and liberation theologian Fernando Lugo (2008-2012), also ousted in an "institutional coup/soft coup"; he was elected in 2008 as the candidate of the Alianza Patriótica para el Cambio (APC)
• Uruguay: The Frente Amplia governments of Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2010), José Mujica (2010-2015) and Tabaré Vázquez again (2015-present) (See: Matt Beagle, Uruguay’s Tabaré Vazquez: Pink Tide or Political Voice of the Center? Council on Hemispheric Affairs 03/04/2006)
• Venezuela: By far the one most perturbing to Washington and the Latin American right, the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) governments of Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013-present).

See also:

Nick Caistor, Latin America: The 'pink tide' turns BBC News 12/11/2015

Robie Mitchell, The Pink Tide Recedes: End of An Era? Council on Hemispheric Affairs 01/14/2016

Jason Tockman, The Rise of the "Pink Tide": Trade, Integration, and Economic Crisis in Latin America Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 10:2 (Summer/Fall 2009)

In a recent post, I wrote, "I'm sure it's pure coincidence. But Liliana Ayalde, the current US Ambassador to Brazil, served as US Ambassador to Paraguay from 2008-2011. A very similar "institutional coup" took place in Paraguay in 2012. (Benjamin Dangl, Behind Paraguay's coup Aljazeera 07/26/2012)"

Boron writes:

La confabulación de la derecha brasileña contó con el apoyo de Washington –¡imaginen cómo habría reaccionado la Casa Blanca si algo semejante se hubiera tramado en contra de alguno de sus peones en la región!– En su momento Barack Obama envió como embajadora en Brasil a Liliana Ayalde, una experta en promover “golpes blandos” porque antes de asumir su cargo en Brasilia, en el cual se sigue desempeñando, seguramente que de pura casualidad había sido embajadora en Paraguay, en vísperas del derrocamiento “institucional” de Fernando Lugo.

[The plot of the Brazilian right counted on the support of Washington - imagine how the White House would have reacted if something like that had been hatched against one of its peons in the region! - In his moment Barack Obama sent as Ambassador to Brazil Liliana Ayalde, an expert in promoting "soft coups" because before assuming her post in Brasilia, in which she is still filling, surely by pure chance had been Ambassador to Paraguay on the eve of the "institutional" overthrow of Ferando Lugo.]

And he points to the collaboration of other rightist parties and governments in Latin America:

Pero el imperio no es omnipotente, y para viabilizar la conspiración reaccionaria en Brasil suscitó la complicidad de varios gobiernos de la región, como el argentino, que definió el ataque que sus amigos brasileños estaban perpetrando en contra de la democracia como un rutinario ejercicio parlamentario y nada más.

[But the empire is not omnipotent, and to make the reactionary conspiracy in Brazil viable, aroused the complicity of various governments in the region, like that of Argentina [the Macri Administration], which defined the attack that his Brazilian friends were perpetrating against democracy in the form of a routine parliamentary exercise and nothing more.]

Left parties and governments, including the Argentine opposition Frente para la Victoria and the citizen mobilizations led by former Argentine President Cristina Fernández, have also recognized the international dimensions of the soft coup against Rousseff and expressed their support for her in this crisis.

Boron calls attention to three major groups of actors in the coup against Rousseff. One group is composed of the opposition legislators who abused their Constitutional powers to nullify the results of the 2014 Presidential election. The second is the judiciary dominated by pro-oligarchy conservatives and reactionaries. (In Argentina, the kirchneristas refer to the rightingwingers in the Argentine judiciary as the Judicial Party to emphasize their crass partisanship.) And the third is made up of the media companies that joined in the soft coup. In the United States, the center-left has been very reluctant to challenge the nature and structure of the corporate media directly; the conservatives have been far more perceptive about exploiting them very much to their benefit, all the while whining about the evil "liberal press." Boron writes on the
Brazilian media:

El tercer protagonista de esta gigantesca estafa a la soberanía popular son los principales medios de comunicación del Brasil, cuya vocación golpista y ethos profundamente reaccionario son ampliamente conocidos porque han militado desde siempre en contra de cualquier proyecto de cambio en uno de los países más injustos del planeta. Al separar a Dilma Rousseff de su cargo (por un plazo máximo de 180 días en el cual el Senado deberá decidir por una mayoría de dos tercios si la acusación en contra de la presidenta se ratifica o no) el interinato presidencial recayó sobre un oscuro y mediocre político, un ex aliado del PT convertido en un conspicuo conspirador y, finalmente, infame traidor: Michel Temer. Desgraciadamente, todo hace suponer que en poco tiempo más el Senado convertirá la suspensión temporal en destitución definitiva de la presidenta porque en la votación que la apartó de su cargo los conspiradores obtuvieron 55 votos, uno más de los exigidos para destituirla. Y eso será así pese a que, como Dilma lo reconociera al ser notificada de la decisión senatorial, pudo haber cometido errores pero jamás crímenes. Su límpido historial en esa materia resplandece cuando se lo contrasta con los prontuarios delictivos de sus censores, torvos personajes prefigurados en la Opera del Malandro de Chico Buarque cuando se burlaba del “malandro oficial, el candidato a malandro federal, y el malandro con contrato, con corbata y capital”. Ese malandraje hoy gobierna Brasil.

[The third protagonist of this gigantic swindle on popular sovereignty are the principle media of communication of Brazil, whose coup vocation and profoundly reactionary ethos are very well known because since forever they have actively opposed every project of change in one of the most unjust countries of the planet. {Presumably here he's referring to social injustices in Brazil, not just to the general problems of their governments.} To separate Dilma Rousseff from her office (for a period of maximum 180 days in which the Senate will have to decide with a two-thirds majority if they agree with the accusation against the President or not) the interim Presidency fell to an obscure and mediocre politician, a former ally of the PT who converted into a conspicuous conspirator and, finally, into an infamous traitor: Michel Temer. Unfortunately, everyone is assuming that in a short time from now the Senate will convert the temporary suspension into final removal of the President because the vote that separated her from her office {temporarily} obtained 55 votes, one more than needed to remove her. And that's how it will be despite the fact that, as Dilma recognized when she was notified of the Senatorial decision, may have committed mistakes but never crimes. Her pristine legal record in this material shines when it is contrasted with the felonious criminal records of those who censure her, grim personalities prefigured in the Opera del Malandro by Chico Buarque when he made fun of the "official scrounger, the candidate of federal scrounging, and the scrounger with a contract, a tie and capital." This scrounging is now governing Brazil.]

Boron doesn't mention any of the Brazilian media companies by name, but the Grupo Globo is surely one of those he has in mind.

He discusses three broad mistakes by Dilma and the PT, lessons for the democratic left in Latin America more generally, particularly at the moment in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, whose governments are targets of the conservative opposition parties and their international allies and all three of which, he notes, were the target of some kind of coup attempt in, respectively, 2008, 2010 and 2002.

The first two mistakes he discusses are closely related: the failure to maintain active mass political movements outside the traditional party structures, as well as neglecting to maintain popular militancy within the PT itself, coupled with an excessive faith that the established state structures would be sufficient to achieve the social reforms they PT leaders envisioned without relying on the popular militancy.

Tercer error: haber desalentado el debate y la crítica al interior del partido y del gobierno, apañando en cambio un consignismo facilista que obstruía la visión de los desaciertos e impedía corregirlos antes de que, como se comprobó ahora, el daño fuera irreparable. Por algo Maquiavelo decía que uno de los peores enemigos de la estabilidad de los gobernantes era el nefasto rol de sus consejeros y asesores, siempre dispuestos a adularlos y, por eso mismo, absolutamente incapacitados para alertar de los peligros y acechanzas que aguardaban a lo largo del camino. Ojalá que los traumáticos eventos que se produjeron en Brasil en estos días nos sirvan para aprender estas lecciones.

[Third error: having discouraged debate and criticism inside the party and the government, arranging instead an easy self-confirmation that disregarded the mistakes and impeded their correction before, as they are experiencing today, the damage was irreparable. There's a reason Machiavelli said that one of the worst enemies of stability of governments was the disastrous role of their counselors and advisers who are always ready to adore them and, for that very reason, are absolutely incapable of alerting them to dangers and the unexpected along the road. I hope the traumatic events that are occurring in Brazil these days will help us understand these lessons.]

Boron believes that the left-leaning governments in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have generally avoided those mistakes.

Meanwhile, "a gang of bandits took the Presidency of Brazil by assault." ("Una pandilla de bandidos tomó por asalto la presidencia de Brasil.")

See also:

Vincent Bevins, In post-impeachment Brazil, the new conservative Cabinet is 100% white men Los Angeles Times 05/13/2016

Vincent Bevins, Three months before Olympics, Brazil suddenly has a lot to resolve Los Angeles Times 05/13/2016

Daniel Gallas, Michel Temer: The man who now leads Brazil BBC News 05/12/2016

Tim Johnson, U.S. officials warn of looming crisis in Venezuela McClatchy Newspapers 05/13/2016

Clarice Silber, Panama Papers lob ‘atomic bomb’ on Brazil’s political class McClatchy Newspapers 04/13/2016

On the "soft coup" concept:

Juan Sebastian Chavarro, Soft Coup in Brazil: A Blow to Brazilian Democracy Council on Hemispheric Affairs 05/12/2016

Ted Snider, A ‘Silent Coup’ for Brazil? Consortium News 03/30/2016

"Soft coup" in Brazil and Thursday

The "institutional coup," aka, "soft coup" in Brazil took place on Thursday. It's a really bad sign for democracy in Brazil and more broadly in Latin America.

Cenk Uygur of The Young Turks gives a rundown on the story in Brazillian [sic] Impeachment Is Actually A Corporate Coup 05/12/2016:





His description of the new President, Michel Temer, is pretty amazing. He's legally banned for running for any public office in Brazil as part of a legal penalty for corruption charges. But the Brazilian oligarchy just installed him as the President of one of the largest and most populous countries in the world. This is not a good thing.

Formally, the Brazilian Senate has voted to conduct and impeachment trial of elected President Dilma Rousseff. But under the Brazilian Constitution, that means she's temporarily removed from power, in this case for up to six months. (Jonathan Watts, Dilma Rousseff suspended as senate votes to impeach Brazilian president The Guardian 05/12/2016)

Rousseff called the action a "modern coup" carried out by the "traitor" Temer. (Democracia suspendida Página/12 12.05.2016)

The new President isn't wasting a moment in implementing standard neoliberal (Herbert Hoover/Angela Merkel/Mauricio Macri) economic policies. Jonathan Watts reports in Michel Temer takes reins as Brazil's president with pledge to rebuild country The Guardian 05/12/2016:

Although he promised to maintain welfare programmes such as bolsa familia poverty relief, he has touted balancing the budget and getting inflation back under 10% as his priority.

In a sign of his commitment to austerity, Temer has slashed the number of cabinet posts from 31 to 22. But he may find it hard to cut other costs ahead of municipal elections and with unemployment already in double digits.

Whether this tough task can be achieved will depend largely on new finance minister Henrique Meirelles, who gained considerable kudos as central bank president under the first two Workers’ party governments. He will be charged with reining in expenses and encouraging other ministers to push ahead with privatisation, outsourcing and weakening stringent labour and pension laws.

Oh, and of course he is inviting the Confidence Fairy to come in and boost the economy. (Brazil's Temer calls for unity, confidence for Brazil recovery) The phrase "con man" is short for "confidence man." I'm just sayin'. (Lisandra Paraguassu and Alonso Soto, Brazil's Temer calls for unity, confidence for Brazil recovery Reuters 05/12/2016)

Brazilian resident Glenn Greenwald reports on the "soft coup" in Brazil’s Democracy to Suffer Grievous Blow as Unelectable, Corrupt Neoliberal is Installed The Intercept 05/11/2016, on which Cenk relies in the video report above. He calls attention to the malign role the major media in Brazil have played in this:

Beyond its obvious global significance, the reason I’ve spent so much time and energy writing about these events is because it’s been astonishing – and unnerving – to watch it all unfold, particularly given how the country’s dominant media, owned by a tiny handful of rich families, allows almost no plurality of opinion. Instead, as Reporters Without Borders put it earlier this month: “In a barely veiled manner, the leading national media have urged the public to help bring down President Dilma Rousseff. The journalists working for these media groups are clearly subject to the influence of private and partisan interests, and these permanent conflicts of interests are clearly very detrimental to the quality of their reporting.”

This Reuters story provides some background, though it doesn't explain how transparently phony the impeachment charges are, Trials and errors: how Rousseff lost Brazil Buenos Aires Herald 05/12/2016.

I'm sure it's pure coincidence. But Liliana Ayalde, the current US Ambassador to Brazil, served as US Ambassador to Paraguay from 2008-2011. A very similar "institutional coup" took place in Paraguay in 2012. (Benjamin Dangl, Behind Paraguay's coup Aljazeera 07/26/2012)

See also:

BBC News, Brazil impeachment: New leader Temer calls for trust 05/13/2016

Darío Pignotti, La noche que la democracia entra en suspenso Página/12 12.05.2016

Darío Pignotti, Dilma luchará contra los usurpadores del Planalto Página/12 13.05.2016

Kleber Tomaz, Temer é ficha-suja e fica inelegível por 8 anos, diz promotora eleitoral 05.05.2016 Globo.com

Gleen Greenwald on the soft coup going on in Brazil

A Brazilain friend of mine who is upset about the so-called "soft coup" or "constitutional coup" underway in Brazil recommended this Cristine Amanpour interview with Glenn Greenwald (in English) as a good summary of the situation, Na CNN jornalista desmascara o impeachment contra Dilma Rousseff no Brasil | O Prato Feito 04/20/2016:

"Soft coup" in Brazil

The impeachment vote on Sunday against left-leaning Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff could be an important turning point in Latin America.

Whether it's a good one or not is not only a matter of perspective. It's also a matter of what happens going forward.

Dilma's supporters, and the democratic left in Latin America more generally, are calling this a coup. The press talks a lot about "corruption" in Brazil, corruption being both a real thing and a sneer word applied to nations whom the speaker doesn't favor. (Blanket, reflexive accusations of corruption have been a common attack on Greece by their EU "partners" in northern Europe.)

But this impeachment move didn't bother to put much of a fig leaf on what they were doing, charging the President with mismanaging the budget. Not as in stealing money, but as in they didn't like her budget. So it's legitimate to call it a coup. Terms I've seen used for it recently include soft coup (golpe blando), institutional coup, and parliamentary coup.

Dilma is in her second term as the elected President of Brazil. First elected in 2011, she became Brazil's first female President, and was reelected in 2014 as the candidate of the Workers' Party, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT).

With the new economic slump in much of the world and with the drop in oil prices in particular, Brazil has been hit hard economically in the last year. A significant part of Brazil's strong growth in prior years has been business with China. And now China's economy is slowing down.

The impeachment process there has some similarities to those in the US Constitution but there are important differences. The vote on Sunday was an impeachment, which is a kind of indictment. And it required a 2/3 vote in the lower house of Congress. Next it goes to the Brazilian Senate, the upper house, for trial and a decision on the charges. If she is convicted on the impeachment charges, she would be permanently removed as President.

However, the Senate must first vote by a majority on whether to conduct a trial or not, a vote that comes May 11. If a Senate majority decides to conduct the trial, Rousseff will be suspended as President for 180 days and Vice President Michel Temer, who is opposed to Rousseff's economic policies and in favor of the IMF/Washington Consensus approach favored by the Brazilian oligarchs (cutting government services, selling off state property, deregulation of local and international corporate activity, lower wages, the usual prescription). If there is anything in economics that has been empirically demonstrated on a grand scale since 2008, it's that such Herbert Hoover policies of governmental austerity and retrenchment in a recession is a pro-cyclical policy, i.e., it makes the recession longer and deeper.

Eric Nepomuceno in the article cited below reports that it's very likely that the Senate will vote yes to the trial, effectively removing Dilma from power in three weeks or so from now. "En pocas palabras: Dilma Rousseff está liquidada" ("In short: Dilma Rousseff is liquidated.") Dilma, who was arrested and tortured as a young woman because she was part of the opposition to the military dictatorship, certainly appreciates the difference between being "liquidated" politically and "liquidated" physically.

Dilma was arrested in 1970 when she was part of the Comando de Libertação Nacional (COLINA), which Ian Epstein in the article linked below describes as "a left-wing guerrilla group that fought the right-wing military dictatorship that ruled Brazil until 1985." The Reuters article linked below describes her as "a 68-year-old former Communist guerrilla." Actually, FWIW, the main guerrila group during that period that identified itself as Communist was called FOGUERA.

This piece from Heather Arnet from just after her reelection gives a glimpse of what the political differences are in Brazil that resulted in the impeachment:

Ronald Reagan famously coined the phrase, “Are you better off now then you were four years ago?” For millions of Brazilians the answer is a resounding yes. But from the coverage of the Brazilian presidential race in the U.S. and European media you could easily have had the impression that Brazil was teetering on the edge of economic collapse. How could an economy, which resulted in lifting 40 million people out of poverty and into the middle class, and with historically low unemployment figures,be considered a troubled economy? It all depends on whose economic interests define your perspective. ...

As other nations fell into recession and declared strict austerity measures, cutting social services, education, healthcare, and government jobs, Brazil invested in all of these. In addition to expanding Brazil’s economic subsidy program, Rousseff also led efforts to successfully pass legislation mandating that income from national oil and energy reserves be reinvested in expanding education and healthcare opportunities for the poor.

But investing in the people of Brazil meant that there were less profits for international investors. The one percent in Brazil and the one percent internationally were still making profits on their Brazilian holdings, because the Brazilian economy was still growing. But they were not making enough profits, as the rate of growth had slowed as Brazil invested in the welfare of its own people. And so the elites demanded that it was time for change.

It was striking to see that nearly all media coverage of this year’s Brazilian presidential election focused on how the “markets” and “investors” were strongly behind Rousseff’s fiscal conservative competitor Aecio Neves. And how investor confidence would fall drastically each time Rousseff rose in the polls. These same articles would cite in the sixth or seventh paragraph that while it was true that tens of millions of families were lifted out of poverty by Rousseff and her party’s economic policies, broad national growth and inflation had suffered under Rousseff. What the articles failed to mention was that it is only the extremely rich who were not benefiting from these policies. [my emphasis]

Yes, Virginia, there is an oligarchy. In Brazil and elsewhere.

The TeleSUR article below reports suspicions that the US is involved in the current golpe blando in Brazil. Which is easy to believe. Hard not to believe, actually. But it will probably take Wikileaks or a new Edward Snowden to provide details.

At the very least, the Brazilian oligarchs' parties would not likely have tried such a blatant "soft coup" if they hadn't assumed that the Obama Administration would at least be passively sympathetic. The initial State Department reaction to yesterday's news was to express confidence in the durability of Brazilian institutions.

It's definitely clearly relevant in this context that the Obama Administration during Hillary Clinton's tenure as Secretary of State supported both the military coup in Honduras in 2009 and the "soft coup" in Paraguay in 2012. The Paraguay coup is definitely a very similar event to what's happening now in Brazil.

Given the United States' policy of keeping itself as the dominant world power and in doing so to ward off the development of any "peer competitor" nation or alliance, the Obama Administration would no doubt be happy to reverse some trends of the last 15 years or so in Latin America. Like the increase in business and closer diplomatic relations between China and several Latin American countries, including purchase of Chinese weaponry. And Brazil is the "B" of the BRICS group which has been challenging the "Washington Consensus" of neoliberal development policies.

But this is very serious stuff. The oligarchy in Brazil is barely pretending there's any kind of legal reason or democratic procedure for removing Dilma from the Presidency. They want her and her policies gone, and they're abusing the existing institutions to nullify the results of the 2014 Presidential election in which she was elected with 54 million votes. This is not something parties and leaders genuinely interested in strengthening democratic institutions would do.

Sources:

Heather Arnet, What Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff Can Teach Hillary Clinton Daily Beast 10/29/2014

Henrique Gomes Batista, Governo dos Estados Unidos afirma confiança nas instituições brasileiras O Globo 18.04.2016

R. Evan Ellis, La aparición de China en las Américas Military Review Enero-Febrero 2015

Ian Epstein, Brazil's Next Outlaw President Daily Beast 10/02/2010

Janína Figueiredo e Aline Macedo, Aliados latino-americanos manifestam solidariedade a Dilma: Argentina, Chile, Paraguai, Colômbia e Peru optam pela discrição O Globo 18.04.2016

Foreign Military Studies Office: Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro and William Mendel Guerrilla in The Brazilian Amazon July 1995

Martín Granovsky, El golpe de los esclavócratas Página/12 18.04.2016

Joe Leahy and Samantha Pearson, Brazil’s crisis takes on carnival atmosphere Financial Times 04/18/2016

Mercedes López San Miguel, Por presidenta y por mujer Página/12 18.04.2016

Eric Nepomuceno, Un golpe que se vio en vivo y en directo Página/12 18.04.2016

Darío Pignotti, Dos Brasilias separadas por un muro Página/12 18.04.2016

Michael Ray and Jeff Wallenfeldt, Dilma Rousseff Encyclopædia Britannica (article updated 04/18/2016)

Maria Carolina Marcello and Alonso Soto, Brazil's Rousseff to fight on after heavy impeachment defeat Reuters 04/18/2016

Open Society Archive: Radio Free Europe, Brazil's Urban Guerrilla in Theory and Practice 06/16/1970

TeleSUR: Juicio a Dilma es una operación mundial dirigida por EE.UU. 18.04.2016

The art of the "soft coup": Why funny business in small Latin American countries can turn out to matter - a lot

Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff spoke today denouncing the impeachment proceedings the pro-oligarchy opposition is pressing against her as an "attempted coup d'etat" while asking her supporters to not fall for provocations and to maintain legality. After all, she is defending the established democratic institutions against an illegitimate use of the impeachment mechanism to nullify the results of democratic elections.

This method of removing an elected government with which the right was unhappy through abuse of existing institutions had a test run in Paraguay in 2012. Natalia Ruiz Diaz reported in Impeachment of Paraguayan President Sparks Institutional Crisis Inter Press Service 07/23/2012:

The Paraguayan Congress removed President Fernando Lugo from office Friday in an impeachment trial that lasted only a few hours.

The move, formally based on the constitution, triggered an institutional crisis for the fragile democracy in this South American country, and has been rejected by the rest of Latin America.

Lugo accepted the summary decision, which cannot be appealed, although he likened it to a coup and said the law had been “twisted.”

Vice President Federico Franco will complete Lugo’s term, which ends in August 2013.

Calls from the rest of the region, from Washington to Buenos Aires, for the proceedings to be carried out with guarantees for due process, fell on deaf ears. Nor was a mission of UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) foreign ministers, who arrived Thursday, successful in mediating the crisis.

While thousands of demonstrators gathered outside Congress to protest the impeachment of Lugo, a former Catholic bishop considered a moderate leftist, UNASUR studied the possibility of refusing to recognise the Franco administration, and members of the mission described the impeachment as a coup.

Latin America is thus facing a new institutional crisis, after the June 2009 coup in Honduras, where then President Manuel Zelaya was ousted and flown out of the country in a military coup backed by Congress.

After accepting the decision, Lugo said in a speech that “Today it was not Fernando Lugo who was removed from power; it was Paraguayan history, Paraguayan democracy that have been deeply hurt.” [my emphasis]

The Obama Administration, with Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State, was sympathetic to both the military coup in Honduras and the "soft coup" in Paraguay. Despite the improvement of relations with Cuba, the Obama-Hillary policy toward Latin America has been a conservative one. That hasn't always given the highest priority to conserving democratic institutions.

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is one of the main US-based and government-supported organizations that promotes "soft" regime change in various countries. Right Web's article of 03/02/2012 on the National Endowment for Democracy explains:

The private, congressionally funded NED has been a controversial tool in U.S. foreign policy because of its support of efforts to overthrow foreign governments. As the writers Jonah Gindin and Kirsten Weld remarked in the January/February 2007 NACLA Report on the Americas: "Since [1983], the NED and other democracy-promoting governmental and nongovernmental institutions have intervened successfully on behalf of 'democracy' — actually a very particular form of low-intensity democracy chained to pro-market economics — in countries from Nicaragua to the Philippines, Ukraine to Haiti, overturning unfriendly 'authoritarian' governments (many of which the United States had previously supported) and replacing them with handpicked pro-market allies."

NED works principally through four core institutes: the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDIIA or NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), and the Center for International Private Enterprise—representing, respectively, the country's two major political parties, organized labor, and the business community.

Funded almost entirely by the U.S. government, NED claims on its website to be "guided by the belief that freedom is a universal human aspiration that can be realized through the development of democratic institutions, procedures, and values. Governed by an independent, nonpartisan board of directors, the NED makes hundreds of grants each year to support pro-democracy groups in Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, Latin America, and the Middle East."

The NED publishes together with Johns Hopkins University a quarterly Journal of Democracy. The October 2013 (24:4) number carried an article by Leiv Marsteintredet, Mariana Llanos and Detlef Nolte defending the soft coup against Paraguay's elected left-leaning President, Paraguay and the Politics of Impeachment:

The international response, spearheaded by the leaders of the South American left, was swift condemnation. Argentina’s President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner called the events a “soft coup,” and the late Hugo Chávez of Venezuela likened them to the coup that had deposed Hondu-ran president Manuel Zelaya in 2009. Others spoke of a “parliamentary” or “institutional” coup, and decried a growing neo-golpista trend in Latin America. Claiming a breach of the democratic order in Paraguay, the regional trade organization Mercosur (Southern Cone Common Mar-ket) and the political and economic alliance Unasur (Union of South American Nations) both suspended Paraguay until after the April 2013 election. Less negative responses came from the United States, Cen-tral America, Europe, and the Organization of American States (OAS), which did not suspend Paraguay but expressed concern and sent a diplo-matic mission to investigate the incident.

They try to normalize the 2012 impeachment: "The Lugo case is an example of a phenomenon known as the 'interrupted presidency,' or 'presidential breakdown,' which has become the main form of presidential instability in Latin America."

I suppose at one level the "soft coup" approach to illegitimate regime change is an improvement of sorts over the military coup approach so popular among Latin American rightists and their American sponsors during the Cold War. But the unwillingness of the ruling oligarchy's to allow democratic institutions to operate freely - Argentina from 1955 to 1973 is a good example - also undermined stability and constitutional government so that military coups became more attractive to antidemocratic elites as solutions to crush popular dissent against political repression and destructive "free-market" economic policies designed for maximum benefit of international corporations.

Marsteintredet et al seem awfully glib about the overturning of democratic election results in Paraguay, which experienced one of the longest-lasting dictatorships in Latin America, that of the infamous Alfredo Stroessner from 1954 to 1989.

The note, "There were strongly negative international reactions to what was, after all, the legal (even if unwise) deposition of a president." (my emphasis)

PR is a bit less tricky a task for nominally "legal" coups, as opposed to defending military ones.

One of the goals of the Obama-Hillary policy is to weaken international institutions like UNASUR which the US does not dominate. Because they can be inconvenient for Washington, American coporations and rent-seeking vulture fund speculators:

Justified or not, the sudden suspension that Mercosur and Unasur slapped on Paraguay [after the soft coup] forced other actors to respond not only to the situation in Paraguay, but also to the South American organizations’ response to the situation. Indeed, Unasur was making a move to displace the OAS as South America’s “go-to” group on matters of security, con-flict mediation, and the defense of democracy. While Unasur responded to the Lugo impeachment within a week, the [US-dominated] OAS took more than two weeks to assess matters and opt against suspending Paraguay. The OAS instead sent an observer mission to help the country prepare for the 2013 elections, foster political dialogue, and keep OAS member states in-formed. The U.S. government backed this decision, and some Central American countries also criticized the decisions taken by Unasur and Mercosur. Although critical of the haste that marked the impeachment process, the OAS noted that things had been done in accord with Paraguay’s constitution. Furthermore, the OAS pointed out, Lugo himself had accepted the outcome, at least at first.

Obama and Hillary supported the soft coup, in other words. Marsteintredet et al describe why independent organizations are dubious from the point of view of soft-coup advocates and apologists:

Nonetheless, Unasur’s and Mercosur’s speedy actions left the OAS standing by the roadside. How a critical episode is defined and inter-preted at the outset is key, for this determines what actions will be taken in regard to the country in question. Unasur showed that when it comes to South American political developments, it can and will act more quickly than either the OAS or the United States. Moreover, the Paraguayan crisis made it plain that presidential summits produce deci-sions faster than does OAS-style diplomacy. The degree of self-interest that was at work in Mercosur and Unasur’s decision making raises some concerns about what the sidelining of the OAS may mean for future ef-forts to defend democracy in the Western Hemisphere. These concerns are substantiated by the contradictory behavior and double standards of governments — Argentina’s and Ecuador’s come to mind—that cry out in defense of democratic rule in South America while not always playing by the rules of liberal democracy at home (when it comes to press freedom, for instance).

US and Latin rightist accusations of inadequate "press freedom" against Cristina's government in Argentina were mainly based on the law she got passed limiting monopoly control of media corporations. Current President Mauricio Macri set it aside just after taking office via emergency decree.

This paragraph from the conclusion reads like a lessons-learned evaluation suggesting ways rightwing parties can make more effective use of the soft coup approach to regime in the future. And also the kind of propaganda spin that can be put on it for American audiences who still may be squeamish about all this democracy stuff:

Lugo’s impeachment and the international reactions that it generated highlight the political motives that can underlie the use of legal instruments. Paraguay’s Congress used the impeachment as a vote of censure for Lugo’s failings in government. Lugo’s fall can be explained by a purely political, albeit parliamentary, logic: A weak president lost the confidence of most of his country’s national legislators. In presidential regimes, such a loss of confidence should not result in an interrupted presidency, but it can lead to deadlock between the legislative and executive powers. Lugo’s impeachment, however, like several other cases of interrupted presidencies, demonstrates that without legislative support presidents can find themselves hard-pressed to survive, much less govern. We believe that this pattern of governmental instability increases the importance of presidential leadership in the construction and maintenance of a governing coalition, preferably based on a negotiated political agenda. Today, a governing coalition is imperative not only to implement the president’s agenda but also, perhaps, to keep the president in office.

In other words, left-leaning politicians and parties elected on a popular program of rejecting neoliberal economic policies and not kowtowing to the whims of the moment in Washington need to be, you know, pragmatic and agree to implement the neoliberal, submission-to-Washington program. Otherwise, gosh, those soft coups are kind of unfortunately. But, you know, by "a purely political, albeit parliamentary, logic" they're just dandy! As long as they serve American interests, of course.

Yes, things that happen in small countries like Honduras and Paraguay can have big implications for larger countries like Argentina and Brazil.

The political right on the move in Brazil, Argentina and Peru

The "soft coup" against left-leaning Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff moved a step forward today: Brazil congressional committee recommends impeaching Rousseff by Maria Carolina Marcello Reuters 04/11/2016. Reuters reports:

The goal of the Brazilian opposition and oligarchy want to remove Rouseff's elected government and replace it with a rightist government committed to the kind of neoliberal economic policies and aggressive posture against the democratic left that the government of Mauricio Macri in neighboring Brazil is taking.

The latest moves in Brazil's political crisis have the country on edge as it faces not only a government meltdown but its worst recession in decades. The political chaos in the capital, Brasilia, is also playing out less than 100 days before the nation plays host to the first Olympic Games to be held in South America - an event that will cast the world's eyes on Brazil.

The battle over Rousseff's impeachment has polarized the nation of 200 million people and brought the government of Latin America's largest economy to a virtual standstill.

The proposed impeachment is also taking place as Brazil faces its largest corruption investigation, targeting a sprawling kickback scheme at state-run oil company Petrobras.

Prosecutors say billions in bribes were paid over several years and have implicated not only members of Rousseff's Workers' Party but members of the opposition leading the charge to impeach her.

Whatevber we eventually find out is happening behind the scenes, this "soft coup" approach against the democratic left is broadly favored by the conservative policy the Obama Administration takes in Latin America, the pragmatic easing of tensions with Cuba notwithstanding.

Mauricio Macri, President of Argentina and sometime director of a Panamanian company

Jennifer Adair sketches the record of the Macri Administration in Argentina that took power in December in Argentina Turns North NACLA 03/30/2016, giving this background:

Throughout the 1990s, Argentina was a shining example of the Washington Consensus and [Argentine mPresident Carlos] Menem its most enthusiastic booster. His government courted foreign investment and introduced austerity measures that led to a punishing rise in inequality and sovereign debt. And while selling public utilities and state enterprises to the highest bidder, Menem also pardoned previously convicted military officers, citing national reconciliation and the dawn of a new age of prosperity.

The era of illicit U.S.-Argentine relations took a nosedive at the start of this century. In 2005, George W. Bush arrived at the Summit of the Americas in the seaside town of Mar del Plata with plans to finalize the details of the FTAA. As was widely reported at the time, his presence sparked massive protests against the free-market recipes of the previous decade. The host of the summit, Néstor Kirchner, who assumed the Argentine presidency in the aftermath of the country’s 2001 economic crisis, delivered a succinct message: US-backed economic policies had produced nothing but “misery, poverty, and democratic instability.” Negotiations for the FTAA tanked, and Bush left Argentina in a fury. It was a stunning turn of events, and a defining moment in the broader regional move away from neoliberal experiments.

Last week, Obama came to inaugurate a new chapter in bilateral relations, bearing the same free-market recipes as his predecessors. The visit confirmed Argentina as a principal ally in the midst of the continental retreat of the “pink tide [i.e., governments of the democratic left];” it also underscored the Macri administration’s role in leading a rightward shift across South America. [my emphasis]

And those Menem-era neoliberal policies are exactly what Macri's government is bringing back:

In his first 100 days in office, Macri has quickly set out to undo the policies of the Kirchner years through the elimination of agricultural export taxes, the end of energy subsidies, massive layoffs in the public sector, and a devaluation of the currency. During their talks, Macri and Obama fortified commitments to increase commercial ties between the two nations. While the initial agreements remain shrouded in mystery, the meetings pointed to future deals in agribusiness, telecommunications, and energy. Further details will likely emerge over the coming weeks. But as an immediate outcome, the agreements move Argentina one step closer towards greater participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, while bolstering Macri’s related desire for closer economic ties with the European Union.

The final piece in realigning Argentina back toward world markets involves the issue of debt. In early March, the Macri government reached an agreement to pay the remaining “vulture fund” holdout creditors. Obama’s visit coincided with ongoing congressional debates surrounding the decision to settle the 15-year dispute, a legal battle that has played out dramatically in a New York federal court and which includes a silent-movie-worthy villain in the figure of Judge Thomas Griesa. Asked to make a statement on the ongoing case, Obama demurred: “I have to be careful not to comment because of the nature of our legal system. These are judges that I appoint.” He nonetheless offered a clear verdict on the implications of the impending settlement, which totals over $4.6 billion dollars in payments to U.S. creditors. “Today in a show of confidence in Argentina’s new direction, many U.S. businesses are announcing tens of millions of investments here in Argentina,” Obama stated. [my emphasis]

On Macri's model, see also: Claudio Scaletta, Restauración neoliberal a la argentina CELAG 02/05/2016.

CELAG also has a guide to some of the leading rightist, neoliberal politicians in Latin America, The Right’s Power. Los nombres de la derecha regional (accessed 04/11/2016). Like this profile by Bárbara Ester of Keiko Fujimori, a hardline conservative leader who just came in first place in the first round of Presidential elections in Peru. (Sepa qué proponen los candidatos a segunda vuelta en Perú TeleSUR 11.04.2016; Peru election: Keiko Fujimori leads in first round BBC News 04/11/2016) As the BBC News story hints, Fujimori is a nasty piece of work:

Ms Fujimori, the daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori, says tackling crime is her priority.

She is also supported by some Peruvians who credit her father with defeating the country's Maoist Shining Path rebel group.

However, other Peruvians have said they would never support anyone associated with her father, who is currently serving 25 years in prison for ordering death squads to massacre civilians during his attempts to end the insurgency.

Euronews reports, Keiko Fujimori 'wins Peru's presidential first round' 04/10/2016:

Later results than the Euronews report show that her challenger in the second round will be Pedro Kuczynski.

Aljazeera America has a report on the state of play in Dilma Rousseff's fight against impeachment: Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Brazil’s impeachment dilemma 12/11/2015. Baiocchi explains:

Legal opinions aside, whether impeachment happens will have less to do with technicalities than with political alliances and mobilization in the next weeks. At the moment, the numbers appear favorable for Rousseff, with enough legislators opposing the process in both houses of Congress to defeat it. A number of important figures from other political parties have come out against impeachment, as have major civil society organizations, including the National Association of Lawyers and the National Conference of Bishops. They are united in defense of democracy and its institutions rather than in support of the Workers’ Party or Rousseff.

Baiocchi's story is a helpful sketch of the situation. He may be overgeneralizing in the following, but it does give a broader picture of political situation:

Beyond the congressional numbers game, there are fundamental social conflicts at work. Brazil today is in its most politically polarized state since the return to democracy in the mid-1980s. Like other countries in Latin America, Brazil is facing a wave of discontent and a backlash against the redistributive projects of the so-called pink tide that appeared to dominate the region in the mid-2000s. From Argentina to Venezuela to Paraguay, conservative political forces have gathered momentum in recent years by leveraging middle-class dissatisfaction with the policies of center-left governments. [my emphasis]

This is kind of a generic dilemma for successful left governments. If they boost the purchasing power of the people by improving their real incomes and the economy growths at a healthy pace, some of the "middle class," including some workers, start to identify more with the opinions and concerns of the wealthiest. (I continue to prefer a structural rather than income-level definition of classes.) And if times get rocky, they may be willing to turn to conservative solutions even though it will work to the disadvantage of many of them.

We could think of it as the "I've got mine, Jack," phenomenon.

John Kenneth Galbraith described the American version of this in his 1992 book The Culture of Contentment:

There are ... some lessons in a larger frame that do endure. The most nearly invariant is that individuals and communities that are favored in their economic, social and political condition attribute social virtue and political durability to that which they themselves enjoy. That attribution, in turn, is made to apply even in the face of commanding evidence to the contrary. The beliefs of the fortunate are brought to serve the cause of continuing contentment, and the economic and political ideas of the time are similarly accommodated. There is an eager political market for that which pleases and reassures. Those who would serve this market and reap the resulting reward in money and applause are reliably available.

Baiocchi also uses a term that has gained some currency for misuse of legal processes for "regime change" that the proponents think they can achieve by the normal political process, or maybe not as fast as they would prefer: "white coup." He uses it to describe the problems the opposition is encountering in pressing the impeachment:

...calls on the far right for a return to military dictatorship have alienated more moderate allies. Rousseff is an unpopular but democratically elected leader, and to many Brazilians, it seems contradictory to campaign in favor of democratic institutions while supporting a white coup against the president.

On the other hand, whether the Workers’ Party [Rousseff's party] will be able to maintain a progressive majority, both to survive the impeachment and then to successfully govern, is an open question. Some analysts have argued, not entirely without cause, that the threat of a coup could realign progressive forces in Brazil, ultimately conferring new legitimacy on the president. And it is true that the impeachment process has brought out energized supporters as well as left-wingers who had abandoned the Workers’ Party in recent months. [my emphasis]

Cristina, Nancy, Dilma and the state of US-Latin American relations

Argentine President Cristina Fernández sent a mildly cheeky letter to President Obama, asking about Nancy Soderberg, who he just appointed Chair of the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB).

Cristina asked if she's the same Nancy Soderberg that is a Co-Chair of the American Task Force Argentina, which appears to be a front group for the vulture funds that have been unsuccessfully trying to drive Argentina into a debt default. From the sidebar on the website, they also produce John Birch Society-like advertisements against Cristina herself. She ends the letter to Obama, "Could this be a case of namesakes?" Of course, the Argentines know it's the same person.

Nicolás Lantos reports more on Cristina's government's position in “Resultaría inadmisible que fuera la misma persona” Página/12 01.11.2014.

They are arguing that by appointing a co-chair of a rightwing lobby group that makes crass propaganda against Argentina to an official US government position, the Obama Administration is endorsing the group's activities. He mentions as an example this propaganda blog post from the ATFA's website, Argentina: "The New Narco State".

Not so far under the surface is a real concern on the part of the Argentine government that the US is playing "regime change" games on behalf of the vulture funds and more generally on the part of corporate interests who see opportunity in putting Argentina back onto the neoliberal rules that led to the Argentine economic disaster and political upheaval of 2001.

Colombia journalist Andrés Cala writes in Is Latin America’s ‘Pink Tide’ Ebbing? Consortium News 10/27/2014:

Unlike some other Latin countries, Venezuela and Argentina have demonstrated more resentment toward U.S. economic and political pressure although acknowledging the need for foreign investment and implementing urgent reforms to their economies. The governments in Caracas and Buenos Aires also are the primary targets of Washington’s hostility, along with Cuba and Nicaragua.

Thus, Venezuela and Argentina may have the least time to make adjustments and soften their radicalism or face the possibility of Washington-encouraged destabilization and “regime change.” Still, Venezuela and Argentina hope to sustain their revolutions by applying the wealth from their natural resources.

Argentina will hold an election in 2015, and anti-government forces in Venezuela have sought a recall referendum to remove President Nicolas Maduro, who otherwise is elected to serve until 2019.

That means there could be some major international interference in Argentina's 2015 Presidential election.

And it's worth watching both Argentina and Venezuela for signs of US-instigated "regime change," whether by peaceful or other means.

The re-election victory last week by Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and her Workers Party maintaining a majority in both houses of Congress is extremely important. Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America and obviously a heavy-hitter in Latin American economic and political affairs. The maintenance of Dilma's left-reform government there is an important benefit to pro-democracy parties like Cristina's Peronist Partido Justicialista in Argentina that also oppose the neoliberal and highly destructive "Washington Consensus."

Former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who is still a force in the Workers Party and may even run for a third term as President in four years, is calling for greater economic cooperation among Latin American countries, possibly leading to an association along the lines of the European Union. (Lula llama a reforzar el eje Sur-Sur Página/12 02.11.2014)

If they do that, the certainly should take the lessons of Argentina's experience of having its peso linked to the US dollar and the experience of the actual European Union and take full account of what a common currency zone really is and the problems it imposes.

Lula's strategy looks to build on the existing foundation of the Mercosur and UNASUR blocs, with the goal of establishing greater independence from the US and the EU. Eventually establishing a common currency is already a goal of UNASUR.

More on Dilma's re-election in Brazil

Al Jazeera English reports on the Brazilian election, Dilma Rousseff re-elected Brazil president 10/26/2014:

Euronews also has a brief spot on the election results, Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff wins second term 10/26/2014:

Much of the reporting on Dilma Rousseff's re-election Sunday as Brazil's President has understandably stressed the relatively narrow margin of her vote, 51.6% vs. 48.4% for her opponent Aécio Neves, according to a 10/26/2014 Reuters report. Reuters called it "one of the closest, most divisive campaigns in Brazil in decades." (Brian Winter and Alonso Soto, Leftist Rousseff narrowly wins second term in Brazil 10/26/2014)

Then again, a clear majority is a clear majority. And, as Eric Nepomuceno points out, Brazil is not a small country; three percentages points amount to around three million votes. (Brasil reafirmó su confianza en Dilma Página/12 27.10.2014) So it's not as if this election turned on hanging chads in a single Brazilian state or something.

And Martin Granovsky adds further perspective. (Las claves de la alegría y el alivio Página/12 27.10.2014) With 55.5 million votes, Dilma's PT is the most-voted-for left party in the world right now. (Granovsky is presumably excluding the one-party elections in China featuring the Communist Party.) After her second term is done, that will represent 16 consecutive years of the PT as the ruling party. Her Presidency follows the two terms of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. And Dilma's policies are broadly a continuation of Lula's. Neither are thought of fondly be advocates of the neoliberal "Washinton Consensus." Emir Sader writes (Por el camino iniciado por Lula Página/12 27.10.2014):

En el enfrentamiento entre el modelo neoliberal de la oposición y la vía de salida del neoliberalismo del gobierno, por cuarta vez los brasileños han reafirmado el camino que Lula ha empezado. Serán por lo menos 16 años seguidos de gobiernos del PT, el período más largo de continuidad de un partido en el gobierno, en período democrático en Brasil.

[In the confrontation between the neoliberal model of the opposition and the path away from neoliberalism of the government, for the fourth time Brazilians have reaffirmed the path that Lula began. There will be at least 16 successive years of PT governments, the longest period of continuity of a party in the government during a democratic period in Brazil.]

Granovsky also calls attention to outsized role played by major media companies, not least of them TV giant Red Globo and the magazine Veja. The overtly partisan role of major media is a widely-recognized fact of life in various South American countries, including Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. In all three countries, the weight of media influence is against the governing party, despite the routine claims in the US media about how the Venezuelan government dominates the press or even controls it.

And he notes that Dilma's re-election was widely seen as a victory for the broader reforms movement (democratic reform, not neoliberal reactionary "reforms") in South America:

El triunfo en Brasil fue recibido como propio en la Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador y Chile, y con satisfacción por el colombiano Juan Manuel Santos, que por Twitter felicitó y dijo que espera “seguir trabajando por el bien de nuestros dos países y la región”.

[The triumph in Brazil was received as their own in Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Chile, and with satisfaction by the Colombian {President} Juan Manuel Santos, who tweeted congratulations and said that he expects to "keep working for the good of our two countries and the region."]

Presumably because of its physical size, population and economy, Gronovsky argues, "Dilma y Lula consiguieron la victoria electoral más importante de los proyectos de reforma con inclusión en Sudamérica" ("Dilma and Lula have achieved the electoral victory of the reform projects with inclusion in South America"). Inclusion refers to civil rights for minorities, including aboriginal peoples, and for gays and lesbians. Same-sex marriage is legal in Brazil.

This is a Portuguese-language report on Dilma's post-election speech; Portuguese is the main language in Brazil. Discurso de Dilma Rousseff após ser reeleita Presidente do Brasil 10/26/2014:

TV Pública argentina provides this Spanish-language post-election analysis, which also discusses yesterday's Presidential election in Uruguay, Visión 7 - Análisis sobre el resultado de las elecciones en Brasil y Uruguay 10/27/2014:

Nepomuceno writes that Dilma's speech as, ""emotivo, sincero, de compromiso" ("emotional, sincere, in a spirit of engagement"). He notes that she will face a stubborn rightwing opposition. Some of whom are "más que conservadores, son radicalmente conservadores" ("more than conservatives, they are radically conservatives"). He gives an example of far-right sentiment: "En Río, el más votado ha sido un militar retirado que defiende la dictadura y dice que prefiere tener a un hijo muerto que a un hijo homosexual" ("In Río, the candidate winning the most votes was a retired general who defends the [last Brazilian military] dictatorship and says he would prefer a dead son than a homosexual son").

Dilma's Worker's Party alliance (Partido de los Trabajadores/PT) won a majority in both houses of Congress. But one of Dilma's main allies, the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB/Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro) may not be consistently reliable. Separate parties in Brazil and Argentina will often combine into an umbrella party or electoral coalition in national elections. Nepomuceno reports that the PMDB was split, with about half supporting Dilma and the other half Neves.

I generally don't attach much significance to stock market changes after elections or disasters. But Brazilian stocks did dip after Dilma defeated Neves, who was conventionally assumed to be more "pro-business." (Maria Tadeo, Brazil elections: Currency and stocks tumble after Dilma Rousseff is re-elected The Independent 10/27/2014) Tadeo gives us a hint of what those "pro-business" policies were:

Neves, a senator and former governor of the state of Minas Gerais, had promised to speed up economic reforms, make the central bank more independent and encourage foreign investment against a backdrop of rising inflation, falling commodity prices and a slowdown in the economy.

"We anticipate that the re-election campaign will act as a wake-up call for Rousseff, helping to recognise the inadequacies of her past policies," said Kunal Ghosh, manager of the Allianz BRIC Stars Fund.

"We will continue to maintain an underweight position in state-owned enterprises and banks in Brazil as policy changes will take time," he added.

On Sunday, Rousseff struck a conciliatory tone and vowed to tame inflation, which is running above six per cent, and "make improvements" when it comes to Brazil's public finances.

Rousseff had previously announced Guido Mantega, the country's finance minister, would be replaced, presumably by a more pro-business minister, if she won a second term.

Dilma carried Minas Gerais, the state where Neves had been governor.

There were notable polarizations along class and regional lines. The less prosperous northeastern states are the main voting base for the PT, and they came through for Dilma in Sunday's runoff. Eric Nepomuceno writes in another article, Dilma otra vez Página/12 27.10.2014:

Al fin y al cabo, ella perdió, y de lejos, en las regiones más ricas del país. En São Paulo, por ejemplo, más desarrollada y poblada provincia del país, Dilma perdió por siete millones de votos. Una tremenda derrota: Eche logró 64 por ciento de los votos de la provincia más industrializada, más rica del país, frente al 36 por ciento de Dilma. Ya en los estados pobres del nordeste su ventaja ha sido aplastante. Un dato importante: en Minas Gerais, provincia natal de los dos adversarios, Dilma ganó con relativa tranquilidad. E igualmente ganó en Río, provincia clave. Todo eso tendrá peso específico de aquí en adelante.

[When all is said and done, she lost by a wide margin in the richest regions of the country. In São Paulo, for instance, the most developed and populous province of the country, Dilma lost by seven million votes. A tremendous defeat: She managed to lose 64% of the votes in the most industrialized province versus 36% for Dilma. Yes, in the poor states of the northeast her window {of victory} was enormous. An important fact: in Minas Gerais, the home province of her two adversaries {in the first round}, Dilma won with relative tranquility. And same won the same way in Río, a key province. All of this will have specific weight going forward from here.]

Dilma wins in Brazilian Presidential runoff

Bloomberg News has an English-language report on Dilma Rousseff's victory in Sunday's election in Brazil that mostly leaves out the nails-on-a-blackboard characterizations that too often characterize articles in the American press on Latin American politics: David Biller and Mario Sergio Lima, Rousseff Re-Elected on Call to Save Brazil’s Social Gains 10/26/2014.

The standard American press filter is that any party or government that doesn't want to let American financial and industrial corporations run wild in their country is deeply suspect.

Reuters' report on the election, Leftist Rousseff narrowly wins second term in Brazil by Brian Winter and Alonso Soto 10/26/2014, is more in line with the standard American press view.

Euronews has a pre-election, 2 1/2 minute report that gives a quick overview of the contest, Brazil: an aristocrat or revolutionary for next president 10/25/2014:

The title refers to Dilma's early political activism, which the Reuters article describes reasonably accurately, "Rousseff, who was jailed and tortured in the early 1970s for opposing that era's military dictatorship, is the country's first woman president."

The McClatchy article gives a good description of the results without a lot of the standard US ideological baggage (Vinod Sreeharsha, Rousseff narrowly wins 2nd term as Brazil’s leader 10/26/2014):

Her triumph came despite a sluggish economy, corruption allegations, discontent over the quality of public services and anger over the government’s handling of two major international sporting events -- last summer’s World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics.

Still, the victory will place Rousseff’s leftist Workers’ Party in power for 16 consecutive years, an unprecedented stint at the helm of Latin America’s largest economy.

With 98 percent of the vote counted, Rousseff, 66, an economist who became Brazil’s first female president in 2010, had won 51.45 percent. Her opponent, Aecio Neves, a senator and former governor of Minas Gerais state, an important mining center, received 48.55 percent, according to the country’s electoral officials. ...

As expected, Rousseff performed best in the country’s northeast, which has had an unprecedented economic boom and seen poverty drop and its middle class expand in the 12 years that Rousseff and her predecessor and mentor, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, have been in power.

And, yes, "macho" South American countries like Brazil, Argentina and Chile have elected and re-elected female Presidents.