Showing posts with label gulf war. Show all posts
Showing posts with label gulf war. Show all posts

Saturday, July 16, 2016

US rolling disasters in the Middle East

"The United States needs to get into the habit of developing and implementing war termination strategies."

So says Chas Freeman as he takes a look at what Andrew Bacevich calls America's War for the Greater Middle East in his most recent book of that title: What America Keeps Getting Wrong in the Middle East The National Interest 06/13/2016. That comment was in particular reference to the inconclusive results of the Gulf War of 1991. Bacevich's chapter on that war is called "No Clean Ending." Bacevich concludes:

Viewed in the context of America' s expanding military involvement in the Greater Middle East ... Operation Desert Storm accomplished next to nothing. The Bush administration's declaration of victory in 1991 did, in fact, turn out to be premature. That results fell short of expectations stemmed less from flawed generalship, however, than from a fundamental misreading of the overall situation.

Although during the coming decade Washington developed an Ahablike mania regarding Saddam, the Iraqi dictator was merely a symptom of what the United States was contending with. The real problem had a multitude of aspects: the vacuum left by the eclipse of British imperial power; intractable economic backwardness and political illegitimacy; divisions within Islam compounded by the rise of Arab nationalism; the founding of Israel; and the advent of the Iranian Revolution.

It's hard to imagine how any victory over Iraq, no matter how complete, could have remedied this menu of challenges. After another decade of trying, the United States gave up the attempt. After 9/11, rather than vainly trying to prop up the Greater Middle East, Washington set out to transform it. A fundamental misreading of Desert Storm helped make that attempt appear plausible. The result was a disaster. [my emphasis]
Jeffrey Record wrote on the Gulf War in Dark Victory: America's Second War Against Iraq (2004):

Certainly in retrospect, the peace imposed on Iraq in 1991 was unsatisfactory. lt failed to unseat Saddam Hussein or thwart his continued attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, although international sanctions and inspections may have placed such weapons beyond reach. It left the Iraqi people impoverished by economic sanctions and imprisoned inside an exceptionally vicious police state. And because the coalition of 1991, with the exception of the United States and Great Britain, subsequently disintegrated over the issue of postwar policy toward Iraq, the peace ultimately proved unenforceable.
The Afghanistan War provides another example. Freeman writes, "The objectives of the NATO campaign have never been clear but appear to center on guaranteeing that there will no Islamist government in Kabul." He observes that this cold have been avoided by accepting the results of the first two months of the intervention:

The objectives of what was initially conceived as a punitive raid into Afghanistan in October 2001 were (1) to dismantle Al Qaeda and (2) to punish its Taliban hosts to ensure that “terrorists with global reach” would be denied a continuing safe haven in Afghanistan. The United States pursued these objectives by supporting mostly non-Pashtun enemies of the mostly Pashtun Taliban who had proven politico-military capabilities and staying power. A limited American and British investment of intelligence capabilities, special forces, air combat controllers and air strikes tilted the battlefield in favor of the Northern Alliance and against the Taliban. Within a little more than two months, the Taliban had been forced out of Kabul and the last remnants of Al Qaeda had been killed or driven from Afghanistan. We had achieved our objectives.

But instead of declaring victory and dancing off the field, we moved the goalposts. The United States launched an open-ended campaign and enlisted NATO in efforts to install a government in Kabul while building a state for it to govern, promoting feminism and protecting poppy growers. The poppies still flourish. All else looks to be ephemeral. [my emphasis]
Freeman criticizes the Clinton Administration's dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran, arguing that it was "plausible as a defense of Israel against its two most potent regional adversaries, Iran and Iraq. But it made no sense at all in terms of stabilizing the Gulf." One of the most predictable and obvious results of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was strengthening Iran's position in the region: "The U.S. occupation culminated in a 'surge' of forces that entrenched a pro-Iranian regime in Baghdad and that only its authors consider a victory."

He also sees the ill-conceived drone wars as bringing blowback against American policies in the Middle East, writing, "The terrorist movements U.S. interventions have spawned now have safe havens not just in Afghanistan, but in the now failed states of Iraq and Syria, as well as Chad, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Sinai, Somalia and Yemen."

And Freeman warns against the illusions of Islamphobia:

In the end, the attribution of Muslim resentment of the West to Islam is just a version of the facile thesis that “they hate us because of who we are.” This is the opiate of the ignorant. It is self-expiating denial that past and present behavior by Western powers, including the United States, might have created grievances severe enough to motivate others to seek revenge for the indignities they have experienced. It is an excuse to ignore and do nothing about the ultimate sources of Muslim rage because they are too discomfiting to bear discussion. ...

For our part, Americans must be led to correct our counterproductive misunderstanding of Islam. Islamophobia has become as American as gun massacres. The presumptive candidate of one of our two major parties has suggested banning Muslims from entry into the United States. This is reflective of national attitudes that are incompatible with the cooperation we need with Muslim partners to fight terrorist extremism. If we do not correct these attitudes, we will continue to pay not just in treasure but in blood. Lots of it.[My emphasis]
Freeman makes this important observation about the current position of the US in the Greater Middle East, "The world’s reliance on energy from the Gulf has not diminished. But ours has. That gives us some freedom of maneuver. We should use it."

Thursday, October 09, 2014

Kurds, the Islamic State and the tangled web of Obama's Non-War War

The Kurdish city of Kobani in syria is apparently on the verge of being taking over by Islamic States forces. (Daren Butler and Oliver Holmes, Islamic State seizes large areas of Syrian town despite air strikes Reuters 10/09/2014; Patrick Cockburn, The Siege of Kobani Counter-Punch 10/08/2014)

This is a discussion from PBS Newshour, in which the general bias toward escalation in war commentary is seen, Can air power alone stop advance of Islamic State militants? 10/08/2014:



Here is the news from Butler and Holmes:

... the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said Islamic State, which is still widely known by its former acronym of ISIS, had pushed forward on Thursday.

"ISIS control more than a third of Kobani - all eastern areas, a small part of the northeast and an area in the southeast," said Rami Abdulrahman, head of the Observatory which monitors the Syrian civil war.

The commander of Kobani's heavily outgunned Kurdish defenders confirmed that the militants had made major gains in a three-week battle that has also led to the worst streets clashes in years between police and Kurdish protesters across the frontier in southeast Turkey.

Militia chief Esmat al-Sheikh put the area controlled by Islamic State, which has already seized large amounts of territory in Syria and neighbouring Iraq, at about a quarter of the town. "The clashes are ongoing - street battles," he told Reuters by telephone from the town.

Turkey is pointedly holding back from any direct intervention to save Kobani, although their parliament has authorized military action:

Despite Kurdish appeals for help, Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu played down the likelihood of its forces going to the aid of Kobani.

"It is not realistic to expect Turkey to conduct a ground operation on its own," he told a joint news conference with visiting NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg. However, he added: "We are holding talks. ... Once there is a common decision, Turkey will not hold back from playing its part."

Ankara resents any suggestion from Washington that it is not pulling its weight, but wants broader joint action that also targets the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. "We strongly reject allegations of Turkish responsibility for the ISIS advance," said a senior Ankara government source.
Turkish policy wants to get rid of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. But they don't want to do anything that would promote Kurdish independence or bolster the strength of Turkey's leftist PKK Kurdish guerrilla group pushing for Kurdish independence.

It seem pretty obvious at the moment that in choosing between IS over the Syrian Kurds, Turkey prefers IS. It's one more aspect of how very complicated Obama's Iraq-Syria Non-War War is.

There has been militant reaction from Kurds in Turkey, as Patrick Cockburn reports:

The refusal by the Turkish government to help the Syrian Kurds in their hour of need immediately provoked demonstrations by Kurds across Turkey. There have been protests, often violent, in the Kurdish south-east and wherever there are Kurdish minorities, such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Bursa. In Varto, a man was killed and in Istanbul a prominent human rights lawyer, Tamer Dogan, was shot in the head. His friends say he may have been targeted. Smoke was rising over many towns where demonstrators had lit fires in the streets and police used tear gas and water cannon.

Turks may react angrily to reports that a bust of Ataturk was burned by a crowd in Van province. The General Staff in Ankara put out a report that the Turkish flag had also been set alight. An office of the Kurdish political party, the HDP, was surrounded in one Istanbul district by a crowd shouting ‘Allahu Akhbar’.

One observer in Turkey writes: “These events could turn what began as a general humanitarian protest at the abandonment of the besieged in Kobani into a headlong collision between the Kurds and the Turks.”
But even for the Turkish Kurds, there are more issues than just Turkish direct intervention, among them the treatment of refugees and allowing passage of PKK fighters through Turkey to Syria.

From Reuters, Turkish Kurds clash with police, angry over Kobani 10/09/2014:



In a European political sideline, the German Left Party, which actively pursues Turkish votes in Germany, seems to be somewhat divided over the Kurds and over opposing direct Turkish participation in the non-war war against IS. Evrim Sommer, a Green Member of the state parliament in Berlin, argues for the value of an independent Kurdistan in Iraq, which he thinks would not adversely affect Turkey. (Freudenfest für 40 Millionen Menschen Neues Deutschland 30.08.2014) Which, in Kobani right now, IS is busy doing for them. Some Left Party parliamentarians have even been calling for a military intervention to protect Syrian Kurds under a UN mandate, "until now a taboo for the Left Party" ("bisher ein Tabu für die Linkspartei"; LINKE-Abgeordnete offenbar für Militäreinsatz gegen IS Neues Deutschland 07.10.2014)

This has not been enthusiastically received in the Left Party, it appears. The Party's spokeswoman for domestic policy, Ulla Jelpke, argues that the Kurds in Iraq and Syria do not want other ground troops brought in against IS, but better weapons for Kurdish forces and access to Turkey for refugees and for Turkey to allow passage for Kurdish fighters going to combat areas in Iraq and Syria. (Uwe Kalbe, Wenig Mitleid für Mitleidige Neues Deutschland 09.10.2014) The argument here reflects Kurdish fears that Turkey would be more likely to use their troops to suppress the Kurds than to fight IS. Kalbe quotes Özlem Demirel, Party spokesman for the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, saying "Turkey itself is part of the problem" ("die Türkei ist selbst ein Teil des Problems").

Cockburn raises an important point about those who are focusing on the obviously limited effect on US air power in defending Kobani:

The Turks were not alone in abandoning Kobani to the Islamic militants. The US was careful not have any direct liaison with Kurdish fighters on the ground though local intelligence should have made their air strikes more effective and might have stopped the Isis advance. Over the past 24 hours, these strikes have increased in number but may come too late as Isis militants fight street to street.

The US campaign against Isis is weakened not so much by lack ‘boots on the ground’, but by seeking to hold at arm’s-length those who are actually fighting Isis while embracing those such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey who are not. There is a similar situation in Iraq, where most of the fighting against Isis is by the Shia militias from which the US keeps its distance. [my emphasis]
As Juan Cole points out, the limited effect of US air power is likely to be partly a matter of not having enough US military on the ground to "paint lasers" on IS targets. (The Last Days of Kobani Loom as ISIL Closes in on Syrian Kurds with Murder on its Mind Informed Comment 10/09/2014)

Wayne White in Kobani: Questionable Turkish, US Behavior LobeLog Foreign Policy also addresses Turkey's Kurdish policy in the Non-War War:

The leftist anti-Turkish politics of the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD or YPD), its connection to the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and an iffy Syrian Kurdish alliance of convenience with the Syrian regime against IS may have trumped military wisdom, leaving potentially 2 million Syrian Kurds to bear the full fury of IS mostly alone. Perhaps Ankara expressed early on a preference that Kobani’s defenders receive little US air support, hoping IS might degrade a longstanding thorn in Turkey’s side.

If Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan harbored such sentiments, time has not been kind to him. The international media dramatized the heroic Kurdish stand at Kobani, and Turkey’s large Kurdish population—not just Syrian Kurdish refugees—have become increasingly outraged. Yet although armed with new legislation authorizing him to take military action, Erdogan has remained passive—not even responding to IS artillery and mortar rounds falling inside Turkey (and wounding several Turkish civilians). He also made the mistake of saying publicly on Oct. 7 that airstrikes would not save Kobani, which was “about to fall.”

David Rohde and Warren Strobel report on various critics and defenders of the White House squabbling over whether President Obama reacting quickly enough to the IS crisis, which as we all know the The Greatest Threat We've Ever Faced. (How Syria policy stalled under the 'analyst in chief' Reuters 11/09/2014)

None of the sides in the policy debate described here seemed to take the position of: "You know, our 21 years of war in Iraq didn't work out so well, and in fact seems to have contributed mightily to a lot more chaos and bad stuff happening. Maybe we should find ways to get negotiated ends to the civil conflicts there and make every effort to avoid getting into war there again."

The Very Serious People don't think that way.

And given Obama's broad war aims and the minimum three-year commitment he's made to his Non-War War, the pressure to send ground troops will continue. Because when you apply can-do logic and a narrow perspective to the situation, it's easy to come up with an analysis like this one from George Petrolekas and Howard Coombs, Avoiding the Long War Redux The National Interest 10/08/2014.

It's one of the features of permanent war is that we permanently get to read optimistic fantasies like that one: drop in some ground troops, swing them around this way, use some bases in Turkey, and Victory!

"The point being that success is possible if aims are limited to the destruction of the IS, and not a mission to establish government or re-establish civil society by military means." Yeah, just blast IS to bits and it's all over in a couple of weeks, nice friendly pro-Western secular governments pop up in Iraq and Syria right away, and we all get free ponies. Awesome.

My favorite part of that is that they use the Gulf War as an example of setting limited aims, getting them done (Iraq out of Kuwait) and getting out clean. Except for, you know, the decade-plus of no-fly zones and bombing that followed. And the 2003 invasion that followed that. And Obama's new Non-War War that followed that and that he's already said will continue at least three years. That means only five consecutive Presidents will have been at war with Iraq. Other than that, we made a clean getaway in 1991!

Friday, July 13, 2012

Time travel blogging, Gulf War edition: John Kenneth Galbraith on the Gulf War, 1991

John Kenneth Galbraith during the Gulf War wrote a piece cautioning against what is sometimes called the boys-with-toys phenemenon, i.e., over-estimated the effects of the latest gee-whiz improvements in the technology of air war. His piece came after the initiation of the air war on January 17, 1991 and before the ground attack had begun on February 24. (See Frontline's Gulf War chonology.)

John Kenneth "Ken" Galbraith in 1944, when he was head of the Office of Price Administration, where among his employees was Richard Nixon

In "Role of Technology in Battle" (San Francisco Chronicle 02/20/1991), he recalled his experience with the US Strategic Bombing Survey during and after the Second World War:

In the closing months of World War II, I became a director of the U.S. Strategic Bombmg Survey. It, was established on the instruction of Franklin D. Roosevelt through Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. Much had been made during the war of the achievements of the great bombing raids on German, Italian and Japanese tar-·
gets.

All or nearly all that was known, however, was from photographic and visual observations from the sky. There was no tendency to understate accomplishment.
The lack of any "tendency to understate accomplishment" is alive and well with our politicians and our glorious generals. We see it currently in the claims for the usefulness of the latest whiz-bang air war technology, robot drones, coming soon to a municipal police department near you. (W.J. Hennigan, Drone trade group adopts guidelines for flying in U.S. airspace Los Angeles Times 07/05/2012).

Galbraith's experience looking closely at the empirical results of the "strategic bombing" of the Second World War left him with a lasting and healthy skepticism of the claims of air war enthusiasts, a skepticism which is sadly lacking among American policymakers today. In his 1991 piece, he wrote:

My assignment, and that of my economists, was to ascertain from the plentiful surviving records what the air attacks on Getman industry, cities and transportation had, in fact, accomplished. Did they arrest industrial production, notably that of weapons and munitions? Did they paralyze transportation? Did they, in consequence, win the war or substantially advance the day of victory?

Alas, they did not. No great wartime enterprise could, in fact, have been more disappointing, leading to sad moments of reflection on the lives lost in the effort.

The physical destruction was, indeed, frightful. But Germany's industrial production - weapons and munitions, in particular - continued to increase, with no visible halt until nearly the end of the war, when ground forces and their more immediate tactical air support had victory substantially in hand.

Sometimes, the bombing actually increased production. In late February 1943, with good intelligence, 90 percent of all German fighter-aircraft plants were attacked; 75 percent were destroyed. January production had been 1,525 planes; after the raids, it was 2,166 in March. The Germans had rallied to the task of restoring production with more than compensating effect. [my emphasis]
In the first edition of his classic The Affluent Society (1958), Galbraith gave an example of how the bombing in Hamburg in August 1943 produced this non-intuitive result:

Yet this terrible event taught a lesson about the economics of war which very few have learned and some, indeed, may have found it convenient to ignore. The industrial plants of Hamburg were around the edge of the city or, as in the case of the submarine pens, on the harbor. They were not greatly damaged by the raids; these struck the center of the city and the working class residential areas and suburbs. In the days immediately following the raids production faltered; in the first weeks it was down by as much as 20 or 25 per cent. But thereafter it returned to normal. By then the workers had scanned the ruins of their former homes, satisfied themselves that their possessions and sometimes their families were irretrievable, had found some rude clothes and the shelter of a room or part of a room in a still habitable house, and had returned to work. On these three nights of terror their standard of living, measured by houseroom, furnishings, clothing, food and drink, recreation, schools, and social and cultural opportunities, had been reduced to a fraction of what it had been before. But the efficiency of the worker as a worker was unimpaired by this loss. After a slight period of readjustment, he labored as diligently and as skillfully as before.

There is a further chapter to the story. Before the attacks, there had been a labor shortage in Hamburg. Afterward, despite the number killed and the number now engaged on indispensable repairs, there was no shortage. For, as a result of the attacks, thousands who were waiters in restaurants and cafes, attendants in garages, clerks in banks, salesmen in stores, shopkeepers, janitors, ticket takers, and employees in handicraft industries (which, being small and traditional, were more likely to be in the center of town) lost their places of employment. They had previously contributed nothing to war production. Their contribution to the standard of living proved dispensable. Now they turned to the war industries as the most plausible places to find employment. [my emphasis]
Another aspect of the results Galbraith described in the Second World War has to do with the fact that the Hitler regime ruled Germany by terror, but not only by terror. As Galbraith writes in The Affluent Society:

Even in the presumptively austere and dedicated world of the Third Reich, in the third year of a disastrous war, the average citizen had access to a wide range of comforts and amenities which habit had made to seem essential.
Elaborating in a footnote, he explains:

In fact, in 1943 the Germans were not concentrating their energies with particular severity on war production. In this respect they were almost certainly behind the British at the time. Until not long before there had been a heady mood of victory with, inevitably, some relaxation. Quite a few of the Nazi leaders were sybarites and were thus somewhat handicapped in imposing austerities which they would not practice themselves. A dictatorship which does not quite trust its people is likely to be hesitant in imposing hardships. Finally, the strategy of industrial mobilization was poorly understood in Germany and this strategy assumed a short war. This failure of understanding was most important of all and might be a lesson. [my emphasis]
It's always a risk that a country at war starts believing its own war propaganda.

Galbraith continues in the main text:

And because they [comforts and amenities] were believed to be essential they were essential. On such matters governments, even dictatorships, must bow to the convictions of the people even if - the exceptional case - they do not share them. The German standard of living was far above what was physically necessary for survival and efficiency. The RAF broke through the psychological encrustation and brought living standards down somewhere nearer to the physical minimum. In doing so it forced a wholesale conversion of Germany's scarcest resource, that of manpower, to war production.
In those days, the Allied bombers were lucky to be able to hit the right city with their bombs. It has since become a permanent feature of advocacy by air power enthusiasts to stress the every-increasing precision of our super-weapons: "smart bombs" in the Gulf War, robot drones right now, something else is a few months or years.

Precision claims were already a feature of the air war promotion in the Second World War, as he notes in the 1991 piece:

There was much reference in World War II to our technological excellence in the air - to precision bombing and the greatly publicized Norden bombsight that made it possible. In practice, 'precision bombing was precise only within the range of around a quarter of a mile.
Yet the deviations of the actual results from the claims persist in every new iteration. Drones may be accurate. But the illusion that it makes acts of war quick and easy - and drone strikes are acts of war, even if the government of the country being struck is giving tacit approval for the strikes - and therefore leads policymakers to make deadly strikes in places that they wouldn't otherwise make.

Galbraith applied those lessons to the impending Gulf War. As it turned out, Iraq's troops were quickly pushed out of Kuwait. And Old Man Bush's Administration made the still-controversial decision not to push the ground war into Iraq proper. Otherwise, we would have experienced something like the Iraq War of his son's Administration and Obama's beginning in 1991. Galbraith's point was that achieving the war aims could require a protracted ground war, and that putting faith in the magic results of air power was highly risky:

World War II was won not by the strategic air forces. Nor was it appreciably shortened thereby. It was won by ground troops suffering all the misery of ground war and taking heavy casualties as they moved across France and Germany, up through Italy and with the greatest casualities of all across the Russian plain.

Japan was defeated by island-to-island fighting northward across the Pacific. The bombing of Japanese cities wrought terrible human and physical destruction. Japanese factories were more vulnerable that Germany's. Production was less rapidly restored.

But again the bombing did not shorten the war. The wonders of modern technology were in the air. Victory was on the islands and on the distant sea.
He recalled that the magic of air power also was less than advertised in conflicts during Reagan's and Old Man Bush's Administrations: "In more recent times, in Libya, Grenada and Panama, there were aerial exploits reflecting the highest in technical achievement. They either missed their targets or, sadly, as in Grenada, damaged a hospital by mistake."

And he expressed his concerns in relation to the Gulf War this way:

It will come as no great surprise that I was strongly against the opening of military hostilities in the Middle East. I testified to this effect before Congress and urged that sanctions and the oil embargo be allowed their full effect.

The past promise of aerial warfare and weapons technology was much on my mind, the human cost of a ground war against the battle-hardened forces of Iraq equally so.
Iraq had only relatively recently concluded its long war with Iran, during which the United States tilted toward Saddam Hussein's Sunni regime in Iraq.

I still hope that ground war may be long postponed and if there emerges a chance for negotiation, it can be seized. The takeover of one country by another cannot be condoned. But the ultimate penalty, if it can be avoided, should not be imposed on those whose fate is to fight in the tanks and on the sand.

Perhaps, this war is different - perhaps technology has now made that difference. But neither the old nor the more recent experience is cause for optimism. And amid the uncertainty, there is one near-certainity: the high human cost of a war on the ground.
As it turned out, Iraq's casualties in Kuwait were high. The US military was mainly prepared to fight the Soviet Red Army, and Saddam had organized his forces on a similar basis at that time. And instead of invading Iraq at the time, Old Man Bush's Administration, in which Dick Cheney was Secretary of Defense, hoped that Saddam's regime would be overthrown by an internal uprising, which failed.

The US and Britain maintained a no-fly under UN authority, and later expanded it. Low-level air warfare continued until the Gulf War began in 2003, including an intensive phase during the bizarrely-named Operation Desert Fox in 1998. The sanctions originally imposed to get Iraq out of Kuwait were maintained with the goal of regime change in Baghdad. Both the continuing air warfare, despite its allegedly invincible power, and the sanctions earned the US a great deal of hostility in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Eventually the extended ground war that Galbraith warned against in 1991 occurred beginning in 2003. The results are now well known. Not least of which was removing Iran's main Sunni rival regime and leaving Iran the dominant Persian Gulf power.

Now the neoconservatives and perpetual warmongers who were so eager to invade Iraq in 1991 and 2003 now want to go to war with Iran.

Maybe a more cautious approach in 1990-1 could have produced a better result than the magic of air war.

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Saturday, March 26, 2011

Libya War, atrocity propaganda: "beware of babies in incubators"

This edition of David Frost's "Frost Over the World" uploaded to YouTube on 03/26/2011 features Omar Turbi, who is affiliated with the Libyan National Council opposition group and who Frost identifies as "an American supporter of the rebels," then with two British Conservative Members of Parliament John Baron and Rory Stewart.



Beginning at around 3:00, Turbi offers what he himself says is a thinly-sourced story of alleged atrocities planned in Benghazi by Muammar Qaddafi. This kind of atrocity propaganda is standard fare in wars. "Propaganda" can be true. Arguably, using true stories makes the best propaganda.

But wars are about more than humanitarian impulses over particular moments of atrocity - or planned atrocity in this case. Reasonable scrutiny sounds lame or even immoral in the face of a well-crafted atrocity story. But unless we want to be suckered endlessly into ill-advised laws, we also have to remember that there are limits to power and that war always, inevitably brings its own atrocities.

The classic example was British propaganda about atrocities said to be committed by German troops in Belgium during the First World War.

The British propaganda wasn't content to stick to real events. This became very well known after the war. And this became one factor during the Second World War in making the German public dismissive about true claims by Allied propaganda about German actions, including mass murder of Jews.

One of the best-known instances of deceptive propaganda directed at the American public was the false claim that Iraqi invaders in Kuwait had thrown little babies out of their incubators in Kuwaiti hospitals. Tom Regan tells the story of how the Kuwait government-in-exile cooked up a successful but fake propaganda story in When contemplating war, beware of babies in incubators Christian Science Monitor 09/06/2002:

More than 10 years later, I can still recall my brother Sean's face. It was bright red. Furious. Not one given to fits of temper, Sean was in an uproar. He was a father, and he had just heard that Iraqi soldiers had taken scores of babies out of incubators in Kuwait City and left them to die. The Iraqis had shipped the incubators back to Baghdad. A pacifist by nature, my brother was not in a peaceful mood that day. "We've got to go and get Saddam Hussein. Now," he said passionately.

I completely understood his feelings. Although I had no family of my own then, who could countenance such brutality? The news of the slaughter had come at a key moment in the deliberations about whether the US would invade Iraq. Those who watched the non-stop debates on TV saw that many of those who had previously wavered on the issue had been turned into warriors by this shocking incident.

Too bad it never happened. The babies in the incubator story is a classic example of how easy it is for the public and legislators to be mislead during moments of high tension. It's also a vivid example of how the media can be manipulated if we do not keep our guards up.
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Wednesday, December 23, 2009

Panama, Afghanistan and Iraq

We might call it the Cheney Arc of War. Dark Lord Cheney was the Secretary of Defense in Old Man Bush's administration and, of course, the Acting President for Foreign Policy and Torture during the Shrub Bush administration.

It's often observed that the rapid ousting of the government in Kabul during beginning of the Afghanistan War was widely perceived by neocons and many others in the foreign policy establishment as a quick win. A quick win that leaves us still fighting there eight years later with no end in sight. But the perceived blitzkrieg success of that war was a significant factor in making the administration and Congress willing to go forward with the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Jordan Michael Smith in Noriega's Revenge Foreign Policy 23/18/09 makes the intriguing suggestion that the 1989 invasion of Panama may have played a similar role in relation to the Gulf War against Iraq of 1991:

The brief and relatively bloodless war in Panama convinced Americans that the use of force could easily solve their problems overseas -- and, what's more, that the United States could largely accomplish this on its own. The United States did not seek international approval before invading Panama, as it did before the first Gulf War. In a recent interview with Foreign Policy, [former US Ambassador to the UN Thomas] Pickering noted that before the 1990 [sic!] invasion of Iraq, "[W]e undertook quite a remarkable series of activities inside the Security Council," including resolutions that imposed economic sanctions on the country and, after the war, the establishment of a peacekeeping force to protect the Kurds. [my emphasis]
Smith overstates the case a bit. American arrogance of power about military force didn't begin in 1989 and, as we see with Obama's escalation in Afghanistan, it didn't end with the Iraq War. But this gives you a picture of the wet dreams into which the Panama invasion sent the neocons:

The brilliant success of the Panama invasion contributed to a feeling of American invincibility. Influential conservative commentators repeatedly cited its success as a reason to invade Iraq after the 9/11 attacks. "The Falklands, Panama, Serbia, and the Middle East all demonstrate the power of legitimate governments over dictatorships," wrote Victor Davis Hanson, explaining how the same would be the case with Iraq. In his influential essay "Power and Weakness," Robert Kagan argued that "with the check of Soviet power removed, the United States was free to intervene practically wherever and whenever it chose -- a fact reflected in the proliferation of overseas military interventions that began during the first Bush administration with the invasion of Panama in 1989." Finally, George Will praised the invasion as "punctuat[ing] a decade of recovery of national purposefulness and a year of militant democracy." [my emphasis]
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Thursday, November 22, 2007

Thanksgiving with Bush, Cheney and war in Iraq


When I first saw Stephen Graubard's Mr. Bush's War: Adventures in the Politics of Illusion, I thought, "Oh, another book about Bush and the Iraq War". But actually, it was published in 1991 and is about Old Man Bush's Gulf War in 1992. Not only the title but the text as well provides a strong reminder that the temptation to contrast the supposedly less ideological, more pragmatic Reagan and Old Man Bush administrations to the radical and dogmatic Cheney-Bush administration can be very misleading. In fact, there are heavy continuities from the Iran-Contra affair during St. Reagan's administration to the Gulf War of Old Man Bush's to the overall disaster we are experiencing today.

Graubard is one of the leading historians of the American Presidency. So it's no surprise that he focuses on how events are seen from the perspective of the incumbent Presidents. But what very few of us knew in 1992, probably including Graubard, is what a potent and poisonous influence Dick Cheney would prove to be. Knowing what we know now, it's hard not to wonder if the Dark Lord's influence was underestimated in the past, as well.

Then-Congressman Cheney was the ranking minority member of the Joint Congressional Committee that investigated the Iran-Contra affair. His doctrine of the "unitary Executive" was first articulated publicly in the minority report on Iran-Contra, much of which was written by David Addington, now the Dark Lord's chief of staff.

Cheney was Secretary of Defense during the Gulf War of 1991 and during the buildup to it. As SecDef, Cheney stayed out of the limelight. Unlike his mentor Rummy during the Iraq War, SecDef Cheney let Generals Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell be the stars of Pentagon press conferences on the war. Cheney has always preferred to operate on "the dark side".

One of the reasons Old Man Bush and his SecDef gave for the urgency of engaging Iraq militarily after their seizure of Kuwait was that Iraq was massing troops near the Saudi Arabian border. It was widely accepted in those days, even by the most "dovish" Democrats, that the US (for better or worse) had a national interest in the survival of the Saudi monarchy because of our dependence on Saudi oil. In those days before the Internet had become a mass product, the St. Petersburg Times down in Florida purchased photos taken at two different times from a commercial satellite and neither showed any sign of the alleged Iraqi buildup near the Saudi border. They published a story on it, but the Establishment media was already slavering over the profits to be had from jingoistic coverage. So the dissenting story didn't get much national attention. SecDef Cheney refused to release intelligence photos on which his claims were based. Last I heard, they had never been released. And I'm guessing never will be, if the Dark Lord has his way.

Graubard does discuss one incident in a way that focuses on the dark side of the SecDef, which we now know so well. In September, 1990, the chief of the Air Force, Gen. Michael Dugan, stated publicly that it would be a good idea to try to decapitate the Iraqi regime by targeting Saddam Hussein for pinpoint air strikes. SecDef Cheney fired him. The general assumption was that Cheney had done so because what Dugan suggested sounded like assassination of a head of state, which was against US policy and international law.

Today, just stating the assumption is enough to see how ridiculous an idea it is. It's always possible that Old Man Bush ordered Cheney to fire him. But we know today that the Dark Lord doesn't give a flying [Cheney] for American or international law. It's inconceivable to me that Cheney would have fired him for that reason.

Graubard suggests a more consistent explanation. Dugan's real sin, he thought, was that in his statement, Dugan said that the Iraqi Air Force "has very limited capability" and that its army was "incompetent". For reasons, I discuss below, this was seriously outside the bounds of the Bush-Cheney Party line on the situation facing the US in the Gulf. So Cheney fired him. Graubard's explanation rings true. Cheney has no compunction against breaking the law. But for violating the Party line in public, sure, Cheney would fire a general. He would even out an undercover CIA agent for that.

The Party line there had to do with the potential difficulty of the war. For political reasons, Old Man Bush and his administration preferred that the general public think that the Iraqi armed forces were ferocious, and that the upcoming war against them could be long and costly. Graubard argues that they knew very well that expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait could be done relatively quickly and easily. But Old Man Bush wanted it to look like he was a far-seeing Churchill, bravely undertaking a huge military risk because of his determination to never let Saddam Hitler get away with aggression, or allow a timid-hearted West to appease him.

The lessons of St. Reagan

Graubard argues that the Reagan and Bush administrations suffered from a real lack of political sophistication in foreign affairs. This not only contradicts the Republican adulation of St. Reagan. It also violates the enduring conventional wisdom that Old Man Bush and his staunch Secretary of State and Bush family consigliere James Baker were skilled operators in foreign policy.

He sees Old Man Bush as copying heavily the lessons he learned from St. Reagan, including Reagan's faults. Reagan and his advisers were largely clueless about the changes that the Soviet Union was undergoing during the Gorbachev era. But his focus was above all on the US-Soviet relationship, because the core importance of that relationship was a central assumption of Cold War diplomacy. Obviously, there were some good reasons for that. But one of the implications was that St. Reagan and his administration paid even less attention to what was going in the rest of the world and so remained clueless about a lot of what they were doing, not least in the Middle East.

Graubard certainly understands the Iran-Contra affair for the criminal and un-Constitutional operation is was. But he mainly focuses on it as a prime example of the complete disarray of Reagan's Middle East policies. Iran was presumed to be a terrible menace because of the experiences of the 1979 Revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis. His administration backed Saddam's Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War with little actual understanding of the issues involved and the implications of such active US involvement. (Oddly, though he gives a big emphasis to the fact that the US backed Iraq during that war, he doesn't even mention that Reagan's administration briefly entered the war as an active naval belligerent on Iraq's side.)

But Reagan's own attention was particularly focused on new hostage situations in the Middle East. The newly-formed Hizbullah in Lebanon had taken some American hostages. Arms-for-hostages swaps were the core of the US-Iranian arrangement in the Iran-Contra affair. In those days, Iran did have a greater influence on Lebanese Hizbullah than it is likely to have today, though they are still closely allied.

But Reagan was good at political theater. I'm not one to mock acting as a background for the American Presidency, because communicating effectively through the mass media is a vitally necessary skill for the President. And, as Graubard explains, Reagan realized that there was real political advantage to be found in small wars that could be done for little visible cost to Americans. So he intervened to quash the devilish Marxist menace from mighty Grenada, populartion circa 30,000 at the time. He bombed Libya, which was also considered an Islamic bogeyman country at the time. He backed Iraq against Iran (and Iran against Iraq in the arms-for-hostages swap), he supported the freedom fighters (aka, murderous terrorists) known as the Contras in Nicaragua, and provided substantial support to the brave mujahadeen (aka, Muslim terrorists) in Afghanistan against the Evil Empire (the USSR). Most of those proved popular, though Nicaragua was an exception. Amazingly enough, in those days, which really weren't that long ago, Congress was actually willing to challenge the President on an important foreign policy issue. Congress even prohibited aid to the Contras. Though some Republicans thought Reagan had the power to disregard that law, like Congressman Dick Cheney. (Funny how that name keeps popping up.)

Old Man Bush, the student of St. Reagan

Old Man Bush was much impressed with the notion that the President could rally the country around a foreign war. So when opportunity presented itself, he jumped at it. (Did I mention that Dick Cheney was his SecDef?) First, in an intervention with only the thinnest of legal justifications, he sent troops into Panama to capture the Panamanian head of state, Gen. Manuel Noriega, which he did successfully, shooting up a few thousand Panamanians in the process. But Panamanians don't vote in American elections.

His great moment, though, came when Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait in August, 1990. He organized an international coalition to drive Saddam out, with the requisite comparisons to Hitler and warnings of a new "Munich". While this is celebrated today as a "good war", Graubard makes some important points about Bush's motivations in undertaking it, in addition to his cynical political calculations.

Old Man Bush's first year as President, 1989, was the year the Eastern bloc of Communist nations clearly started coming apart. The Berlin Wall was officially opened in November, 1989. It was clearly a new era. But what kind of new era? Graubard argues that Old Man Bush and his advisers really had no grand conception of what the "new world order" that Bush rhetorically invoked should look like. They were still focused on the centrality of the US-Soviet relationship and failed to see how weak Gorbachev's government had become until the coup attempt in August, 1991, which essentially set in motion the final collapse of the Soviet Union itself.

Old Man Bush, consigliere James Baker and SecDef Cheney saw the Gulf War as an opportunity to assert a new status of worldwide hegemony for the United States. And, more specifically, to demonstrate to the world that the USSR no longer had any significant power to influence events in the Middle East in opposition to the US.

But Graubard also points out that their administration had no more of an overall Middle East policy than St. Reagan's had. They gave little real thought to the various effects of the United States making war on a Muslim country, or of the long-term involvements and problems that were likely to result from their consciously limited goal of driving Iraq out of Kuwait. From what we now know, it appears that Old Man Bush expected an internal uprising to overthrow Saddam after his defeat in Kuwait.

Graubard's book was evidently completed sometime around the end of 1991. So he had no way of knowing how rapidly Bush's war-related popularity would decline. But he makes a number of valuable observations, a number of which suggest that the conventional view today of the Gulf War is quite distorted.

One thing that is a major continuity between Old Man Bush's administration with Dick Cheney and Shrub Bush's administration with Dick Cheney is that Old Man Bush wanted to build up the Gulf War as an historic victory, far beyond what it actually was, in order to pose politically as a mighty military leader. His pitiful son obviously had something similar in mind, as we saw with his now-infamous appearance on the USS Abraham Lincoln in his flight suit and manly codpiece.

Their blundering ignorance about the Middle East and their grossly exaggerated sense of the ability of US military power to drive political events there are also notable continuities.

And we should never forget what is likely the most important continuity of all: Dick Cheney.

Graubard's book also reminds us that the good-vs.-evil dualism that the Cheney-Bush administration of today has made so prominent didn't begin on 9/11/2001, in a passage that also reminds us of the hopeless shallowness of the ways in which the Bushes have used Second World War imagery:
The same Manichaean idiom, to distinguish between the "evil empire" of the Soviet Union and the democratic republic across the Atlantic, was increasingly used to describe the population at home, divided between an industrious and virtuous majority and a reckless, indolent, and vice-ridden minority, who caused all the trouble. An older American style of political debate went out of fashion; the new style, created for use on television, depended on code words, especially significant at those crucial four-year intervals when the future of the nation was being decided. Melodrama became the staple of politics; humor was banished. To suggest that the White House had been recently used as a retirement home [for St. Reagan], that a minor tyrant [Saddam Hussein] was elevated to appear as a new Hitler, that a make-believe war [the Gulf War], which could have had only one result militarily, was given more cosmic importance - and that these were the characteristic features of the new American politics - these were fairly serious charges, legitimated only by the fact that they were true, that they described a country governed by an executive increasingly given to staging media events, incapable of coping with serious revolutionary issues.

Roosevelt was courted by Churchill and Stalin because he was prepared to mobilize and share the produce of a self-confident society, recently emerged from a traumatic depression, but still unscathed by war. In his willingness to conscript, deploy, and risk armies and navies - asking for sacrifice from millions - Roosevelt recognized the importance of engaging the public. He had no interest in their mouthing popular patriotic sentiments, though he had no objection to them. Neither he nor his allies ever doubted that the margin between victory and defeat lay substantially in what the United States agreed to do, what the Congress and the people were to accept. The Second World War was dangerous for all who fought it, and not simply because Allied leaders announced that fact publicly. (my emphasis)
No, today's authoritarian Republican Party didn't begin with the Scalia Five's appointment of George W. Bush as President in 2000. But Dick Cheney has had a major role in the process for decades.

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