Showing posts with label jenkins' ferry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label jenkins' ferry. Show all posts

Friday, April 05, 2013

Confederate "Heritage" Month 2013, April 7: Sympathy for the devil William Tecumseh Sherman

Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman is certainly a devil in Lost Cause pseudohistory. In fact, he's a key figure in the posture of white Southerners as victim that is at the center of Lost Cause hokum. Unfortunately, Lost Cause conjuring of false claims about Gen. Sherman has been taken up by historians and journalists who should know better.

Wesley Moody's Demon of the Lost Cause: Sherman and Civil War History (2011) does a good job of taking apart those Lost Cause claims about Sherman in an accessible manner, although there's inevitably a lot of military history involved, so "accessibility" is relative here.

Moody doesn't deal with Sherman's postwar command in the American West and his role in the Indian Wars, for which I would be much more inclined to criticize him than for his role in the Civil War. Moody starts with a brief sketch of Sherman's career through the Civil War. The remainder of the book describes the evolution of Sherman's popular image and elaborates on Sherman's actions during the Civil War through debunking Lost Cause claims against him.

The set-piece of the Lost Cause case against Sherman is his famous March to the Sea through Georgia, followed by a similar march through South Carolina, the leading state in the secession movement. In the later Lost Cause version, promoted with gusto by pro-Confederate, pro-segregation organizations like the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC), the United Confederate Veterans (UCV) and its successor group the Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) and the magazine Confederate Veteran which began publication in 1893.

The March to the Sea was commemorated with a song written in 1865 by Henry Clay Work, "Marching Through Georgia," here in a version from Tennessee Ernie Ford; this embed will require you to go to the YouTube site for some reason, but it plays there:



Here's another version from Jay Ungar:



And why not an autoharp instrumental version from Ernest Stoneman?



Ironically, Sherman came "to hate that song," Moody writes. "It had been played for him from Europe to Californa. Perhaps he had just hear it too many times ..."(p. 122) So with three version of it available here, I'm sure this blog post would have irritated the General, too.

Despite his well-entrenched image, Gen. Sherman did not pioneer "total war." His marches through Georgia and South Carolina were not intended to break the morale of the civilian population. They were not defined by plunder, violence against civilians or wanton destruction of property. He didn't even come up with the idea of economic warfare, as he is often credited with doing. He was a good general who beat the Rebs enough times.

Sherman's becoming the "demon of the Lost Cause" is ironic in many ways. In the years immediately following the war, Sherman was fairly well regarded in the South and was well received there. He was very critical of the Republican version of Reconstruction, "Congressional Reconstruction" as it is sometimes called, and was even critical of federal efforts to combat Ku Klux Klan type terrorism. He was seriously considered as a Democratic candidate for President, in no small part because of his popularity among whites in the South. His name still comes up in Presidential politics in the form of the proverbial "Shermanesque statement," referring to his insistent rejection of the possibility of becoming a Presidential candidate.

Moody sometimes sounds like an attorney arguing his client's case. But the polemical edge is necessary for a writer taking on a well-established image of a famous historical figure. He points out, for instance, that if Sherman had really been widely regarded in the South as a monstrous villain that had committed widespread atrocities, it seems unusual that he would enjoy the postwar acceptance among white Southerners that he did.

This is a circumstantial argument, but an entirely legitimate and plausible one in this case. He argues that Sherman's March to the Sea in late 1864 had a straighforward military goal, "to reach Savannah and put his army into position to move north in order to trap the Army of Northern Virginia between himself and Grant. His army very quickly reached its destination with minimal losses." He also notes in another valid circumstantial argument:

Sherman moved his army as quickly through Georgia as possible. While he did destroy the manufacturing capabilities of Atlanta and destroyed all the railroads in his path, he completely bypassed the industrial cities of Macon, Columbus, and Augusta. If Sherman's mission had been to destroy the ability of the enemy to wage war (the definition of "total war"), he left untouched three of the enemy's biggest assets. Macon and Columbus still had river access to the Gulf of Mexico, and Augusta with its powder works was still connected to Lee's army by railroad. (p. 33)
Plus, destroying the morale of Georgians wasn't exactly an urgent task, since morale was pretty lousy by late 1864. "The lack of resistance that Sherman's army found in Georgia is the best evidence that the state was suffering a serious morale problem." Newspapers elsewhere in the South complained at the Georgians' lack of opposition to Sherman's Yankee army.

And he observes, "The Georgia legislature met in March 1864 to discuss offering peace terms. The people of the north Georgia Mountains had never been loyal to the Confederacy, and as the war dragged on southern Georgians lost their dedication to the Confederate cause. Taxes and conscription had more to do with this than Sherman." (p. 139)

Moody observes a remarkable fact about Sherman's military reputation as it evolved over the 20th century. Military historians and even philosophers drew conclusions about his actions and strategic thinking based on Lost Cause claims without asking too closely whether those claims were factually correct. Particularly important in this regard were three British military historians: Garnet Wolseley, Basil Henry Liddell Hart and John Frederick Charles Fuller:

These English officers formed the background for the argument that Sherman fought the first modern war, even though the heart of their argument was that Sherman's famous march was reminiscent of an older form of warfare. Hart's argument that Sherman used economic warfare and Fuller's that Sherman fought a barbaric war led many Civil War and military historians of the post-World War II era to ask the question as to whether the Civil War was total war.
This view of Sherman's ruthlessness was further by John Walters in an article called "General Sherman and Total War" for the Journal of Southern History 14/4 (Nov 1948). Moody identifies several problematic aspects of Walters' argument and his sloppy historiography. "Walters's argument were little different from what had been published in the Confederate Veteran between twenty and forty years earlier," he writes.

Dick Cheney's favorite historian Victor Davis Hanson even got into the act, accepting the Lost Cause version of Sherman as a savage monster but recommending him as a model to follow. Since VDH's name is practically synonymous with hackery, I don't know if we should consider it snark when Moody refers to him as "the eminent historian of ancient warfare" and a "well-respected military historian." But he says nicely that when it comes to Sherman, VDH is a hack: "Hanson was by no means attempting to disparage the US Army. He simply fell into the trap off assuming that the orthodox view was accurate. Hanson made the argument that total war can be a positive thing when it is used to defeat slaveholding tyrants. He failed to examine the question as to whether Sherman truly fought a total war." In other words, the "well-respected military historian" is a cheap hack.

He's a little easier on Mark Grimsley (The Hard Hand of War, 1995) and Charles Royster (The Destructive War, 1991), though he finds them falling into excessive credulity about the Lost Cause version of Sherman's career, because they both cite facts that do contradict the Lost Cause approach. A particularly sad case is that of reporter James Reston, who wrote Sherman's March and Vietnam (1984) accepting a Lost Cause version of Sherman apparently derived from a 1973 book by Walters, Merchant of Terror: General Sherman and Total War. Here Moody finds it harder to be generous: Reston's main difficulty was how to portray Sherman as a brutal monster who destroyed Georgia while at the same time making fun of Southerners for believing Sherman was a brutal monster who destroyed Georgia." Reston did enough research in Georgia that he encountered one of the difficulties of the Lost Cause version, the fact that numerous antebellum structures were still standing that were in the path to which Sherman supposedly laid waste. (Philip Van Doren Stern wrote in his 1940 The Life of Abraham Lincoln, "Sherman set out from Atlanta on November 15, severing his lines of communication and marching across Georgia, cutting a swath of destruction sixty miles wide as he went.") Moody explains, "The myth that merged around many of these homes was the Sherman had a romance as a young officer with one of the ladies of the house. As Reston pointed out, if this were true in half the cases, Sherman would have been 'one of the great ladies' men of all military history[']."

Recalling the comments on Steven Spielberg's Lincoln (2012) which I discussed in the first two posts of this year's series, Moody writes in a short chapter on "Sherman in Film":

The movie industry has perhaps done more than any other group to cement the Lost Cause version of Sherman in popular culture. The ideas presented were not original, but they certainly reached such a wider audience. Although most of the themes of the great epics are viewed as outdated today, the Lost Cause themes and especially those dealing with General Sherman have been too easily accepted. (p. 131)
He gives the most famous of all Civil War movies, Gone With the Wind (1939), credit for not completely sucking in this regard. "While the movie shows Union soldiers in a negative light, Sherman and his men are portrayed much better than they could have been. ... Even the Union soldier whom Scarlett O'Hara kills to prevent his raping her was identified as a deserter." But he also notes that the film portrays Sherman's bombardment of Atlanta "as a break from civilized warfare. What the film ... did not mention is that Atlanta was a fortified city and the rules of war have allowed firing on them since cannon fire brought down the first castle wall."

Moody makes a good point about how the Lost Cause version of Sherman's March to the Sea and the South Carolina campaign plays into over-optimistic claims by air power advocates that massive destruction aimed at the civilian population will break the enemy's will to resist:

The idea that atrocities hurt the morale of an army or a people is counter-intuitive. Historically, the type of behavior Sherman's army is accused of would rally an enemy's troops to fight harder. The Confederate government and its allies in the major newspapers of the South obviously believed this, as they published numerous propaganda stories about Sherman and other callous Union generals in order to motivate Confederate soldiers. Before Sherman had even accepted a position in the Union army, Jefferson Davis predicted that the North would behave that way in order to engender support for the Confederate cause. (p. 140)
It's refreshing to see an effective challenge to a key Lost Cause claim like the demonization of William Tecumseh Sherman.

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Tuesday, April 02, 2013

Confederate "Heritage" Month, April 2: War crimes at Poison Springs and Jenkins' Ferry

In yesterday's post I discussed how the opening scene of Steven Spiegberg's acclaimed film Lincoln (2012) treats the take-no-prisoners policy followed by the officers in command of the 2nd Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment at the Battle of Jenkins' Creek in Arkansas in 1964.

As I noted there, President Lincoln had approved the Lieber Code in 1863, which is considered an important advance in prohibiting the practice of "giving no quarter," i.e., "take-no-prisoners," fight until the enemy are all dead whether they are resisting or not. It's unhistorical and unfair for the movie to give the impression that Lincoln approved as such a policy which in fact he had taken special action to prohibit the year prior to that battle.

Wesley Moody in Demon of the Lost Cause: Sherman and Civil War History (2011) notes that "the standard work on the laws of war" during the Civil War was Emmerich De Vattel's The Law of Nations (link is to an 1883 printing of the 1852 edition of that work), Book 3 dealing with the laws of war. Moody reports, that Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman "kept a copy of Vattel with him throughout the war."

Vattel in Book 3, paragraphs 140 and 141 dealt with the question of giving no quarter:

§ 140. Limits of this right.

But the very manner in which the right to kill our enemies is proved, points out the limits of that right. On an enemy's submitting and laying down his arms, we cannot with justice take away his life. Thus, in a battle, quarter is to be given to those who lay down their arms; and, in a siege, a garrison offering to capitulate are never to be refused their lives. The humanity with which most nations in Europe carry on their wars at present cannot be too much commended. If, sometimes, in the heat of action, the soldier refuses to give quarter, it is always contrary to the inclination of the officers, who eagerly interpose to save the lives of such enemies as have laid down their arms.

§ 141. A particular case, in which quarter may be refused.

There is, however, one case in which we may refuse to spare the life of an enemy who surrenders, or to allow any capitulation to a town reduced to the last extremity. It is, when that enemy has been guilty of some enormous breach of the law of nations, and particularly when he has violated the laws of war. This refusal of quarter is no natural consequence of the war, but a punishment for his crime, — a punishment which the injured party has a right to inflict. But, in order that it be justly inflicted, it must fall on the guilty. When we are at war with a savage nation, who observe no rules, and never give quarter, we may punish them in the persons of any of their people whom we take, (these belonging to the number of the guilty.) and endeavour, by this rigorous proceeding, to force them to respect the laws of humanity. But, wherever severity is not absolutely necessary, clemency becomes a duty. Corinth was utterly destroyed for having violated the law of nations in the person of the Roman ambassadors. That severity, however, was reprobated by Cicero and other great men. He who has even the most just cause to punish a sovereign with whom he is in enmity, will ever incur the reproach of cruelty, if he causes the punishment to fall on his innocent subjects. There are other methods of chastising the sovereign, — such as depriving him of some of his rights, taking from him towns and provinces. The evil which thence results to the nation at large, is the consequence of that participation which cannot possibly be avoided by those who unite in political society. [my emphasis in italics]
The white officers of the 2nd Kansas may have been thinking of this latter concept when they took when they decided to pursue a no-quarter policy in the encounter with the Rebels that became the Battle of Jenkins' Creek. It followed numerous killing in the vicinity of black Union soldiers and of black noncombatants by Confederate forces. But it seems doubtful whether Vattel's formulation would have justified their decision, even had if the Lieber Code had not been in place.

The Lieber Code, Art.III.49 specifies:

All soldiers, of whatever species of arms; all men who belong to the rising en masse of the hostile country; all those who are attached to the army for its efficiency and promote directly the object of the war, except such as are hereinafter provided for; all disabled men or officers on the field or elsewhere, if captured; all enemies who have thrown away their arms and ask for quarter, are prisoners of war, and as such exposed to the inconveniences as well as entitled to the privileges of a prisoner of war. [my emphasis]

Francis Lieber (1798-1872), author of the Lieber Code promulgated by President Lincoln in 1863

I include these to show that the laws of war were clear at the time, to the Confederates and even more explicitly for the Union: killing of prisoners or a no-quarter policy was illegal.

The Confederate government treated of African-American prisoners of war as a special case. White Federal prisoners, with some inevitable exceptions, were treated as prisoners of war. Not always well treated, as the infamous case of the Andersonville prison camp testifies. Captured black soldiers, however, the Confederacy regarded as simple criminals and it refused to give them prisoner of war status. They could be imprisoned, enslaved or even executed without the rules applying to white Union prisoners.

The use of African-American troops by the Union had immense psychological importance. White Southerners had lived in horror of slave revolts for decades. The Second Amendment to the US Constitution, which our gun fetishists today idolize, was placed there primarily at the insistence of Southern state that required white male citizens to participate in slave patrols, whose purpose was to catch runaway slaves and generally to terrorized the black population slave and free to discourage revolts. Even nonslaveholding white were required to participate in the patrols. So the fear of slave revolts was widespread and ingrained into daily life in the South prior to the Civil War. It was accompanied by periodic panics over slave revolts, most of which existed only the in the fevered, guilty imaginations of white people, though slave resistance and the occasional slave revolt really did occur, too. John Brown had fanned those fears with his plan to set up a guerrilla army in the South to free slaves.

Gregory Urwin in "'We Cannot Treat Negroes ... as Prisoners of War': Racial atrocities and Reprisals in Civil War Arkansas" in Urwin, ed., Black Flag Over Dixie: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War (2004) recounts the kind of hysteria with which now chronically-paranoid Southern defenders of slavery greeted the news of arming black soldiers:

African Americans are such a conspicuous and valued part of today's American military that it is difficult to appreciate the revolutionary nature of Abraham Lincoln's decision to let slaves become soldiers. Yet, when John Eakin [editor of the Washington Telegraph which Urwin calls "the voice of Confederate Arkansas] proclaimed that "the crime of Lincoln in seducing our slaves into the ranks of his army" should be ranked "amongst those stupendous wrongs against humanity, shocking to the moral sense of the world, like Herod's massacre of the Innocents, or the eve of St. Bartholomew," multitudes of Confederates on both sides of the Mississippi would have agreed. "All minor and local massacres," Eakin added defensively, "pale before it."

To Eakin and other guardians of Southern slavery, African Americans were always two persons rolled into one. On the one hand, they were simple and childlike souls, needing white care and guidance to lead happy and productive lives. On the other hand, they remained savages at heart, purportedly like their ancestors in Africa, and had to be restrained by slavery. If ever those bonds should slip, they would revert to their animal nature and attempt to kill every white person they came across."
As Urwin describes, the Battle of Poison Creek took place on April 18, 1864, and "wqas one of the most complete victories e3ver won by Confederate forces in Arkansas. The Rebs ambushed a Union force, which was forced into retreat. But "[a]s the exulting Rebels scattered the train's escort, they refused to take prisoners from its largest unit, the 1st Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment. Thus, a glorious Confederate triumph was transformed into Arkansas's most notorious war crime." Not only did numerous eyewitnesses describe the slaughter, there was immediate indication of what had happened. "What aroused suspicion was that the 1st Kansas had suffered 117 slain but only 65 wounded." The number of wounded is typically much higher than the number killed. Urwin cites several samples of the documentary evidence, including:

In letters, diaries, reminiscences, and oral testimony handed down from generation to generation, the victors at Poison Spring described the fate that befell those black soldiers who failed to escape. Lt. William M. Stafford, a Texas artilleryman in Maxey's division, confided to his journal: "The surprise of the enemy was complete-at least 400 darkies were killed. [N] 0 black prisoners were captured." Three different Arkansas cavalrymen expressed pride in the fact that the Union dead were "mostly Negroes." A trooper in the ist Arkansas Cavalry boasted that "we almost exterminated the troops that had the train in their charge."
Slaughtering black prisoners of war: "Suthun honuh" in action.

A contingent of Choctaw Reb troops commanded by Col. Tandy Walker was especially brutal, including desecrating the bodies of the dead after the killing was done:

The Choctaws harbored so much animosity for their black victims that killing them was not enough. In addition to scalping and stripping, the Indians devised other ways to desecrate the ist Kansas Colored's dead. The Washington (Ark.) Telegraph treated its readers to this example of "Choctaw Humor": "After the battle of Poison Springs, the Choctaws buried a Yankee in an ordinary grave. For a headstone they put up a stiff negro buried to the waist. For a footstone another negro reversed, out from the waist to the heels." Three days after the battle, a Union burial detail discovered that three dead white officers from the 1st Kansas had been scalped, stripped, and turned on their faces as a sign of dishonor, while the corpses of their black soldiers were laid in a circle around them."

News of these atrocities traveled quickly throughout southern Arkansas.
This happened against a background of such killings. Gen. Kirby Smith of the Trans-Mississippi Department of which Arkansas was a part, criticized on of his Louisiana officers, telling him he hoped that reports of his men taking African-American troops prisoner were false. "I hope this may not be so, and that your subordinates who may have been in command of capturing parties may have recognized the propriety of giving no quarter to armed negroes and their officers." A week after Poison Springs, Confederates had attacked and defeated a Federal formation at Mark's Mills, Arkansas, that was carrying a reported 300 escaped slaves. But the Rebs only took 150 black prisoners. Many of the rest they just killed. Urwin writes, "The exact number of fugitive slaves killed at Mark's Mills will probably never be known, but it undoubtedly topped one hundred."

It was following these two incidents that the Battle of Jenkins' Ferry took place on April 30. And, as I described in yesterday's post, the white officers had decided on a clearly illegal no-quarter policy for the battle. Even after the Rebels forces retreated, the 2nd Kansas men continued to kill wounded Rebs. However, the Union force left behind 150 wounded men at a field hospital, who were taken by Confederate cavalry. Nine of them were from the 2nd Kansas. The Rebels murdered them all, three immediately, the other six two weeks later.

Urwin puts the Confederate policy toward black Union soldiers into a historical trend of white racist violence:

Confederates regarded the employment of African American soldiers as such a crime against humanity that they felt absolved from any obligation to treat black troops and their white officers as honorable opponents. Rebellious slaves and white abolitionist agitators had to be exterminated to keep other blacks in their place and save a social system based on racial subordination. These convictions added a unique 'element of savagery to the Civil War, and they persisted for a century after Appomattox. During Reconstruction, many Confederate veterans joined terrorist organizations that frequently assassinated assertive blacks who dared to press for political equality. As heirs to this heritage of racial oppression, the descendants of those veterans would preserve much of the old Southern order down to the 1960s. Thanks to the civil rights movement and the aggressive actions of the national government, expression of much of America's ingrained racial hatred has been driven underground, but students of the dark side of the Civil War should not be surprised to see it still surface from time to time."
And now that the Republican Party has completely embraced a straight-up segregationist approach to voter suppression aimed primarily at blacks and Latinos and generally making white racism more "respectable" in their ranks, we're already seeing and hearing more of that "dark side."

I hope I've made it clear that for both Confederate and Union soldiers, killing of prisoners and a no-quarter, take-no-prisoners policy was illegal under the laws and standards of the time. And to state again my problem with the opening sequence of Lincoln: the no-quarter policy and the killing of the wounded at Jenkins' Ferry was not a policy decided by the African-American troops of the 2nd Kansas, but by their white officers, contrary to the distinct impression that the movie leaves; the illegal killing of prisoners and wounded by black Federals was not a part of Union policy and in fact was clearly in violation of it; such behavior was not common practice on the Union side, but the much more frequent incidents of such conduct by Rebel forces against African-American Union troops was part of a larger criminal policy toward black prisoners-of-war by the Confederacy and, as we saw with Gen. Smith, in many cases explicitly directed by officers (as was the no-quarter policy by Union officers at the Battle of Jenkins' Ferry); and, Lincoln and the Union government did not approve of a no-quarter policy or ever encourage the illegal execution of Confederate prisoners.

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Monday, April 01, 2013

Confederate "Heritage" Month, April 1: 10th editionthis feature

It's amazing at one level, since it doesn't seem like that long. But I started blogging in 2003, so this blog will have a 10th year anniversary later this year.

I started in 2004 using the occasion of Confederate Heritage Month to do a daily post on the broad topic of opposing neo-Confederate ideology. So this is the 10th version.

Some of these posts have focused on neo-Confederate ideology directly, which is part of a larger segregationist and white racist worldview in the United States. And integral part, actually. Some years I've selected a single thematic topic, like John Brown of the Southern Agrarians. Other years, including this one, I've taken a more eclectic approach.

This year I'm starting out with a look at racial atrocities during the Civil War. Like almost everything about the Civil War, it has become a topic of ideological posturing by segregationists and fans of the Confederacy.

Steven Spielberg's Lincoln (2012) starring Daniel Day-Lewis has recently provided dramatic new images of parts of Civil War history for American and foreign .

Here's a YouTube video of that opening scene, which depicts African-American Union troops in what is identified as a battle at Jenkins' Ferry in the midst of a bitter fight with white Confederates, Opening scene of Lincoln:



The fight is explained in the following conversation, in which a black soldier later addresses Lincoln on a rainy night as he apparently is receiving troops who want to come by and chat with him (my transcription):

Soldier: "Some of us was in the 2nd Kansas Colored. We fought the Rebs at Jenkins' Ferry last April just after they killed every Negro soldier they capture at Poison Springs. So at Jenkins' Ferry, we decided we weren't takin' no Reb prisoners. We didn't leave a one of them alive. For the ones of us who didn't die that day, we joined up with the US 116th Colored, sir, from Camp Nelson, Kentucky."

Lincoln: "What's your name soldier?"

"Private Harold Green, sir." ...

"How long have you been a soldier?"

"Two years, sir."

"Second Kansas Colored Infantry, they fought bravely at Jenkins' Ferry."

"That's right, sir."
Then the conversation turns to exposition of the role of black troops on the Union side. Lincoln talks to them like a kindly uncle with obvious compassion. And apparently with complete approval of the atrocities that Pvt. Green has confessed.

Several things bothered me about this scene the moment I first saw it on the screen. One is that it clearly had Lincoln reacting to a confession of a no-quarter approach to a battle, i.e., refusing to accept a surrender and just killing every one of the enemy soldiers. It also gave only the barest hint of the most common kind of racial atrocity during the war, the repeated murder of African-American Union prisoners by Confederates.

I didn't recall immediately Lincoln's own position on that particular issue, though I thought his casual approval of such a thing would have been unlikely in the extreme. But now that I've researched it a bit, here are some relevant dates and events.

Both battles mentioned above were real ones. The Battle of Poison Springs was on April 18, 1864. The Battle of Jenkins's Ferry took place on April 30, 1864. (Both were in Arkansas.)

Here is what John Burns writes in his article, "Quarter, Giving No" in Roy Gutman et al, Crimes of War 2.0: What the Public Should Know (2007):

Although ancient history contain examples of general ordering troops to spare soldiers defeated in battle, and even of attempt by early lawgivers to punish those judged too brutal with the enemy, modern efforts to ensure humane treatment of enemy fighters date back to the American Civil War, when President Lincoln, in 1863, promulgated what became known as the Lieber Code, a codification of the laws of armed conflict, which expressly forbade Union troops to give no quarter.
In other words, the President that Spielberg's film depicts as casually approving of no-quarter battles in 1864 was the President who in 1863 had established the Lieber Code "which expressly forbade Union troops to give no quarter," a rule that is historic in the international laws of war for forbidding just the kind of action we see him approving in the opening scene of Lincoln.

Jens David Ohlin at his blog which is also named LieberCode explains in the permanent footer at the bottom of his blog:

The Lieber Code was the first codification of the international laws of war. Commissioned by President Lincoln during the Civil War, the Lieber Code was formally known as General Order No. 100 and was published as a pamphlet that could be carried by Union soldiers during battle. The Code was written by Columbia University Professor Francis Lieber, who was heavily influenced by, among other sources, the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Though published in 1863, the Lieber Code is still cited today by legal scholars, courts, and international tribunals.
In his post Response to Goodman 03/08/2013, he notes, "Although the law of war has advanced considerably since Lieber, its general structure remains relatively unchanged."

The opening scene to Lincoln does have an arguably legitimate artistic purpose in introducing this particular film. The subject was the passage of the 13th Amendment by Congress and the legislative sausage-making that went into it, with some unsavory deal-making leading to a historic step for freedom and democracy. The opening scene sets the stage with a brief tale of a justifiable goal from the standpoint of Constitutional government in America (defeating the Confederate Army) being achieved by unsavory, evil immoral means (no-quarter fighting).

Still, films are a major way people get impressions of history. And that opening image in this popular movie nominated for an Oscar for Best Movie was and will be seen by more people than are likely to look the article on "Quarter, Giving No" in Crimes of War 2.0. And the impression that opening scene will leave with most viewers is that African-American troops murdered white Confederates (true but only a part of the story of racial massacres in the Civil War, most of which were by white Confederates murdering black Union soldiers) and that the perennially most-popular-President Lincoln cheerfully and kindly approved of such massacres (when in reality he established a major precedent against no-quarter battles in the year before the one in which the opening scene is set).

The Lincoln movie leaves another misleading impression in that scene. The viewer is left to think that the "colored" troops agreed among themselves that they would take no prisoners among the Confederates in that battle ("we decided we weren't takin' no Reb prisoners"). In fact, the take-no-prisoners goal was established by the white officers in charge; the officers in charge of the "colored" units were all white, as we see in the much earlier film Glory (1989), for instance.

Here is the description of that decision by Gregory Urwin in "'We Cannot Treat Negroes ... as Prisoners of War': Racial atrocities and Reprisals in Civil War Arkansas" in Urwin, ed., Black Flag Over Dixie: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War (2004):

Within a day of the bloodbath at Poison Spring [a take-no-prisoners by Confederates against black Federal troops], Col. Samuel J. Crawford called the officers of the 2d Knasas Colored Infantry into council at Camden to discuss the enemy's treatment of their sister regiment. Before they adjourned, Crawford and his officer solemnly swore "that in future the regiment would take no prisoners so long as the Rebels continued to murder our men."
I'll post more this month around the essays in Urwin's book. But one last thing about the Lincoln opening scene shown above.

Even considering the dramatic function of the scene in introducing and framing the political conflict which is the main subject of the plot, the encounter as depicted seems very unlikely. For one thing, it shows an African-American private in 1864 using his time during a brief encounter with his white Commander-in-Chief to confess to a war crime in violation of Lincoln's own Lieber Code. And his cheeky friend presses the President on better pay and promotion opportunities for the the black troops. And then two white soldiers, both notably less articulate than the black soldiers, come up and recite most of the Gettysburg Address to Lincoln after which Pvt. Green recites the last part eloquently.

But since he uses that concluding part of the scene to establish an heroic aura for Lincoln, it's understandable, and most viewers would see that the borderline corny setup with the Gettysburg Address is meant to play that purpose. It's not likely to leave any substantive historical misconceptions.

Portraying Lincoln misleadingly as approving of take-no-prisoners warfare will. That and the image of black troops slaughtering whites in a no-quarter battle will not only create wrong historical impressions. They also will feed easily into neo-Confederate polemics against Lincoln and the Union cause.

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