Showing posts with label secession. Show all posts
Showing posts with label secession. Show all posts

Friday, April 07, 2017

Confederate "Heritage" Month 2017, April 6: Jefferson and the Aaron Burr secession conspiracy

I've been using Brian Steele's article, "Thomas Jefferson, Coercion, and the Limits of Harmonious Union" (Journal of Southern History 4:2008), as a jumping-off point for looking the positions Jefferson took on secession and states rights at several crisis moments during his lifetime. One of those was Aaron's Burr's conspiracy.

This article from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), The Burr Conspiracy (n/d accessed 04/06/2017, summarizes Burr's plan this way:

When Vice President Aaron Burr killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel in 1804, he also killed his chance to be president. Wanted for murder in New York, he fled the state and went to Philadelphia. Realizing that he had no future on the east coast, Burr, in a frantic effort to salvage his destroyed political power and heavily in debt, conceived a plan to seek political fortunes beyond the Alleghenies. He first contacted the British Minister, Anthony Merry, living in Philadelphia. He offered Merry his services in any efforts by Great Britain to take control over the western part of the United States. Merry, who hated the United States, wrote his Foreign Ministry that while Burr was notoriously profligate, nevertheless, his ambition and spirit of revenge would be useful to the British government. Merry became a strong supporter of Burr's schemes.
In 1805, Burr came up with a plan that involved secession:

Burr was dropped from the presidential ticket by Jefferson and in April 1805 commenced to put his plans into motion. He again approached the British via Minister Merry. He informed Merry that Louisiana was ready to break with the United States and once it did all the western country would follow suit. To be successful, Burr requested that Britain assure his protection, provide him with a half of million dollar loan, and dispatch a British naval squadron to the mouth of the Mississippi River. The British might have entertained Burr's requests but Prime Minister Pitt died and was succeeded by Charles James Fox, a life-long friend of the United States. Fox considered the Merry-Burr discussions indiscreet, dangerous and damnable and recalled Merry to England on June 1, 1806. Having failed to secure British aid in an attempt to separate western states from the United States, Burr then headed west across Pennsylvania. [my emphasis]
As the article recounts, Jefferson's Administration charged Burr with treason. Burr walked on the treason charge because the highly partisan and anti-Jefferson Supreme Court Justice John Marshall presided over the trial and found him innocent. Jefferson and his supporters had good reason to think that the Chief Justice had not handled the trial well, to put it mildly.

Confronted with this treasonous attempt at secession, Jefferson charged the perpetrator with treason. That was strong statement of his position, even though the active collusion with Britain rather than just the secession plans themselves were also involved.

During the crisis that unfolded during Aaron Burr's conspiracy (which Jefferson ultimately understood as a plan to separate the western states from the Union), Jefferson consulted [Secretary of State James] Madison about whether the executive had the authority to use regular troops in cases of domestic insurrection. When Madison told Jefferson that he did not, Jefferson drafted a bill "authorizing the emploiment [sic] of the land and naval forces of the US. in cases of insurrection" in all situations where the president is authorized to use militia "to suppress such insurrection, or to cause the laws to be duly executed." [my emphasis]
But Jefferson celebrated the fact that the crisis was resolved without a resort to force on the part of the federal government:

At all times, though, Jefferson hoped that local authorities would suppress the plot and counted on the loyalty and republicanism of the inhabitants of the western states. After the plot failed, the lesson Jefferson took from it was that government was strongest when "every man feels himself a part" of it - the message of the first inaugural. It proved, too, "the importance of preserving to the State authorities all that vigor which the Constitution foresaw would be necessary, not only for their own safety, but for that of the whole." The "hand of the people" had "given the mortal blow to a conspiracy which, in other countries, would have called for an appeal to armies." Federal force thus seemed unnecessary in a union of such harmony and affection.
Steele stresses how emphatically Jefferson insisted on the necessity and justice of the national government preserving itself in the face of a state in open rebellion and attempting to secede from the Union:

But if the people of Ohio and Kentucky and Louisiana had not come through [in foiling the secession plot], Jefferson was prepared for Burr. In his sixth annual message Jefferson reminded Congress that a benign government directed by the will of the people made "insurrection or enterprise on the public peace or authority" nearly unimaginable. Nevertheless, Jefferson remained unwilling to trust such "moral restraints only" and praised the wisdom of laws that "provided punishments for these crimes when committed." But even this seemed insufficient to deal with such a conspiracy against the Union. Accordingly, Jefferson encouraged Congress to pass laws giving him the power to prevent even the "commission" of such crimes. As much as Jefferson trusted the magnetism of affection and interest to hold the Union together, he nonetheless considered a kind of preemptive suppression of "insurrection" a legitimate function of the national government. [my emphasis]
Jefferson's record on secession and the need to preserve the Union with the appropriate means to do so, including military coercion, stand out clearly in the Burr conspiracy incident.

Thursday, April 06, 2017

Confederate "Heritage" Month 2017, April 5: Jefferson and the need for national authority

In the April 4 installment, we looked at Thomas Jefferson's position in the Kentucky Resolutions, which became the prime display in the arguments of later secessionists and segregationist in trying to associate the author of the Declaration of Independence with their causes.

But as Brian Steele explains in "Thomas Jefferson, Coercion, and the Limits of Harmonious Union" (Journal of Southern History 4:2008) that Jefferson's support for the legitimate right of the national government to compel states to meet their obligations as part of a unified country even before the Constitution went into effect.

The Articles of Confederation were the constitution of the US 1781 to 1789. The difficulty of coordinating federal action and providing sufficient revenues for the central government were prime considerations in leading people like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison to see the need for an improved national constitution. You sometimes hear that debate over the Constitution of 1787 pitted the democratic common people in the Anti-Federalist cause against the wealthy Federalist supporters of the new federal compact. This is a deeply misleading impression, which the famous Progressive historian Charles Beard had a lot to do with establishing in the public mind.

Steele describes Jefferson's insistence on the implied, inherent right of the national government to maintain the union of states even under the Articles:

The inability of the Confederation government to compel states to provide revenue was one of the problems that would Iead to the writing of the Constitution. But Jefferson argued that the Confederation simply needed to act on its natural right to collect taxes. "lt has been so often said, as tobe generally believed," he complained to Edward Carrington in 1787, "that Congress have no power by the confederation to enforce any thing, e.g. contributions of money." But, Jefferson argued, "[i]t was not necessary to give them that power expressly; they have it by the law of nature." Jefferson explained his reasoning: "When two nations make a compact, there results to each a power of compelling the other to execute it." Jefferson had made this point more explicit earlier in his commentary on Jean Nicolas Demeunier's article on the United States in the Encyclopedie Methodique. Congress was far from "impotent," Jefferson wrote. Whenever "two or more nations enter into a compact, it is not usual for them to say what shall be done to the party who infringes it. Decency forbids this. And it is as unnecessary as indecent, because the right of compulsion naturally results to the party injured by the breach." Accordingly, "When any one state in the American Union refuses obedience to the Confederation by which they have bound themselves," he told Demeunier, "the rest have a natural right to compel them to obedience."
This was the broader perspective that Jefferson brought to the nature of the Union even prior to the controversy over the Alien and Sedition Acts that led to the protests embodied in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.

Questions over possible secession and the relationship of the states to the federal Union also arose in the crisis over the Presidential election of 1800. In those days, the victor in the Electoral College became President and the second-place candidate became Vice President. It's easy to understand now how this could prove to be awkward. Which is why the Constitution was amended to change it.

But the 1800 election results resulted in an Electoral College tie between Jefferson and Aaron Burr. Which threw the election to the House of Representatives. The High Federalists were scheming to avoid the House vote by putting some sort of special administrative officer in charge of the federal government to prevent Jefferson's Republican Party from taking the Presidency. Both Jefferson and Burr were from the Democratic-Republican Party, then usually called the Republican Party; it's the party that evolved into what we now know as the Democratic Party.

The tension was great enough that Republican leaders feared that in the event of Jefferson's election, Federalist states in New England might try to secede from the Union. Dumas Malone in Jefferson the President: First Term, 1801-1805 (1970) recounts:

As might have been expected, Jefferson kept aloof from this controversy insofar as he could, but he afterwards said that he conversed with John Adams about the state of affairs when he chanced to meet the President walking on Pennsylvania Avenue.
It's worth pausing here to think what a different time that was!

Even if we suspect that the encounter Jefferson describes wasn't quite as casual as he describes, what we have there is the President and the President-elect, at a time when the opposition party might well have attempted to overthrow the Constitutional government to stop Jefferson from taking office, walking on a public street discussing matters of the utmost importance for the state. Malone doesn't mention whether or not there were bodyguards of some kind present. But the Secret Service as a constant protection for the President didn't start until Lincoln's Administration.

Malone continues:

At the moment [Jefferson] was disturbed by reports that "a very dangerous experiment was then in contemplation, to defeat the Presidential election by an act of Congress," devolving the government in any interregnum on a president of the Senate, who would be elected by that Federalist body. This alleged plan was the more dangerous because it contemplated provision for a contingency in advance of the voting and thus would have encouraged the Federalists to prevent a constitutional election. He asserted to Adams that "such a measure would probably produce resistance by force and incalculable consequences," which the President could prevent by negativing [opposing] it. He got no satisfaction out of Adams, whom he reported as having suggested the simplest and quickest way out - that is, that he insure his election by giving assurances that he would honor the public debt, maintain the navy, and not displace the federal officers [all causes given by the High Federalist to impede Jefferson's assuming office] [my emphasis]
Malone also quotes Jefferson from a letter of 02/15/1801 to James Monroe, then Governor of Virginia, after the Federalist conspirators had backed off:

If they [the High Federalists] could have been permitted to pass a law puning the government into the hands of an officer, they would certainly have prevented an election. But we thought it best to declare openly and firmly, one & all, that the day such an act passed, the middle States would arm, & that no such usurpation, even for a single day, should be submitted to. This first shook them; and they were completely alarmed at the resource for which we declared, to wit, a convention to re-organize the government, & to amend it. The very word convention gives them the horrors, as in the present democratical spirit of America, they fear they should lose some of the favorite morsels of the constitution. [my emphasis]
In other words, Jefferson and Monroe were ready to mobilize the militias of the states like Virginia govenrned by Republicans. (The national army hardly existed at this time.) Part of the decision was based on the Federalists counting the troops likely to line up on either side of the conflict.

Malone provides some excellent context for this Jeffersonian approach to resolving the crisis:

When reporting his election to Madison soon thereafter, he said that the Federalists were confronted not only with the impossibility of electing Burr, but also ·with "the certainty that a legislative usurpation would be resisted b:~ arms, and a recourse to a convention to reorganize and amend the government." A few weeks later, after his inauguration and at a time of calm, he wrote differently to his learned friend Joseph Priestley. "There was no idea of force, nor of any occasion for it," he then said. A more correct Statement, nearer the full truth, would have been that there was no idea of force among the responsible leaders, except in the case of attempted usurpation by the Federalists, and that the occasion for employing it did not arise. At the moment Jefferson, who was congratulating the country on the peaceful Settlement of this dispute, presented a half-truth to a lover of peace. Also, he described the probable course of events in the case of the non-election of a President, when the federal government would have been like a clock that had run down. [my emphasis in bold]
Jefferson and Monroe were not thinking of mobilizing Republican state militias in order to secede from the Union. They were planning to defend the central government and the Constitutional order against the plotters' plan for what today we might call a "soft coup" to overthrown it. Jefferson's stance was to defend the central government and the Constitution, fully aware that an attempted secession by Federalist-led states could require an military response by the central government.

Another key difference to the Confederate secessionists was that in 1801 election crisis, slavery as such was not the cause of it. Although it's important to remember that the Constitution the Jeffersonians were defending was one that protected slavery. Abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison would later call it "the pro-slavery, war sanctioning Constitution of the United States." Also characterizing it as "an agreement with Hell."



Tuesday, April 04, 2017

Confederate "Heritage" Month 2017, April 4: Thomas Jefferson vs. secession

Thomas Jefferson was alive and engaged with public issues during several of the most important disputes involving secession of states from the Union in some way. In "Thomas Jefferson, Coercion, and the Limits of Harmonious Union" (Journal of Southern History 4:2008), Brian Steele looks at Jefferson's position on those issue throughout his career, concluding that Jefferson was consistent in recognizing that the Union can and should resort to coercion, including military coercion, in the case of a state trying to succeed or blatantly defying federal authority.

Jefferson, Steele argues, "was willing to enforce federal law in the face of opposition by state and local authorities, that he believed the Union was empowered to coerce a seceding state, and that he claimed executive prerogative in cases of national self-preservation or even of national interest."

Southern secessionists and later segregationist advocates of "states rights" and interposition (nullification) pointed to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799. James Madison was heavily involved in drafting the former, Jefferson the latter.

The text of Resolutions Adopted by the Kentucky General Assembly can be found at Princeton's Papers of Thomas Jefferson website, The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, which also has a discussion of the somewhat uncertain nature of Jefferson's contribution to their drafting. Monticello.org (Thomas Jefferson Foundation) also has a discussion of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. The causes to which the Kentucky Resolutions, largely written by Jefferson and excerpted below, were the Alien and Sedition Acts passed and being enforced by the John Adams Administration. They were directed against immigrants, described in the excerpt as "the friendly strangers ... to whom the mild spirit of our Country and its laws had pledged hospitality and protection." They also authorized broad powers of repression to the federal government against the free press and free speech.

VIII. Resolved, that the preceding Resolutions be transmitted to the Senators and Representatives in Congress from this Commonwealth, who are hereby enjoined to present the same to their respective Houses, and to use their best endeavours to procure at the next session of Congress, a repeal of the aforesaid unconstitutional and obnoxious acts. ...

IX. Resolved lastly, that the Governor of this Commonwealth be, and is hereby authorised and requested to communicate the preceding Resolutions to the Legislatures of the several States, to assure them that this Commonwealth considers Union for specified National purposes, and particularly for those specified in their late Federal Compact, to be friendly to the peace, happiness, and prosperity of all the states: that faithful to that compact, according to the plain intent and meaning in which it was understood and acceded to by the several parties, it is sincerely anxious for its preservation: that it does also believe, that to take from the states all the powers of self government, and transfer them to a general and consolidated Government, without regard to the special delegations and reservations solemnly agreed to in that compact, is not for the peace, happiness, or prosperity of these states ...

Let him say what the Government is if it be not a tyranny, which the men of our choice have conferred on the President, and the President of our choice has assented to and accepted over the friendly strangers, to whom the mild spirit of our Country and its laws had pledged hospitality and protection: that the men of our choice have more respected the bare suspicions of the President than the solid rights of innocence, the claims of justification, the sacred force of truth, and the forms & substance of law and justice. In questions of power then let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution. That this Commonwealth does therefore call on its Co-states for an expression of their sentiments on the acts concerning Aliens, and for the punishment of certain crimes herein before specified, plainly declaring whether these acts are or are not authorised by the Federal Compact? And it doubts not that their sense will be so announced as to prove their attachment unaltered to limited Government, whether general or particular, and that the rights and liberties of their Co-states will be exposed to no dangers by remaining embarked on a common bottom with their own: That they will concur with this Commonwealth in considering the said acts as so palpably against the Constitution as to amount to an undisguised declaration, that the Compact is not meant to be the measure of the powers of the General Government, but that it will proceed in the exercise over these states of all powers whatsoever: That they will view this as seizing the rights of the states and consolidating them in the hands of the General Government with a power assumed to bind the states (not merely in cases made federal) but in all cases whatsoever, by laws made, not with their consent, but by others against their consent: That this would be to surrender the form of Government we have chosen, and to live under one deriving its powers from its own will, and not from our authority; and that the Co-states recurring to their natural right in cases not made federal, will concur in declaring these acts void and of no force, and will each unite with this Commonwealth in requesting their repeal at the next session of Congress [my emphasis]
In hindsight, it's easy to see how secessionists and segregationists could have used such language as "declaring these acts void and of no force" to be precedent for the claims of secession, Calhoun-style nullifiction or George Wallace-style "interposition."

But these resolutions, including those of Virginia primarily written by Madison, did not call for or threaten secession. Nor did they declare that the states would offer forceful resistance to federal officials enforcing federal law. As seen above, the action the Kentucky legislature was requesting from other states was to join them in protesting the unconstitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts and "in requesting their repeal at the next session of Congress." Steele observes:

To be sure, Jefferson's Kentucky Resolutions have been understood as giving sanction to later secession movements, and it is not always a simple matter to reconcile Jefferson's views on coercion with his stance in the 1790s. Nevertheless, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions did not advocate - or even broach - secession, and there were substantial qualitative differences between them and the later claims made by some New England Federalists and South Carolina nullifiers, despite the claims to Jefferson's legacy made by the latter group in particular. Much of the way we have thought about and understood the 1790s has been distorted by our viewing that period through the lens of later events, particularly those of the 1830s and, especially, 1860-1861.
It requires some imagination to picture it now, but in the 1790s, the principle of judicial review on Constitutional issues had not yet been established. It was really after the Civil War that it was firmly. When the Constitution was being written, Jefferson had preferred to see it include judicial review explicitly, but it wasn't included. Ironically, the famous case in which the Supreme Court first asserted its power of judicial review of Constitutional questions, Marbury v. Madison (1803) was a decision against Jefferson's Presidential Administration. So the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were protests stating that, in the opinion of those state legislature, the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional.

The discussion of "states rights" has been greatly complicated by the history of secession and nullification/interposition. But disputes between the states and the federal government over laws and policies continues today, notably on the enforcement of federal immigration laws. States no longer attempt to secede or nullify laws in these disputes. That ship has long since sailed. But they do go to court over them. And they also lobby for changing federal laws they don't like - which is what the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were demanding.

Rachel Maddow the other night did report there was some kind of Russian plot to promote California secession. If that is so, it has managed to keep itself remarkably concealed from actual Californians.

There are several reference in the above excerpt from the Kentucky Resolutions to what is know as the contract theory of the Union, to which Jefferson adhered. At the time of the Civil War, secessionists were fond of citing this compact theory, while leaders like Lincoln rejected it. Here, it's important to note that the compact theory was not just secession propaganda. It was a serious political theory. But, as Steele reminds us, the compact theory did not inherently involve the right of a state to secede from the Union: "The compact theory of the Union governed by the law of nations could lead to different kinds of conclusions about the nature of that union."

As we'll see in tomorrow's post, Jefferson understood the compact theory to mean that the federal government indeed had the legitimate right to compel individual states to comply with the "compact," including the use of military force. Steele describes Jefferson's application of the contract theory in the Kentucky Resolutions this way:

In the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, Jefferson called the national government a "creature of the compact" - not an original party to it. There is a tendency on the part of historians to associate this compact theory of the Constitution, which Jefferson articulated, with a kind of "take it or leave it" view of the Union. Partly because Lincoln rejected the compact theory and many self-identified advocates of states' rights seemed to hold such a view, thereby tainting commitment to "states' rights" with the stain of disunion, the tendency is not altogether misplaced. But, as Jefferson told William Eustis in 1809, the Union - "the spirit of concord with her sister States" - had "placed us under that national government, which constitutes the safety of every part, by uniting for its protection the powers of the whole." The national government, in other words, might have been the "creature of the compact," but it was an umbrella of protection for that very compact, emerging out of the Union and remaining an indispensable part of it, rather than a separate entity to be ignored or discarded at pleasure. Jefferson noted, in fact, that the national government is the instrument through which the states act in their relations with each other. [my emphasis]

Sunday, April 02, 2017

Confederate "Heritage" Month 2017, April 3: Jefferson's record on secession

A continued challenge for understanding history is "anachronism," or viewing previous events through contemporary standards in a way that interferes with understanding the meaning of the past events and the motives of key players. It's always a struggle, because we always start from some point of view. How we work from a subjective viewpoint to understanding the reality outside our heads was a key issue on which Kant and Hegel staked distinctly different positions. And the Kant-Hegel argument continues to this day. And those two thinkers were certainly not the first to grapple with the problem.

One very helpful perspective is the one taken by this issue of the German publication Zeit Geschichte 3/2016, titled, Wir Sind das Volk. Die Deutschen und die Demokratie - 1789 bis heute:


It's a collection of essays about the development of democracy in Germany from 1789 until the present day. And it focuses on major political milestones, such as the spread of Democratic Clubs in the wake of the French Revolution, the Hambacher Fest of 1832, and the proclamation of the German Republic in 1918.

An historical exhibit in the Reichstag building in Berlin at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall took a similar approach:


Like any approach, this has its limits because it focuses on one historical process rather than others. The first section of the Zeit Geschichte issue prominently features a photo of Philipp Scheidemann proclaiming the German Republic in 1918 from a window of the Reichstag. Karl Liebknecht's proclamation shortly afterwards of the "Free Socialist Republic" is mentioned in the caption, but not given the dramatic photographic prominence of Scheidemann's. This doesn't mean that it's somehow "fake history." If the topic were the history of the German social democracy, Liebknecht's proclamation would likely have been given greater prominence.

And a series of blog posts debunking Confederate pseudohistory focuses on issues and events with particular relevance to the topic. It's also a reminder that events prior to the Civil War are often seen through the perspective of how the issues were framed at the time of war and its immediately preceding time.

Secessionists claimed precedents using arguments in the manner in which politicians today still do, i.e., in a polemical and selective manner. Both sides were particularly keen to connect their cause with the traditions of the American Revolution. (I'm starting to think that only the political right in the US today still try to do so. But that's another story.) Thomas Jefferson - author of the Declaration of Independence, Governor of Virginia during the Revolution, third President, prominent Southern intellectual and slaveowner - was an important symbol for both sides.

And he was alive and politically involved at the time of various incidents that raised the issues of states' rights and secession in,different ways, including:

The protests of Virginia and Kentucky against the Alien and Sedition Acts during the John Adams Administration, known as the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the first primarily authored by James Madison, the second by Jefferson

Election crisis of 1801; yes, those are as American as apple pie
Burr conspiracy of 1805-6
War of 1812 and the Hartford Convention of 1814
Missouri Compromise of 1820
Nullification Crisis of 1832
Nashville Convention of 1850, yet another treasonous plot by John Calhoun
Compromise of 1850
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 and its violent repercussions in "Bleeding Kansas"
Dred Scott decision of 1857
And, of course, Lincoln's election of 1860 and immediately subsequent events

In the next post in this series, I'll take a look at the positions Jefferson took on the first three, which took place during his lifetime.

Confederate "Heritage" Month, April 2: Nullification and secession, the War of 1812 experience

John Dos Passos had among his later works two popular histories, Mr. Wilson's War (1962), about the First World War, and The Shackles of Power: Three Jeffersonian Decades (1966). Written in an attractively accessible style, both forgo the burden of footnotes. Which can be frustrating if you like to read the footnotes. Or want to follow up on the source for a quote or claim.

While it makes for smooth reading, important nuance can suffer.

In Shackles of Power, Dos Passos writes about one of the important milestones in the development of states' rights and federal power. It has to do with the Federalists who sympathized with Britain in the War of 1812. They promoted their own version of secessionism in the process. Here is the description given by the 1960 edition of The Beards' New Basic History of the United States by Charles, Mary and William Beard:

To make matters worse for [President James] Madison, the war was decidedly unpopular in the Northeast where, presumably, a war proclaimed in behalf of free commerce would have been welcomed. In the House of Representatives, Daniel Webster, of Massachusetts, denounced the draft of men as unconstitutional. Federalists decried the conflict as merely "Mr. Madison's war." The govemor of Connecticut refused to obey the President's call for troops and the Connecticut assembly declared the state to be "free, sovereign and independent." A convention of delegates from various parts of New England, assembled in Hartford in October 1814, adopted resolutions akin in spirit, if not in letter, to those put forth by Kentucky and Virginia in 1798.
Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826)

Dos Passos echoes the comparison to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions:

Jefferson never forgave the Essex Junto [of pro-British secessionist advocates], any more than he forgave Aaron Burr, for their efforts to break up the Union. He wrote of the mortification of the New England clergy, whom both he and Madison blamed for the Federalist excesses, exulting bitterly in "the disgrace with which they have loaded themselves in their political ravings, and of their mortification at the ridiculous issue of their Hartford convention. no event more than this has shown the placid nature of our constitution. under any other their treasons would have been punished by the halter. we let them live as laughing stocks for the world, and punish them by the torment of eternal contempt."

In the course of the war the Republicans had switched politics with the Federalists. The Federalists were now defending nullification and states' rights as Jefferson and Madison had defended them at the time of the Kentucky Resolutions. The Republicans were now the party of central government, a standing army, and a navy capable of meeting force with force in relations with foreign nations. To that they were about to add a tariff for the protection of manufactures. (p. 286}
Given how the Confederates and their later apologists use historical precedents to justify the secession of 1860-61.

The neo-Confederate version is pseudohistory. Or Fake History, in more topical phrasing.

So part of what I try to do in these Confederate "Heritage" Month posts is to promote real history. In the case of the positions Jefferson and Madison took at the time of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the Britannica Online article on them rightly notes, "The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were primarily protests against the limitations on civil liberties contained in the Alien and Sedition Acts rather than expressions of full-blown constitutional theory. Later references to the resolutions as authority for the theories of nullification and secession were inconsistent with the limited goals sought by Jefferson and Madison in drafting their protests." (internal links omitted)

The US Constitution, like all constitutions and legal systems, evolves as new problems arise. The Constitution of 1789 didn't explicitly address the question of whether or not a state in the Union could secede by its own choice. Of course, a Constitutional Amendment could always allow for a state to leave the Union. But that would require much more than the single state's own choice.

It's worth noting that the present-day Brexit may wind up raising some similar issues. The 2004 EU Constitution does provide for an exit process. But as the two-year period of negotiation that Britain just initiated proceed, we could see the remaining EU nations contesting the terms and the timing of the actual Brexit event. Here is the BBC News summary of that aspect of the EU Constitution (What the EU constitution says 06/18/2004):

In fact, the EU under Angela Merkel's leadership is already making such threats. Nikos Chrysoloras and Patrick Donahue report in EU Puts the Squeeze on U.K. as Brexit Negotiation Clock Ticks Bloomberg 03/31/2017:

The European Union told U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May she will have to wait almost two months for Brexit negotiations to begin and that talks on a trade deal can come in the fall, but only if she first agrees to pay an exit bill.

The EU moved quickly to exercise its control over the Brexit countdown clock now that May has triggered the two-year negotiation period. Substantive talks can’t begin until May 22, when EU governments are set to approve the final negotiating directives for the bloc’s Brexit point person, Michel Barnier.
In the United States, the question of whether a state can leave the Union on its own accord was settled decisively at Appomattox.

Saturday, April 01, 2017

Confederate "Heritage" Month, April 1: What's it about?

I've been doing Confederate "Heritage" Month posts on the blog since 2004. And I'm doing it this year, too. It's a counter-observation of the event, which also know as Confederate History Month. It's ably explained (in its variation) in a new article by Ashton Pittman in the Jackson [MS] Free Press, What ‘Confederate History Month’ Really Is 03/29/2017:

In April, five states will officially celebrate Confederate History Month (or Confederate Heritage Month): Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. In Georgia, which stopped the celebrations after a neo-Confederate killed nine black churchgoers in neighboring South Carolina in 2015, a lawmaker is pushing to bring it back, citing Trump's election and the end of the era of "political correctness."

#To be clear, Confederate History Month isn't about remembering our past and taking lessons from it. Key proponents of the month's continued existence are the Sons of Confederate Veterans, whose revisionist history of the Confederacy and the Civil War minimizes and even denies the role of slavery in southern secession. On April 9, 1865, Confederate General Robert E. Lee surrendered in Virginia. Yet 152 years later, many in our region are still fighting the lost war. Some of us do it by flying Confederate flags, complete with lofty slogans like, "The South Will Rise Again!" and "Heritage, Not Hate!" Some of us do it in more insidious ways. For no good reason, we work overtime to make sure those "Yankees" don't come in and wreck our perfectly dead-last economies. We definitely don't want those federal Yanks telling us how to run our education system. And despite the fact that we are the region that most needs health-care options that the Affordable Care Act offers, we did everything we could to thwart any effort from the Obama administration to help improve our miserable condition.
In the 03/28/2017 version at the Deep South Daily Pittman edits, the headline is Call ‘Confederate History Month’ What It Really IS: 'White Supremacy Month'.

Last year, civil rights activists in Mississippi had the following reaction to Republican Gov. Phil Bryant's official proclamation of Confederate Heritage Month (Critics assail Mississippi governor for declaring April ‘Confederate Heritage Month’ Raw Story/Guardian 04/03/2016):

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) leaders in Mississippi reacted by proposing a civil war remembrance of their own: Union Army Heritage Month.

“These white and black Mississippi patriots fought for the continuation of the United States of America as one nation, under God, indivisible with liberty and justice for all,” Derrick Johnson, president of Mississippi’s NAACP, wrote to the Clarion-Ledger.

“Should not these soldiers be honored, too?”

Scores rallied on the steps of the capitol, in Jackson. They were diverse. Kathleen Chambers personified a shift in the state’s mentality: she is young and white, and instead of a southern drawl she spoke with the universal up-talk of young people.

“Any white people I know? They’re not OK with this,” she said to the local television station WAPT.

Of Bryant, she said: “He’s trying to turn a Confederate heritage into a good thing, when it’s not. It shouldn’t be celebrated. Especially we shouldn’t celebrate owning people in the past.”
While we are marching through Georgia - Tennessee Ernie Ford: