Showing posts with label muslim brotherhood. Show all posts
Showing posts with label muslim brotherhood. Show all posts

Thursday, July 04, 2013

Real-time revolution in Egypt

We're celebrating the birthday of our American Revolution today. In Egypt, they're experiencing one real-time.

Tamarrud is the movement, often referred to as a youth movement, that was the main organizer of the massive protests against now-ousted elected Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi. Juan Cole uses "Rebellion" as the English translation for the name Tamarrud. Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was a high-profile player in the ousting of the elected government, which was headed by the Muslim Brotherhood. (The spelling of Anglicized Arabic names often varies depending on the English-language source, especially with relatively new figures in the news, e.g., Tamarrud/Tamarod.)

Coup in Egypt generate mixed reactions Aljazeera English 07/04/2013:



Stephen Walt posts this message dated 06/30/2013 (last Friday) from "a friend in Cairo who prefers to remain anonymous" who identifies himself as a political scientist (Letter from Cairo Foreign Policy 07/02/2013), who wrote before the coup:

The stated scenario (some might call fantasy) of many opposing the current government is a temporary military takeover that cleans out the Muslim Brotherhood leadership and sets the stage for a temporary caretaker government (the media has reported on a council of three), a rewriting of the Constitution, the election of a house of representatives (their lower house of parliament), and then the presidential election. This scenario has enormous support among the population that opposes the current government. For them, this is not a coup d'etat -- it is how Egypt can save itself. For the rest of Egypt, who voted for and still support President Morsy (slightly dwindling in the delta area but still at around 43 percent overall), this would be an undoing of a legitimate political process of elections -- and one that those in the United States and Europe endorse and hold as the standard for the transfer of power.
This is the broad public posture being taken by the coup leaders immediately after Morsi's ouster.

The invaluable Robert Fisk gives his crusty take on the supposed non-coup coup in When is a military coup not a military coup? When it happens in Egypt, apparently The Independent 07/04/2013:

For the first time in the history of the world, a coup is not a coup. The army take over, depose and imprison the democratically elected president, suspend the constitution, arrest the usual suspects, close down television stations and mass their armour in the streets of the capital. But the word 'coup' does not – and cannot – cross the lips of the Blessed Barack Obama. Nor does the hopeless UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon dare to utter such an offensive word. It’s not as if Obama doesn't know what's going on. Snipers in Cairo killed 15 Egyptians this week from a rooftop of the very university in which Obama made his 'reach-out' speech to the Muslim world in 2009.

Is this reticence because millions of Egyptians demanded just such a coup – they didn’t call it that, of course – and thus became the first massed people in the world to demand a coup prior to the actual coup taking place? Is it because Obama fears that to acknowledge it's a coup would force the US to impose sanctions on the most important Arab nation at peace with Israel? Or because the men who staged the coup might forever lose their 1.5 billion subvention from the US – rather than suffer a mere delay -- if they were told they'd actually carried out a coup.
He also makes these useful comparisons:

... Morsi was indeed elected in a real, Western-approved election. Sure, he won only 51 per cent -- or 52 per cent -- of the vote.

But did George W. Bush really win his first presidential election? Morsi certainly won a greater share of the popular vote than David Cameron. We can say that Morsi lost his mandate when he no longer honoured his majority vote by serving the majority of Egyptians. But does that mean that European armies must take over their countries whenever European prime ministers fall below 50 per cent in their public opinion polls? And by the way, are the Muslim Brotherhood to be allowed to participate in the next Egyptian presidential elections? Or will they be banned? And if they participate, what will happen if their candidate wins again?
As Fisk makes clear in that column itself, he's not defending the approach of Morsi and the Brothers (as the Muslim Brotherhood is known for short). "He treated his Muslim Brotherhood mates as masters rather than servants of the people, showed no interest in protecting Egypt’s Christian minority, and then enraged the Egyptian army by attending a Brotherhood meeting at which Egyptians were asked to join the holy war in Syria to kill Shiites and overthrow Bashar al-Assad's regime." So the latest turn in the Egyptian revolution is in part a spillover effect of the Syrian civil war.

Juan Cole in Egypt's "Revocouption" and the future of Democracy on the Nile Informed Comment 07/04/2013 reminds us how risky the current situation in Egypt is. Revolutions are very messy events, messier than normal politics. If the only legitimate goal of war is to establish a better peace, a revolution is a means to establish a new and hopefully better boring normal routine. (We'll talk about "permanent revolution" another time.) And Cole notes that the coup in Egypt does have some striking features not present in your run-of-the-mill coup d'tat:

In fact, there certainly was a popular revolutionary element to the events, with literally millions of protesters coming out on Sunday and after, in the biggest demonstrations in Egyptian history. You can’t dismiss that as merely a coup d’etat from on top by a handful of officers.

But on Wednesday there was also a military coup, provoked by the officer corps’ increasing dissatisfaction with President Muhammad Morsi as well as a determination not to stand by as the country threatened to devolve into chaos, as rival street crowds confronted one another.

The Minister of Defense and de facto head of the military establishment, Brig Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, was the one who set forward the framework for the change in government. ...

The interim president is Adly Mansour, the acting chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court.
And both revolutions and coups can turn out badly:

The mass arrests and the resurrection of Mubarak-era phony prosecutions are both extremely troubling, since they have the effect of criminalizing the Muslim Brotherhood and creating again the category of thought crimes in Egypt, the abolition of which was one of the gains of 2011.

The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters maintain that Wednesday’s events were nothing more than a seedy military coup against a legitimate, freely elected president. They are angry and despondent about having the military steal from them the fruits of their victory at the polls. Some more radical elements of the Brotherhood have threatened to turn to terrorism as a result of Morsi being deposed.

What Rebellion and al-Sisi have done is extremely dangerous. Not only does it risk undermining the legitimacy of democratic elections, it risks discouraging Muslim religious groups from participating in democratic politics. The danger is real. A similar revocation of the results of a revolution in Algeria late in 1991 threw the country into a decade and a half of civil war that left over 150,000 dead. The 'debaathification' program of the post-2003 Iraqi government, which was vindictive toward former members of the Baath Party, probably helped throw that country into a low-grade guerrilla struggle that continues to this day. Egyptians who think their country is immune from such phenomena are fooling themselves. [my emphasis]
During the Cold War, the US and Israel actively promoted Islamist political movement as an alternative to anti-capitalist, left-leaning movements that would be less friendly to the West and more supportive of Soviet positions. Robert Dreyfuss describes this process in his book Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (2005), which also gives an account of the development of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the diverse evolution of its international influence. The Osama bin Laden brand of jihadist ideology was one of those influences, most of which have been less obviously malign. We're seeing in Egypt and in Turkey the playing out of the contradictions of a party with theocratic inclinations (Marsi's Brothers in Egypt, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party in Turkey) working within democratic institutions. Those democratic institutions are far better established in Turkey than Egypt, of course.

Walt's Anonymous friend gives this perspective on the Egyptian context of the non-coup coup idea:

One of the two core challenges in this current dynamic is the fact that there are only two institutions that its people trust. While Americans have trust and confidence (at various times) in the media, the president, elections, the Supreme Court, local elected officials, and maybe even their police, Egyptians really only have two: the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF -- often just referred to as the Army for shorthand, but it includes a navy and an air force among a few other services) and their devout faith for Islam. This is not a political Islam for a majority but a spirituality that, at most, imbues their every action in life and, at least, encourages a sense of surrender and acceptance -- the idea that there are many things beyond one's control and the best you can do is to do your best. ...

The second challenge of the current dynamic is Egyptians' perception that the only way they have been able to achieve any real change in their system -- and in their elected government's behavior -- has been through street protests and demonstrations. Hosni Mubarak fell due to 18 days of protest. Morsy changed his stance on extensive presidential oversight and power in the draft of the Egyptian Constitution only after massive street protests last November and early December. The decision to call for earlier parliamentary elections (which later was undone) was achieved after the Jan. 25 protests this year. Hence, Egyptians' almost supernatural belief in the ability of the demonstrations -- starting June 28 -- to force a change in the government.
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Friday, February 18, 2011

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan)

Zaid Hassan argues in The Strategic Caution of the Muslim Brotherhood Religion Dispatches 02/10/2011 that "to dismiss the Brotherhood as incompetent or irrelevant ignore both the historical and current reality of the Brotherhood as virtuoso political actors and survivors." To treat the Brothers - the Ikhwan, in the Anglicized version of its Arabic name - as the equivalent of "Al Qa'ida" is foolish. Even though Sayyid Qutb, an Ikhwan leader during his lifetime, is considered the main spiritual godfather of the kind of violent, extreme Salafi thinking which Osama bin Laden adopted, the Ikhwan has gone a very different way. (I guess "godfather" is kind of an awkward term to use in an Islamic context.)

Hassan quotes Abdelwahab El-Affendi describing the Ikhwan's approach as "tactical carefulness and strategic modesty." Any supporter of secular democracy will have concerns about Ikhwan's longer-term goals in terms of imposing their conservative religious views on others through state power. But it's important to try to be genuinely realistic in assessing what the Ikhwan actually is without swallowing propaganda fear-mongering from Christianists like Glenn Beck or Rush Limbaugh.

Robert Dreyfuss provides more background on Ikhwan in What Is the Muslim Brotherhood, and Will It Take Over Egypt? Mother Jones 02/11/2011. His book Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (2005) deals extensively with the Ikhwan. Dreyfuss' book puts the development of political Islam as we know it today into the anti-Communist context of the Cold War, when the United States and Israel viewed Islamist groups and movements as useful and desirable competition to left-leaning, pro-Soviet parties and governments.

Recent superficial discussions of Egyptian politics on American TV might lead one to believe that the Egyptian regime was a bitter opponent of Ikhwan and Islamism. Which is a half-truth. Mubarak hated and feared the Muslim Brotherhood. But his predecessor Anwar Sadat promoted an Islamicizing trend as part of his approach to governance, as Dreyfuss describes in Mother Jones:

Guided by Kamal Adham, the head of Saudi Arabia's intelligence service, Anwar Sadat — who'd been a member of the Brotherhood in the 1940s — reintroduced the Ikhwan to Egypt. At the time, Sadat had no political base, and he wanted to undermine the influence of the Nasserites and the communists. To that end, he calculatedly unleashed the power of right-wing political Islam. The Brotherhood's youth wing, often using physical force to intimidate its opponents, helped Sadat recapture ideological control of Egypt's universities. The Brotherhood also took the reins of Egypt's professional societies—doctors', engineers', and lawyers' groups. But because Sadat did not formally allow the Ikhwan to set up a political party, it fragmented into various components, some of which—inspired by Sayyid Qutb, a violent Salafi theoretician who was hanged by Nasser—turned to nihilist violence. One of these offshoots murdered Sadat in 1981, and then Vice President Mubarak took over. [my emphasis]
Karen Armstrong describes the Islamicizing trend under Sadat in her book, Holy War: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World (1991).

This trend continued under Mubarak, as Paul Amar explains in Why Egypt's Progressives Win Jadaliyya - h/t Russ Wellen, Egypt Has Already Experienced Islamic Rule -- and Found It Wanting FPIP Blog 02/14/2011:

In the past ten years this political force of this particular wing of the Brothers has been partially coopted by Mubarak’s government from two angles. First, Brothers were allowed to enter parliament as independent candidates and have been allowed to participate in the recent economic boom. The senior Brothers now own major cell phone companies and real estate developments, and have been absorbed into the NDP machine and upper-middle class establishment for years. Second, the government wholly appropriated the Brothers’ moral discourse. For the last ten or fifteen years Mubarak’s police-state has stirred moral panics and waved the banner of Islam, attacking single working women, homosexuals, devil-worshipping internet users, trash-recycling pig farmers, rent-control squatters, as well as Baha’i, Christian and Shi’i minorities. In its morality crusades, the Mubarak government burned books, harassed women, and excommunicated college professors. Thus, we can say that Egypt has already experienced rule by an extremely narrow Islamist state – Mubarak’s! Egyptians tried out that kind of regime. And they hated it. [my emphasis]
Dreyfuss offers this cautious observation about the state of Ikhwan today:

In 2007, the Brotherhood released a draft political program that included several very troubling proposals, including the idea that Egypt's government be overseen by an unelected council of Islamic scholars who would measure the country's laws against the Koran and sharia to make sure governance would "conform to Islamic law." Since then, various Muslim Brotherhood officials have also made conflicting statements about anything from the role of women to the treatment of non-Muslim minorities.

In the end, there's no getting around the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is, if not an anachronism, a profoundly reactionary force. Its views on marriage, the family, homosexuality, and the like are distasteful to most Western minds and many Egyptian ones. And it harbors a strong current of overt anti-Semitism, along with a penchant for conspiracy theories. Despite Egypt's drift toward a more conservative Islamic outlook since the 1970s—which paralleled similar trends across the Muslim world—the Egyptian people, especially the middle class, may in the end not be receptive to the Brotherhood's message.
Juan Cole also provides an update on the Ikhwan in Fear Not the Muslim Brotherhood Boogeyman Truthdig 02/15/2011. He reminds us that some American demagogues are perfectly happy to flat-out lie about the group:

Someone named Andy McCarthy, identified as a "former federal prosecutor," has been everywhere in the media making the most grossly inaccurate claims about the Muslim Brotherhood and demonstrating a profundity of ignorance about Egypt unmatched since Pope Innocent III launched the disastrous Fifth Crusade in 1213. McCarthy alleged that the Brotherhood assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981, that Ayman al-Zawahri of al-Qaida is in this group, and that the fundamentalist party Hamas in the Gaza Strip is under the control of the Egyptian Brotherhood. Everything he said to millions of Americans was a laughable falsehood.
He also reinforces the role that Islamist politics played in the ruling style of Anwar Sadat:

In the 1970s, Sadat rehabilitated the Brotherhood and stipulated that if it would eschew violence and become a civil society association, the government would let its members out of jail and allow them relative freedom. It was this bargain, to which the Brotherhood has faithfully adhered, that drove radicals such as al-Zawahri, now al-Qaida’s No. 2 leader, to break with the Brotherhood and to denounce it virulently. Sadat was not assassinated by the Brotherhood, contrary to what was alleged to the great Mideast expert Sean Hannity by the great Mideast expert McCarthy. The president was felled by militants who rejected both him and his ally, the Muslim Brotherhood.
He also reminds us that while it's ridiculous to imagine the Ikhwan as some super-menace, foreign policy makers need to be realistic in thinking about what it is:

The Muslim Brotherhood is a fundamentalist organization. It is relatively hostile to women's rights, and its vision of moving Egypt even further from civil, secular law to a conservative and literalist interpretation of medieval Muslim traditions is reactionary. Its literature is tainted with the worst sort of anti-Semitism. But decades of repression have not destroyed the movement, and there is no reason to believe that more repression would be more effective now.

There is another, proven, way to deal with this problem. The political success stories of the past decade in the Muslim world with regard to democratization are Turkey and Indonesia. In both countries the fundamentalist religious tendency has been liberalized and domesticated by its participation in the parliamentary process. Mubarak’s regime did not work. Democracy in Turkey and Indonesia has. Let us go with a winner for once. [my emphasis]
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