Showing posts with label populism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label populism. Show all posts

Sunday, March 11, 2018

Italy and populist politics

Italy's election of March 4 left three parties that in one form or another are seen as populist parties. In Europe, notably Austria and Germany, "populist" is often used as more-or-less-synonymous with rightwing politics and demagoguery. It's too narrow a definition, which would exclude some of the most significant populist movements in history, including the Populist Party itself once led by William Jennings Bryan. That spin on what "populist" means is worth keeping in mind when reading commentaries on Italian politics of the moment.

The leading vote getter in March was the left populist Five Star Movement. Although they have in the past talked about anti-austerity economic policies in line with his own, Yanis Varoufakis is very cautious about finding hopeful results in their first place win. (LA STAMPA interview on the Italian election result (the original answers in English) yanisvaroufakis.eu 03/09/2018). Varoufakis describes himself and the DIEM25 group of which he is a leader as progressive Europeanist, i.e., pro-EU but anti-austerity.

"The Italian election yielded a sad impasse," he writes. "The only real beneficiaries are those who invested in xenophobia and fear." And he emphasizes the role of bad economic policies in the result: "Like every other European country in which the establishment pressed on with failed, austerity-based policies, pretending that they were the solution to our continent’s systemic crisis, the ballot box reinforced the forces of European disintegration."

He doesn't present Five Star in a very appealing light:
What’s your view of the Five Star? Do you categorise them as a populist movement or as a new left?

No party that invests in fear of the migrant, of the ‘other’, the refugee can pose as left-wing. The term ‘populist’, in my mind, has been widely abused of recent. In terms of domestic economic policies, Five Star is clearly trying to re-position itself as a centrist party that can be trusted by the establishment. It tries to maintain its perceived radicalism by targeting the old political class and it corrupt ways while refraining from challenging the ‘system’ itself. Of course, when a system is failing as obviously as Europe’s and Italy’s, the attempt to embrace the system while criticising its functionaries seems to me ill-fated.

What do you think of M5S’s proposal for a basic income? Is it radical? Is it progressive?


M5S are proposing a Guaranteed Minimum Income. This must not be confused with the Universal Basic Income, which would be paid to every citizen with no conditions attached. M5S’s proposal is for a minimum means-tested payment that is conditional also on registering at a job centre, demonstrating that you are looking for work, and not turning down job offers – even if they are low grade and demeaning. In essence, M5S is proposing a welfare net that is standard in most central and northern European countries. Many Italians need this payment and see it as a glimpse of hope – so we should not be quick to criticize it. Whether it will, in the end, be good for poorer Italians or not will depend on the implementation, and in particular what other benefits (e.g. disability or child benefits) are cut.
Angela Giuffrida in The Guardian describes also describes how the current Five Star position on immigration is on the same wavelength with reactionaries (From rebels to Italy's biggest single party: can the Five Star Movement govern? 03/05/2018):
The big question is with whom would the party ally in order to reach the 40% share of the vote required to govern Italy. Experts speculate that it could exploit the dismal performance of the Democratic party and attempt to split that party, or try to team up with the small leftwing group Free and Equal. Another scenario is a tie-up with the League, formerly known as the Northern League, a far-right party with whom it is more closely allied on issues such as immigration and Russia.

Di Maio has said he would stop sending the rescue boats that save migrants in the Mediterranean, which he has called a “sea taxi service”, while Matteo Salvini, the League’s leader, has pledged to deport thousands of illegal immigrants.
Maurizio Cotta looks at some of the "macro" factors at work in the Italian election (Italy: First European Country In The Hand Of Populists? Social Europe 03/09/2018):
According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 2017 Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) on Italy the economic recovery started to take off under the Democratic Party-based governments of Matteo Renzi and Paolo Gentiloni, but people’s perceptions didn’t change much and are still dominated by the effects of the deep recession of the past years – fear of unemployment, experiences of business failures, and the tightening of living conditions. Naturally, the main governing parties suffer under such conditions, whereas opposition parties that are perceived as being far distant from the government enjoy voters’ goodwill. Thus, first and foremost the Five Star Movement and the League grew rather than Forza Italia which had headed the government three times between 1994 and 2008.

A second reason for the success of these two parties is the growing resentment in large strata of the population against the policies of the EU. Many people feel damaged by economic austerity on the one hand and resent the scant solidarity shown to Italy’s problems with immigration on the other. The Five Star Movement and the League have both shown very critical attitudes towards the EU – to the point of even suggesting a referendum on the Euro.
John Weeks thinks the centrist parties are ignoring Biblical signs of skeptical and critical attitudes toward the real existing EU (EU Takes Beating In Italian Elections: When Will They Ever Learn*? Social Europe 03/07/2018):
The centrist parties in the European Parliament treated the growth of the far right as a fringe phenomenon requiring no amendment to their “ever closer union” agenda. The British vote to leave brought no more than a momentary shock. Shrugging off Brexit as a uniquely British phenomenon and no threat to the continent, the centre-right (European Peoples’ Party) and centre-left (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats) pursued their top-down strategy of deepening through compromise.
Mario Pianta in Loathing And Poverty: Italy After The 2018 Elections Social Europe 03/06/2018 stresses economic issues in looking at the Italian election:
Ten years of severe economic and social crisis are the background to all these developments. Italy’s per capita income is now back to the levels of twenty years ago; behind this average there is a collapse – of about 30% – of the income of the 25% poorest Italians, living in the South or in the declining peripheries of the Center-North. Twenty years of stagnation and decline mean a generation with ever-lower expectations in terms of income, work and life. Impoverishment has become a reality for a very large swathe of Italians. The Five Star vote reflects the poverty of the South – their call for a general minimum income has been attractive in this regard. The vote for the League expresses the fear of impoverishment in the North. Only in the centres of major cities – where the richest and the highly educated live, and the economy is better – has the vote taken different directions, going to Forza Italia and the Democratic Party.
The particulars are different from country to country, of course. But people trying to understand this moment in politics in EU countries have to wrestle with the complex overlaps between economic situations and xeophobic sentiment:
Poverty is coupled with fear. The fear of worsening economic conditions and social status; the fear of having immigrants next door, other poor people competing for fewer low-skilled jobs and scarcer public services. In the elections the most prevalent fear was that of immigrants – the landings in Lampedusa, the inability to integrate them, the killing and shootings in Macerata. Salvini turned anti-immigration attitudes into his most effective political tool; Five Star expressed the same hostility – calling NGOs saving immigrants in the Mediterranean ‘water taxis’ for illegal aliens and refusing to vote for a bill granting citizenship to second generation Italians with migrant origins. [my emphasis]
So the left-leaning populist in Five Star did embrace the anti-immigrant rhetoric that rightly disgusts Yanis Varoufakis.

All over Europe, the phenomenon of the center-right Social Democratic parties collapsing after years of embracing Angela Merkel-style neoliberal economics is a major factor in the political picture.

Tuesday, February 27, 2018

Left populism

Here are a few of recent articles on populism. I found both of them especially interesting because they deal with the question of left populism.

Dani Rodrik, What Does a True Populism Look Like? It Looks Like the New Deal New York Times 02/21/2018

Anton Jäger, 21st Century Americanism Jacobin 02/22/2018

Andrés Velasco, Why Economic Recovery Won’t Defeat Populism Project Syndicate 01/285/2018.

Velasco's column does a good job of describing how populism can be left or right:
As is frequently pointed out, populism is a style of politics that creates an “other” on which society’s ills can be blamed. In the left-wing variety, the “other” is the elite – whether economic, financial, or political. For right-wing populists, foreigners, immigrants, or ethnic and religious minorities serve the same purpose.

The phenomenon is far from new. Populism was widespread in the US in the late nineteenth century; twentieth-century European fascism was a variety of right-wing populism; and left-wing populism has of course been a feature of Latin American politics from Getúlio Vargas [Brazil] and Juan Domingo Perón [Argentina] decades ago to Cristina Fernández de Kirchner [Argentina] and Nicolás Maduro [Venezuela] today.
In Europe and the US, populism is often used as a synonym for demogoguery and rightwing politics. Velasco does much better.

The one thing in that section that I would put differently is that his quote implies that left populism always set up the Elite as the antagonist of the People. Ernesto Laclau's excellent work on populism describes it as a style of politics that sets up a dichotomy of the People and the Elite. But that is true of rightwing populism and the left variety. Donald Trump campaigned against Wall Street and corporate-deregulation "trade" treaties, although he didn't describe the latter that way. The image of the Elite in present-day Republicanism is a vague combination of the mainstream media, college professors, Mean Libruls, the Clintons, George Soros, etc. And Trump made use of that rightwing notion of the elite.

On the other hand, left populism doesn't have to always call the elite by that name. In Juan Perón's first Presidential election in 1946 he made the then US Ambassador Spruille Braden. He even used the slogan "Perón or Braden," setting himself as the defender of the Argentine people against the oligarchy backed by foreign capital symbolized by Braden.

Anton Jäger talks about populism in the context of the American left. He makes some good observations. He discusses a speech by Kenneth Burke, a left-leaning literary critic, in 1935, in which he talks about the image of the People as a political myth, apparently more-or-less in the sense Georges Sorel understood it. He quotes Burke:
“Myths” may be wrong, or they may be used to bad ends — but they cannot be dispensed with. In the last analysis, they are basic psychological tools for working together. A hammer is a carpenter’s tool; a wrench is a mechanic’s tool; and a “myth” is the social tool for welding the sense of interrelationship by the carpenter and the mechanic, though differently occupied, can work together for common social ends. In this sense a myth that works well is as real as food, tools, and shelter are.
This has a resemblance to the part of Laclau's notion of populism that I find untenable, which is the idea that a political alliance has to be understood in linguistic terms as a collection of political actors including voters who subjectively decide to coalesce around a definition of political myth of the people, the working class, Perón's descamisados, or other symbols, without looking for any sociological causation in those affiliations.

Burke in 1935 was speaking in the context of discussion of the "popular front," which in Europe meant the Social Democrats and the Communists making a political alliance together along with perhaps smaller left-leaning parties. France was governed by a Popular Front government under Leon Blum for a year in 1936-37.

In the US, the Socialist and Communist parties had relatively minor influence on national politics, although there were some alliances that resembled the European ones, such as the merger of the Farmer-Labor of Minnesota which was strong at the state level, at one point hold a state legislative majority. It also elected Senators, Congresspeople, and Governors.

From my perspective, Jäger gets a little lost in his wrestling with the notion of left populism. "The scenario of a populism that never goes beyond identity — the same gambit as that of the alt-right — remains a serious threat," he writes. His concern is that vital economic and class issues will get overshadowed by identity concerns like race and gender.

Dani Rodrik, though, sees the New Deal as one of the models for a left populist movement, and he also uses the notion of populism in Laclau's sense of being a potential political style for both right and left:
It wasn’t until 1933 that the [original] Populists’ main plank, the end of the gold standard, was adopted. By then the United States was mired in the Great Depression, and Franklin D. Roosevelt had decided the economy needed the monetary boost that adherence to the gold standard precluded. Internationalists complained that Roosevelt acted unilaterally, but he had little patience with orthodox economic ideas or shackles — foreign or domestic — on his conduct of economic policy. At home, he had to fight conservative courts to put his New Deal reforms in place.

By his day’s standards, and perhaps also today’s, Roosevelt was an economic populist. But the New Deal reinvigorated the market economy and saved capitalism from itself. It may also have saved democracy, as it helped staved off the dangerous demagogues and chauvinist ideologues, of which there were plenty (such as Father Coughlin and Huey Long).
Rodrik is an economist, and it's kind of a professional hazard for economists to look for economic explanations of electoral results. And economic factors do loom large in political movements and voter choices.

But, as journalists and social scientists have been documenting in detail, other factors of social conditions and psychological factors also weigh heavily. the role of authoritarian tendencies is a major factor in understanding and opposing current far-right populism like Trumpism in the US or Victor Orbán's in Hungary.

The Five Star Movement in Italy with Luigi Di Maio as its lead candidate is one of the major contenders in Italy's national elections this coming Sunday. Whether Five Star is left populist or right populist or an uncomfortable mixture of both isn't clear to me. They have been very critical of the euro currency and have advocated stimulative economic policies in opposition to the dominant neoliberal consensus. But, as this PBS Newshour report indicates, they may be flirting with some rightwing populist themes, as well, How a rising populist party could shake up Italian politics 02/25/22018:



See also: Gregory Viscusi, The Many Faces of Five Star Are Winning Votes All Over Italy Bloomberg Politics 02/01/2018

Pierre Briançon, Italy resigns itself to the euro but risks remain Politico EU 02/22/2018

Thursday, November 30, 2017

Poland and the popular in populism

Aleks Szczerbiak explains that there's a part of the populism of Poland rightwing populist ruling party that could usefully be applied by parties of the left and the center-left (Explaining the popularity of Poland’s Law and Justice government EUROPP Blog 10/26/2017):
Why is the ruling party so popular? Perhaps most importantly, the government has delivered on several of the high-profile social spending pledges that were the key to its 2015 election success. The most significant of these were its extremely popular flagship ‘500 plus’ child subsidy programme for the first children of poorer households and every second and subsequent child in all families, and a law reversing the previous government’s deeply unpopular pension reforms, which had increased the retirement age to 67 (from 60 for women and 65 for men).

The ‘500 plus’ programme in particular has had an important symbolic effect by providing a significant and clearly identifiable financial boost to many low income households who felt frustrated that they had not shared sufficiently in Poland’s recent economic growth. Many Poles feel that, while politicians have often promised to help the less well-off, Law and Justice is the first party to actually deliver on these pledges on such a scale. [my emphasis]

The political opposition, he reports, "argue that [those popular social programs] place a massive strain on public finances." That argument, of course, is the sort of neoliberal, there-is-no-alternative dogma that has been widely shared for way too many years by both liberal and conservative parties in the West. Digby Parton reminds us of this recent American example (Tax-pocalypse now: GOP’s denial of reality hits critical mass Salon 11/30/2017):
When Barack Obama became president in 2009, he called together all the opinion leaders in Washington and announced that he was planning to propose a Grand Bargain that would include a cut in "entitlement" spending in exchange for the Republicans agreeing to allow the Bush tax cuts on the wealthiest Americans to expire. It had progressive Democrats in a state of agitation, feeling that the president was selling out the signature achievement of the New Deal for a temporary tax hike.

Szczerbiak continues to explain what he seems to be presenting as the most important opposition arguments:
Economic growth is strong, investment increasing, unemployment is at its lowest level for 25 years, wages have started to rise, and increased tax revenues have actually led to a reduction in the state budget deficit.

For sure, the government’s critics argue that it is benefiting from a more general upswing in the European economy and a short-term consumption boom rather than increased productivity and private sector investment. The level of public debt remains high and increased social spending could, they say, cause serious problems in the future if there is an economic downturn and the fiscal situation deteriorates. Nonetheless, Poles are more optimistic about the state of both the economy and their personal finances than they have been for many years. [my emphasis]
But I wouldn't want to make this into a simple argument that "economics overrides prejudice," or the like.

Because as Szczerbiak makes clear, those increases in social spending come in a political package that includes militant xenophobia and Islamophobia and some authoritarian elements in governance, as well as a strong EU-skeptical component. for instance, "a June 2017 poll conducted by the IBRiS agency for the ‘Polityka’ journal found that 51% of respondents actually supported leaving the EU if this was the only way to prevent Poland from being forced to admit Muslim migrants."

Some critics of rightwing populism use the term "Herrenvolk democracy" to describe a situation in which the in-group (Real Americans, Real Poles, Real Russians, etc.) enjoy benefits, including social programs traditionally more associated with the left than the right, while excluding the hated out-groups (Arabs, foreigners, Muslims, whoever). It's not easy to say how much of the appeal of rightwing populism in Poland, the US and other Western countries has to do with the increase benefits for the in-group or to the psychological satisfactions of having a weaker group to hate and to whom one can feel superior.

But I do say with confidence that any party that calls itself left or center-left should be actively advocating and defending such benefits, not apologizing for them or doing what Obama did in proposing his Grand Bargain, i.e., adopt conservative/neoliberal framing of essential programs like Social Security and Medicare and actually advocate to cut benefits on them.

Saturday, June 03, 2017

Liberal concern trolling? Or a bad hair day?

Michael Tomasky has, for whatever reason, cranked out a column that reads like straight-up "liberal concern-trolling," i.e., repeating conservative criticisms of liberals in the form of giving liberals helpful advice: Elitism Is Liberalism’s Biggest Problem New Republic 05/30/2017.

The New Republic had a long stretch under Andrew Sullivan as editor (1991-1996) when it largely reflected the posture of the late, unlamented Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) of 1985-2011, which was a prominent vehicle for what we're calling Corporate Democrats these days. The magazine in more recent years has drifted back to something like its historical progressive stance. There are what we might call successor organizations to the DLC, like Third Way and the New Democrat Network. (It's still a "tell" when an allegedly Democratic group adopts the Republican usage of "Democrat" as an adjective instead of "Democratic.")

Politics and "the elite"

Before digging in to Tomasky's text, I want to talk a bit about the concept of "elite" in politics.

My favorite definition of populism comes from Ernesto Laclau, who sees it as an approach to politics that constructs a political alliance of "the people" that stands in opposition to "the elite." In this view, populism is a political style, not some kind of ontologically different kind of politics. Various populist movements have defined the elite in different ways: "Wall Street" (the US Populist Party in the 19th century); the "economic royalists" (FDR in 1936); "the oligarchy" (Juan Perón in Argentina). One of my favorite variations was Perón in the 1946 Presidential campaign. The American Ambassador in Buenos Aires was a guy named Spruille Braden, a stereotypical ugly American who was focused on getting maximum benefit for his cronies in the mining business. He went on to become a founding member of the John Birch Society. Perón defining slogan in that election was "Perón or Braden." In this case, "Braden" came to symbolize the Argentine oligarchy and their foreign patrons. (Perón won the election.)

In 2016, we saw Donald Trump making "the liberal media" and "the swamp" (corruption) work as slogans for the elite. For Bernie Sanders, "the million-auhs and billion-auhs" became his symbol of the elite.

The person-to-person part

Also, it's tempting for reporters, pundits and bloggers to focus on messaging and framing and the like. Ideology and positions and how they are explained and popularized are obviously critically important, because that get to the actual policies that elected official follow in office. But retail politics also gives a central importance to organizational issues. And fundraising, of course. Mobilizing the base for the Democrats isn't just a matter of policies and slogans, it's also a function a function of face-to-face involvement with voters and particularly get-out-the-vote operations. The Internet and social media have made dramatic changes in politics. But the retail, person-to-person operations are still essential in winning elections. And more so for the Democrats than for the Republicans, because Republicans tend to be more consistent about voting in elections.

Howie Klein in What Is Today's Democratic Party Offering The Working Class? Down With Tyranny! 05/31/2017 emphasizes a critical weakness for the Democrats that was apparent in last November's results for the Democratic Party: depressed turnout among African-American voters, for which a significant part of the problem is the widespread voter suppression being practiced by Republicans all across the country.

Howie's headline reflects an important point. When pundits talk about the working class in the US, not only is the functional definition usually fuzzy, but it usually focuses on white workers, sometimes explicitly and sometimes not. But it's a notoriously tricky undertaking. Minorities like blacks or Latinos have distinct problems from racial/ethnic discrimination that white workers typically do not have. But they also have common problems that affect them all. The American Prospect has a new symposium taking on this perennial issue for the Democrats.

I don't want to dwell on it here. But Hillary Clinton's excuse-making doesn't strike me as very helpful at this juncture. (Zaid Jilani, Clinton Says Obama Broke Through the Racial the Racial Barrier Because He's An "Attractive, Good-Looking Man" The Intercept 06/02/2017) The now-famous interview from this past week is here, Full interview: Hillary Clinton, former U.S. Secretary of State Recode 05/31/2017:



The Democratic Party and democratic traditions

Tomasky cheerfully adopts the conservative stereotype of the elitist coastal Mean Libruls as applying to himself:

... let me announce that I myself am an elite liberal. I tick all the major boxes. I’m not religious. I have few Republican friends. I have deeply conflicted feelings about patriotism. I would never consider living anywhere other than a major city, or at the very least a liberal university town where the odds are slim that I would end up next door to an actual racist. So if I’m hectoring anyone here, I’m hectoring a group that includes me.
The boxes he checks are those of the Republican talk radio slogans against the Mean Libruls. Libruls are city slickers. Libruls are stuck-up intellectuals. Libruls don't know Real Amurcans ("middle America") who hate blacks and Latinos.

Each side is supported by a set of assumptions that brings it a measure of emotional reassurance. Those inclined to blame racism take a dark view of middle America; they’re often accused, by those on the other side of the partisan divide, of being too sheltered, too politically correct, too obsessed with identity politics. Those who argue it was mostly economics are implicitly saying that, the horrors of a Trump presidency notwithstanding, the electoral situation isn’t really all that bad, that those people aren’t really all that bad; they’re typically accused by the other side of being soft on racism, or even racist themselves.
That's stated in a neutral way. At least superficially. But the parallel construction of the paragraph is an odd one. The inclined-to-blame-racism position is contrasted to what "those on the other side of the partisan divide" (Republicans) say about them. While the electoral-situation-isn't-all-that-bad position is contrasted to what the establishment Democrats say about them; because I don't hear Republicans criticizing anybody for being "soft on racism."

He cites various ways that "elite liberals who live on the coasts" supposedly need to clean up their acts to relate to the salt-of-the-earth middle Americans. I'll mention one particularly odd one here: "middle Americans go to church. Not temple. Church. God and Jesus Christ play important roles in their lives." Church not temple? Is Tomasky seriously suggesting that the Democrats have a problem of being too Jewish?

I know Bernie Sanders' campaign last year refrained from accusing his Democratic critics of anti-Semitism. Unlike Obama's campaign in 2008, which encouraged tagging criticism of the candidate as racist. And unlike Hillary Clinton's campaigns of 208 and 2016, both of which were happy to accuse their Democratic opponents as motivating by sexism, "Obama boys" in 2008, "Bernie Bros" in 2016. Politics is politics.

Maybe it would have been advisable for Bernie in 2016 to take more of a poke at anti-Semitism among his Democratic critics, as well.

This framing of the Democrats' situation by Tomasky particularly struck me:

It has been observed that today’s conservative movement, to use the old Leninist vernacular, is a “vanguardist” movement. The word referred to the revolutionary party, the one that was going to make the revolution happen. (Its weak-kneed counterparts were the “spontaneists,” who were going to sit around and wait for it to happen, being alert to the moment.) Some conservatives welcomed the comparison. In Blinded by the Right, David Brock reports that Grover Norquist had a portrait of Lenin in his home.

A movement intent on hastening the revolution develops certain habits of mind. It has enemies, to be sure. But it knows that it’s an embattled minority, so it welcomes new recruits, as long as they agree on some basic principles. That’s why every liberal who abandons liberalism to join the right — from the Irving Kristol neocons of days gone by, to David Mamet and Donald Trump — is joyously embraced. So you’ve finally seen the light! Welcome!

American liberalism is, of necessity, anti-vanguardist. It is counterrevolutionary, since liberals know well that the only revolution that stands a chance of taking hold in this country is a right-wing one. At the same time, elite liberals are regularly being smacked around by a left that is stronger and more confident than it has been in 40 years.

As an anti-vanguardist movement, liberalism thinks very differently than its conservative opponents do. In trying to protect its territory against insurgencies on both the right and left, it becomes defensive and distrustful. Whereas the vanguardist movement that won is on the prowl for new comrades, the anti-vanguardist movement that lost is looking for people to blame. It’s not plotting a revolution. It’s rehashing year-old fights.

Tomasky seems to be trying to make a point that is valid in itself, that the Republicans are more focused in their conservative messaging and their political determination than the Democrats are with theirs.

But he (probably inadvertently) makes an additional point with the comparison. The alt-right/neo-Nazi movement with which White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon has been identified indulges in a kind of mirror-image thinking about the radical left. The John Birch Society, the one-time mother ship of rightwing conspiracy theories, modeled itself after the semi-clandestine cell structure they understood the US Communist Party to be using. They often style themselves against their image of the Enemy. Which is one reason that we can often tell what rightwingers are thinking by listening closely to what they are accusing the Mean Libruls of thinking.

But instead of following that line of thinking, he celebrates this: "American liberalism is, of necessity, anti-vanguardist. It is counterrevolutionary, since liberals know well that the only revolution that stands a chance of taking hold in this country is a right-wing one."

This is what we used to call "Cold War liberalism." Now we have a new version of it, a Cold War Liberalism 2.0 of sorts, with Russia now as the enemy bogeyman again. And still with a bias toward stability and conservatism in foreign policy, even though the Russian bogeyman today is is now a reactionary power, not a Communist one. But if the 1.0 version of Cold War liberalism had a bias toward social-democratic, welfare-state orientation in social and economic policies, the DLC/corporate-Democratic version has a neoliberal approach in economic policy that's often hard to distinguish from Herbert Hoover economics, while adhering to a social liberalism opposing racism, gender discrimination and xenophobia.

But there is a distinctly conservative, quietist cast to Democratic neoliberalism. Hillary Clinton's 2016 slogan of "Stronger Together" captured that attitude well.

Meanwhile, the Republicans style themselves as revolutionaries against their imaginary version of The Elite. We've had the Reagan Revolution and the Gingrich Revolution. And they have been willing to use the neoconservative brand of Trotskyist sloganeering about spreading democratic revolution to places like Iraq via war. The favorite party of the billionaires casts itself as the champion of the regular working folks against the "globalists." While the Democrats insist on pitching even their most New Dealish policies, like Obamacare and the 2009 bailout, in terms of free-market, budget-balancing conservatism. And God forbid that they should push through something like "card check" to facilitate union organizing!

This also accounts in part for one of my pet peeves: the unwillingness of Democrats to embrace even the progressive aspects of Democartic Party heritage prior to 1860, or even later. Because that tradition was very much a revolutionary tradition. For all its limitations from the viewpoint of today's democratic standards, the American Revolution and the Constitutional government it made possible was seen by people in Europe and Latin America as a genuine "vanguard" for democracy in the world at that time. Andrew Jackson's movement, currently in especially bad regard, represented a significant expansion of democracy and an extension of democracy into the realm of using politics to resist the power of concentrated wealth. At least Democrats can still recognize that the Union side of the Civil War also enacted a revolutionary change by ending the slavery system. In the common terminology of the time, when Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, he changed a "conventional" war to preserve the Union on the prewar basis to a "revolutionary" war aimed at overthrowing the social system in the South, which was based on slavery.

Lincoln was a Republican, of course. But he led a Republican Party that for all its limitations at the time was literally a revolutionary-democratic party. Lincoln himself took Democratic Party founders Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson as models for his own political project, which he understood as a continuation of democratizing the United States and expanding the boundaries of freedom. But for today's Democratic Party, that sounds like corny left dogmatism. And we're talking about what Lincoln was trying to do in the 1860s!

How long has it been since you heard a Democrat talk like this, from Lincoln's in his First Annual Message of December 3, 1861?

It is not needed nor fitting here that a general argument should be made in favor of popular institutions, but there is one point, with its connections, not so hackneyed as most others, to which I ask a brief attention. It is the effort to place capital on an equal footing with, if not above, labor in the structure of government. It is assumed that labor is available only in connection with capital; that nobody labors unless somebody else, owning capital, somehow by the use of it induces him to labor. This assumed, it is next considered whether it is best that capital shall hire laborers, and thus induce them to work by their own consent, or buy them and drive them to it without their consent. Having proceeded so far, it is naturally concluded that all laborers are either hired laborers or what we call slaves. And further, it is assumed that whoever is once a hired laborer is fixed in that condition for life.

Now there is no such relation between capital and labor as assumed, nor is there any such thing as a free man being fixed for life in the condition of a hired laborer. Both these assumptions are false, and all inferences from them are groundless.


Labor is prior to and independent of capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves much the higher consideration. [my emphasis]
Even Bernie Sanders doesn't express such a strong point as, "Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves much the higher consideration." Most Democrats would fear their tongues would turn to ash if such words ever escaped their lips.

But Bernie has been willing to tap into that radical democratic tradition. And he hasn't been afraid to talk about "revolution," which in his version would be made by reducing the power of money from corporations and the One Percent to influence elections, establishing universal medical coverage, and increase the active participation in politics by labor and ordinary citizens. We could have an interesting political science discussion about whether achieving those changes would change the social system so fundamentally as to be considered a revolution. They certainly wouldn't in themselves abolish the corporate capitalist structure of the economy! But they would represent a significant shift in the dynamics of political power from what currently exists in the US in 2017.

It wasn't that long ago that American policymakers' failure to adequately understand revolutions was a major problem for US foreign policy. Back when Bill and Hillary Clinton were protesting the Vietnam War, that point was commonly being made and for some time after. I hardly if ever encountered it stated in that way today.

The Republican Party is currently able to have it both ways. They are the safe-haven party for "the super-rich and the giant corporations," to borrow a phrase used by Sen. Fred Harris in the 1970s. But with Trump, they also get to posture as the champion of the ordinary person against the destructive "globalist elites."

If the Democrats can't reorient themselves more toward their own "people's power" traditions, it's hard to see how they can easily overcome the Republican Party's current advantages. And even harder to see how they can move away in practice from neoliberal economic policies which are a dead-end for the Democratic Party as a progressive force in politics.

Friday, December 02, 2016

Smorgasbord: Trump, populism and an Argentine poet

This whole Russians-and-fake-news theme is going to work out poorly for the Democrats. Here are some interesting recent developments along that line:

Spencer Ackerman and Julian Borger, US legislation proposes new committee to counteract Russian 'covert influence' Guardian 11/30/2016. This is a link to the proposed legislation they discuss.

Julian Borger and Raya Jalabi, US Syria policy: signs of shift as Trump son meets pro-Russia Damascus figure Guardian 11/23/2016: this isn't necessarily sinister. But it's part of what will become a much bigger picture.

Christian Lowe and Natalia Zinets, Russia says foreign spies plan cyber attack on banking system Yahoo! Tech/Reuters 12/02/2016. Because cyberwar is such an arcane thing and is surrounded by secrecy and complicated by multiple agendas, it's very hard to know what to make of these reports. Because there are things like this: "The Obama administration is contemplating an unprecedented cyber covert action against Russia in retaliation for alleged Russian interference in the American presidential election, U.S. intelligence officials told NBC News." (William Arkin, CIA Prepping for Possible Cyber Strike Against Russia NBC News 10/14/2016)

Marcy Wheeler, Seven Democrats Write Obama Asking Him to Declassify More Information on Russian Involvement in The Elections Emptywheel 11/30/2016. I hope the Obama Administration releases more substantial information on this. If he doesn't, it just makes the Democratic position on Russian interference in the election look even more like McCarthyist desperation.

On the continuing and lively discussion of populism, Mike Konczal (Learning From Trump in Retrospect Medium 12/01/2016) makes an important observation on how Trump rhetorically constructed the Elite against which he ran a populist campaign: "Trump never blames the rich for people’s problems. He doesn’t mention corporations, or anything relating to class struggle. His economic enemies are Washington elites, media, other countries, and immigrants. Even when financial elites and corporations do something, they are a combination of pawns and partners of DC elites."

There are some really good analyses out there evaluating the evolution of rightwing Republicanism into Trumpism and how to prepare for what's coming:

Rick Perlstein, Democracy and Indecency: From Nixon to Trump Washington Spectator 11/29/2016: "For me, 2007 was the watershed, not 2009: that was when I began stating as a matter of fact that millions of Americans now considered a government controlled by Democrats de facto illegitimate. "

Tina Dupuy, So We Elected an Autocrat: What To Do Now Medium ExtraNewsfeed 12/01/2016: "Really want to get under Trump’s liver-spotted thin skin? Call the movement [against him] The Popular Vote, its members The Popular Voters. At the time of this writing Hillary is leading in the popular vote by 2.5 million." Something tells me that "The Popular Voters" won't become one of Ernesto Laclau's "vacant signifiers" that catches on as the self-definition of a left populist movement. But who knows?

John Shattuck, Resisting Trumpism in Europe and the United States The American Prospect 12/02/2016: "The election of Donald Trump shows what happens when democracy misfires."

Hamilton Fish, White Grievance, Little Hyperboles, and the Coming Storm Washington Spectator 11/17/2016:

Yet, as ProPublica’s Alec MacGillis suggests in his masterful reporting from Pennsylvania and Ohio, the Trump voters are not always who we thought they were. MacGillis cites three common denominators—they live in places that are in decline, they lack strong attachments to either party, and they carry a profound contempt for a dysfunctional Washington. It’s a perverse tribute to the political skill of the Republicans, and an indictment of the inattentiveness of their audience, that the GOP could oppose every Obama initiative, bring the federal government to the edge of the precipice more than once, and still reap the support of those who were angry at the do-nothing Congress. For liberals, this runs parallel to their recognition that the greatest political achievement of the right is to have made their victims their most ardent supporters.
Daniel Engber, Does Fighting Racism Make Racists More Racist? Slate 12/01/2016 (My own short answer: white racists would certainly like you to think that!)

Joanthan Chait goes around the block to get back to a safe, comfortable assumption that the Trump Era won't be that different than anything that came before in The 2016 Election Is a Disaster Without a Moral New York 12/02/2016. And he repeats the it's-all-the-Rooskies-fault Democratic excuse that will come back to bite the Dems, "Clinton would have beaten Trump anyway, if not for the combined efforts of Russian intelligence and the FBI to bring her down."

John Dean takes a look at the Coming Consequences for the Litigious President-elect Trump Justia 11/11/2016:

Unlike any of his predecessors, President-elect Trump has “at least 75” open lawsuits, according to a nationwide study by USA Today. Just before his election on November 8, Trump threatened to sue all the women who claimed to have been sexually molested by him (some 12 women at last count), and several of them threatened to sue him for defamation for calling them all liars. In addition, as his campaign was winding down, several vendors whom he had used during the campaign, claimed they were confronted with his standard business practice of refusing to pay, so several of these people may soon file actions against him, if they are not paid. So, Donald Trump could enter the presidency with as many as one hundred active civil lawsuits, which will have potentially differing and multiple detrimental impacts on his presidency.

Either as a plaintiff or defendant, and Trump is on both sides, in any lawsuit requires time and effort to prepare oneself and one’s attorneys. It takes time and effort to testify at a deposition or during a trial. And it takes time and effort to stay abreast of the lawsuit. Given the fact that Trump may be the least qualified person to ever be elected president, he has much more work to do than most who seek and reach this high office. He does not even have a good newspaper knowledge of the way Washington works, let alone the presidency. It appears he has never read even a single biography of any of the men who preceded him as president, so he has a very steep learning curve. Throughout the campaign there have been reports that he has a very short attention span. Bottom line: His litigation is going to make it much more difficult, if not impossible, to meet his responsibilities as president. The smart move would be to settle these cases, but he may not have the money to do so. And he may be financially stretched to pursue them as well.
On a totally different topic, Felipe Pigna highlights a different article each day on his El Historiador website. Today he features José Mármol y su lucha contra Juan Manuel de Rosas. José Mármol (1817-1871) was a poet who opposed the government of Juan Manuel de Rosas (1793-1877), the Governor of Buenos Aires who was the main national leader of Argentina 1829-1832 and 1835-1852. Though Rosas' legacy is much contested, he was the leader who first established a national identity from various provinces of the previous Spanish Vice Regency of Rio de la Plata.

Rosas, "The Exterminator of Anarchy"

Mármol was associated with the cause of the Unitarians - a political designation, not a religious one, they were basically all Catholics. Rosas was part of the Federalist party. Mármol's most famous work is Amalia (1855), which is set in the context of the violent political struggles during the Rosas period. It still stands as a major work in Argentine literature.

I should start doing Argentine History Mondays or something like that on a regular basis.

Friday, November 25, 2016

Populism accused of being always anti-democratic

Since the grim Presidential election results, The American Prospect has been running a number of articles in the "resistance" mode from people like Adele Stan (Donald Trump’s Calibrated Race and Sex War 11/23/2016), Harold Meyerson (Can Cities Protect Their Immigrants from Trump? 11/17/2016), Derrick Jackson, White Nationalist Bigotry Is the Official Policy of Trump’s White House 11/23/2016, Bob Kuttner, No Common Ground with Trump 11/22/2016 and Paul Waldman, The Greatest Grift of All 11/21/2016.

But Marc Fleurbaey in Why Populism Challenges Democracy from Within 11/25/2016 presents us with an end-of-ideology kind of look at populism, arguing that it always "presents a threat to constitutional democratic procedures and institutions."This is essentially a conservative position, though the corporate-liberal cause also finds such arguments convenient.

He treats populism mostly as rightwing populism. He does note in two sentences, "to be sure, there are some left-wing forms of populism in both continents that claim to be inclusive of the new immigrants rather than exclusionary. But even populists on the left put forward claims as a challenge to the constitutional fabric of representative democracy."

Fleurbaey's column is described there as an excerpt from Inequality as a Challenge to Democracy from the International Panel on Social Progress, although Fleurbaey is not listed at the as an author.

Section 2.6 of is called "Populism: A challenge from within." Fleurbaey is not listed at the Chapter 14 link as one of the authors, though he is cited.

The Prospect column reads like an ideological declaration, an explanation to the committed of what the Correct Line is at the moment on the topic at hand. It reads that way because it doesn't specify any real-world examples of what it's talking about. Not Trump, not the Brexist campaign, not even any historical examples like the Populist Party which can the concept its name.

So when you're just tossing declarations into the void, you can say things like, "Populist movements pushed xenophobic ideologies that opened the door to fascist regimes," without fear of contradiction. Because who know what's referenced, if anything?

So it may or may not be relevant to rise questions based on the historical examples most generally taken to be "fascism." If the governments of Heinrich Brüning and Franz Von Papen that immediately preceded Hitler's Chancellorship in Germany were regarded by anyone as "populist" regimes, it seems to have escaped the attention of every historical or journalistic account of the period I've even come across. They were stone conservative and made no attempt to construe themselves as defenders of the People against the Elite, which the classic populist construction of politics (William Jennings Bryan and the Populist Party, Juan Perón and the Peronist movement in Argentina from 1945 on).

The Spanish Popular Front government elected in 1936 that soon faced the Civil War that eventually brought Francisco Franco to power hardly seems an example of "populism." Unless we define populism so broadly as to include any multiparty coalition government. Which would also pretty much remove any meaningful distinction to the term.

The Chapter 14/Section 2.6 does reference the anti-austerity protests following the 2008 financial crash, like the indignados in Spain and the Occupy movement, as examples of popular protest movements. But it seemingly views them as non-populist.

And it cites Fidesz party of Viktor Orbán in Hungary and the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland of the4 Kaczyński brothers as populist examples. And those two are generally regarded today as rightwing populist parties. But he cites them only in passing.

Apart from the lack of actual analysis presented in both Fleurbaey's and Chapter 14/Section 2.6, assuming that populism is inherently anti-democracy leaves a large swath of political opinions and attitudes to be exploited by the rightwing without the kind of effective competition that left populism can provide.

Foreign Affairs devoted several articles to populism in its Nov/Dec 2016 issue, including "France’s Next Revolution? A Conversation With Marine Le Pen." Le Pen is leader of the rightwing populist French National Front and is currently expected to be one of the two leading candiates in next spring French Presidential election. She frames her positions here this way: "In many countries, there is this current of being attached to the nation and rejecting untamed globalization, which is seen as a form of totalitarianism. It’s being imposed at all costs, a war against everybody for the benefit of a few."

The "everybody for the benefit of a few" is a typical populist formulation.

The National Front has pulled a significant number of voters from left parties, including the Communist Party, though it clearly emphasizes rightwing political positions. This comment from her presents a formulation that could resonate with both left and right voters:

So I would note that Clinton supports TTIP [the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership]. Trump opposes it. I oppose it as well. I would also note that Clinton is a bringer of war in the world, leaving behind her Iraq, Libya, and Syria. This has had extremely destabilizing consequences for my country in terms of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the enormous waves of migration now overwhelming the European Union. Trump wants the United States to return to its natural state. Clinton pushes for the extraterritorial application of American law, which is an unacceptable weapon for people who wish to remain independent. All of this tells me that between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, it’s Donald Trump’s policies that are more favorable to France’s interests right now.
She also makes a number of criticisms of the EU that could be the same. She's explicitly in favor of French exit from the EU, "What I want is a concerted exit from the European Union." That is mostly a conservative position, with anyone on the left generally favored remaining in the EU but drastically reforming it. But that's not universally true. And as the euro continues to be a major drag on economic activity, that position will seem to more and more people like the only practical solution. The Five Star Movement is more a left populist party with substantial public support, and they are for Italy leaving the EU.

But Le Pen's scoffing at the notion that the EU has helped preserve peace in Europe gives more of a rightwing nationalist signal to her voters:

Because it’s not the European Union that has kept the peace; it’s the peace that has made the European Union possible. This argument has been rehashed repeatedly, and it makes no sense. Regardless, the peace hasn’t been perfect in the European Union, with Kosovo and Ukraine at its doorstep. It’s not so simple.

In fact, the European Union has progressively transformed itself into a sort of European Soviet Union that decides everything, that imposes its views, that shuts down the democratic process.
But here she shows the xenophobic core of the National Front's historical and current appeal. And it shows the kind of mixture of signals in which some could appeal to left or center-left voters, others give a rightwing-nationalist twist, and some plain misinformation.

In reality, the euro is a currency created by Germany, for Germany. It’s a suit that fits only Germany. Gradually, [Chancellor Angela] Merkel sensed that she was the leader of the European Union.
A blurring of the true and false. The euro has primarily benefited Germany. But only proportionately, compared to other eurozone members. Le Pen could read that in Joe Stiglitz' new book, which she cites specifically in this interview, The Europe: How A Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe (2016). But she's very right about Merkel's dominant leadership role in the EU, very much enabled by the existence of the euro currency as it's

But here she makes the pivot the xenophobia and narrow nationalism:

She imposed her views. She imposed them in economic matters, but she also imposed them by agreeing to welcome one million migrants to Germany, knowing very well that Germany would sort them out [i.e., distribute them to other countries]. It would keep the best and let the rest go to other countries in the European Union.
This is a bait-and-switch routine, sucker populism. She makes popular and valid points, like fear of globalization and references what known as the democratic deficit in the EU. But then she interprets it all in terms of old-fashioned anti-German nationalism, and focuses her criticism on the hot-points of anti-immigrant hatred. She continues directly:

There are no longer any internal borders between our countries, which is absolutely unacceptable. The model imposed by Merkel surely works for Germans, but it is killing Germany’s neighbors. I am the anti-Merkel.
She also uses a Trumpian equation of terrorism with Muslims and indulges in sweeping Islamophobia:

How can France protect itself from terrorist attacks like the one in Nice in July?

So far, it has done absolutely nothing. It has to stop the arrival of migrants, whom we know terrorists infiltrate. It has to put an end to birthright citizenship, the automatic acquisition of French nationality with no other criteria that created French like [Amedy] Coulibaly and [Chérif and Saïd] Kouachi [the terrorists behind the Paris attacks of January 2015], who had long histories of delinquency and were hostile toward France. This isn’t the case for everyone; I’m not generalizing. But it’s a good way to have a surveillance mechanism. We need to revoke citizenship from dual nationals who have any kind of link to terrorist organizations.

We especially need to combat the development of Islamic fundamentalism on our territory. For electoral reasons, French politicians rolled out the red carpet for Islamic fundamentalism, which has developed in mosques and so-called cultural centers financed not only by France but also by countries that support Islamic fundamentalism. We also have to regain the mastery of our borders, because I can’t see how we can combat terrorism while having open borders. [my emphasis in italics]
Terrorism=Muslims=foreigners="the few" in this sentence quoted above, "It’s being imposed at all costs, a war against everybody for the benefit of a few." Identifying the It as globalization, which she then identifies with the more personified and familiar figure of the Evil Foreigners.

And this is the same kind of language we hear from the American versions of the Authoritarian International. The gubment is doing absolutely nothing. Birthright citizenship! The politicians rolled out the red carpet for Islamic fundamentalism. The so-called cultural centers. The foreigners are criminals so we need surveillance on them all. We've lost the mastery of our borders.

She complains about "open borders," the most publicly popular feature of EU membership. She even gets in a dig at the bad values of "tAnglo-Saxons" and their multicultural ideas.

Marine Le Pen's interview provides a great example of the distinction between rightwing and leftwing populism, a distinction that Marc Fleurbaey int he pieces linked above doesn't acknowledge. I quoted this essay by John Judis a few days ago,All The Rage New Republic 09/19/2016:

The central feature of all these [historical] populist campaigns has been the attempt to champion “the people” against an elite or establishment. ...

But there is another element of populism that is less understood, one that divides the tradition into two distinct political strains. In the left-wing strain, epitomized by Long, Perot, Occupy Wall Street, and Sanders, populists champion the people against the elites. In the right-wing strain, it’s also the people versus the elites — but the elites are attacked for coddling and subsidizing a third “out group,” such as African Americans (Wallace) or immigrants who have entered the country illegally (Buchanan, the Tea Party, and Trump). [my emphasis]

Wednesday, November 23, 2016

French Politics leading up to the 2017 Presidential race and rightwing populism

France is now in the process of their Presidential election, the final round of which will come in the spring of 2016.

The conservative, Gaullist party is now called the Republican Party. Last Sunday, former conservative President Nicolas Sarkozy came in third in the Republican primary. There will be a runoff on November 27 with François Fillon, who got the largest plurality on Sunday, and Alain Juppé. Juppé is thought to be more moderate than Fillon, who once served as Sarkozy's Prime Minister and who seems to be a real piece of work (Sarkozy defeated in primary for French right's presidential candidate Guaradian 11/20/2016):

Fillon has called for a rapprochement with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, on Syria. After the US election, he welcomed a new alliance between Putin and Trump. Asked early in the campaign whether France should cooperate with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad to fight Islamic State, he said France should unite with all possible forces, “democratic or not”. He told the website Atlantico in October: “De Gaulle, Churchill, Roosevelt allied with Stalin to defeat nazism.”

Fillon said the French people “wanted authority” and his was a “powerful project” to reform France.
Now, I'm not on board with the New Cold War talk. But viewing the Islamic State as analogous to Hitler is the kind of comparison that encourages the worst kind of threat inflation. Hitler was the head of the militarily most powerful state in the world at that time. He could not be appeased ("appeasement" before 1938 just referring to concessions in a negotiation), he could not be contained and he was bent of military aggression. The Islamic State is a Sunni terrorist group heavily funded by Saudi Arabia and hardly qualifies as a "state" at all, even though that's what it calls itself.

I can't say I'm thrilled at the strong possibility that a new French President eager to find New Hitlers to fight might be taking office next year.

The main contender against the Republican candidate is expected to be Marine Le Pen, head of the French Deplorable Party, more formally known as the National Front.

The current Socialist President François Hollande is currently held to be a sure loser, who likely won't make in into the final round of next year's Presidential vote. Leaving the final choice for French President as one between the Republicans committed to Angela Merkel's stone-conservative Herbert Hoover/Heinrich Brüning economics and Le Pen and her Deplorables.

Hollande is one in a growing set of Socialist leaders who managed to blur the distinctions of his party's positions to the point that they are scarcely discernible any more compared to the conservatives. Pro-EU reformers who wanted to see a change in eurozone economic policy to one that made macroeconmic sense were heartened in 2102 when Hollande was elected on a platform of opposing the Fiscal Compact, and disastrously bad proposal of Merkel's that would effectively ban any economic policy that actually did make any macroeconmic sense from being used by the eurozone. It's formal name is the European Stability and Growth Pact. But Fiscal Suicide Pact would be a much more descriptive name. (See my Irish referendum today (Thursday) on eurozone fiscal suicide pact 05/31/206 for more on that misbegotten agreement.)

Hollande had promised to force Merkel to renegotiate the Fiscal Suicide Pact if elected. But once in office, he capitulated completely on the agreement, which he endorsed and Parliament ratified. In accord with neoliberal/Merkel/Brüning economic policies including the Fiscal Suicide Pact, he supported Merkel and the Troika in their brutal economic retaliation against Greece in 2015 for the offense of electing a government of which Frau Merkel did not approve. And Hollande has spent much of 2016 pushing for reducing the protections of current labor laws, provoking huge protests by, well, members of the Socialists' labor base.

Gosh, I wonder if that has something to do with his poor standing in the polls?

The Inside Story episode reports on the politics in France; although it's dated 11/20/2106, it was clearly recorded before Sunday's election results were called, Who can stand up to the National Front? Al Jazeera English 11/20/2016:



This is part of the problem Jürgen Habermas addresses in his interview, , Für eine demokratische Polarisierung Blätter 11:2016/For A Democratic Polarisation: How To Pull The Ground From Under Right-Wing Populism Social Europe 11/17/2016:

The economic globalisation that Washington introduced in the 1970s with its neoliberal agenda has brought in its wake, measured globally against China and the other emergent BRIC countries, a relative decline of the West. Our societies must work through domestically the awareness of this global decline together with the technology-induced, explosive growth in the complexity of everyday living. Nationalistic reactions are gaining ground in those social milieus that have either never or inadequately benefited from the prosperity gains of the big economies because the ever-promised “trickle-down effect” failed to materialise over the decades. ...

Since Clinton, Blair and Schröder social democrats have swung over to the prevailing neoliberal line in economic policies because that was or seemed to be promising in the political sense: in the “battle for the middle ground” these political parties thought they could win majorities only by adopting the neoliberal course of action. This meant taking on board toleration of long-standing and growing social inequalities. Meantime, this price – the economic and socio-cultural “hanging out to dry” of ever-greater parts of the populace – has clearly risen so high that the reaction to it has gone over to the right. And where else? If there is no credible and pro-active perspective, then protest simply retreats into expressivist, irrational forms. ...

In my estimate, domestic politicians mishandled right-wing populism from the start. The mistake of the established parties lies in acknowledging the battlefront that right-wing populism is defining: “We” up against the system. Here it matters hardly a jot whether this mistake takes the form of an assimilation to or a confrontation with “right-wing”. Take either the strident would-be French president Nicolas Sarkozy who is outbidding Marine Le Pen with his demands, or the example of the sober-minded German justice minister Heiko Maas who forcefully takes on Alexander Gauland in debate – they both make the opponent stronger. Both take him/her seriously and raise his/her profile. A year on we here in Germany all know the studiously ironic grin of Frauke Petry (AfD leader) and the demeanour of the rest of the leadership of her ghastly gang. It’s only by ignoring their interventions that one can cut the ground from under the feet of the right-wing populists.
I would dissent from Habermas' description there about the problem in dealing with the populist right for the left-center parties has been "acknowledging the battlefront that right-wing populism is defining: 'We' up against the system."

The basic political construction of populism is the People vs. the Elite. How the narrative is formed around which the popular coalition is formed against the Elite matters a lot. Occupy Wall Street was identified with the oligarchic One Percent. Which really does exist. And really does act in collective ways to push governmental policies that further enrich themselves at the expense of the well-being of the broader public, the Ninety-Nine Percent in the Occupy construction. John Judis points out a very important distinction between the right and left varieties (All The Rage New Republic 09/19/2016):

The central feature of all these [historical] populist campaigns has been the attempt to champion “the people” against an elite or establishment. But how the people and the elite are defined has changed with the campaigns. The People’s Party represented “the plain people” against the “plutocracy,” Huey Long the “poor man” against the “money power,” Wallace “the man in the street” against “big government,” Trump the “silent majority” against the “special interests,” and Sanders “we the people” against the “billionaire class.”

But there is another element of populism that is less understood, one that divides the tradition into two distinct political strains. In the left-wing strain, epitomized by Long, Perot, Occupy Wall Street, and Sanders, populists champion the people against the elites. In the right-wing strain, it’s also the people versus the elites — but the elites are attacked for coddling and subsidizing a third “out group,” such as African Americans (Wallace) or immigrants who have entered the country illegally (Buchanan, the Tea Party, and Trump). [my emphasis]
The latter variety can be usefully characterized as "sucker populism." (See: Jim Hightower, Don't Be a Sucker—Donald Trump Does Not Have a Populist Bone in His Body Alternet 09/21/2016.)

But maybe Habermas is just using a overly-broad characterization there. Because the more specific point he's making there is that centrist parties are making a serious mistake in trying to outdo the rightwing populists in pandering to fear and hatred of those third party out-groups that Judis references. We certainly see that mistake in France, which Habermas cites. (See: Philippe Marlière, French politicians are now marching to Marine Le Pen’s immigration tune Guardian 11/19/2016)

Habermas is right about the direction the solution has to take. In Europe, the pro-EU but anti-austerity voters need parties with a clear pro-EU but anti-austerity position. The social-democratic parties for years and years now have been offering only a vaguely different variation on the conservative assumption of TINA: There Is No Alternative to Hoover/Brüning economics:

... the political scene is predominantly grey on grey, where, for example, the left-wing pro-globalisation agenda of giving a political shape to a global society growing together economically and digitally can no longer be distinguished from the neoliberal agenda of political abdication to the blackmailing power of the banks and of the unregulated markets.

One would therefore have to make contrasting political programmes recognisable again, including the contrast between the – in a political and cultural sense – “liberal” open-mindedness of the left, and the nativist fug of right-wing critiques of an unfettered economic globalization. In a word: political polarisation should be re-crystallised between the established parties on substantive conflicts. Parties that grant right-wing populists attention rather than contempt should not expect civil society to disdain right-wing phrases and violence. Therefore, I regard as the greater danger a very different polarisation towards which the hard-core opposition within the CDU is moving when it casts a leery eye on the post-Merkel period. In Alexander Gauland it recognises anew the pivotal figure of the Dregger wing of the old Hesse CDU, or flesh of its own flesh, and toys with the idea of winning back lost voters by way of a coalition with the AfD. [my emphasis]

Sunday, November 06, 2016

Authoritarianism, populism and Trump

A couple of new pieces on the current American authoritarian movement.

Anna Applebaum signs up for what seems to be morphing into conventional press wisdom about populism: the notion that populism is only rightwing, anti-democratic populism (Trump is a threat to the West as we know it, even if he loses 11/04/2016):

They share ideas and ideology, friends and funders. They cross borders to appear at one another’s rallies. They have deep contacts in Russia — they often use Russian disinformation — as well as friends in other authoritarian states. They despise the West and seek to undermine Western institutions. They think of themselves as a revolutionary avant-garde just like, once upon a time, the Communist International, or Comintern, the Soviet-backed organization that linked communist parties around Europe and the world. Now, of course, they are not Soviet-backed, and they are not communist. But this loose group of parties and politicians — Austria’s Freedom Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom, the UK Independence Party, Hungary’s Fidesz, Poland’s Law and Justice, Donald Trump — have made themselves into a global movement of “anti-globalists.” Meet the “Populist International”: Whoever wins the U.S. election Tuesday, its influence is here to stay.
A Populist International headed by Vladimir Putin? As Charlie Pierce likes to say: Honky, please!

This simplistic anti-Russian rhetoric from Democrats and liberals is one of the more disturbing features of this year's Presidential contest. Democratic hawkish toward Russia is nothing new. It's been a bad policy habit of theirs for a while. Though the Republicans have generally been worse. And I doubt that would change much in a Trump Administration.

The Clinton campaign's chair John Podesta was on Meet the Press today. After dealing with a question from Chuck Todd on supposedly lower black early voting turnout in North Carolina compared to 2012 without bringing the Republican voter-suppression campaign against minorities there and nationwide, Podesta proceeded to make this comment, "Donald Trump, who's adopted, essentially, Russian follo-- foreign policy and rejected bipartisan U.S. foreign policy."

This dogmatic Russia-baiting is going to wind up producing even worse foreign policy decisions than the developing Cold War 2.0 mentality already has.

Getting back to Applebaum's column, she also uses the zombie idea that Edmund Burke was a conservative. He was a flaming reactionary! Corey Robin overstated his case in The Reactionary Mind (2011) in arguing that American conservatives were all really reactionaries. But he's right about Burke being a reactionary rather than a conservative.

But Jason Stanley's op-ed piece Beyond Lying: Donald Trump’s Authoritarian Reality New York Times 11/04/2016 is a good analysis. Including this:

Trump’s narrative about “inner cities” is so old that young people are unfamiliar with it. There is no national crime wave. While increases have occurred in cities like Chicago and Los Angeles, violent crime in the United States remains at historic lows. (A thorough study of this topic can be found at FactCheck.org.)

The simple picture Trump is trying to convey is that there is wild disorder, because of American citizens of African-American descent, and immigrants. He is doing it as a display of strength, showing he is able to define reality and lead others to accept his authoritarian value system.

The chief authoritarian values are law and order. In Trump’s value system, nonwhites and non-Christians are the chief threats to law and order.
Trump knows that reality does not call for a value-system like his; violent crime is at almost historic lows in the United States. Trump is thundering about a crime wave of historic proportions, because he is an authoritarian using his speech to define a simple reality that legitimates his value system, leading voters to adopt it. Its strength is that it conveys his power to define reality. Its weakness is that it obviously contradicts it. [my emphasis]



Friday, November 04, 2016

David Atkins on economics and bigotry in politics

David Atkins has a helpful summary and brief analysis of the class-vs-identity argument over what is motivating Trump voters, Racism Alone Doesn’t Explain Trump’s Support, Which Also Reflects Economic Anxiety The American Prospect 11/04/2016. He touches on the insight that defenders of the One Percent have about the implications of the analysis:

If Trump owes his support just to a last gasp of angry white male privilege, then Trump’s unorthodox economic positions can safely be ignored as irrelevant. More importantly, his base can be politically shrugged off as the freak-out of an empowered but shrinking demographic that is losing its privilege in a rapidly diversifying electorate. The Republican Party will confront and defeat the racism of its older base by promoting economically orthodox, younger “reformicons,” and Democrats can comfortably remain the center-left party of college-educated professionals, single women, and minorities, with a greater focus on identity-conscious than on class-conscious politics.

But if economic grievances are core to Trump’s rise, then GOP candidates will be forced to shift further away from the desires of their big donors and toward more protectionist and anti-Wall Street policies. For their part, Democrats will need to take account of not only the rising economic populism of Sanders-supporting millennials, but the relevantly similar policy preferences of conservative-leaning independents who backed Trump over more staid, corporate-friendly choices like Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio.
As I like to say on this dispute, it's important for people who want to understand what's going on to be able to walk and talk at the same time. And that's what Atkins is trying to do in this piece.



Thursday, November 03, 2016

Populism, anti-populism and neoliberalism

Defenders of rule by Big Money are understandably alarmed by populism. And some of them are particularly concerned to keep left-leaning constituencies from indulging it, and so are trying to stigmatize the whole idea of populism as rightwing populism.Former Chilean Finance Minister Andrés Velasco writes in The Anti-Democratic Heart of Populism 10/27/2016, "Populism rests on a toxic triad: denial of complexity, anti-pluralism, and a crooked version of representation."

Velasco's column relies heavily on the argument of Jan-Werner Mueller, whose polemic against populism I discussed in a recent post. And Velasco's recommendation for democratic parties consist of exortations for better marketing practices and these policy reforms:

Leave delegation to complex technical matters. Take advantage of modern technologies to bring other choices – particularly those having to do with the fabric of daily life – closer to voters. Tighten campaign finance laws, regulate lobbying better, and enforce affirmative-action measures to ensure that representatives are of the people and work for the people.
Those "complex technical matters" in the neoliberal view include just about everything to do with trade and economic policy. But let's throw a bone to the unwashed masses by passing some cosmetic reforms to campaign financing and lobbying until the proles calm done and accept their fate.

There is a diagnostic component required to make this approach sound plausible. Its advocates have to deny that stagnant or declining economic conditions have anything to do with the growing popularity of populist political campaigns in Europe and the US.

Here it's important for people trying to understand this realistically to remember we need to walk and talk at the same time.

Economic insecurity produces political discontent. Those who find themselves in an extremely comfortable position are eager to thwart the development of any potential majority coalition that might have a serious desire to disturb that contentment by requiring the wealthy to pay more taxes, or denying their businesses the right to do whatever they want to do, no matter how much harm it may do to the larger community.

So there are a lot of approaches to doing this. In the United States, at least since the 1844 Presidential election ("Tippecanoo and Tyler, Too"), even politicians eager to do the bidding of the monied interests knew they had to make it sound like they cared about the needs of the common people. And if potential popular coalitions against those interests could be divided or distracted by other villains, so much the better. So in the antebellum South, fear and hatred of blacks kept many whites devoted to a political and economic order that did not have their interests as the first priority. Railroad interests were happy to have native workers focusing on their hatred and fear of immigrant labor instead of agitating against the misdeeds of the robber barons.

And, of course, a foreign enemy serves that purpose very well, too, along with providing profit opportunities for the armaments industry and the military-industrial complex more generally.

So it's a fact of life that voters have a variety of pressures, opinions and influences that affect their political choices and political participation, or lack thereof. And hard times create an opportunity for demagogues to link substantive grievances like the lack of jobs to subjective hatreds against minorities, foreigners, or women. And to promote the political equivalent of quack medicine.

Since the late 1960s in the US, leading political commentators have tended to take a perspective that minimized the role of white racism in particular among voters supporting conservative causes. It was considered thoughtful to wonder about the "alienation" and hurt feelings of such voters, while treating racism or religious bigotry as secondary matters about which it was better not to be judgmental. Now in the 2010s, that same vague approach is still popular among popular writers and even some academics.

Bob Kuttner takes a look at several recent books grappling with this complex of issues in a long review essay, Hidden Injuries of Class, Race, and Culture The American Prospect 10/03/2016. At the end, he repeats a statement of Lyndon Johnson, "If you can convince the lowest white man that he’s better than the best colored man, he won’t notice that you’re picking his pocket." And Kuttner adds:

Martin Luther King Jr. often observed much the same thing. “The Southern aristocracy took the world and gave the poor white man Jim Crow,” King said from steps of the Alabama Capitol, following the 1965 march from Selma to Montgomery. “And when his wrinkled stomach cried out for the food that his empty pockets could not provide, he ate Jim Crow, a psychological bird that told him that no matter how bad off he was, at least he was a white man, better than a black man.”
During the 2016 Presidential election, there has been no end of quibbling among progressives about the role economic discontent is feeding Trump's rightwing support. Is it really that? Or is it that Republican voters just hate black people and/or immigrants and/or women and/or Muslims? Are Trump supporters deceived, or are they "deplorables"?

We'll have lots of exit polls to analyze a week from now. But I don't think that is a hard question to understand. It becomes so if we frame it as a simple one.

The suspicion of the labor left and the nationalist right over corporate-deregulation "trade" treaties is nothing new. We saw that split on full display back in 1993 in the debate over NAFTA ratification. So it's easy enough for me to believe that there are some actual swing voters who would vote for Trump as a protest against the deregulation "trade" treaties. And for whom his racism and xenophobia or misogyny are not terribly objectionable. Or maybe distasteful but not bad enough to override the anti-regulation-treaty sentiment.

But it shouldn't be a conceptual problem to recognize that as well as to understand that for the vast majority of habitual Republican voters, those prejudices and bigotry are not objectionable at all. For a great many voters, White Identity is simply more important than better economic opportunities for a lot of voters.

But even for them, we shouldn't simply disregard class or immediate economic issues as affecting their attitudes, either. Identifying with the wealthy and successful is often a part of personal ambition. If you want to be part of an exclusive country club, Republican political opinions and associations are likely to make you fit in better with that crowd than Democratic, left or populist ones. For some people, voting for the Democrats would be a personal embarrassment, an admission of lack of ambition and gumption in life. The one think about Jefferson Davis that I find remotely sympathetic is what his future wife Varina Howells of a Whig family wrote her mother after meeting him, "Would you believe it, he is refined and cultivated, and yet he is a Democrat!"

The actual ways in which economic pressures translate themselves into individual political decisions can also be complicated. But to pretend they don't exist is unrealistic. And often connected with an ideological agenda.

Project Syndicate has been featuring various pieces on this set of issues. Anatole Kaletsky (Pensioners and Populism 10/28/2016) marshals several arguments for the populist-appeal-has-nothing-to-do-with-economics appeal. For instance:

For starters, most populist voters are neither poor nor unemployed; they are not victims of globalization, immigration, and free trade. The main demographic groups behind the anti-establishment upsurge have been people outside the workforce: pensioners, middle-aged homemakers, and men with low educational qualifications receiving disability payments.
And none of these groups feel economic stress?

His other arguments are similarly weak. The ideological point for those who want to discredit populism is that there is no need to address inequality or the damage done by deregulation and privatization or other aspects of neoliberal dogma as a way of address populist discontent. He concludes by hoping the Brexit vote will be a fluke and the high point of populist political manifestations in the West. Or at least Europe. That way, he hopes it will be "the last gasp of an aging generation that tried to impose its nostalgic parochialism on an increasingly cosmopolitan younger generation, but succeeded in only one unfortunate country."

Joschka Fisher also tries to write the whole thing off as a no-nothing throwback movement by people who just don't understand that There Is No Alternative to the neoliberal dystopia (How Much Europe Do Europeans Need? Project Syndicate 11/02/2016):

... the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing global recession are widely, and justifiably, seen as a massive failure on the part of the “establishment.” Anti-elite sentiment continues to erode intra-European solidarity and mutual trust, and the EU has become mired in a prolonged bout of slow growth and high unemployment.

Across the West, a general feeling of decline has taken hold, owing to the shift in global wealth and power toward Asia. ... Worldwide, there is growing discontent with globalization, digitization, and free trade, accompanied by a slow shift toward protectionism. Europeans, in particular, seem to have forgotten that protectionism and nationalism are inextricably linked – one cannot be had without the other. ...

As always, when fear runs rampant in Europe, people seek salvation in nationalism, isolationism, ethnic homogeneity, and nostalgia – the “good old days,” when supposedly all was well in the world. Never mind that the bloody, chaotic past was anything but perfect. Nationalist leaders and their supporters today are living in a “post-empirical” reality, where the truth and experience have no purchase.
I can't help but notice Fisher's comment that voters are "justifiably" viewing the financial crash and Great Recession as a failure of the Establishment parties. Sadly, a key period in that collective failure in Germany was the neoliberal turn of the red-green coalition government in which he served as Vice Chancellor Foreign Minister (1998-2005) as the Green Party leader.

Also at Project Syndicate, though, Joe Stiglitz recommends the very approach that the neoliberal advocates trying to discredit the whole concept of populism are trying to discredit (How Trump Happened 10/14/2016):

There are two messages US political elites should be hearing. The simplistic neo-liberal market-fundamentalist theories that have shaped so much economic policy during the last four decades are badly misleading, with GDP growth coming at the price of soaring inequality. Trickle-down economics hasn’t and won’t work. Markets don’t exist in a vacuum. The Thatcher-Reagan “revolution,” which rewrote the rules and restructured markets for the benefit of those at the top, succeeded all too well in increasing inequality, but utterly failed in its mission to increase growth.

This leads to the second message: we need to rewrite the rules of the economy once again, this time to ensure that ordinary citizens benefit. Politicians in the US and elsewhere who ignore this lesson will be held accountable. Change entails risk. But the Trump phenomenon – and more than a few similar political developments in Europe – has revealed the far greater risks entailed by failing to heed this message: societies divided, democracies undermined, and economies weakened.

Sunday, October 30, 2016

A muddled definition of populism

Princeton's Jan-Werner Müller tries to stigmatize populism as inherently rightwing, anti-democratic populism in Real Citizens Boston Review 10/26/2016:

Getting populism wrong can distort our understanding of political reality in at least two crucial ways. For one thing, there is the danger of equating populism — which justifiably has a bad name across Europe and in parts of the Americas — with legitimate protest against specific policies. At the same time, it underestimates the perils posed by actual populism, such as that of Trump and Marine Le Pen. Populists don’t just criticize elites or play on the prejudices of people using emotionally charged rhetoric. They posit that there is one true, unified people and that they alone are its legitimate representatives. In a pluralist democracy comprised of diverse interests and identities, this claim opens the path to excluding entire groups — and in the worst cases, to authoritarianism. Opponents of populism must be explicit about this danger: they should not pretend that the populist is just another type of politician, if a bit more emotional or uncouth. But they also have to avoid a trap: excluding the supporters of the excluders. This is the tactical error Hillary Clinton made when she criticized Trump voters as “deplorables.”

Populists always claim that they, and they alone, represent the people. Consider Trump’s salvific boast in his speech at the Republic National Convention: “I am your voice,” with the corollary: “I alone can fix it.” This rhetoric condemns other political contenders as entirely illegitimate. The populist does not just disagree about policy; disputes are always matters of character. Other politicians are corrupt, or they put elite institutions before the people. In a word, the defining orientation of the populist is not anti-elitist or even antiestablishment (for populists are perfectly content with the establishment when they are in power) but anti-pluralist. This attitude translates into exclusions both at the level of party politics — other politicians are crooked — and at the level of citizens: opponents are likened to traitors to the nation. [my emphasis]
Populism as a concept has been and is used loosely. Michael Kazin in The Populist Persuasion: An American History (1998) noted how the concept of "populism" in the 1980s and 1990s was at times watered down to the point of near-meaninglessness:

Beginning in the mid-1980s, populism became something of a fashion statement. Journalists and copywriters affixed the term not just to campaigners and officeholders (a habit begun in the early 1970s) but also to talk-show hosts, cable networks, rock musicians, film directors, low-priced bookstores, even sports fans who boo when rich athletes play poorly. Hewlett-Packard, one of the largest corporations in America, advertised a new product as neither "liberal" nor "conservative" but "Populist ... the perfect printer for the masses"; while Banana Republic, a clothing outlet geared to young professionals, unveiled its "Men's 100% Cotton Twill POPULIST pants ... steeped in grass-roots sensibility and the simple good sense of solid workmanship ... No-nonsense pants for the individual in everyman."

Defining what the common people want and then selling it to them has long been the forte of both merchandisers and politicians. Snapped a comedian in 1992, 'To be a populist, all you have to be is popular." Yet the promiscuous applications of the term conveyed something more compelling - the discrediting of alternatives.
Ernesto Laclau did a great service in developing a systematic political theory to describe populism as a distinct political phenomenon in his book La razón populista [On Populist Reason] (2005). He notes that populism as a referent term "has always been ambiguous and vague in social analysis." But he approach populism as "a mode of constructing the political." And the frame of the populist construction is defining the People versus the Elite.

The basic substantive flaw in Müller's argument is that all politicians in competitive elections are arguing in some form that they are a better representative for the people of that consistency than their opponent. That's not the same as calling all supporters of the opponent "traitors" or excluding all of them from being legitimately part of "the people," or denying them legitimate citizenship.

But he's not making a substantive argument so much as a polemic against the concept of populism, which he simply defines as "anti-pluralist." As he says in the quote above, "the defining orientation of the populist is not anti-elitist or even antiestablishment."

In other words, he defines populism as it actually exists in history and present-day politics, like in the Populist Party headed by William Jennings Bryan that gave the concept its name, as not being populist. Only those who brand their opponents as traitors who are not legimately part of the people or even citizens. For Müller, in other words only rightwing populism is populism. And therefore anything that pretends to be any other kind, like Bernie Sanders' Presidential campaign, is really just another form of rightwing populism. But despite his impressive scholarly credentials, his argument is so muddled that even the polemic is not terribly effective.

The argument that "populists are perfectly content with the establishment when they are in power" is ahistorical. It's actually just a play on words in which a government is by definition part of the "establishment." Populist governments can and do present themselves as defenders of the People against the Elite. Recent and current populist governments in Latin America, including those of the Kirchners and the Venezuelan regime, have represented themselves as defenders of the interests of the majority of the public (the People in the populist construction) against the economic elite. We can argue about whether their claims or legitimate or not. But it's a fact that populist governments can and do strike a posture as the defenders of the People against the Elite.

Admittedly, I'm saying that with an understanding of populism consistent with Laclau's history-based version.

The rest of the article is pretty much variations on that theme. For example, "Populism has no particular interest in getting people continuously to participate in politics." Except those who do. Again, the Kirchners in Argentina are an excellent example.

And, illustrating the confusion to which his approach leads, later in the article he refers to how in Latin Americas, "advocates of populism have always stressed its inclusionary and emancipatory character in what remains the economically most unequal continent on the globe." This he says of a type of movement that he defines as exclusionary.

Müller not only dismisses how populism constructs the concept of the elite. He essentially ignores the more vital element of constructing a People to oppose the elite, how that combination of a multi-class groups is put together and how a unifying symbolic representation of that groups is established. In fact, he manages to contort that whole process into arguing that constructing a popular alliance across class lines is a refutation of the claims of populists: "In some countries such as France and Austria, populist parties are effectively catchalls: they draw a large number of workers but also many from other walks of life."

Müller makes some more-or-less legitimate criticisms about making facile assumptions about the motivations of supporters of populist movements. But since he mangles the definition of populism, trying to apply those criticism to populism doesn't produce any particularly helpful analysis.