Showing posts with label spanish civil war. Show all posts
Showing posts with label spanish civil war. Show all posts

Monday, June 29, 2015

Greece today: does the Spanish Civil War analogy work?

Economist and political scientist Vicenç Navarro has come up with a sentence of Faulknerian lenght to describe the current situation in the euro crisis (El terrorismo financiero contra Grecia Público 29.06.2015):

Estamos hoy viendo un ataque frontal del capital financiero, hegemonizado por el alemán, y vehiculado primordialmente a través del Banco Central Europeo (BCE), en contra del pueblo griego, ataque que intenta evitar cualquier atisbo de rebelión frente a las políticas de austeridad que están destruyendo el bienestar de las clases populares de todos los países de la Eurozona y muy en particular de Grecia, cuyo gobierno Syriza ha sido el primero en decir “BASTA YA” frente a lo que no hay otra manera de llamarlo como terrorismo financiero (ver el libro del Profesor Juan Torres y yo, titulado Los amos del mundo, las armas del terrorismo financiero).


[Today we are seeing a frontal assault by finance capital, hegemonized {dominated} by the German version, basically facilitated by the European Central Bank (ECB), against the Greek people, an attack aimed at preventing any trace of rebellion against the austerity policies that are destroying the well-being of the popular classes of all the countries of the eurozone and very particularly those of Greece, whose SYRIZA government has been the first to stay "STOP NOW" in the face of what can't be called anything else than financial terrorism (see the book by Professor Juan Torres and me titled, Los amos del mundo, las armas del terrorismo financiero).]
Like the writer I quoted in my previous post, also from Público, Navarro makes an analogy to the Spanish Civil War. Both are evoking it to emphasize the importance of international solidarity with the Greek people.

Spanish Civil War poster

I'm leery of simplistic historical analogies, especially ones involving the Second World War. But I'm with Navarro on the following, even if he's a touch melodramatic about it:

Salvando las diferencias que existen en cada hecho histórico, lo cierto es que en Grecia hemos estado viendo una situación semejante, en que la lucha por la justicia social y por la democracia en aquel país es la lucha por la justicia social y por la democracia en todos los países de la Europa Occidental. La pervivencia de la justicia social y de la democracia en los países de la Unión Europea se está jugando hoy en aquel país.

[Despite the difference that exist in every historical event, what is certain is that in Greece we are seeing a similar situation in which the struggle for social justice and for democracy in that country is the struggle for social justice and democracy in all the countries of Western Europe. The survival of social justice and democracy of the countries of the European Union is in play in that country.]

Saturday, August 30, 2014

George Orwell in the Spanish Civil War and revolutionary tourism in Syria

Marcy Wheeler has a good point in her post Did Eric Arthur Blair Come Back from Catalonia Radicalized? Emptywheel 08/29/2014.

Which has me thinking — and not for the first time — of the large numbers of people who went to fight in the Spanish Civil War.

After all, it’s not like wanting to overthrow Bashar al-Assad is an ignoble goal. And while I think most Brits (and Americans) will grow disillusioned by the intolerance and ruthless discipline of ISIS, I can imagine the attraction, from afar, of moral certitude they offer. The 1930s, like today, are a morally confusing time, and those who fought the fascists in Spain ended up being vanguards of a necessary fight, even if they fought for an equally loathsome authoritarian force in the process.

The experience of fighting — and growing disillusioned — in Spain was chronicled by George Orwell in Homage to Catalonia. After his return, his views were suspect, but he did manage to return to the UK and warn of the dangers of absolutism.
Marcy's account skips over some of the fine points. By "an equally loathsome authoritarian force in the process," I assume she means the Soviet Union.

And while the USSR did sponsor the International Brigades, the government they were supported was the elected democratic government of the Spanish Republic.

And Orwell actually fought with a group called the Partido Obrero de Unification Marxista (POUM). Gabrielle Ranzato in The Spanish Civil War (1999; Janet Sehre Paxia translator) discusses the situation in early 1937:

The situation thus hurled toward war. And the point of collision could be none other than Barcelona, the revolutionary city, the city farthest from control by the central government. There, a small, anti-Stalinist party - the POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista). the object of the [Soviet-line] Communist International's greatest aversion, was attempting to orient the anarchist organizations in the direction of a political revolution along the lines of the original Russian one. This aim was sometimes foolhardy in its ambition. ...

A single clash was therefore sufficient to spark off the decisive battle. In early May of 1937 the Catalan government police force, headed by a Communist, tried to occupy the telephone company building where the anarchists, who had been settled in there since July, controlled trolled all communications. A shooting match broke out and soon spread throughout the city. Barricades reemerged, behind which on one side, the POUM militants were shooting together with the anarchists; and on the other, the Communists of the PSUC (Partit Socialita Unificat de Catalunya) together with the Catalan autonomists. The fighting caused hundreds of casualties, and was ended by appeals from the anarchist ministers who had hastened in from Madrid, followed by the intervention of central government troops sent to preside over pacification.

What followed brought total victory for the [Soviet-line] Communists. ... The Communists opened the crisis after the old Socialist leader refused to agree to their request to dissolve the POUM; they succeeded in imposing a new government which excluded the anarchists. That government was supported by the Republican parties and by Prieto's moderate Socialists, and headed by one of the latter, Juan Negrín. ...

The POUM was outlawed; its leaders were imprisoned; its secretary, Andres Nin, was kidnapped and assassinated. [my emphasis]
The POUM and the anarchists were acting on the notion that a social revolution had to be staged to create a government with strong enough popular support to defeat Franco's Falangists.

The point Marcy makes in her post is to call attention to the similarity in the situation of revolutionary tourists like Orwell in Spain and those in Syria today. I hadn't thought of it until I read her post.

I'm not sure that the British government at the time would have regarded Orwell's fighting in a militia that regarded itself as more communist than the Communists as more benign than directly supporting the pro-Spanish-Republic Communists.

But her point is a very good one. The fact that a young person decides to go fight against a Syrian regime that even the Western media demonized for months until the Obama Administration recently decided we may need to ally with them, that in itself doesn't mean they will be incorrigible terrorists for life.

One more installment in the long let's-not-do-stupid-stuff when it comes to the so-called War On Terrorism.

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Sunday, January 02, 2011

Javier Zamora Bonilla's "Ortega y Gasset" (2 of 2)


José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955)

This is a discussion of Javier Zamora Bonilla's biography Ortega y Gasset (2002) continued from Part 1.

The Franco dictatorship is another matter. And Ortega's record on that matter contributes heavily to the ambiguity of his legacy. Ortega's political and philosophical orientation throughout his adult life was that of classical liberalism, which stood for "free markets and free men." (And, yes, until well into the 20th century that meant free men.) Ortega had living experience of four major periods in Spanish political life: the Restoration (1875-1923), the Primo de Rivera dictatorship of 1923-1931, though Rivera didn't head it at the end; the Second Republic (1931-1939); and, the Franco dictatorship (1939-1975).

In the Restoration, Spain was a monarchy with the King having strong Executive power and a functioning Parliament, but a highly corrupt and unresponsive political system. Ortega in that period favored retaining the monarchy but was attracted by the parties of the left: republicans, democrats and social-democrats (PSOE). He favored a form of socialism which he saw as the necessary social component of democratic liberalism. Even though he was influenced by Ferdinand Lasalle's thought as well as by English Fabian Socialism, he always rejected the dominant Marxism of the Social Democratic Parties in Europe (and later of the Communists, though of a different kind) and the idea that the working class or any other class needed a party distinctly representing their interests.

His position under the 1923-31 military dictatorship was more complicated. Initially, the Spanish left viewed Rivera's seizure of power with some optimism, as did Ortega. The PSOE and the socialist-allied UGT labor union maintained partially-friendly relations with the Rivera government. Ortega initially hoped the military regime would be a transitional one, which would relatively quickly step down in favor of a revitalized electoral system that would allow for free, competitive elections of more genuinely representative politics than that of the "old politics" of the Restoration. He saw fairly soon that wasn't happening, and he maintained a critical posture in public (to the extent censorship would allow) to the military regime. Raymond Aron's general characterization of Ortega's liberalism - that "Ortega is an anti-revolutionary" who "detested the revolutionary attitude" - is not fully descriptive of his position, either during the Restoration or during the military dictatorship.

When the Republic took power in 1931, Ortega was an active supporter. In this period his liberalism lead him to insist on a secular state - while opposing dogmatic anti-clericalism, which played an important role in Spanish politics - and opposing a monarchy. King Alfonso XIII had voluntarily left the country in April 1913, when elections showed a clear victory for the pro-Republic parties, explaining in seemingly self-reflective terms that "espero que no habré de volver, pues ello sólo significaría que el pueblo español no es próspero ni feliz" (I hope I don't have to return, because that would mean that the Spanish people are neither prosperous nor happy).

Ortega served in the Cortes Constituyentes for several months in 1931, but stepped down of his own choice. As Zamora explains, Ortega decided that the day-to-day business of politics was not suited to him. But Ortega gave a fairly haughty twist on it, talking grandly about how the role of the intellectual is to be analytical and reflective rather than making the quick decisions often called for in political life. A realization of his own gifts and limits, or an unwillingness to make up his mind and take responsibility for his decisions on public policy? It's hard to say which was more persuasive for him, but it seems clear even from Zamora's sympathetic account that that the latter consideration weighed heavily. "La política es analfebetismo" (Politics is illiteracy)m Ortega said in justifying his decision to quit the Cortes.

Civil wars are complicated and very messy. The Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 was no exception. Zamora's account of the politics of the Republic is unfortunately flawed by his treatment of the position of the PSOE, a Social Democratic party and part of the Socialist (Second) International, as essentially identical to that of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), a Comintern-line party. Suffice it here to say that establishing a democratic government and political culture turned out to have a higher ratio of vital to razón than Ortega preferred. He came to view the Popular Front government under Manuel Azaña of the Left Republican Party, which came to power in the elections of February 1936, as an illegitimate one. The military rebellion lead by General Francisco Franco began in July 1936. Gabriele Ranzato in The Spanish Civil War (1999 American edition) explains:

Some of the most widely respected figures of Spanish culture, such as José Ortega y Gasset, Pérez de Ayala and Pio Baroja, repelled by the violence in the Republican area, adhered to the rebel cause with some reservations but then were unable to live in the clerico-fascist environment of the Nationalist zone, and moved abroad.
As far as Ortega's position goes, that's an exceptionally generous account. Even though Zamora's account is sympathetic to Ortega in general and he goes to some lengths to depict Ortega's thinking in 1936, he doesn't hide the fact that Ortega sympathized with the Franco rebellion. Civil wars are not only messy, they are also civil wars. Ortega fled Spain to France with his family in September 1936 with the assistance of the pro-Republican militia of which his brother Eduardo was a member. Both his sons fought voluntarily for the Rebel cause.

But he was never considered a desirable figure by the Franco regime or its conservative and reactionary supporters in the Catholic Church hierarchy. Some Franco supporters took some of his ideas about the identity and destiny of the Spanish nation to justify the Rebel cause. Ortega's own thinking had brought him to a position of opposing the Republic and supporting Franco. That was one feature of his classical liberalism that should not be whitewashed out of his history and legacy. As early as 1915, the same year he began calling his approach a system of to razón vital, Zamora notes that in an essay called "¡Libertad, divino tesoro!", Ortega explicitly prioritized liberalism over democracy.

Ortega was not a fascist and never identified directly with Spanish political tendencies that understood themselves as fascist. It's worth noting that the German writer and committed democrat Thomas Mann praised La rebelión de las masas just after it was published and supported Ortega in his numerous German appearances after the Second World War. Though I certainly see Ortega's decision to support Franco over the democratic government of the Second Republic as both wrong as a moral and political matter, and also as a reflection of flaws in his philosophy, his liberalism viewed a representative democratic republic as the most desirable form of government. It's just that his abstract brand of liberalism, especially his refusal to recognize the political significance of social class, put him in the reactionary camp in 1936. Which is where those who revere an abstract or superficial Centrism as a supreme political value sometimes find themselves winding up.

Zamora puts it this way:

No es de extrañar que muchos fascistas españoles tuvieran algunas ideas orteguianas como fuente de inspiración. El demérito de Ortega no está en que éstos utilizaran sus ideas, lo que no podía evitar, sine en que él no las hubiese explicado suficientamente.

[It's not surprising that many Spanish fascists had some Ortegian ideas as a source of inspiration. The demerit of Ortega is not in that those people utilized his ideas, which he could not have prevented, but rather in that he did not make them sufficiently explicit.]
Or, as Leon Uris once said of Frederick Nietzsche's work, the Nazis quoted him out of context to make it appear he would have supported their ideas. But he often wrote in ways that were awfully easy to take out of context.

Ortega contributed a great deal toward encouraging education in general in Spain and the study of science, especially. He encouraged much broader philosophical thinking in both Spain and Argentina, where he was also widely known and respected for most of his life. More particularly, he encouraged the study of German philosophy, which he considered the most advanced philosophical thinking in Europe and essential for developing a greater appreciation of science.

His philosophy suffers from its chronic evanescence and its desire to paper over essential differences rather than understand them. This is why he is one of the most important exponents of classical liberalism from the last century but also a cautionary tale about the bad places to which a too-abstract liberalism can lead. His razón historica gives him a sense of history as a process that behaves according to some kind of laws provides him material for provocative observations and relevant questions, even though the limits of his liberalism also puts limits on the amount of realism he can apply to his accounts of history.

Ortega's elegant writing style has allowed his ideas to be broadly heard and discussed, and not only in Spanish. And his long-time advocacy of the political unity of Europe has come a long way toward becoming a reality.

Articles by Javier Zamora Bonilla:

Vueltas y revueltas del problema catalán El Imparcial 29.06.2010 Talks about Ortega and other intellectuals sympathizing with the Franco rebellion.

Por un nuevo impulso progresista del proyecto europeo El Imparcial 15.08.2010 Discusses current issues of European unity.

Cesar Güemes, (interview with Javier Zamora Bonilla) Como filósofo, José Ortega y Gasset "no ha entrado del todo a la academia" La Journada 20.04.2003

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Saturday, January 01, 2011

Javier Zamora Bonilla's "Ortega y Gasset" (1 of 2)


"Rosa, oriéntame. No veo claro lo que ocurre." (Rosa, guide me. I don't see clearly what's happening.)

Those were the last words of Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955), according to Javier Zamora Bonilla in his biography, Ortega y Gasset (2002). The words are a poignant symbol for Ortega's own ambiguous intellectual legacy.

Ortega's disciple Julián Marías in "La metafísica de Ortega", Revista de Estudios Orteguianos 12-13/2006 cites Ortega along with Fichte, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dilthey and Bergson saying of them, "Todos estos filósofos ha tenido más o menos conciencia de la necesidad de encontrar una vía de acceso a esa realidad evanescente, figitiva, siempre haciéndose, que se llama la vida o la hisotoria." (All these philosophers were more or less conscious of the necessity to find a way of access to this evanescent reality, fugitive, always making itself, that is called life or history.)

Aside from whether that's a good description of the work of all those thinkers, the element of evanescence is an important feature of Ortega's thought. He understood himself as a man of the middle. In philosophy, he tried to development an alternative philosophy to realism and idealism without rejecting reason itself. In politics, at the time he was most directly involved at the beginning of the 2nd Republic which was established in 1931, he was elected to the national Cortes Constituyentes (which essentially functioned as the parliament at the time) as the head of the ASP (Agrupación al Servicio de la República), which he hoped to develop as the core of a national party embracing all classes, standing between the proverbial two extremes. Fleeing Spain for France soon after the start of the civil war in 1936, he was regarded by the Republic as an opponent. Remaining in exile the rest of his life, he was allowed to visit Spain but was regarded with deep suspicion by the Franco regime, reviled by the reactionary Catholic press and seen by British intelligence as a possible key leader in a transition from the Franco dictatorship to a new republic. He was kicked out of his professorship for political reasons by the military dictatorship of 1923-1931, by the 2nd Republic and by the Franco dictatorship.

Ortega was born into a prominent press family and was active in the printed press media business for much of his life, beginning his first newspaper at age 19. He is generally regarded as one of the best writers in Castillian Spanish, a gift which may have contributed to the ambiguity of his philosophical legacy. He always believed that books should be readable, and he liked the essay format suited to publishing in newspapers and magazines. He would no doubt have been a talented blogger. So he was reluctant to develop a systematic presentation of his outlook in a more traditional philosophical format. Some of the most important statements of his philosophy is a more systematic form were from lecture series that were only published after his death, including ¿Qué es filosofía? (What Is Philosophy?) (1929), Vida como ejecución (El ser ejecutiveo) (1929-30), Sobre la realidad radical (1930) and ¿Qué es la vida? (1930-31). All of these were done about the same time as the publication of what remains his most famous and popular work, La rebelión de las masas (Revolt of the Masses), published serially in the newspaper El Sol in 1929 and 1930, then as a book in 1930.

(I posted earlier on an essay by Raymond Aron on La rebelión de las masas and noted that Aron said the book was actually written in 1924-6. But Zamora's account gives no reason to think he wrote it much before it was actually published. Aron may have had in mind earlier published work of Ortega's which Ortega himself expressly considered closely related to the book, including España invertebrada. Bosquejo de algunos pensamientos histricos, though that began running in El Sol in 1920 and was published as a book in 1922.)

Zamora is a political scientist and the director of the Centro de Estudios Orteguianos of the Fundación José Ortega y Gasset. His biography does a good job of situating Ortega's developing thought in the context of the politics of Spain. Zamora focuses on Ortega's public career and on explaining his philosophy. Those were the aspects in which I was most interested and the absence of gossip in this biography is refreshing. Still, I was surprised at how very little Zamora tells about Ortega's life with his wife and children.

Ortega's theory is called raciovitalism, although his term "razón vital" (vital reason) is probably preferable. In his view, life is its own basis and reasoning, that is, thinking systematically about one's life and experiences, is part of the experience of life. One of his early and literarily pleasing formulations of this approach was, "Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia, y si no la salvo a ella no me salvo yo." (I am and my circumstances, and if I don't redeem them I won't redeem myself.) This was his way of surpassing Cartesian rationalism (I think, therefore I am) and irrationalism.

But it's scarcely a fully satisfying solution. For instance, he argued as a metaphysical principle that each person's point of view was necessarily different because they inevitably have a perspective that brings out a different aspect of reality ("perspectivism"). He looked to Albert Einstein's theories of relativity to lend support to that view, which Ortega largely took from phenomenology. But this creates the problem of acknowledging the thing-in-itself of the Object, a problem that one might have thought such a close student of Kant as Ortega was might have taken more pains to avoid. And despite the seemingly dynamic relationship in that early formulation just quoted between the individual (or the individual ego) and the physical and social circumstances in which he lives, Ortega defended a fairly extreme form of individualism, rooted in the classical liberalism whose tradition he embraced.

Ortega formulated his approach to history as "razón historica" (historical reason), which he saw as distinct from but intimately connected to razón vital. Here his philosophy crosses into the realms of politics and sociology, as it does in La rebelión de las masas. The basic issue that Ortega formulates in that work is the one presented by social and economic developments in the early 20th century, in which large numbers of people have access to the benefits of technology and demand full democratic participation in political life. But many people aren't prepared to understand either the science behind the technology or the responsibilities of a fully-participating citizens. So we get the phenonenon of the "mass man" (hombre-masa), who is basically the mediocre person as distinct from the person of excellence.

Here's where that evanescence gets to be an obvious problem. As Zamora explains well, Ortega explicitly denied that he was referring to the working class or poor people in general in referring to hombre-masa. He defended his concept by arguing explicitly that he understood the concept in terms not of class or wealth but of personal excellence. He thought hombre-masa could be found in every class, especially in the class of small capitalists, which he could identify at the time in Europe clearly as the petit bourgeois (Kleinbürgerliche in German) and have people know what he meant. (In American English today, nobody knows what petit bourgeois means and its basically never used; "middle class" would be a sensible translation if 90%-plus of the American population didn't self-identify as "middle class".)

However, he acknowledged that the more affluent had better access to the means to acquire that excellence. Yet he stubbornly refused to look at class as an essential part of understanding history. So he wound up with vague formulations that, as Raymond Aron noted, was taken by some of his initial German readers to suggest that a Leader like Hitler represented the man of excellence, while others took it to mean that rightwing demagogues like Hitler were exploiting the worst tendencies of hombre-masa.

The latter is clearly closer to Ortega's intentions. He rejected Mussolini's Fascist form of government and that of National Socialism in Germany; Zamora's account doesn't indicate that Ortega ever expressed even the most abstract sympathy for Hitler's goals or methods. Ortega had a somewhat Romantic notion of national character, national destiny, etc. And though he apparently wasn't much bothered by Western colonialism or all the horrors it entailed, he did not conceive of hombre-masa or the people of excellence in racial terms, as the Nazis did. Even in La rebelión de las masas he was stressing the common culture of European nations and the need for European political unity, ideas not remotely on the program of Hitler and his followers. At the philosophical level, Ortega's insistence of the central importance of Reason was quite different from the approach of the Nazis even at the most "highbrow" level, where race was the central organizing concept. And, as someone whose thinking was deeply rooted in classical, 19th century and contemporary German philosophy, the anti-intellectualism of Nazism must have been particularly unattractive.

Continued tomorrow in Part 2.

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Thursday, December 11, 2008

Finding the dead of the Spanish Civil War


Baltasar Garzón

The print edition of the newsmagazine Cambio 16/1920 22.09.2008 discusses the current efforts in Spain to selttle outstanding issues from the Spanish Civil War and the Franco dictatorship. ("Las fasas del olvido" por Diego Caballero).

Spain's leading "investigative judge" Baltasar Garzón has initiated an acocunting for all those who disappeared during that period. In once sense, the present-day sides in the dispute are similar to then. The Socialist Party (PSOE) of Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero supports Garzón's project. The Partido Popular (PP), which is the "postfascist" organizational successor to Franco's Falangist Party, oppose it, saying they don't want to reopen the wounds of the Civil War.

Just to clarify: though the have an organizational history connected to Francoism, the PP is generally accepted in Spain and Europe as a Christian Democratic-type conservative, pro-democracy party.

Of particular concern is identifying the fates of the 30,000 or more people identified by the Associatión para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórico as having disappeared during that period and have never been accounted for.

Spanish Republican Civil War poster (a secular version of St. George and the dragon, the dragon in this case being Franco's rebels)

Caballero writes:

Hasta la fecha han side localizadas en España 284 fosas comunes de la Guerra Civil y la posterior represión franquista. Aunque las cifras varían en función de las fuentes, se calcula que la Guerra Civil española causó mas de medio millón de muertos, además de miles y miles de presos y exiliados.

[To date 284 mass grave from the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent Francoist repression have been located in Spain. While the numbers vary depending on the sources, it is estimated that the Spanish Civil War caused more than half a million deaths, in addition to thousands and thousands of people imprisoned and exiled.]
Pro-Republican International Brigades poster

Judicial actions against perpetrators at this late date would be difficult, not least because a lot of them have passed on. But some families whose bank accounts were seized by Franco's government are receiving settlements. And there is huge value historically and for families on an emotional level in clarifying the deaths.

The Catholic Church, which collaborated heavily with Franco's dictatorship, has been reluctant to assist in Garzón's hunt for the missing.

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Friday, April 27, 2007

Gernika (Guernica)

Yesterday, April 26, was the 70th anniversary of the bombing of the town of Gernika, Spain, in 1937 which was immortalized in Picasso's famous painting, one of the great statements of antiwar art of all time. Though it wasn't a statement against all war as such. At the time it was done, it was a statement against Francisco Franco's forces and against his German and Italian allies who did the actual bombing.

This PBS Web site that focuses on Picasso's famous painting gives a brief summary of the infamous event:

On April 27th, 1937, unprecedented atrocities are perpetrated on behalf of Franco against the civilian population of a little Basque village in northern Spain. Chosen for bombing practice by Hitler's burgeoning war machine, the hamlet is pounded with high-explosive and incendiary bombs for over three hours. Townspeople are cut down as they run from the crumbling buildings. Guernica burns for three days. Sixteen hundred civilians are killed or wounded.
The bombing was not done only by the Germans though. The notorious German Condor Legion joined with the Italian Aviazione Legionaria in the attack. Among other things, it allowed them to test the effect of their current air war technology.

It wasn't the first time air power had been used in war. In the First World War there had even been some primitive instances of dropping bombs from a plane, with minimal effect. But this was the first full-scale assault on a city by aerial bombing. Events since then make it almost impossible to imagine how the prospect of such a thing was viewed then. Air power was even considered by many to make war essentially impossible, because the devastation that countries could cause each other would be so great it would be a huge deterrent. It didn't work out that way.

La memoria de Gernika de Eva Lamarca El País 19/04/2007 recounts the events mainly through interviewing several living survivors of the attack.

See also the then-and-now photos at La memoria de Gernika. (Photo by Carlos Luján El País 20.04.07)

Luis Iriondo was 14 years old at the time. He recalls hiding in an air-raid shelter. Shelters had been hastily constructed after Franco's forces bombed Durango on March 31. He recalls the first round of attacks, "A los tres minutos, ya no podíamos respirar. Éramos tantos y aquello era tan pequeño, sin ventilación, ni luz? Morir enterrado vivo me aterraba". (For those three minutes, we couldn't even breathe. There were a lot of us, and the space was very small, without ventilation or light. To die buried alive terrified me.")I don't know whether he was consciously using a literary touch in that last sentence with "enterrado...aterraba" but it comes out that way.

Luis talks about his friend Cipriano Arrien, who, like boys will, wanted to see the action. He refused to go to the shelter with Luis. Luis remembers thinking to himself, "¡joer, lo estará viendo todo y yo no podré contarle mañana ni cómo son los aviones!", ("Dang, he'll see everything and I wouldn't even be able to tell you tomorrow what the airplanes are like!") After the attack was over and Luis came out of the shelter, he looked for Cipriano were he had left him; "lo encontro muerto" (he found him dead).

When Luis went to look at his family's house and saw, "Nada. Se quedó sin nada. Sin ropa, sin comida, sin morada." ("Nothing. Nothing was left. No clothes, no food, no home.")A single photograph of himself is all that remained to him from his things of that time.

According to Eva Lamarca's article, 71% of the Gernika's population lost their homes in the attack. When the brutality of the attack became known to the world, the Francoists were worried about public reaction, in particular that of the Catholic Church, which was supported Franco's fascist revolt. So they put out the story that it was actually the "reds" (the defenders of the democratic Republic) who had bombed the town to make it look like the fascists had done it. The cover story wasn't terribly convincing.

José Ángel Etxaniz, who is part of the Fundación Gernika-Gogoratuz, a group of six (most of whom are historians), explains in the article that the official casualty figures put out by the Republic at the time were 1,654 dead and 889 wounded. Obviously, the fact that death were greater than wounded looks odd. Lamarca quotes another member of the group as saying that the number of death was no more than 150, and also that 99% of the buildings in the town sustained some kind of damage. She quotes Josefina Odriozola as also saying that only 1% of the buildings in town were left undamaged, while the rest were damaged or completely destroyed.

It's a reminder of the destructiveness of air power and the very serious questions about to what extent it should be used. According to the official figures from the Air Force, during the month of March 2007, flew 1,663 "close-air support" missions in Iraq and 1,264 in Afghanistan, at least some of them involving the dropping of 500-lb. and 2,000-lb. bombs. Every one of those bombs is creating a little bit of Gernika.

And yet the air war in both places is virtually unreported in the mainstream press. When the histories of those wars are written, the role of air power will loom much larger than it does in contemporary reporting. The air power true believers will, as always, profess to find brilliant results. But the actual results deserve a hard look from Congress, the press and the public, as well as military analysts.

Jeffrey Record of the Air War College gives us a glimpse of how European military planners viewed air power in the 1930s in his paper Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s (US Army Strategic Studies Institute) August 2005:

Both governments and publics in Britain and France were gripped by a generic dread of mass air attacks on cities, and governments misread the size and nature of the German Luftwaffe, taking at face value Hitler’s announcement in 1935 that Germany already had air parity with Britain. They saw in war with Germany immediate and massive air attacks on London and Paris. The dread of air attack stemmed from a belief that strategic bombardment was irresistible and that its potential effects could include rapid disintegration of the political and social order. In 1932 British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin had famously declared: "There is no power on earth that can protect [its people] from being bombed. . . . The bombers will always get through. The only defense is in offense, which means that you have to kill more women and children than the enemy if you want to save yourselves." Baldwin’s view was certainly the starting point for British and American air power advocates from the early 1920s onward. They believed that air power, not armies and navies, would determine the outcome of future wars, and that the best defense against air attack was a good offense in the form of massive bomber forces. They rejected investment in defenses which (in the days before radar and “pursuit” aircraft that could fly as fast as bombers) they rightly regarded as futile, and they were firmly opposed to diverting air power to assist ground and naval forces.(pp. 30-31; my emphasis)
Tammy Davis Biddle also addresses the view of air power by both military professionals and the public in those days in the U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 2nd Edition (2006):

During the interwar years, public views on warfare tended to embody extremes — either a determination to avoid the topic altogether, or a tendency to articulate it in the most apocalyptic terms. Perhaps this should be unsurprising in the aftermath of the unremittingly grim experience of World War I, but its effect was to leave little room for rigorous or considered analysis. Dark forebodings in the realm of popular culture resulted in a flurry of books addressing the apocalyptic side of the spectrum: The Poison War, The Black Death, Menace, Empty Victory, Invasion from the Air, War Upon Women, Chaos, Air Reprisal, and What Happened to the Corbetts. The impact of these was augmented not only by the futurist scenarios being played in the (increasingly popular) cinemas, but also by the ominous and troubling events of the 1930s, including the Japanese attack on Manchuria, the Italian attack on Abyssinia, and the Spanish Civil War.

By this time as well, the ideas of Italian air enthusiast General Giulio Douhet were becoming more widely known in English-speaking countries. Douhet's 1921 book, The Command of the Air, had painted a graphic vision of societal collapse in the face of air attack. Indeed, it was the futurist drama he conveyed rather than the analytical rigor of his ideas that gave Douhet a lasting place in the canon of air warfare. A poet, painter, playwright, and amateur novelist, Douhet brought to bear on his work "the intense modernist fascination with the latest advances in science and technology — with the automobile, with electricity, with gas, and finally with the aeroplane — prevalent in prewar Italian protofascist avantgarde culture." Though both British and American airmen had developed indigenous theories of air warfare that did not depend on Douhet — and though there is no evidence that Douhet was read widely in Britain or the United States before the 1930s — his ideas were cited thereafter and used to support apocalyptic visions of air warfare. His prose seemed to capture an important element of the mood in the West, and it seemed to capture, as well, a kind of archetypal image of the airplane as weapon. (p. 336; my emphasis in bold)
Other Gernika references:

Fundación del Museo de la Paz de Gernika (Gernika Peace Museum): also available in English. The Documentation Center at that site includes this account:

The technical aspects of the bombing of Gernika are still one of the most passionate topics of modern history. The destruction of Gernika was perpetrated by the German Condor Legion and the Italian air force, acting on the commands of Franco’s rebel army. The military tactics applied were so devastating that Gernika has gone down in history as the first experiment in total war.
And they quote Martínez Bande:

The planes took off from the aerodrome at Vitoria, flew out over the sea and then performed a half-turn to follow the Oca valley and attack Guernica from North to South. Apparently there were three types of plane: Heinkel 111s and Junker 52s for bombing purposes, and Heinkel 51s for air combat and machine-gunning. They must have come in two groups working in shifts, and there is general discrepancy as to the numbers of each. We calculated that between 15 and 20 bombers and fighter planes took part in each wave of bombing. Their numbers were quite sufficient. The tactics employed were to drop ordinary shells first, and then small incendiary cluster bombs, at the same time machine-gunning any villagers who had not yet reached cover - not only in the town itself, but also in its outlying districts and also around the neighbouring parishes.
Gernika El País editorial 27/04/2007. This is about a current controversy involving Gernika. The town is located in the Basque country, which has a history of separatism that is particularly strong among conservative Catholics. Juan José Ibarretxe, the head of the Basque provincial government, has demanded that the government of Spain officially apologize for the bombing as the German government did a decade ago. But, the editorial says, "la Guerra Civil no fue una lucha entre España y Euskadi, en contra de lo que muchos nacionalistas vascos se obstinan en proclamar." (The Civil War was not a fight between Spain and Euskadi [the area's name in the Basque language], despite what many Basque nationalists obstinately proclaim.")

¿Quién tiene que pedir perdón por Gernika? de Pablo Sanz Yagüe El País 27/04/2007, an opinion piece on the same subject.

Gernika pide la paz como "valor supremo" de Alberto Uriona El País 27/04/2007. Alberto Uriona writes, "Gernika se convirtió ayer en un foco mundial de reivindicación de la paz." ("Yesterday, Guernica became a world focus for rededication to peace.")

Gernika, capital mundial de la paz El País 26/04/2007:

Gernika es hoy la capital mundial de la paz. A primera hora de la mañana se han reunido en el Ayuntamiento los alcaldes de varias ciudades que sufrieron bombardeos durante la II Guerra Mundial: Hiroshima (Japón), Hamburgo, Pforzheim y Desdre (Alemania), Volgogrado y Stalingrado (Rusia) y Varsovia (Polonia).

[Guernica today is the world capital of peace. At the first hour of the morning, the mayors of various cities that suffered bombing during the Second World War met in the Ayuntamiento: Hiroshima (Japan), Hamburg, Pforzheim and Dresden (Germany), Volgograd and Stalingrad (Russia) and Warsaw (Poland).]
PSOE e IU desbloquean la Ley de la Memoria Histórica al acordar la ilegitimidad de las sentencias durante el franquismo Cadena Ser 19-04-2007.

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