Showing posts with label repressive tolerance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label repressive tolerance. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 02, 2014

A Herbert Marcuse mention pops up in "The Nation"

Michelle Goldberg brings up Herbert Marcuse's famous essay, "Repressive Tolerance" in #CancelColbert and the Return of the Anti-Liberal Left The Nation 04/02/2014:

Nor is this just happening here. In England’s left-wing New Statesman, Sarah Ditum wrote of the spread of no-platforming—essentially stopping people whose ideas are deemed offensive from speaking publicly. She cites the shouting down of an opponent of the BDS movement at Galway University and the threats and intimidation leveled at the radical feminist Julie Bindel, who has said cruel things about trans people. “No platform now uses the pretext of opposing hate speech to justify outrageously dehumanising language, and sets up an ideal of ‘safe spaces’ within which certain individuals can be harassed,” wrote Ditum. “A tool that was once intended to protect democracy from undemocratic movements has become a weapon used by the undemocratic against democracy.”

Call it left-wing anti-liberalism: the idea, captured by Herbert Marcuse in his 1965 essay “Repressive Tolerance,” that social justice demands curbs on freedom of expression. “[I]t is possible to define the direction in which prevailing institutions, policies, opinions would have to be changed in order to improve the chance of a peace which is not identical with cold war and a little hot war, and a satisfaction of needs which does not feed on poverty, oppression, and exploitation,” he wrote. “Consequently, it is also possible to identify policies, opinions, movements which would promote this chance, and those which would do the opposite. Suppression of the regressive ones is a prerequisite for the strengthening of the progressive ones.” [my emphasis]
Well, no, that's not exactly what Marcuse's essay said, "that social justice demands curbs on freedom of expression."

I wrote about Marcuse's essay and the two that accompanied it when it was published:

1. Are there problems with tolerance?
2. Robert Paul Wolff on going "Beyond Tolerance"
3. Barrington Moore, Jr., on science and tolerance
4. Tolerance, social analysis and radical democracy
5. Herbert Marcuse on repressive tolerance
6. The need for tolerance, its limits and its "repressive" form

Michelle seems to be following the Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. caricature of Marcuse, which I discuss in Political violence and "existential politics" 06/30/2013. And at greater length in Herbert Marcuse, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Political Violence and "Existential Politics."

Her reading of "Repressive Tolerance" is at best superficial. Marcuse's essay was actually a thoughtful provocation whose main goal was to highlight the restrictions which Western capitalist democracies put on freedom of expression in fact despite the general observance of classical liberal legal forms. Marcuse was certainly not indifferent to the value of the liberal political tradition, as he showed in his important essay “The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State“ in Herbert Marcuse, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (1968). The English text of Negations is available online in an authorized SCRIBD edition. I discuss the "Struggle Against Liberalism" essay in National Socialism vs. Liberal Philosophy (2010 paper).

Ironically, in connecting her misreading of Marcuse to speech codes and the like, she winds up echoing one of the weirder theories to creep out of the far-right swamp, one that argues that the Frankfurt School, of which Marcuse was a major figure, was responsible for "political correctness." Here's a post I did on it: "Cultural Marxism": a far-right conspiracy theory involving the Frankfurt School 07/30/2011.

Here's is one of my favorite journalists. Her book Kingdom Coming: The Rise of Christian Nationalism is one of the best things I've read on the Christian Right.

I'd like to think it was unintentional that she seems to be invoking that crackpot theory. But she's dug around in the far right way more than most journalists have. And this one's been around for a while.

From the white supremacist gutter to "The Nation"? Please tell me it was just a bad-hair moment!

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Sunday, July 07, 2013

"Both sides" of the Voting Rights Act and racially-discriminatory voter suppression

"Within the affluent democracy, the affluent discussion prevails, and within the established framework, it is tolerant to a large extent. All points of view can be heard: the Communist and the Fascist, the Left and the Right, the white and the Negro, the crusaders for armament and for disarmament. Moreover, in endlessly dragging debates over the media, the stupid opinion is treated with the same respect as the intelligent one, the misinformed may talk as long as the informed, and propaganda rides along with education, truth with falsehood." - Herbert Marcus, "Repressive Tolerance" in Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr. and Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance (1965; 1969)

To Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., that may have sounded reprehensible, suggesting as it did problems in the real existing political system of the US in 1965 that he preferred not to recognize.

But here is a contemporary illustration of the same process, in which the pro-democracy and anti-democracy position, the straightforward one and the tendentious one, the anti-racism and pro-racism ones, are presented in polite balance, in a segment in which "the misinformed may talk as long as the informed, and propaganda rides along with education, truth with falsehood." It includes Nina Perales from the pro-voting-rights Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) and James Burling from the hardline conservative Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), the latter taking the position that, golly, we don't have to worry much about racial discrimination in voting any more, because "this country's commitment to civil rights, this country's commitment to voting rights is undiminished."

What the Voting Rights Act Ruling Means for Voters PBS Newshour 07/05/2013, which the PBS Newshour website



Bill Berkowitz discusses PLF's advocacy of anti-affirmative action positions in Pacific Legal Foundation on the wrong side of history Bend Weekly 02/07/2007. "Fighting to re-segregate America," he writes, is not the PLF's only goal. But it has clearly been one of them. While Berkowitz' column doesn't name the immediate cases he's discussing, one of them appears to be the one that produced the decision, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2007) in which the Roberts Court stood Brown v. Board of Education on its head by blocking a voluntary school desegregation plan. PLF took the pro-segregation side, of course.

Also on PLF's history, see Source Watch's entry, Pacific Legal Foundation (accessed 07/07/2013).

And if you want to see an example of "the stupid opinion is treated with the same respect as the intelligent one," check this one of David "Bobo" Brooks and the sad, allegedly liberal, Ruth Marcus discussing the same issue, in this case Bobo representing "the intelligent one", although giving a clean-shaven segregationist view along the lines of: oh, gee, they probably shouldn't have gutted the Voting Rights Act, but I can't see what advantage my nice Republican friends trying to discriminate, and if they did, it will backfire on them, so how could this wind up with anyone discriminating against them? Okay, "weasely" would be a better discription, but in contrast to Marcus, it represents "the intelligent one." Marcus meets Bobo's double-reverse segregationist statement with these the first words out of her mouth:

Oh, well, I so totally agree with David.

I think maybe I should just say, OK, agreed, let's move on, and we can find something to disagree about.
Yes, it is possible to here a high-brow discussion on PBS quality-TV and come out of it less informed than before you heard it! Tags: , , , , ,

Wednesday, May 01, 2013

The Village tries to settle on an explanation for the crush-and-burn result on gun regulation

I'm sticking by my defense of Maureen Dowd's column of 04/20/13, in which she says that Obama lost on gun regulations because, "No one on Capitol Hill is scared of him."

For once, she was not only right but focusing on a relevant point. She caught some flak, including from Conan O'Brien at Saturday's Nerd Prom, for holding up an example from a movie as her model that Obama should have been following. But that was standard MoDo shallowness. The unusual thing was that she focused on a meaningful criticism of President Obama on a significant issue and event.

But her column Bottoms Up, Lame Duck New York Times 04/30/2013 goes back to her usual standard of MoDo-ness, even though she's working the same criticism. Here's the core of it:

ABC News’s Jonathan Karl asked Obama if he was already out of "juice" to pass his agenda, citing the president’s inability to get a watered-down gun bill passed in the Senate, Congress swatting away Obama on the sequester cuts, and the recent passage of a cybersecurity bill in the House with 92 Democrats on board, despite a veto threat from the White House.

"Well, if you put it that way, Jonathan, maybe I should just pack up and go home,” President Obama said with a flash of irritation, before tossing off a Mark Twain line: “Rumors of my demise may be a little exaggerated at this point."

Then he put on his best professorial mien to give his high-minded philosophy of governance: Reason together and do what's right.

"But, Jonathan," he lectured Karl, "you seem to suggest that somehow, these folks over there have no responsibilities and that my job is to somehow get them to behave. That’s their job. They are elected, members of Congress are elected in order to do what’s right for their constituencies and for the American people."

Actually, it is his job to get them to behave. The job of the former community organizer and self-styled uniter is to somehow get this dunderheaded Congress, which is mind-bendingly awful, to do the stuff he wants them to do. It's called leadership.

He still thinks he’ll do his thing from the balcony and everyone else will follow along below. That's not how it works.
Much of the punditocracy was willing to support Obama on this from the viewpoint of Beltway "Centrism," one of whose key assumptions that the when a Democrat is President, the Presidency doesn't really have all that much power. We saw Elizabeth Drew working that theme the other day.

MoDo for that brief moment in her previous column caught a glimpse that there was something seriously wrong with the current functioning of the system that was dramatized by the gun background check vote in the Senate. But MoDo ain't no Paul Krugman and clearly has never aspired to be. So now she's back to whining that its all Obama's fault because, "leadership"! And he should schmooze more with Mitch McConnell. But basically it's all because of Obama's quirks which have endlessly annoyed MoDo. And it's all a celebrity pageant for MoDo to glom onto, anyway. None of this mulling over the existential state of representative democracy for her.

Howard Fineman delivers a more standard version of the, well-a-President-can't-really-do-much-you-know version: "His administration is not the first to fall into a Slough of Despond early in the second term. It's all but inevitable. Still, the [press conference] session was notable primarily for the complexity and intractability of the issues Obama is now facing." (Obama: 'Maybe I Should Just Pack Up And Go Home' Huffington Post 04/30/2013).

David Graeber in The Failure of Gun Legislation in the Senate Tells us we Need to fight for our Democracy, a 04/30/2013 guest post at Juan Cole's Informed Comment, actually does get into the larger issue around the gun regulation vote. What he describes here is a real-time version of repressive tolerance:

Even fundamental structural issues are shrugged away. Politicians and journalists who regularly hold out American democracy as a beacon to the world never seem to reflect on what the world is supposed to make of the fact that, say, 2/3 of the American public who don’t happen to live in swing states effectively have no say in who gets to be the President, or that we can have House elections, as we did in 2012, where a majority of voters can choose candidates from one party and watch the other party win the election anyway.

One can only conclude that for most of our official opinion-makers, the word "democracy" no longer has anything, really, to do with popular will. It refers to a structure of authority. "Democracy" for them means that elaborate architecture of checks and balances created by the Framers of the Constitution, the fact that elections, appointments, congressional votes and judicial and executive decisions take place according to established laws, bylaws, traditions, and procedures. It means following the rules laid down by the Founding Fathers and their later, duly authorized, interpreters. Hence in the event of a crisis, the press feels that it's first loyalty is not to what the public wants, or even really to the facts, but above all, to maintaining public faith in the legitimacy of what they consider "democratic institutions." This came out very clearly during the dispute over the Bush-Gore election of 2000. No one contested that Gore was the choice of the majority of American voters. It was not at all clear that Bush was the choice of the majority of Florida voters (and as it later turned out, he was not.) But after a Supreme Court decision in which a majority of justices barely disguised the fact that they were intervening to stop the ballot-counting on the basis of their own personal political preferences, the media instantly declared the issue over—many openly admitting that they felt pointing out that the Court had effectively engaged in a judicial coup would be irresponsible, since it would undermine popular faith in the integrity of "democratic institutions."
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Tuesday, November 29, 2011

Allison Kilkenny on repressive tolerance

Allison Kilkenny doesn't use the phrase "repressive tolerance" in Occupy Wall Street and the Importance of Creative Protest The Nation 11/21/2011. She explains how Occupy's actual impact was connected with the participants' willingness to break with established procedures and rules on how free speech and freedom of assembly and the right to protest were to be exercised:

Up until Occupy, most protests had become exercises in futility. Protesters would show up with their sad, limp carboard signs, march around for a little while - maybe press would show up, but most likely not - and then everyone would go home. Hardly effective stuff.

Even when the protests were massive, say during the lead-up to the Iraq invasion, media had learned to ignore protests as being the hallmark of a bygone era of granola-munching hippies. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the media helped hand protesters loss after loss, perhaps recognizing the fact that protest waged within the perimeters constructed by city officials is completely ineffective.

Demonstrators need a permit to march, and even then must remain on the sidewalk and never disrupt traffic; they need a permit to use a bullhorn, a permit to play music, etc. Protesters, in other words, can protest as long as they never disrupt the normalcy of everyday living, which of course defeats the concept of meaningful protest in the first place.

After a while, all protests began to look the same. Protesters show up, march around, chant X or Y slogan, and if it’s super-exciting, clash with the police and everyone goes to jail. Repeat chorus. It’s no wonder the corporately controlled media were so easily able to write off protest culture as being unimportant or ineffective. The horrible truth was, it had become futile.

That is, of course, until Occupy showed up and refused to play by the city-written rules. No, they wouldn’t be getting permits. No, they wouldn’t be going home at curfew. They would remain in camps as permanent monuments to the injustice and inequality of America’s society. There was no “normal” anymore. There was only what Occupy chose to do, and to not do.
Repressive tolerance is a concept identified with the Frankfurt School philosopher Herbert Marcuse. To judge from these quotes from Marcuse's 1968 Postscript to his famous essay, "Repressive Tolerance", he would have related to Allison Kilkenny's point:

Under the conditions prevailing in this country, tolerance does not, and cannot, fulfill the civilizing function attributed to it by the liberal protagonists of democracy, namely, protection of dissent. The progressive historical force of tolerance lies in its extension to those modes and forms of dissent which are not committed to the status quo of society, and not confined to the institutional framework of the established society. Consequently, the idea of tolerance implies the necessity, for the dissenting group or individuals, to become illegitimate if and when the established legitimacy prevents and counteracts the development of dissent. This would be the case not only in a totalitarian society, under a dictatorship, in one-party states, but also in a democracy (representative, parliamentary, or "direct") where the majority does not result from the development of independent thought and opinion but rather from the monopolistic or oligopolistic administration of public opinion, without terror and (normally) without censorship. ... The ideology of democracy hides its lack of substance. ...

However, the alternative to the established semi-democratic process is not a dictatorship or elite, no matter how intellectual and intelligent, but the struggle for a real democracy. Part of this struggle is the fight against an ideology of tolerance which, in reality, favors and fortifies the conservation of the status quo of inequality and discrimination. ... The tolerance which is the life element, the token of a free society, will never be the gift of the powers that be; it can, under the prevailing conditions of tyranny by the majority, only be won in the sustained effort of radical minorities, willing to break this tyranny and to work for the emergence of a free and sovereign majority - minorities intolerant, militantly intolerant and disobedient to the rules of behavior which tolerate destruction and suppression.
To quote Arlo Guthrie: Some things don't change, you know; some things do.

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Saturday, January 10, 2009

Legal accountability

The New York Times on 01/10/09 has three op-ed writers weighing in on trials for senior-level law-breakers in the Cheney-Bush administration.

Charles Fried of Harvard Law School in History’s Verdict says it would be "savage" to prosecute those responsible for torture, malicious political prosecutions, massive corruption and the like. The civilized thing is to just wait until the next Republican administration takes the Cheney program to the next level of the Unitary Executive. Why, prosecuting these fine public servants would be like Hitler killing the SA leaders in the Night of the Long Knives in 1934? You don't want to be like Hitler, do you? If foreigners commit war crimes and we're on the other side, then sure we can prosecute them. Let's just be content with remembering that a few of these fine folks from the outgoing administration got a little carried away here and there.

Dalia Lithwick of Slate in Forgive Not makes a good argument for actual prosecution, though she also seems to think that John Conyers' proposal for a commission is a good idea. Given the weight of Beltway Village opinion against legal accountability, I think that establishing such a commission in the absence of prosecutions (which would presumably be handled by a special prosecutor) would be worse than nothing. Conyers is proposing yet another bipartisan commission. Sure, hey, Dick Cheney will be a private citizen by then. Maybe we can appoint him as the Republican co-chair with "bipartisan" alibi-man Lee Hamilton to balance him out on the Democratic side. After all, Cheney knows quite a bit about the subject matter already. He's an actual expert in it, as a matter of fact. She also makes the argument that by just forgetting and forgiving, "We are also forgiving ourselves." Say what? Yes, the public has a responsibility to maintain democracy. But the perpetrators of torture are the ones guilty of crimes, not the majority of the public that opposed those practices.

Jack Balkin of Yale Law School, whose Balkinization blog is a valuable resource on a range of legal and constitutional issues, in A Body of Inquiries also argues for truth commissions to investigate this administration's misdeeds. He thinks that the legl type opinions from administration legal authorities would likely shield them from prosecution. But that sounds like a very dubious assumption to me. Just having your Mob lawyer say it's okay doesn't mean that it's legal. The basic problem with the truth-commission(s)-only approach is that shining light on all those misdeeds is fine. But the Republicans know about them already and support them. They would prefer to not have them talked about, sure. But unless some meaningful legal deterrent is established - and it seems to be only actual prosecutions can do that in this situation - the next Republican administration can be expected to resume the same practices. And worse.

If there had been substantial resistance within the Republican Party to this administration rogue-state practices internally and externally, then there would at least be some more reasonable hope that truth commissions could be effective even without prosecutions. But after Watergate, Iran-Contra and now eight years of far worse abuses supported virtually unanimously by the Republicans in Congress, that assumption sounds empty to me.

I'm tempted to say that this is a good example of the concept of repressive tolerance. With respectable opinion hostile to the idea of prosecuting Republicans for outrageous violations of domestic and international law on very substantial issues, the Times provides a forum for three people to address the issue of legal accountablility. Two of the three advocate the Village conventional wisdom. The third advocates prosecutions though also with a nod to what sounds like a toothless and worse-than-useless bipartisan commission.

The dissenting position - in this case, the notion that public officials have to obey the law and that something that violates the rule of law so fundamentally as the torture policy can't be treated like some political pecadillo - gets a hearing in the leading newspaper, where it can be safely disregarded by those devoted to the conventional wisdom.

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Friday, July 14, 2006

The problems of tolerance (6): The need for tolerance, its limits and its "repressive" form

"I never thought I'd live to see the day when old-fashioned journalism would be a form of civil disobedience". - William Sloane Coffin, Oct 2005

I've found taking a new look at A Critique of Pure Tolerance (1965) helpful in thinking about the larger conceptual background of tolerance: a human right; as an essential element of democracy; as a necessary element of scientific research and development of knowledge; and, as a vital part of political and social progress.

The issue of tolerance, in both its formal (legal, human-rights) aspect and in its role of facilitating the search for truth and progress, comes up in many ways these days. I started writing these posts before the Republicans' recent "the New York Times is a traitor" campaign. In some ways it may seem counterintuitive for me as someone who sees the goal of that campaign as being to stifle the press altogether to be posting right now about 40-year-old essays that hold the concept of tolerance up to scrutiny.

But we can't let the Republicans drive what we talk about. They do it far too often already.

Here are a few links that raise different aspects of the issue of tolerance in its formal and qualitative aspects.

David Neiwert in Here comes the flood , Orcinus blog 06/13/06, writes about the punditocracy beginning to freak out over the implications of blogosphere democratizing of information dissemination and political comment and analysis. Using Times columnist Maureen Dowd as an example, he also gives a good commentary on the way that genuine alternatives for policies, not even to speak of different ways of life, get muffled in the corporate media environment:

What sparked the rise of Web-based political communication like the blogosphere was the behavior of people like Dowd. When she was named to one of the Times' cherished columnist slots, she replaced the estimable Anna Quindlen, a dependably thoughtful voice of liberalism. Dowd, in contrast, has operated more in the mode of a gossip columnist with snippy, personality-driven journalism that often becomes simply trite; while the Times' conservative columnists in the late '90s were singleminded in their pursuit of Clinton's impeachment, Dowd chose more often than not to chime in on their side, and likewise was a happy participant in the "Al Gore is a weakminded liar" theme that played out in 2000.

With that kind of voice representing "liberals" in the New York Times - and folks like Joe Klein and Pat Caddell showing up on cable TV to represent the "liberal" side - it's not the least surprising that genuine liberals felt the need to begin speaking up. Otherwise, their voices were not going to be heard. The blogosphere and Webzines became an effective way for that to happen.
Also, in An open letter to my fellow journalists Orcinus blog 06/26/06, Neiwert describes how destructive and partisan the current journalistic practice of "balance" can be. He quotes a favorite saying, "The enemy isn't conservatism. The enemy isn't liberalism. The enemy is b******t."

He then elaborates a bit:

At some point, journalists are going to have to come to terms with the reality that the b******t, in the past 10 years and more, has not been an even-steven thing, where liberals are just as prone to it as conservatives - though most "fair and balanced" journalists like to pretend that this is so.

No, the reality is that in that time, the levels of unmitigated b******t flowing from the many founts of, er, wisdom on the right has been ceaseless, programmatic, and deliberately aimed at overwhelming the press. That's not to say that the left doesn't peddle b******t still, nor that every jot and tittle emanating from the right is a falsehoood. But the proportionate level of b******t from the right is so overwhelming as to render any quibbles almost negligible.

The press is drowning in it, as [the book] Lapdogs [by Eric Boehlert] demonstrates on every page. And the blogosphere, believe it or not, has the potential to be a lifeline.

If reporters can overcome their initial defensiveness, they will discover that bloggers' critiques can actually be helpful and insightful. Perhaps more to the point, they'll discover that there is a wealth of real information available on blogs that often was tucked away into obscure corners, particularly expertise from the likes of Juan Cole and P.Z. Myers.
In other words, the failure of the mainstream media to articulate alternatives and even to present relevant factual material in many cases has created a niche that blog technology allowed thousands of people to step in to begin filling it. I wonder if the people that perfected the software that allows regular updates of text without the author re-writing the code for the Web page realized that they were going to shake the old-line media to the extent that has occurred. Although, as Marcuse would surely remind us if he were around today, the "negative", critical function of blogs can also be absorbed and co-opted by the Establishment.

Jane Hamsher (FDL Book Salon - Lapdogs, Pt. 2 06/25/06) talks about the difference between rightwing and liberal blog approaches to the press:

As [Eric] Boehlert notes, there is great irony in the fact that journalists have been so easily lulled into compliance with right-wing narratives. We on the left may be critical but we’re trying to urge the press into higher standards; the right essentially wants to destroy them.
This is a very good example of how what Sloane Coffin called "old-fashioned journalism", journalism that does more than just type up whatever nonsense some industry lobby puts out in order to show the "other side" of an issue and achieve a phony kind of "balance", has become in itself a kind of dissent from the current order of things.

But there is a difference from the approach of the Republican right, which can sound superficially like what I just said, and criticisms like those Hamsher is making. Wolff, Moore and Marcuse in A Critique of Pure Tolerance all say in various ways that tolerance has a purpose: to separate the accurate from the inaccurate, the scientific from the superstitious, the socially constructive from the destructive. For that to happen, there has to be a genuinely free debate. A kind of debate that is seriously limited in today's American society - limited by extreme government secrecy, by illegal surveillance, by a well-funded rightwing noise machine that intimidates the press, by religious zealots with big bucks at their disposal who want to sabotage any notion of truth and value not stemming from their interpretation of the Christian faith, and more.

Bob "the Daily Howler" Somerby provided some interesting comments on class issues and the press in his Howler post of 06/26/06. He quotes David Ehrenstein on why the "press corps" was so hostile to Bill Clinton and Al Gore:

Clinton was all about their class-hatred, Eric. Don’t you remember what “Dean” Broder and Sally “Kneepads” Quinn wrote about him “trashing the place”?

He was Britney Spears to them - pure Trailer Trash. The fact that he was smarter, braver and more tenacious than they were only made it worse for them.
Now, I'm not sure if Ehrenstein meant to imply that he was saying that he sees poor Britney that way. Let's be generous and assume that he was making a more sensible statement, saying that just as the mainstream media can't possibly understand the cutting-edge social criticism and progressive postmodernism that is Little Boo's defining characteristic in her public persona, they were also incapable of seeing why the public elected both Bill Clinton and Al Gore President. Actually, there is a distinct similarity between Clinton and Britney (although I'm pretty sure Boo is a flaming socialist, not a cautious Democrat like Clinton).

The Howler comments on this:

Reading minds is hard to do - but we’d guess that this comment is on the mark. On the other hand, there’s a surface problem with this analysis. By the time of Campaign 2000, the corps hated Gore even more than Clinton - and far from being “trailer trash,” Gore came from the DC/St. Albans class. Yes, he also grew up on the Tennessee farm. But in the most literal sense, Gore was not a class outsider, available for simplistic “class-hatred.”

That said, we’d guess that the press corps’ problem with Dems is, in large part, a matter of class. Human beings have always been tribal, and our modern, tribal national politics is largely a tribalism of class. We haven’t discussed this matter before, and we won’t be skilled in our descriptions. But it’s fairly clear that tribal connections have long defined our two major parties, and have done so more and more since the time of the GOP “Southern Strategy.”

Increasingly, the GOP is the tribe of the upper-class, older American order - and the Democrats are the tribe of everyone else. Everyone who doesn’t fit in the old order has found their way to the Dem coalition. The Dems are the party of The Other - of the “lower-class;” of racial minorities; of gays; of uppity women. The Republicans are the party of the traditional upper-class ideal - and of all those who will swear allegiance to that orders’ values. This does not mean that Dems are always right - or that Reps are always wrong [although obviously they normally are - Bruce] - about issues involving class and race. It does mean that the parties represent two different tribes - and that many people align themselves based on tribal impulses. [my emphasis in bold]
In other words, class considerations matter. And they often exert their force in subtle as well as overt ways.

It's striking how the Howler's description of the mainstream press tends to see the Democrats as the Other - however removed that may be from the very corporate-friendly real existing Democratic Party - sounds remarkably like the Outsiders that Herbert Marcuse identified as being the groups vested in trying to create a genuinely free debate: "The Dems are the party of The Other - of the “lower-class;” of racial minorities; of gays; of uppity women."

That doesn't mean the Democratic Party is necessarily more representative of the real needs and concerns of all those groups than it was in 1965. It just means that the Establishment press is that much further removed from focusing on many of the real problems of American society.

Next, I have an excerpt from Cyber-Mobilization: The New Levée en Masse by Audrey Kurth Cronin Parameters (US Army War College) Summer 2006.

This excerpt raises some disturbing questions. But I should also say, after having complained about the general lack of understanding in America about the revolutionary past of democracy, Cronin's article draws on that tradition to frame her article. For example, referring to the French Revolution, she writes:

The role of the poor French peasant in particular, supporting the revolution and fighting its wars, was central to the power of the popular army. The passionate participation of the working-class Frenchman, who previously would not have been granted the right of citizenship, was a vital evolution in the organization for war. The unprecedented range of communications effected a transformation of individuals in the lower strata of French society into the “People,” the holders of popular sovereignty. They also enabled the quite conscious building of a national identity: from a focus on warfare in the service of local nobility, those on French territory drew themselves into one focused and motivated fighting unit. The French people believed that they were fighting a war for freedom and against tyranny, for their revolution and against monarchical power, and the bombardment of information from above and within consolidated those beliefs. In this culmination of social, political, and military change, the French nation and the army were as one. [my emphasis]
The disturbing part comes later in the article. She is discussing the implications of cyber-mobilization, which is being used not only by democratic movements but also by violent Salifist jihadist groups. She defines the problem this way:

In democratizing global communications, the West’s initial assumption was that the natural outcome would be the spread of democratic concepts. And to some extent, that did happen. The combination of cell phones and the Internet has facilitated a variety of democratic movements, including the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the sweeping of Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo into power, anti-globalization protests by groups like Direct Action, and many other types of grass-roots campaigns. Another powerful motivator in the post-Cold War years was the conviction that democracies do not fight each other: with the spread of connectivity would come increasing access to the ideals of the liberal state, an undermining of authoritarian regimes, and a natural reduction in war. Sadly, however, democratic means did not guarantee democratic ends. Like the printing press, television, or radio, these new tools were just as capable of advocating repression and violence as democratic change. The new age of communications has proven to be a double-edged sword.

Like the levée en masse, the evolving character of communications today is altering the patterns of popular mobilization, including both the means of participation and the ends for which wars are fought. Most important, it is enabling the recruiting, training, convincing, and motivating of individuals who are driven to engage not primarily in the high-tech cyber-attacks that many US policymakers are focused upon, but in old-fashioned violence in the physical world. Today’s mobilization may not be producing masses of soldiers, sweeping across the European continent, but it is effecting an underground uprising whose remarkable effects are being played out on the battlefield every day.
And she discusses the solution:

Just as the telephone, telegraph, and radio eventually engendered countervailing technologies in code-breaking, monitoring, intercepting, and wire-tapping, the United States is gradually recognizing the strategic potential of these means and just beginning to effectively react. Most of the United States’ efforts have been focused on counteracting their practical, logistical effects, including terrorist fund-raising on the web, preventing the use of the Internet for logistical coordination, intervening in communications, and tracking statements and websites. These activities are imperative, demanding intelligence collection, monitoring, disinformation, and disruption, but they are embryonic and limited in their scope. The intelligence community’s relatively narrow remit cannot cover the full implications of the physical and ideological mobilization that is currently taking place. The parallels drawn here with the levée en masse should give us pause.

The good news, however, is that this connectivity can also provide the means to counter the use of these tools to mobilize for radical causes, if the United States will consciously engage in a wide-ranging counter-mobilization. Overall connectivity is far higher in countries that represent more open, democratic societies.

This should be a tool that greatly advantages the United States,one that Western military organizations are adept at using themselves. But currently the security implications of connectivity are too controversial to analyze seriously. Americans are too busy worrying about the economic benefits of the web and who is to control it, arguing about impositions on freedom of speech and who is to determine them, willing to neglect the impact of what appears on the web even as it translates into killing people in the real world. The Internet is vital to US security, not only because of its obvious centrality to the American economy, but also because of its less-obvious role in animating our friends and enemies. The state can reclaim the tools of popular mobilization, but only if it will more seriously address the need to understand, react to, and employ them. [my emphasis]
"The state can reclaim the tools of popular mobilization". No one quarrels with the need to intervene in terrorist plots, online or off. But when we see the ways in which the most rabid Republicans identify Democrats, liberals, blacks and so forth as The Enemy even more than The Terrorists, its a reminder that keeping the public debate open and not under the thumbnail of corporate conformity of government disinformation operations is a real problem.

Finally, Duncan Black (Atrios), in Stand Up 06/27/06 gives a good, brief statement of how a false form of "tolerance" can actually lead to less freedom and more domination - and worse:

Torturing people, jailing journalists for treason, the president being allowed to disobey the law at whim... The mainstream media has made all of these things a part of the normal conversation. They've allowed "two sides" to all of these things to be debated on equal footing. Left wing bloggers on the internets complain about the media and they get ignored and accused of "blogofascism." Conservatives call for the New York Times to be blown up and their reporters and editors jailed and they get treated seriously on MSNBC's flagship political talk show. [my emphasis]
The United States is not East Germany yet. It's not even like the segregated South yet, even though the neosegregationist Republican Party today is far closer to the spirit of Theodore Bilbo than of Theodore Roosevelt.

But can we say that we see "repressive tolerance" at work? I think we can.

Other posts in the series:

1. Are there problems with tolerance?
2. Robert Paul Wolff on going "Beyond Tolerance"
3. Barrington Moore, Jr., on science and tolerance
4. Tolerance, social analysis and radical democracy
5. Herbert Marcuse on repressive tolerance
6. The need for tolerance, its limits and its "repressive" form (current post)

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Thursday, July 13, 2006

The problems of tolerance (5): Herbert Marcuse on repressive tolerance

This post is on the third and most famous essay in A Critique of Pure Tolerance (1965), Herbert Marcuse's "Repressive Tolerance"; the full essay in the English original is available at that link, and also a German translation. This post can stand on its own. But my previous post was also meant as an introduction to this one. It explains more about two aspects of Marcuse's approach that are important in "Repressive Tolerance": Hegelian dialectical social analysis and a radical democratic perspective.

Marcuse's argument assumes that people in advanced industrial societies, including the United States, are in basic ways unfree. A key part of that unfreedom is a widespread lack of key knowledge about public affairs and a false consciousness that prevents people from making truly free decisions. That would require a genuinely informed citizenry.

I'm not sure it can be counted as progress, but the meaning and implication of "false consciousness" is very easy to understand today. The lead up to the Iraq War, with manufactured evidence that was pimped not only by an obedient Republican Party and its vast echo chamber. It was also facilitated by the Establishment press - the name Judith Miller summarizes that aspect of it - and by a prewar debate that, in its official aspects, was little more than a Potemkin debate. That's not to say that there weren't real opposition voices heard. It means that between the White House misuse of secrecy and fraudulent evidence, the mainstream media's misconduct and the President's decision at least as early as June 2002 to go to war regardless of what Iraq did, the official debate meant little more than the deliberations of the old East Germany Parliament.

Marcuse writes:

But with the concentration of economic and political power and the integration of opposites in a society which uses technology as an instrument of domination, effective dissent is blocked where it could freely emerge; in the formation of opinion, in information and communication, in speech and assembly. Under the rule of monopolistic media - themselves the mere instruments of economic and political power - a mentality is created for which right and wrong, true and false are predefined wherever they affect the vital interests of the society. This is, prior to all expression and communication, a matter of semantics: the blocking of effective dissent, of the recognition of that which is not of the Establishment which begins in the language that is publicized and administered. The meaning of words is rigidly stabilized. Rational persuasion, persuasion to the opposite is all but precluded. The avenues of entrance are closed to the meaning of words and ideas other than the established one - established by the publicity of the powers that be, and verified in their practices. Other words can be spoken and heard, other ideas can be expressed, but, at the massive scale of the conservative majority (outside such enclaves as the intelligentsia), they are immediately "evaluated" (i.e. automatically understood) in terms of the public language - a language which determines "a priori" the direction in which the thought process moves. [my emphasis]
The volumes that have already been written about the prewar fraud about Iraq's non-existent "weapons of mass destruction" could be seen as an extended commentary on that quotation.

Yet I don't want to push the point too far. Despite the intensity of the war propaganda and the massive use of government secrecy to cover the fraud, large numbers of Americans still opposed the war. False consciousness even in that extreme case was less than pervasive.

Where Marcuse's point remains particularly relevant in this case is that even now, despite the far-reaching nature of the WMD fraud(s) and the extensive consequences of the Iraq War, most people do not take it as reflecting a fundamental flaw in our political and social system. (I'll leave aside for the moment whether that would be an accurate conclusion.)

What is central to Marcuse's idea of repressive tolerance is that, in a society dominated by great wealth, or by Big Capital as his German fans would be more likely to term it, the formal practice of democratic tolerance effectively obscures the fact for most people that their choices and their freedom are in fact severely limited. Marcuse writes:

These background limitations of tolerance are normally prior to the explicit and judicial limitations as defined by the courts, custom, governments, etc. (for example, "clear and present danger", threat to national security, heresy). Within the framework of such a social structure, tolerance can be safely practiced and proclaimed. It is of two kinds: (i) the passive toleration of entrenched and established attitudes and ideas even if their damaging effect on man and nature is evident, and (2) the active, official tolerance granted to the Right as well as to the Left, to movements of aggression as well as to movements of peace, to the party of hate as well as to that of humanity. I call this non-partisan tolerance "abstract" or "pure" inasmuch as it refrains from taking sides - but in doing so it actually protects the already established machinery of discrimination.
Like Wolff and Moore in their essays, Marcuse emphasizes that tolerance has a purpose:

The telos [goal] of tolerance is truth. It is clear from the historical record that the authentic spokesmen of tolerance had more and other truth in mind than that of propositional logic and academic theory. John Stuart Mill speaks of the truth which is persecuted in history and which does not triumph over persecution by virtue of its "inherent power", which in fact has no inherent power "against the dungeon and the stake". And he enumerates the "truths" which were cruelly and successfully liquidated in the dungeons and at the stake: that of Arnold of Brescia, of Fra Dolcino, of Savonarola, of the Albigensians, Waldensians, Lollards, and Hussites. Tolerance is first and foremost for the sake of the heretics - the historical road toward humanitas appears as heresy: target of persecution by the powers that be. Heresy by itself, however, is no token of truth. [my emphasis]
For tolerance to play its role of exposing falsehood and enhancing the well-being of humanity, it must be real. In other words, the kind of dissent that leads to that goal must have a real chance to be turned into policies and reality.

Wolff and Moore are more clear in their essays about the distinction between tolerance as a political-legal process, on the one hand, and the limits of tolerance in decision-making, on the other.

But, like Wolff and Moore, Marcuse discusses two kinds of tolerance. He sees tolerance as involving basic democratic and human rights. "Tolerance is an end in itself," he says.

And he also sees tolerance as a necessary condition for decision-making on political and social questions. His focus is on this aspect. Just as in science (both "hard" and "social"), which was Moore's focus in his essay, decision-making in political and social matters involves some accepted criteria of decision-making. Some choices involve more urgent matters than others. Some competing options must be judged as relevant and meaningful to the choice, and others excluded. And eventually a decision has to be made, a judgment established, among the competing legitimate priorities.

That may seem to be a far too dignified way to describe the decision-making process of Congressional Republicans under Tom DeLay and his K-Street Project. But it applies even in that situation. The real questions is whether it's legitimate for, say, a defense-contractor lobbyist's bribes to a Congressman Duke Cunningham should be a factor in important policy decisions.

Marcuse argues that some alternatives considered normal, respectable, mainstream in American political discourse should in fact be considered inappropriate for establishing policies. If this seems to be an odd argument for someone to have been making in 1965, at the height of Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" in the US, consider other aspects of the historical context. The Goldwater Presidential campaign of 1964, though a landslide loss, showed what a Republican Party aggressively defending segregation and militarism might become. And Johnson "Americanized" the Vietnam War in 1965, relying on deceit and threat-inflation that was bad enough in itself, despite the fact that it looks almost like saintly honesty compared to the pre-Iraq War marketing job by the Bush administration.

A lot of what Marcuse has to say about the right of resistance and the role of violence, both official and unsanctioned, will strike many American readers as jarring. That's mainly because of what I discussed in my last post, the general lack of awareness of the revolutionary aspects of our own national history. But anyone who admires the sentiments of the Declaration of Independence and is not a pacifist should actually find most of those passages uncontroversial.

On of his comments is a reminder that political "terror" until relatively recently meant mostly terror by the state:

Robespierre's distinction [in the French Revolution] between the terror of liberty and the terror of despotism, and his moral glorification of the former belongs to the most convincingly condemned aberrations [of political violence], even if the white terror was more bloody than the red terror.
In these times where "red" is the commonly-used color for Bush's Republican Party, I should mention that in the French Revolution, "red" meant the revolutionaries, "white" the counterrevolutionaries.

But even for those more familiar with the Thomas Jeffersons and Harriet Tubmans and John Browns of American democratic history, some of Marcuse' arguments in this regard will be disturbing:

Liberating tolerance, then, would mean intolerance against movements from the Right and toleration of movements from the Left. As to the scope of this tolerance and intolerance: ... it would extend to the stage of action as well as of discussion and propaganda, of deed as well as of word. The traditional criterion of clear and present danger seems no longer adequate to a stage where the whole society is in the situation of the theater audience when somebody cries: "fire". It is a situation in which the total catastrophe could be triggered off any moment, not only by a technical error, but also by a rational miscalculation of risks, or by a rash speech of one of the leaders. In past and different circumstances, the speeches of the Fascist and Nazi leaders were the immediate prologue to the massacre. The distance between the propaganda and the action, between the organization and its release on the people had become too short. But the spreading of the word could have been stopped before it was too late: if democratic tolerance had been withdrawn when the future leaders started their campaign, mankind would have had a chance of avoiding Auschwitz and a World War.

The whole post-fascist period is one of clear and present danger. Consequently, true pacification requires the withdrawal of tolerance before the deed, at the stage of communication in word, print, and picture. Such extreme suspension of the right of free speech and free assembly is indeed justified only if the whole of society is in extreme danger. I maintain that our society is in such an emergency situation, and that it has become the normal state of affairs. [my emphasis]
Yow! You can practically hear the OxyContin crowd screaming, "See! That's what The Liberals are after!" That Marcuse considered himself a Marxist and not a liberal wouldn't make any difference, since in FOXLand there is no difference. They would go into spasms at the amplification on this idea that he made in his 1968 Postscript to the essay:

Given this situation, I suggested in "Repressive Tolerance" the practice of discriminating tolerance in an inverse direction, as a means of shifting the balance between Right and Left by restraining the liberty of the Right, thus counteracting the pervasive inequality of freedom (unequal opportunity of access to the means of democratic persuasion) and strengthening the oppressed against the oppressed. Tolerance would be restricted with respect to movements of a demonstrably aggressive or destructive character (destructive of the prospects for peace, justice, and freedom for all). Such discrimination would also be applied to movements opposing the extension of social legislation to the poor, weak, disabled. As against the virulent denunciations that such a policy would do away with the sacred liberalistic principle of equality for "the other side", I maintain that there are issues where either there is no "other side" in any more than a formalistic sense, or where "the other side" is demonstrably "regressive" and impedes possible improvement of the human condition. To tolerate propaganda for inhumanity vitiates the goals not only of liberalism but of every progressive political philosophy.

If the choice were between genuine democracy and dictatorship, democracy would certainly be preferable. But democracy does not prevail. The radical critics of the existing political process are thus readily denounced as advocating an "elitism", a dictatorship of intellectuals as an alternative. What we have in fact is government, representative government by a non-intellectual minority of politicians, generals, and businessmen. The record of this "elite" is not very promising, and political prerogatives for the intelligentsia may not necessarily be worse for the society as a whole. [my emphasis]
It's not clear where these notions of Marcuse's owe more to Lenin's State and Revolution or to Plato's Republic. But here, he is directly advocating and justifying the suppression of democratic freedoms.

It's true that in historical revolutions, the opponents of the victorious side have generally found it necessary to withdraw freedoms from at least some of their opponents. British supporters were suppressed during the American Revolution and many dispossessed afterward. Abraham Lincoln found it desirable to suppress the speech and printing presses of the "Copperheads", Northerners who actively sympathized with the Confederacy. Andrew Johnson's rush to restore full democratic rights to former Confederates after the Civil War was a key factor setting the state for decades of racial segregation in the South. The long-term interests of democracy and Constitutional government were not well-served by Johnson's actions.

But this portion of Marcuse's essay I find less than appealing or persuasive. It seems in this regard to be a general restatement of a conventional Marxist understanding of the revolutionary process in history. And I would argue that it doesn't follow from the arguments he makes here and elsewhere. (See the concluding quotation below.)

What is more appealing and persuasive is his discussion of how people can free their own minds from the false consciousness of what he calls administered opinion:

This means that previously neutral, value-free, formal aspects of learning and teaching now become, on their own grounds and in their own right, political: learning to know the facts, the whole truth, and to comprehend it is radical criticism throughout, intellectual subversion. In a world in which the human faculties and needs are arrested or perverted, autonomous thinking leads into a "perverted world": contradiction and counter-image of the established world of repression. And this contradiction is not simply stipulated, is not simply the product of confused thinking or fantasy, but is the logical development of the given, the existing world. To the degree to which this development is actually impeded by the sheer weight of a repressive society and the necessity of making a living in it, repression invades the academic enterprise itself, even prior to all restrictions on academic freedom. The pre-empting of the mind vitiates impartiality and objectivity: unless the student learns to think in the opposite direction, he will be inclined to place the facts into the predominant framework of values. Scholarship, i.e., the acquisition and communication of knowledge, prohibits the purification and isolation of facts from the context of the whole truth. An essential part of the latter is recognition of the frightening extent to which history is made and recorded by and for the victors, that is, the extent to which history was the development of oppression. And this oppression is in the facts themselves which it establishes; thus they themselves carry a negative value as part and aspect of their facticity. To treat the great crusades against humanity (like that against the Albigensians) with the same impartiality as the desperate struggles for humanity means neutralizing their opposite historical function, reconciling the executioners with their victims, distorting the record. Such spurious neutrality serves to reproduce acceptance of the dominion of the victors in the consciousness of man. Here, too, in the education of those who are not yet maturely integrated, in the mind of the young, the ground for liberating tolerance is still to be created. [my emphasis]
But he also reminds us that if such an approach remains limited to individual self-development, its liberating potential will be limited. Humans are social creatures, and freedom has objective as well as subjective meaning. Freedom cannot be fully realized in self-knowledge:

The publicity of self-actualization promotes the removal of the one and the other, it promotes existence in that immediacy which, in a repressive society, is (to use another Hegelian term) bad immediacy (schlechte Unmittelbarkeit). It isolates the individual from the one dimension where he could "find himself": from his political existence, which is at the core of his entire existence. Instead, it encourages non-conformity and letting-go in ways which leave the real engines of repression in the society entirely intact, which even strengthen these engines by substituting the satisfactions of private, and personal rebellion for a more than private and personal, and therefore more authentic, opposition. The desublimation involved in this sort of self-actualization is itself repressive inasmuch as it weakens the necessity and the power of the intellect, the catalytic force of that unhappy consciousness which does not revel in the archetypal personal release of frustration - hopeless resurgence of the Id which will sooner or later succumb to the omnipresent rationality of the administered world - but which recognizes the horror of the whole in the most private frustration and actualizes itself in this recognition. [my emphasis in bold]
In the 1968 Postscript, Marcuse makes an important point. No doubt, it brought little comfort to suburban white folks freaking out over urban riots in predominantly black neighborhoods. But in the year that Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy were assassinated, and after years in which civil rights demonstrators and antiwar protesters had all-too-often been the victims of official violence, he made an essential and democratic point:

Under the conditions prevailing in this country, tolerance does not, and cannot, fulfill the civilizing function attributed to it by the liberal protagonists of democracy, namely, protection of dissent. The progressive historical force of tolerance lies in its extension to those modes and forms of dissent which are not committed to the status quo of society, and not confined to the institutional framework of the established society. Consequently, the idea of tolerance implies the necessity, for the dissenting group or individuals, to become illegitimate if and when the established legitimacy prevents and counteracts the development of dissent. This would be the case not only in a totalitarian society, under a dictatorship, in one-party states, but also in a democracy (representative, parliamentary, or "direct") where the majority does not result from the development of independent thought and opinion but rather from the monopolistic or oligopolistic administration of public opinion, without terror and (normally) without censorship. ... The ideology of democracy hides its lack of substance. [my emphasis]
In the final paragraph of the 1968 Postscript, he describes again in radical-democratic terms how the ideology of tolerance can disguise a reality of unfreedom. And he seems to suggest that his suggestion for a dictatorship of intellectuals was meant as a provocative paradox - or maybe an Hegelian "contradiction":

However, the alternative to the established semi-democratic process is not a dictatorship or elite, no matter how intellectual and intelligent, but the struggle for a real democracy. Part of this struggle is the fight against an ideology of tolerance which, in reality, favors and fortifies the conservation of the status quo of inequality and discrimination. For this struggle, I proposed the practice of discriminating tolerance. To be sure, this practice already presupposes the radical goal which it seeks to achieve. I committed this petitio principii in order to combat the pernicious ideology that tolerance is already institutionalized in this society. The tolerance which is the life element, the token of a free society, will never be the gift of the powers that be; it can, under the prevailing conditions of tyranny by the majority, only be won in the sustained effort of radical minorities, willing to break this tyranny and to work for the emergence of a free and sovereign majority - minorities intolerant, militantly intolerant and disobedient to the rules of behavior which tolerate destruction and suppression.
Other posts in the series:

1. Are there problems with tolerance?
2. Robert Paul Wolff on going "Beyond Tolerance"
3. Barrington Moore, Jr., on science and tolerance
4. Tolerance, social analysis and radical democracy
5. Herbert Marcuse on repressive tolerance (current post)
6. The need for tolerance, its limits and its "repressive" form

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Wednesday, July 12, 2006

The problems of tolerance (4): Tolerance, social analysis and radical democracy

The third and final essay in A Critique of Pure Tolerance (1965) is by far the most fam ous, "Repressive Tolerance" by Herbert Marcuse. It occurred to me that an introduction would help before I discuss the essay directly, because the essay is written in philosophical language that, it's fair to say, is not so easily accessible.

There are biographical sketches of Marcuse online, especially at this Website: Herbert Marcuse Official Homepage. I've also done a brief biographical post on him: Herbert Marcuse Web site 07/11/04.

Here it's important to note that Marcuse was known as someone who synthesized the theories of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud into social criticism. He was part of the Frankfurt School who practiced what they called "critical theory". Marcuse was also a specialist in the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel, and Hegelian dialectics and historical philosophy are very evident in "Repressive Tolerance".

Marcuse could be accurately described as a utopian socialist, and even in "Repressive Tolerance" he talks about the role of utopian thought. His utopian bent was one reason more traditional Marxists criticized him for philosophical "idealism" (which is not the same as the colloquial meaning of "idealism"). But he did not lay out visions of what his kind of model society would look like. He concentrated on analysis of existing societies, mostly the highly-developed Western capitalism societies. He also wrote a book on Soviet Marxism (1958).

During most of his career, I don't believe the term "thinking outside the box" had become an everyday part of American English yet. But Marcuse, for better or worse, thought outside the box. And he looked outside the expected channels to understand society and its transformations.

So, for him, the civil rights and Black Power movements, the student and antiwar movements, the beatniks and the hippies, raised vital issues about the fundamental conditions of society. He did not believe those movements could bring about fundamental transformation in the short term. (Marxists, somewhat like American generals predicting troop withdrawals from Iraq, are good at pushing out the time horizon for The Revolution.)

His willingness to think outside the proverbial box meant that he also saw great potential in the feminist movement. And he understood the necessity and transformational potential of focusing on ecological issues, long before the emergence of the German Green Party or the scientific consensus on global warming having formed.

I'm making this a long introduction because "Repressive Tolerance" employs a couple of concepts that are essentially unknow to the American punditocracy: dialectical social analysis and radical democratic theory.

The Hegelian concept of negation is key to Marcuse's Critical Theory. Negation in the Hegelian dialectic is the normal process of transformation, which involves preserving the original but also cancelling it and lifting it up. The seed is "negated" by the tree. The grown tree preserves the essence of the seed. But it is not the seed, it is something else: a higher development of the seed.

(Sorry, that formula that seemingly every American who's heard of "dialectics" has been taught at some point, thesis-synthesis-antithesis, is Kantian dialectics, not Hegelian.)

Marcuse's Critical Theory applies this dialectical approach. In the 1960 additional preface to his 1941 Reason and Revolution, he explained:
Dialectical logic is critical logic: it reveals modes and contents of thought which transcend the codified pattern of use and validation. Dialectical thought does not invent these contents; they have accrued to the notions in the long tradition of thought and action. Dialectical analysis merely assembles and reactivates them; it recovers tabooed meanings and thus appears almost as a return, or rather a conscious liberation, of the repressed! Since the established universe of discourse is that of an unfree world, dialectical thought is necessarily destructive, and whatever liberation it may bring is a liberation in thought, in theory. However, the divorce of thought from action, of theory from practice, is itself part of the unfree world. No thought and no theory can undo it; but theory may help to prepare the ground for their possible reunion, and the ability of thought to develop a logic and language of contradiction is a prerequisite for this task. (my emphasis)
In other words, Marcuse applies critical thinking to social analysis using this concept of dialectical negation. This approach largely eliminated the possibility of his work being turned into a set of guiding principles for a political party or group. And while he did have some definite influence on activists and militants in the 1960s and 1970s, especially in Europe, I don't recall ever hearing of any group trying to organize a "Marcusian" political party.

And it also means that his approach is not something that is necessarily intuitive in the language of political consultants and Big Pundits. It would be both entertaining and painful to see David "Bobo" Brooks go about describing Herbert Marcuse.

I would say that the emergence of the blogosphere as a tool for activism and a significant factor in politics could be seen as a "Marcusian" event, producing challenges to the established institutions of politics and the press.

The same goes for the current immigrant-rights movement. Perhaps even more so, because in addition to being a movement of "outsiders" involving Latinos, non-citizens and poor people, it is also a heavily workingclass movement.

All of which is another major element that, sad to say, makes Marcuse's thought especially challenging for readers today. And that is, however many philosophical approaches he incorporated, Marcuse was working from a radical democratic perspective.

That means words like "repression: and "revolution" were normal for him to use. The observation was often made during and after the Vietnam War, and is at least as relevant today, that a lack of widespread understanding of our own American revolutionary history was one of the United States' beigggest problems in trying to comprehend revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped world. Celebrating the Fourth of July with fireworks displays is fun, but it doesn't teach anyone much about the history of the American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence.

So, for any trolls who identify the world "revolution" exclusively with Sunni Salafist suicide car bombers, I'll quote a sample of Marcuse's approach to the issue from a time that was far more tumultuous in the US and western Europe than 1965. This is from Counter-Revolution and Revolt (1972):
Distinction must be made between violence and revolutionary force. In the counterrevolutionary situation of today [1972] , violence is the weapon of the Establishment; it operates everywhere, in the institutions and organizations, in work and fun, on the streets and highways, and in the air. In contrast, the revolutionary force which is destined to terminate this violence does not exist today. Revolutionary force would be the action of masses or classes capable of subverting the established system in order to build a socialist society. Examples would be the unlimited general strike, the occupation and taking over of factories, government buildings, centers of communication and trasnportation, in coordinated action.
For good white suburbanites today, this may invoke images of swarthy men with Taliban beards swarming into the Pentagon and seizing it. But in the peaceful revolutions after the fall of the Berlin Wall in eastern Europe and in the USSR, something like this actually happened not so long ago. And many of those same surburbanites were thrilled to hear about it.

It's worth quoting something else he said about the distinction he makes in the quotation just given between "violence and revolutionary force". In "Repressive Tolerance", he wrote:
In terms of historical function, there is a difference between revolutionary and reactionary violence, between violence practiced by the oppressed and by the oppressors. In terms of ethics, both forms of violence are inhuman and evil - but since when is history made in accordance with ethical standards? To start applying them at the point where the oppressed rebel against the oppressors, the have-nots against the haves is serving the cause of actual violence by weakening the protest against it.(my emphasis)
Again, enough to send a good Republican gasping for breath worded that way. But the ethical point is one typically made in war. What's unethical and evil in itself - systematically killing people - is heldby every country on earth to be sometimes a necessity of state, where the alternative would have worse consequences from their viewpoint.

I would stress, though, that it's vital to distinguish between necessary violence and unnecessary, between just wars and unjust ones. But violence is violence. A Russian bomb dropped on a Afghan village in the 1980s in the name of Communism and international solidarity is the same kind of violence as an American bomb dropped on a Afghan village in 2006 in the name of democracy and Global War on Terrorism. It's the same kind. Whether one is necessary and the other not is a different question. It might be objected that even talking in terms of the right of revolution or similar things in today's environment will only give encouragement to militia nuts, to Christian terrorists like Timmy McVeigh, and to fans of Mad Annie Coulter. Yeah, right, like they need any encouragement from me or anyone else in Left Blogostan.

But whether we're tlaking about the American Civil War or the fall of the Communist governments in easter Europe or the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, some basic knowledge of the role of revolution in our own American history would broaden the discussion in a beneficial way.

Finally, a related impoverishment of the political language in America obscures the distinction between formal liberalism and social rights. Historically, this division came into clear sight in the European Revolutions of 1848, something else rarely mentioned in America. It wouldn't be far off to say they are virtually unknown in America. But they were a world-historical event, to use a good Hegelian/Marcusian term.

Briefly, in 1848 democratic revolutionary movements broke out all over Europe. In Germany, a democratically elected parliament met in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt, which today is a virtual monument to this key event in the development of democratic institutions in Germany. In Vienna, the Emperor Franz Joseph was obliged to depart the city, which was held for a time by democratic rebels.

In those revolutions, the parties known as "liberal" parties represented capitalists big and small as well as other "respectable" professionals. They supporteddemocracy but also opposed unions, workers' economic rights and radical property reforms The socialist groups representing workers as well as some militant farmers' groups supported democratic rights, but looked much more favorably on the social goals, as well.

It's not that this distinction is unknown to Americans. Voting is a "liberal democratic" right; Social Security involves a social right. When Bush and the Republicans floated a radical Social Security phase-out plan in early 2005, the harshly negative public reaction showed that most people understood the social right to minima economic security in old age.

But the Big Pundits don't often talk in these terms. So when someone makes an argument, as Marcuse does in "Repressive Tolerance", that draws a distinction between formal democratic rights and the substantive social realities imposed by income, wealth and class, it doesn't necessarily sound clear to American readers.

So, in the next post, we'll look at how Marcuse actually applies dialectical social analysis and radical democratic theory to the question of "pure tolerance".

1. Are there problems with tolerance?
2. Robert Paul Wolff on going "Beyond Tolerance"
3. Barrington Moore, Jr., on science and tolerance
4. Tolerance, social analysis and radical democracy (current post)
5. Herbert Marcuse on repressive tolerance
6. The need for tolerance, its limits and its "repressive" form

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