Showing posts with label natural law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label natural law. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 11, 2016

David Hume and Adam Smith

Anthony Gottlieb reviews a new biography of the British philosopher Hume in Who Was David Hume? New York Review of Books 05/26/2016.

David Hume (1711-1776)

He relates this story early in the piece:

Hume the philosopher did have his early admirers, but they had to be careful what they said about him. Six months after Hume’s death, one of his closest friends, Adam Smith, implicitly likened him to Socrates, which caused a scandal. Smith had recently published a controversial treatise on economics, The Wealth of Nations, yet his eulogy of Hume, and especially his account of Hume’s composure in the face of death, “brought upon me ten times more abuse than the very violent attack I had made upon the whole commercial system of Great Britain.” [my emphasis]
That is particularly interesting for me for what it says about how Adam Smith saw his famous work on economics in the context of the British mercantalist system of the time.

Despite the tremendous influence Hume's empiricism had on other major philosophers like Kant, Gottlieb writes that Hume's reputation in the philosophy profession has generally not been so good. But that there is a newfound interest in his work:

... it is probably the rise of so-called “naturalism” in philosophy that best explains Hume’s newfound appeal. Naturalism has several components, all of which were prominent in his work. Hume stressed the similarities between people and other animals: a century before Darwin’s Descent of Man, he argued that there is no great difference between the minds of humans and the minds of some creatures in zoos. (Hume also anticipated Darwin in implying that certain mental traits function to aid reproduction.) He treated religion as a natural phenomenon, to be explained in psychological and historical terms — which tended to annoy the pious — and he argued that the study of the mind and of morals should be pursued by the same empirical methods that were starting to cast new light on the rest of nature. Philosophy, for Hume, was thus not fundamentally different from science. This outlook is much more common in our time than it was in his.

Philosophers now regard Hume’s account of reason not as a mischievous plot to undermine it but as an attempt to explain how it works. As Harris puts the matter, he was developing “an entirely new theory of rationality.” Hume treats humans as clever animals whose beliefs about most things are based on “custom,” in the form of a propensity to expect the future to resemble the past — a propensity, he argued, that is essential for the conduct of life, but cannot be provided with any sort of independent justification. This thesis has come to be known as “the problem of induction,” though Hume himself did not regard it as presenting much of a problem. He played up the importance of what he called “experimental” or “probable” reasoning in human knowledge, and played down the significance of mathematical and quasi-mathematical deductions. This was a considerable novelty after some two thousand years in which philosophers, still enthralled by Greek geometry, had mostly done the opposite. Hume’s emphasis on the sort of empirical and fallible beliefs that humans share with some lesser creatures was all too easily interpreted as a denigration of the powers of the human mind. [my emphasis]
Gottlieb is particulary interested in what he takes to be a kind of coy, discreet atheism on Hume's part.

But he also takes note of Hume's contribution to economic theory:

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals ... was, in Hume’s view, “incomparably the best” of his works, but the public, in both Britain and France, was more taken by his Political Discourses, a set of essays mostly on economic topics that followed a year later in 1752. Adam Smith wrote that Hume was, so far as he knew, the first writer to argue that manufacturing and commerce tend gradually to produce greater liberty and security for citizens. Hume’s economic essays were particularly acute on monetary theory and on trade. He was insistent about the mutual benefits of international trade, wary of national indebtedness, and dismissive of mercantilist obsessions with gold. It has been said that if only Hume had laid out his arguments more systematically, the birth of modern economics would be recorded as 1752, instead of 1776, when Smith’s Wealth of Nations was published.
Hume and Adam Smith were friends, and they had significant mutual influence on each other's philosophical thinking, as Henry Bittermann noted (Adam Smith's Empiicism and the Law of Nature. I Journal of Political Economy Aug 1940):

... the argument of historical continuity is particularly deceptive when applied to the development of ideas, for it tends to neglect a host of other influences on the thinking of any one man. In Smith's case it neglects the influence of Hume, whom he called "by far the most illustrious philosopher and historian of the present age"" and from whom, he said, he differed "a little." While the critics have often noted Hume's influence on specific points, they seem to have neglected Hume's philosophic influence on Smith. Yet Hume's achievements as a philosopher were to upset a rationalist epistemology involving self-evident ideas, to question the assumptions commonly made about causation, and to attack with telling blows the arguments of natural theology. His political theories were directed against natural law and natural rights. It is, of course, quite possible that Smith completely refused to accept his closest friend's conclusions, but he could scarcely have passed over the published arguments without comment, and, in fact, in several places he points out his express disagreement with Hume. The high praise of Hume would probably not have been applied to an author whose conclusions he thought were erroneous. Likewise Hume, though he criticized various points of Smith's ethical and economic theories, did not charge him with adherence to notions which he himself had refuted. Their silence cannot be regarded wholly as friendly forbearance; rather it indicates considerable agreement on fundamental issues.

Tuesday, February 11, 2014

The right to rebel - and its flexible interpretations - especially for Exceptional Americans

This article on the situation in Ukraine articulates the democratic right of rebellion in a current context, but basing it on the classical liberal-democratic tradition. Kirill Rogov, Monopoly on violence vs. the right to rebel Eurozine 26.01.2014:

In a modern state, the monopoly on violence −− which lies behind the foundation of any state −− is checked by the concept of natural law. This means that what is lawful is not defined by whatever arbitrary exercise the legislator chooses to undertake. Instead, the law may not infringe the natural rights of citizens, which are theirs from birth. Nor may it depart from society's understanding of what justice is, because that understanding is based on the idea of inalienable natural rights. The check on state violence emerges particularly from the fact that within the framework of representative democracy, the legislator is not a source of power, but a representative of the power of the people. The notion of full people's power is fundamental to most modern constitutions, including those of Russia and Ukraine.

It follows from this that neither the Russian Duma nor the Ukrainian Rada can pass laws curtailing the basic rights of citizens. For, according to the constitution, these very citizens have endowed them with the power to legislate and rule. Limiting the powers of citizens is effectively usurpation, an anti−constitutional coup. This holds true even if this curtailment is introduced with reference to the will of a "majority" (as so often happens). A parliamentary majority cannot take a legitimate decision concerning the limitation of the rights of citizens, because the source of power lies not with the national majority but with the entire aggregate of free citizens who possess these rights from birth. That is why the concept of natural law −− that is to say the concept of the primacy of the natural rights of citizens over the right of the state to violence −− presupposes the right to rebellion (as has been noted on a number of occasions in recent days). This was formulated in the famous documents of the Enlightenment, which advanced the notion of natural law and the sovereignty of the nation: the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), the French Constitution (1793) and the US Declaration of Independence (1776).

The right to rebellion is not a call or a slogan, but a term describing a particular contradiction within the law. The essence of it lies in the fact that the state −− the nature of which lies in a monopoly on the use of force −− loses its legitimacy in the minds of citizens, if it violates natural law. Thereby, any violence to which the state has resorted ceases to be lawful as well. This contradiction is directly described in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed by the UN: "It is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law." [my emphasis]
This is actually standard liberal-democratic theory. And it's likely to read as uncontroversial to an American audience.

But that's in part because Americans so often assume that we're Exceptional and that such considerations apply to people in countries whose governments we (i.e., our government) doesn't like.

But if you're, say, Edward Snowden leaking information to the press about actions of the NSA that sure look like they are "curtailing the basic rights of citizens," the government, leaders of both parties and the Establishment media - including some supposedly liberal commentators on MSNBC - are not likely to look at you as a defender of natural law and human rights but as a traitor and a criminal. And if Snowden gets caught by the US government, he's very likely to spend the rest of his life in a super-max prison.

I wonder how many people could get a half-reasonable account of what "natural law" even is in that context. It sounds all Bill-of-Rightsy, so members at a Rotary Club luncheon might nod in automatic agreement if a speaker used them.

For a philosophical treatment of the concept, see John Finnis, Natural Law Theories Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy 07/25/2011.

With the Tea Party and the Republicans (pretty much redundant terms at this point), we see a John Calhoun-like reactionary version of that concept, used to justify the bitterest opposition to regulations of business misconduct or measures to protect the rights of women or minorities. And the lay the political groundwork for an impeachment threat against President Obama. Here's Ben Carson, the Christian Right star of the 2013 National Prayer Breakfast, carrying on in that vein: Sabrina Siddiqui, Ben Carson, Fox Commentator: Progressives Will Turn America Into Nazi Germany Huffington Post 02/10/2014.

American recognition of the right to rebel in other nations is notoriously subject to pragmatic considerations - the borderline between pragmatic and cynical is often porous in these matters - as Hillary Mann Leverett reminds us in Learning the Wrong Mideast Lessons Consortium News 02/11/2014:

On the eve of Iran's [1979] revolution, as a deep and abiding thirst for independence was sweeping through Iran, President Jimmy Carter toasted the shah, in "great tribute ... to your leadership and to the respect and the admiration and love which your people give to you."

Thirty-two years later, U.S. foreign policy elites seemed to have learned little. When similar revolutionary fervor threatened another pillar of U.S. dominance in the Middle East — Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak — the Obama administration appeared to be following the example of its 1970s predecessor.

Vice President Joe Biden proclaimed that Mubarak wasn't "a dictator" because he was an American ally and a friend of Israel — thereby highlighting that the only way an Arab leader can be those things is by being a dictator. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had already declared "President and Mrs. Mubarak to be friends of my family."

But with security forces marauding through Tahrir ("Liberation") Square, killing nearly 1,000 people by the time Mubarak finally resigned — and drawing more people to protest, instead of repelling them — alarm set in among Washington’s foreign policy elite. Could the U.S. really lose the Egyptian pillar it had so assiduously co-opted after its Iranian pillar was tossed out in 1979?
It was hard not to think that the Trotskyist roots of neoconservatism weren't showing back in 2002-3 when the Cheney-Bush Administration was drumming up an invasion of Iraq with endless talk of spreading the blessings of democracy by war. Or, as in turned out in practice, by bombing, shooting and torturing the people of the countries we decided to so bless.

The Obama Administration clearly hasn't been as warlike as its predecessor. But they also got into the war-of-liberation act, as Mann Leverett points out:

The Obama administration’s second goal was to co-opt the Arab Awakening for U.S. purposes, by showing that, somewhere in the Middle East, the U.S. could put itself on the “right” side of history. So, when Saudi Arabia offered the Arab League "cover" to intervene in Libya and arm anti-Gaddafi rebels, President Barack Obama overrode objections by his Defense Secretary and military leaders to order U.S. forces into action.

On March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council narrowly adopted a resolution authorizing use of force to protect civilian populations in Libya. In short order, Team Obama distorted it to turn civilian protection into coercive regime change. The results have been disastrous for U.S. interests and for the region: Worsening violence in Libya, a growing jihadi threat in North Africa, a dead U.S. ambassador, and more polarized U.S. relations with Russia and China.
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