Fethullah Gülen and last year's coup in Turkey

The European Council on Foreign Relations presents an essay by journalist Sedat Ergin of Hürriyet Daily about last year's attempted coup in Turkey, No question who planned and executed the attempted coup in Turkey 10/27/2017

From the start, Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan blamed the coup attempt on followers of Fethullah Gülen, an Islamist leader who has livedin the US since the late 1990s but was a supporter of Erdoğan's until 2013. (I wrote about it at the time in Turkish coup, Erdoğan and Gülen 08/05/2017; Turkey and the US War for the Greater Middle East 08/05/2017)

Gülen made his way into the endless and endlessly strange series of stories about the shady foreign ties of Donald Trump's closest collaborators just recently, as Carol Lee and Julia Ainsley reported for NBC News in Mueller Probing Possible Deal Between Turks, Flynn During Presidential Transition 11/10/2017:

Four people familiar with the investigation said Mueller is looking into whether [former National Security Adviser Michael] Flynn discussed in the late December meeting orchestrating the return to Turkey of a chief rival of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who lives in the U.S. Additionally, three people familiar with the probe said investigators are examining whether Flynn and other participants discussed a way to free a Turkish-Iranian gold trader, Reza Zarrab, who is jailed in the U.S. Zarrab is facing federal charges that he helped Iran skirt U.S. sanctions. ...

Erdoğan has repeatedly pressed U.S. officials to extradite the cleric, Fethullah Gülen, who lives in Pennsylvania. Turkey blames Gülen for the attempted coup in that country in July 2016. Erdoğan also has repeatedly raised Zarrab's case with U.S. officials. ...

NBC News reported Sunday that federal investigators were looking into whether Flynn tried to push for the return of Gülen to Turkey once in the White House in exchange for millions of dollars, and that Trump administration officials asked the FBI to review the Gülen case anew. Officials said the FBI denied the request because Turkey had not provided any new evidence in the case, which was reviewed by the Obama administration.

Newsweek's report was a bit sharper, saying that the investigation was about a Turkish offer to Flynn to kidnap Gülen and take him illegally back to Turkey. (Graham Lanktree, Mueller Investigating Michael Flynn for Plot to Kidnap Turkis Opposition 11/10/17)

Sedat Ergin notes that Turkish prosecutors cast a wide net and have brought charges against some soldiers who were ordered into action at the time without any actual knowledge that they were participating in a coup:

Among those tried are names known to be Gülenists in the military, as well as a considerable number of generals not thought to be pro-Gülen names. The existence of this second group of soldiers sometimes prompts questions in the West about whether the coup was primarily Gülenist enterprise.

But in fact the reason for their being on trial is that they had been selected by the Gülenists to fill certain military or bureaucratic positions after the putsch - as indicated in the assignment lists they prepared before the coup. Prosecutors linked the majority of the generals whose names appear in these lists to the coup, and subsequently arrested them even though they seem to have been unaware of their assignments. [my emphasis]

But as for the coup itself, based on the evidence and confessions so far, Ergin states confidently that there was "an extremely detailed, comprehensive coup plan that spread to all corners of Turkey, covering all branches of the military in the army, navy and the air force, as well as the gendarmerie." And:

As a journalist who witnessed the reality of Turkey’s July 15 coup attempt, and who has subsequently worked on this matter through many court files, it is quite incomprehensible that there is still debate in Western societies on the identity of the perpetrators of the coup – even calling into question the reality of the putsch itself.

The prevailing authoritarian trend in Turkey and the strict practices of the state under ongoing emergency rule likely play a role in such confusion. But the dust cloud brought about by these authoritarian practices - which require the harshest criticisms from the standpoint of democracy and the principle of the rule of law - should not be allowed to obscure the reality of the coup itself.

What we have before us is a coup attempt that was shaped over many months by civilian and military Gülenists, with the Akıncı air base in serving as the command centre in the execution phase. This can be documented with very credible evidence presented in countless ongoing lawsuits. Regardless of the events that have taken place since July 15, there can be no doubt whatsoever who planned and executed this attack on Turkish democracy.

US relations with Turkey have gotten more complicated and ambiguous in recent years, especially around the Syrian civil war and the status of the Kurds. So I've wondered since last year if the US government was involved in active monkey business of some kind around the coup.

On the other hand, even if that's the case, I wouldn't want to see Gülen kidnapped by whatever sort of goons a guy like Michael Flynn might hire to do the job and sent back to Turkey on the sly.

If there are legitimate reasons to extradite him and there is reasonable assurance he would receive a fair trial, that would be another story. And if he's been doing anything illegal here - like planning a coup in another country against the wishes of the US government - then some kind of US legal action against him is probably required.

Plenty of complications in Syria

Turkey's role is one of the chronic complications in considerations of expanding the US military role in the Syrian civil war.

Bashar al-Assad's government in Damascus recently opened up a front against the YPG, the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdish PKK. (Konflikt zwischen Assad-Regime und Kurden: In Syrien droht eine neue Front Spiegel Online 20.08.2016; Kurdish militia launches assault to evict Syrian army from key city of Hasaka Reuters 08/21/2016) Turkey's President Tayyip Erdoğan's government has been a foe of the Assad regime. But Turkey is more concerned about the PKK becoming strong enough to mount an effective secessionist movement inside Turkey.

As Robert Fisk notes in Turkey's hit list of enemies is growing as Erdogan prepares to buddy up with Putin in Syria Independent 08/21/2016, this could presage better relations between his government and Assad's. Not least because of Turkey's current efforts to improve relations with Assad's ally and sponsor, Russia:

Syrian opposition figures in Turkey have been alarmed at reports of secret talks between Damascus and Ankara – through what the French used to call “interlocuteurs valables”, or people trusted by both sides – and an apparently stray remark by the Turkish Prime Minister just before the attempted coup (and before the St Petersburg meeting) to the effect that relations will one day have to be restored with Syria.

Clearly Erdogan’s new love for Mother Russia comes at a price. The Tsar will surely have discussed his own affection for Bashar – and Turkey’s role in trying to crush the Government which Moscow supports with its armed forces – at their mutual summit. Could it be, therefore, that the Sultan is thinking of renewing his old friendship with the Lion of Damascus? Be sure he is.

The Obama Administration has been providing assistance to the PKK as a fighting force opposed to both the Bashar al-Assad government in Damascus and the Islamic State.

For public consumption, the Obama Administration has always claimed to be developing a fighting force of Syrian Moderates. Such people seem to be hard to find. That tends to happen in civil wars, I hear.

The closest thing we've been able to claim as Syrian Moderates the last few months has been the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition headed up by the Kurdish YPF. (Kurdish-led SDF launches offensive on Syria's Raqqa Aljazeera 05/24/2016) Also awkward given the interests of our NATO ally Turkey.

The US has "embedded" American troops with the Kurds. It's a small commitment of US forces. But it's likely to escalate, especially if Hillary Clinton continues her hawkish stance on Syria when she becomes President. Juan Cole writes (Near-War: US Planes almost tangle with Syrian MiGs, which bombed area of US troop Embeds Informed Comment 08/20/25016):

Since the YPG is the only really reliable ground force willing and able to take on Daesh [the Islamic State], the US has allied with it (over the objections of Turkey). Washington has embedded some 200 US troops with YPG units (some were even caught wearing YPG insignia). ...

if you bomb the YPG, you might well hit an American special operations soldier.

Washington minded, and flew its own jets over Hasaka on Friday, apparently scaring off the Syrian pilots (the Pentagon tried to play this confrontation down).

But this US and coalition intervention could have a long tail. Is the US committing itself to a no-fly-zone over Rojava, the area of Syria on which the YPG wants to erect a mini-state? Arguably, the US no-fly-zone over Iraq helped get us into the Iraq War.

So not only are US troops in danger of being killed by al-Assad’s mad bombers (as tens of thousands of innocent civilians have been) but US pilots are in danger at any moment of going to war in the skies against the Syrian air force.

Me, I think this is a dangerous flashpoint.

Another group that the US is supporting is the Nusra Front, which is also opposed to both the Syrian government and the Islamic state. The Nusra Front has some rather embarrassing connections, though: "The al-Nusra Front's pledge of allegiance to al-Qaeda has ended speculation over the suspected ties between the Syrian jihadist group and the Islamist militant network." (Profile: Syria's al-Nusra Front BBC News 04/10/20136) This has been an embarrassment for a while. (Robert Perry, Should US Ally with Al Qaeda in Syria? Consortium News 10/01/2015)

The Nusra Front has recently made a show of renouncing it's Al Qaeda affiliation. Though the sincerity and meaning of that nominal disavowal is quite dubious. (Gareth Porter, Al Qaeda’s Name Game in Syria Consortium News 08/06/2016; Robert Fisk, Don't be fooled by reports that al-Qaeda and Nusra have split for the good of the suffering Syrian people Independent 07/29/2016)

Ray McGovern gives us a sense of the kind of disregard for international law that the Obama Administration too often has in its military policies, not a promising sign for Syria policy (A Lawless Plan to Target Syria’s Allies Consortium News 08/20/2016):

Remember, after the U.S.-backed coup in Ukraine in February 2014, when Russia intervened to allow Crimea to hold a referendum on splitting away from the new regime in Kiev and rejoining Russia, the U.S. government insisted that there was no excuse for President Vladimir Putin not respecting the sovereignty of the coup regime even if it had illegally ousted an elected president.

However, regarding Syria, the United States and its various “allies,” including Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel, have intervened directly and indirectly in supporting various armed groups, including Al Qaeda’s Nusra Front, seeking the violent overthrow of Syria’s government.

Without any legal authorization from the United Nations, President Barack Obama has ordered the arming and training of anti-government rebels (including some who have fought under Nusra’s command structure), has carried out airstrikes inside Syria (aimed at Islamic State militants), and has deployed U.S. Special Forces inside Syria with Kurdish rebels.

And there is no shortage of actors in the Syrian civil war who would love to see the United States become more deeply involved militarily. Patrick Cockburn reports (There are so many foreign backers in the Syrian war that nothing is changing – rebels hope that Hillary Clinton could change that Independent 08/12/2016):

Each side [in the civil war] responds to any setback on the battlefield by asking and getting greater support from foreign backers. In this case, the Syrian government is looking to Russia, Iran and Shia militias from Lebanon and Iraq for reinforcements and air strikes. As they have shown repeatedly since 2011, none of these allies can afford to see Assad defeated and have a great deal riding on his staying in power. They were caught by surprise on 1 August when the rebel umbrella group Jaish al-Fatah, of which the main fighting component is the salafi-jihadi al-Nusra Front, broke through government lines in south west Aleppo. Rebel fighters, numbering between 5,000 and 10,000 men, are supported by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. The Syrian army, battered by suicide bombers, retreated and their commander has been sacked. ...

Pro-Assad forces are reported to have been reinforced by 2,000 fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iraqi Shia militias – their military experience, training and morale often making them superior to the regular army. ...

A further factor reinforcing the stalemate in the war is that much of the fighting in Iraq and Syria is conducted on all aides by criminalised warlords with no interest in the well-being or even survival of the civilian population. But such cynicism, while usually realistic, can also be deceptive because it fosters a belief that nobody has a core of firm believers who will fight to the end.

Every fight in Syria takes place in political, sectarian, ethnic and social landscapes so distinct that they falsify generalisations about the course of the conflict. ...

Indigenous factions in Syria are not going to bring an end to the war except by victory on the battlefield and this is a long way off. But the conflict has become progressively internationalised with the US starting its air campaign against Islamic State in September 2014 and Russia doing the same in defence of Assad a year later. ...

... the Syrian Kurds are the main military ally of the US in Syria. ...

It may be ... that Turkish capacity and willingness to help the anti-Assad rebels will be more limited in future. The rebels will hope this does not happen and wait to see if they will be rescued by a Hillary Clinton Presidency. More hawkish towards Assad than President Obama, she might shift from giving priority to destroying Islamic State, but more likely she will stick with his policies. [my emphasis]

The Russia-Turkey complication in the Syrian civil war

Despite Hillary Clinton's apparent eagerness to get the US more deeply involved in the Syrian civil war, there are lots of complications. One of the latest being a seeming momentary improvement of relations between Russia and Syria.

John Helmer argues in this interview that Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Russian President Vladmir Putin was actually a failure for Erdoğan, Putin and Erdogan Meeting Leaves All Fronts of Policy Unresolved The Real News 08/11/2016:

Helmer argues that Russia opposed the July coup attempt because of its concerns about stability in Turkey, not because it is looking for a new strategic relationship with Turkey. He notes that Turkey is supporting Muslim extremist groups in numerous places that are inconvenient to Russia.

Dimitar Bechev writes in What's behind the Turkey-Russia reset? Aljazeera 08/09/2016:

It appears that the current rift with the West pushes Turkey closer to Russia. The US is blamed for failing to cooperate with the Turkish authorities for the extradition of Gulen - the alleged mastermind of the coup attempt.

Many in Turkey see the US as the chief culprit. The majority of Turks also berate the EU's reluctance to stand by Erdogan as he faced a life-threatening situation, and criticise Europe's exclusive focus on the clampdown that followed , ostensibly targeted against the "parallel state".

The historical record shows that any time relations with Western allies are strained, Ankara tilts to Moscow. This happened after the 2003 war in Iraq; between 1997 and 1999 when the EU refused to invite Turkey for membership talks; following the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and so forth.

But, as Helmer's discussion of the public diplomacy this week shows, it''s too early to assume that any drastic change in Turkish-Russian relations.

But Turkish relations with the US and the EU has definitely been disturbed by the July coup attempt and its aftermath. Atilla Yesilada reports (Could Turkey turn its back to the West? Aljazeera 08/08/2016):

A danger lurks around the corner. The Justice and Development Party's (AKP) effort to cleanse the society of Gulenists is causing a deterioration in relations with the United States and the European Union, which might lead to a confidence crisis among investors and creditors.

There is little doubt among Turkish citizens that the Gulenists organised and largely executed the putsch. ...

The EU is deeply concerned about the human rights violations that are occurring with increasing frequency in the process of the purge, such as the arrest of journalists and the alleged mistreatment of coup-plotting officers under custody.

The EU authorities also told Ankara in no uncertain terms that the reintroduction of capital punishment of putschists would trigger immediate suspension of accession talks.

The Gulenists are the Hizmet network composed of followers of the currently US-based Islamist leader Fethullah Gülen.

Turkey and the Syrian civil war

Another reminder of the hazards of intervening in other countries' civil wars, Syria's in this case. Robert Fisk (Erdogan’s meeting with Putin will tell us what the future holds for Syria Independent 08/09/2016):

[I]f Nato and the EU believe they can rely on their faithful ally Sultan Erdogan to pursue the destruction of the Assad regime or curb refugee flows to Europe – or tolerate US jets flying out of Incirlik airbase and other former Armenian properties in Anatolia – they can think again. ...

The first post-coup visit [the failed coup attempt of July in Turkey] of [Turkish President] Recep Tayyip Erdogan is to Russia –and there’s a coup of a different kind.

Here’s another line from the Tass version of Erdogan’s pre-St Petersburg declarations: "A solution to the Syrian crisis cannot be found without Russia. We can resolve the Syrian crisis only in cooperation with Russia.”

The US is heavily dependent on Turkey and that Incirlik airbase - which reportedly has something like one-sixth of NATO's nuclear arms supplies - to conduct the war against the Islamic State in Syria. The EU is relying on Turkey to hold refugees from Syria, Libya and other African countries in Turkey and not send them on to EU countries.

This is likely to get even more complicated.

Fisk also notes:

And then, above all others perhaps, those who will fear for their lives in the aftermath of this fraternal jaunt to the Tsar’s palace: the Turkish army. For what is becoming ever clearer is that – and this is called the kicker to the story – Russia and, indeed, Iran played an intelligence role in warning Erdogan of the military coup plotted against him.

The Arabs have already been told by their Russian collocutors that Putin, being the old KGB boss that he was, personally sent a message to Erdogan after learning of the coup from Turkish army communications, which were picked up and listened to by Russian technicians at their air base just outside Latakia in Syria.

The Iranians – who would be happy to see Turkey turned against their Sunni Islamist enemies in Syria – also tipped off Erdogan about the coup, so the Arabs have been told. [my emphasis]

The US, Fethullah Gülen and his Hizmet movment in Turkey

Dani Rodrik, a critic of the Islamist trends represented by both Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan's AKP (Justice and Development Party) and Fethullah Gülen's Hizmet movement, addresses recent accusations by Erdoğan against Hizmet in Is the U.S. behind Fethullah Gulen? Dani Rodrik's weblog 07/30/2016.

Formerly allies, Erdoğan made a definitive break with Gülen's and Hizmet in 2013. Erdoğan now blames Gülen's and Hizmet for the failed July coup attempt against his government.

Rodrik's argument in that post:

I don’t think Gulen is a tool of the U.S. or has received support from the U.S. for its clandestine operations. But it is possible that some elements within the U.S. national security apparatus think Gulen furthers their agenda, is worth protecting on U.S. soil, and have so far prevailed on other voices in the establishment with different views. Regardless, the U.S. needs to seriously reconsider its attitude towards Gulen and his movement.

However, on Gülen's role in the coup itself, he writes that "the Turkish government’s claim that Gulen was behind the coup ... is largely justified." The link there is to a previous post of his, "Is Fethullah Gülen behind Turkey's coup? (with update)" 07/23/2016.

Rokrik dismisses suspicions about how Gülen got permanent residence in the US and the assumption that Hizmet could not have mounted an operation like the July coup attempt without active US support.

However, he does cite this circumstantial evidence for some kind of "tacit" US support for Gülen's movement over the years since he immigrated into the US in 1999:

Judging by Wikileaks cables, U.S. diplomats in Turkey were exceptionally knowledgeable about Gulenist activities. These cables are in fact a goldmine of information on the Gulen movement. Form these we learn, among others, about the elaborate ruses used by Gulenist sympathizers to infiltrate the Turkish army, Gulen’s request for support from the Jewish Rabbinate’s during his green card application, and the attempt by sympathizers within the Turkish national police to get a “clean bill of health” for Gulen from the U.S. consulate in Istanbul. We also learn that even in the heyday of their alliance, Gulenists presciently regarded Erdogan as a liability.

Perhaps of more direct interest to the U.S., foreign service officers have long been aware that many Turks have been obtaining visas under false pretenses, with the ultimate aim of ending up as teachers in Gulen’s charter schools. Yet apparently nothing was ever done to stop this flow, nor to hold the movement to account. A ridiculous number of H-1B visas have been issued to Turkish teachers in these schools. One naturally wonders why the U.S. administration never clamped down on the Gulen movement for apparent visa fraud.

The same question arises with respect to the widespread pattern of financial improprieties that has been uncovered in Gulen’s charter schools. A whistleblower has provided evidence that Turkish teachers are required to kick back a portion of their salary to the movement. The FBI has seized documents revealing preferential awarding of contracts to Turkish-connected businesses. Such improprieties are apparently still under investigation. But the slow pace at which the government has moved does make one suspect that there is no overwhelming desire to bring Gulen to justice.

Gulen typically defends himself against such charges by saying that the schools are run by sympathizers and are not directly under his control. Yet the fact is that he took direct credit for the schools in his green card application, saying he had overseen their establishment.

Then there is the Sledgehammer case, which has the Gulen movement’s fingerprints all over it. This and the closely related Ergenekon trials did untold damage to the military of U.S.’ Nato ally. The jailing of hundreds of officers, including a former chief of staff, sowed a climate of fear and suspicion within the army and sapped military morale. Perhaps the U.S. was bamboozled, like many others, early on about these trials. But by now it should know that these sham trials were launched and stage managed by Gulenists. American officials have been quick to complain in public about the damage the post-coup purge has done to Turkish military capabilities. Yet there was not a peep from them during the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer witch hunts; and nor has the U.S. administration expressed any discontent about the Gulen movement’s role in them since.

And he cautions at the end:

It is very unlikely that Gulen would receive a fair trial in Turkey. So the U.S. has a legitimate ground for not extraditing him. But the U.S. foreign policy establishment would be making a very big mistake if they simply dismissed the calls from Turkey about Gulen’s complicity. It is easy for the U.S. to hide behind Erdogan’s clampdown and the ill treatment of the putschists. But the U.S. has considerable explaining to do too.

Weeks before the coup attempt, Stephanie Saul wrote about some of Gülen's activities in the US, Charter Schools Tied to Turkey Grow in Texas New York Times 06/06/2016:

[A]n examination by The New York Times of the Harmony Schools in Texas casts light on ... the way they spend public money. And it raises questions about whether, ultimately, the schools are using taxpayer dollars to benefit the Gulen movement — by giving business to Gulen followers, or through financial arrangements with local foundations that promote Gulen teachings and Turkish culture. ...

Harmony Schools officials say they scrupulously avoid teaching about religion, and they deny any official connection to the Gulen movement. The say their goal in starting charter schools — publicly financed schools that operate independently from public school districts — has been to foster educational achievement, especially in science and math, where American students so often falter. ...

... records show that virtually all recent construction and renovation work has been done by Turkish-owned contractors. Several established local companies said they had lost out even after bidding several hundred thousand dollars lower.

“It kind of boils my blood a little bit, all the money that was spent, when I know it could have been done for less,” said Deborah Jones, an owner of daj Construction, one of four lower bidders who failed to win a recent contract for a school renovation in the Austin area.

Harmony’s history underscores the vast latitude that many charter school systems have been granted to spend public funds. While the degree of oversight varies widely from state to state, the rush to approve charter schools has meant that some barely monitor charter school operations.

Turkey and the US War for the Greater Middle East

The coup in Turkey and its aftermath could have large consequences for the US and Europe.

In the case of the US, the presence in America of President Tayyip Erdoğan's one-time Islamist ally, now rival, Fethullah Gülen has been an irritation to Erdogan for years already, since the political split between the two leaders in 2013.

One of the many US military bases overseas is in Turkey at Incirlik Air Base, which the linked article at Global Security describes this way (n/d but includes information on the coup attempt; accessed 08/05/2016):

The attempted coup in Turkey on 15 July 2016 resulted in unexpected national security concerns for the United States. The purportedly spontaneous uprising called into question the security of American hydrogen bombs currently stored in a Turkish airbase. Located in southeast Turkey, the Incirlik Airbase includes NATO’s largest nuclear weapons storage facility. The American embassy in Ankara issued an "Emergency Message for US Citizens,"on Saturday morning, cautioning that “local authorities are denying movements on and off of” Incirlik and that power had been cut. US Air Force planes stationed at the base were prohibited from taking off, and the airbase had to rely on backup generators for power. The threat level reached FPCON Delta, the highest alert, usually declared after a terrorist attack or if an attack is deemed imminent.

The base commander, General Bekir Ercan Van, along with nine other Turkish officers, was detained at Incirlik on Sunday for allegedly supporting the coup. American airbase flights have resumed, but power has not been restored. [US European Command reported on July 22 that power had been restored.]

Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, claims that the Turkish airbase contains about fifty B-61 hydrogen bombs, more than a quarter of all the nuclear weapons in the NATO stockpile. What separates the B-61 from other weapons is its ability to adjust nuclear yield. The bomb dropped on Hiroshima, for example, had the impact of roughly fifteen kilotons of TNT. The adjustable yield of the bombs held at Incirlik can range 0.3 to 170 kilotons, making for a more versatile weapon.
[my emphasis]

This air base has been used for US operations against the Islamic State (IS), the Islamic rebel/terrorist group with whom we are not officially at war.

Turkey's interest in the Syrian civil war is primarily aimed at preventing a strengthening of Kurksih power and in overthrowing the Syrian regime. The US focus in theory is more on fighting the Islamic State (IS) than in overthrowing the Assad regime as such. Turkey has also opposed the IS. (Beat Ammann, Eine immer schwierigere Zweckbeziehung Neue Zürcher Zeitung 20.07.2016) But since the coup, Turkey appears to be trying to improve its relations with Assad ally Russia.

An section titled, "Der Neo-Sultan," in article titled „Trump, Türkei, Brexit, Terror - Warum spielt die Welt verrückt?„ Profil (print edition) 25-07-2016argues that the internal situation in Turkey also can't be understood without taking into account the Kurdish conflict.

There have been protracted efforts over years to arrange an eventual entry of Turkey into the EU, efforts which Erdogan activlelysupported until recently. That has involved closer economic relations between Turkey and the EU, the latter being Turkey's most important trading partner. It has also involved Turkey adopting the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The post-coup actions of Erdogan's government raise new questions about Turkey's longterm seriousness about their adherence to the Charter. Erdogan's current push to restore the death penalty in the wake of the coup is already a looming issue that would push Turkey even further away from prospective EU membership.

Angela Merkel's refugee policy requires cooperation from Turkey. The current arrangement involves Turkey holding immigrants in Turkey and preventing them from moving on to EU member countries.

Turkish coup, Erdoğan and Gülen

Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan's AKP (Justice and Development Party) is a nominally secular and conservative party that actually has Islamist inclinations. Erdoğan came to national power as Prime Minister in 2003. He became President in 2014. During his years in power, he has become progressively less patient with the processes of liberal democracy.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (born 1954), President of Turkey

In the wake of the thwarted coup attempt of July 15, Erdoğan has been undertaking a drastic crackdown on followers of Fethullah Gülen, an Islamist leader living in the US since the late 1990s, who was a supporter and collaborator of Erdoğan's until 2013. When he first took power, Erdoğan installed numerous Gülen followers in his administration and in justice institutions. And there seems to be good reason to think that Gülen's followers have also establish themselves within the military, as well. Gülen's mevement is called Hizmet.

Fethullah Gülen (born 1941), Islamist rival to Erdoğan

After the break, the BBC News reported (Tim Franks, Fethullah Gulen: Powerful but reclusive Turkish cleric 01/27/2014):

Mr Gulen has been almost universally depicted as being in a virtual death clinch with his erstwhile ally, Prime Minister Erdogan, in a struggle for power and vengeance in Turkey.

Whoever struck first, Mr Erdogan has recently been seeking to curb the reach of Mr Gulen's Hizmet ("Service") movement, whose followers - or "participants" as some of them prefer to call themselves - include police chiefs and prosecutors leading corruption investigations into the heart of government. Mr Erdogan has decried their work as that of "a state within a state".

Timothy Phelps reported for the Los Angeles Times (From his Pa. compound, Fethullah Gulen shakes up Turkey 01/20/2014):

Gulen preaches an unusual mix of Islamic piety and Sufi mysticism, as well as free markets, democracy and religious tolerance. His followers have built a worldwide religious, social and nationalistic movement, known as Hizmet, in his name. They control a network of schools, companies and charities around the globe, including about 120 schools and scores of nonprofit groups in the United States.

Gulen's following is especially potent back home. Inspired in part by sermons on his website, his supporters in the Turkish police and judiciary, backed by allies at the country's largest newspaper, are pushing a corruption investigation into Erdogan's inner circle that has sparked a bitter political power struggle.

The wide-ranging inquiry already has caused three Cabinet ministers to resign and led to dozens of arrests. The economy has taken a hit and the lira, the national currency, fell to a record low against the dollar in the last week.

Erdogan, who once embraced Gulen as a close political ally, has launched an escalating series of counterattacks. The government has closed Hizmet schools and fired 2,000 police officers deemed loyal to the cleric. Erdogan also has announced plans to place the appointment of judges, which Gulen allegedly influences, more under government control.

That was two and a half years ago. So Erdoğan's accusations against the Gülen movement didn't spring out of thin air in the wake of the coup.

Erdoğan is an adherent of the Islamic Milli-Görüs movement. He was a political disciple of Islamist politician Necmettin Erbakan, who served as Turkish Prime Minister 1996-7, having been elected as part of the Islamist Welfare Party.

In any case, Erdoğan blames Gülen and his followers for the coup, and accuses the Obama Administration of having connived in it. And Erdoğan is proceeding to purge accused followers from the military.