Showing posts with label walter lafeber. Show all posts
Showing posts with label walter lafeber. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 24, 2007

Wars in Iraq and Vietnam (1): the China connection

Historian Walter LaFeber

I'm going to try to make a few posts on the book Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam: Or, How Not to Learn from the Past (2007), Lloyd Gardner and Marilyn Young, eds. One of the essays composing the book is by Walter LaFeber, the "Cold War revisionist" historian that I've been quoting recently from one of his own books. His essay is called "Zelig in U.S. Foreign Relations: The Roles of China in the American Post-9/11 World".

What does China have to do with the Iraq War, you may ask? Obviously, China was a part of the justification for the Vietnam War, a justification which shifted remarkably over the time of direct American involvement. In the early 1960s, China was seen as part of monolithic international Communism headed by the Politburo in Moscow. China had already begun having a major split with the Soviet Union, but the significance of that was not fully appreciated by policymakers, in no small part because the McCarthy Red Scare had run a number of the most qualified Asia experts out of the government.

Later, as the Soviet-Chinese split became publicly obvious, then containing China became in itself one of the justifications for the war. But even when Nixon and Kissinger established a new strategic relationship with China, the Vietnam War continued.

LaFeber's main point is to emphasize how the neoconservatives tried to set up China as the justification of their militarized foreign policy before 9/11 gave them the excuse to make the Great Islamic Caliphate Conspiracy the justification for that approach.

He also emphasizes how the "culture war" rejection of the anti-Vietnam War movement was a major motivation in the minds of many neocons in the 1990s:

American observers with illusions and too little historical perspective began to talk about the developments in the 1990s - a U.S. military budget greater than the next twenty such budgets in the world combined, the amoeba-like spread of the American computer domination of global communications, President Clinton's virtual eradication of the huge U.S. governmental debt - as simply the preface to making the post-2000 years another American Century, to be dominated by what columnist Charles Krauthammer called the Washington-based "unipolar power." This new American Century appeared to be especially in hand because, as President George H.W. Bush announced in 1991 with the defeat of Iraq in the First Gulf War, Americans had finally "kicked" the ghost of Vietnam. They once again seemed willing to commit their lives to the use of armed force. Much of the heavier kicking was done by the growing neoconservative movement, which included Krauthammer and Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. The neoconservatives, who believed in, among other tenets, basing policies on the willing use of ever larger U.S. military power, the all-out defense of Israel, and the spreading of American democratic principles around the globe, had begun in the 1960s-1970s as an angry, gut-driven reaction to the U.S. failure in Vietnam. The neocons possessed a visceral dislike of the antiwar movement (especially on college campuses), which they blamed for undermining the war effort. (my emphasis)
And China became their favorite bogeyman to justify a huge political, economic and psychological investment:

China now served the all-important purpose of replacing the Soviet Union as an enemy, or at least a potential enemy. It had to, for there seemed to be no other threat that could serve as justification for massive U.S. military budgets and the more than 700 bases Americans had established around the globe to contain a now nonexistent Soviet Union. As China had been conceived in Washington during the 1970s as the card to be played against the Soviets, in the 19905 it was conceived [by the neocons] as the card that would replace the Soviets. What the Vietnam War had helped create, the supposed end of the "Vietnam syndrome" would now re-create as a suitable armed threat, at least potentially, to justify the U.S. military budgets for containing the Chinese. (my emphasis)
Some of milestones of the neocon pressure campaign are now fairly well known: the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance prepared by Paul Wolfowitz as part of Dick Cheney's Defense Department.

Although China was the larger bogeyman, most of the neocons were obsessed in the 1990s with overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. But they also wrongly assumed that such a thing could be accomplished relatively simply and cheaply. Prior to the coming of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), they needed a bigger threat than Iraq to justify their worldwide policies. As LaFeber explains it:

In April 2001, a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane, flying one of many American missions close to China's border, collided with a Chinese fighter plane that had been tailing it. The fighter crashed, and the pilot was never found. The EP-3 managed to land on China's Hainan Island and the twenty-four crew members were captured. A major crisis loomed as Chinese officials refused to pay attention to Washington's calls and demands, while conservative voices urged a get-tough policy. Led by Secretary of State Colin Powell, the Bush administration managed to work out wording about the United States being "very sorry" (not the full apology demanded by Beijing), and the crew was released. Conservatives and especially neoconservatives, led by William Kristol, blistered Powell and Bush for what they termed a "national humiliation." U.S.-China relations seemed well on the way to at least a mini-Cold War.

Then came 9/11. As Bush embarked in October 2001 on a war in Afghanistan to destroy al-Qaeda terrorist bases, and then in March 2003 in Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime, China slid down the U.S. priority list. This deemphasis of the Chinese did not mean, however, that they were ignored. To the contrary: as Bush's presidency moved well into its second term, the Chinese had become a major and unsettlingly effective opponent of the United States. (my emphasis)
LaFeber notes that the actual challenge of China to US positions in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and even in Latin America were more diplomatic and economic than military. And, therefore,

... the Bush administration grew less competent in dealing with the threat because the neoconservatives, who so largely shaped the administration's, and especially the president's assumptions, had emphasized military power - not diplomatic or economic power - as the trump card in international politics.
LaFeber's analysis is a reminder that foreign policy is shaped not only by responses to the actions of foreign nations but also to internal Americans imperatives, both political and economic.

He closes with the warning that as US relations with China continue to evolve, American policymakers need to achieve a more realistic picture of China and not make it an morphing "Zelig" that can be shaped in the American image of it to serve a seemingly endless variety of purposes: "As [American] officials simply hoped for the best, the Chinese Zelig continued to assume various forms for Americans, few of which the Americans seemed to understand."

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Imperialism

One of the ironic things about the Cheney-Bush foreign policy is that it changed the word "imperialism" as applied to the United States from a marker of left-leaning (or, occasionally, isolationist) foreign policy criticism to a label of pride when used by neoconservatives. It's now very common among even mainstream Serious Foreign Policy Thinkers to refer to the US as an "empire".

John Judis gives a succinct summary of where the present-day concept of "imperialism" emerged in his article Bush's Neo-Imperialist War American Prospect Online 10/22/07:

There have been empires since the dawn of history, but the term "imperialism," and its modern practice, originated in the late 19th century. During that time, Britain and the major European powers struggled to carve up the less developed world into colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence. The new empires spawned during this period didn't consist of "settler colonies" like the original American colonies or Australia, but indigenous possessions like British India or French Indochina. The United States got into the great game in 1898 when, after successfully ousting Spain from Cuba and the Pacific, the McKinley administration, prodded by Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, decided to annex the Philippines.

There were two kinds of imperial rule: direct, where the colonial power assigned an administrator - a viceroy or proconsul - who ran the country directly; and indirect, where the colonial power used its financial and military power to prop up a native administration that did its bidding and to prevent the rise of governments that did not. The latter kind of imperial rule was developed by the United States in Cuba in 1901 after Roosevelt's Secretary of War Elihu Root realized that direct rule could bring war and rebellion, as it had done, to the McKinley administration's surprise, in the Philippines. The British later adopted this kind of imperial rule in Egypt and Iraq.
Still, his definition raises the murky border between "imperialism" in the France-in-Algeria sense and "neo-imperialism" of the kind that the United States arguably exercised in Cuba and other Latin American nations. Imperialism in the straightforward sense clearly applies to situations like the one Judis describes of British rule in Egypt, where Egypt was not a formal colony of the UK, but Britain controlled its foreign policy and national finances.

Still, for the United States the Spanish-American War and the subsequent counterinsurgency operation in the Philippines, which became an American colony in the straightforwardly imperialist manner, though it was technically called a "protectorate", was an important turning point in American history and foreign policy.

Walter LaFeber in The American Age (1989) described how that period is viewed by historians:

As the twentieth century dawned, the United States stepped onto the world stage as a great power. Because of the triumphs scored between 1898 and 1900, it strode confidently now with Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and Japan - nations that possessed immense military strength and had used that strength for conquest. Never had an independent nation risen so far so fast as did the United States between 1776 and 1900.

Historians have argued not over whether the United States deserved great-power status by 1900 (all agree that it did), but whether Americans consciously intended to follow the expansionist policies after 1896 that projected them into such distant regions. Historian Ernest May believes that the United States had "greatness thrust upon it." But another scholar, Albert K. Weinberg, concludes that U.S. officials were no more passive at key moments than "is the energetic individual who decides upon, plans, and carries out the robbery of a bank." The years 1896 to 1900 thus become critical for the student of U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century. For if the nation entered the ranks of great world powers at this time, it is of central importance to know how it did so. By accident? Because of a few elite officials who pushed reluctant Americans overseas? Because of the U.S. system's domestic needs that forced that system to assume global responsibilities? The well-known saying "Just as the twig is bent, the tree's inclined" might have meaning for U.S. diplomatic history. The reasons why the United States moved outward so rapidly in the late 1890s help us understand why it grew from these roots (or twig) into a twentieth-century superpower.
Judis describes why pursuing an imperialist policy like that envisioned in the Bush Doctrine and put into practice in the Iraq War is a losing proposition in today's world:

As the war in Iraq has turned into a quagmire, neo-conservatives who had goaded the president into action have blamed the war's failure on the administration's flawed strategy. They have propounded a series of "if only's": If only the administration had sent more troops, if only it had not disbanded the Ba'ath army, if only it had handed the leadership of Iraq over immediately to con man Ahmed Chalabi. Of these, only the addition of more troops might have quelled the insurgency, and then only temporarily. If there is any lesson from the 130-year history of imperialism, it is that the natives eventually grow restless. Since World War II, the peoples of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa have been throwing off rather than welcoming foreign control.

The Middle East, where Muslims still blanch at the Crusades and later British and French attempts to divide and rule, is particularly sensitive to outside attempts at domination. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda didn't spring from Mecca but from the battlefield in Afghanistan, from resentment of American support for Israel and of American bases on Arab soil. Bush's policy in the region has reflected a profound ignorance of this history. Wrote former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in January 2007, "America is acting like a colonial power in Iraq. But the age of colonialism is over. Waging a colonial war in the post-colonial age is self-defeating."
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Tuesday, October 16, 2007

Isolationism

Sen. William Borah, one of the leading Congressional isolationists of the 1930s

Rather than trying to review The American Age (1989) by Walter LaFeber in one post, I'm going to make shorter posts (on top of the two I've done already) to focus on particular points.

In this one, I'll refer to his good, brief description of the phenomenon of American "isolationism" in the 1930s:

Americans were sharply divided over how they should deal with this inflamed world. One group, the "isolationists," believed that the nation should maintain complete freedom of action. In the words of historian Wayne Cole, "Unilateralism and non-interventionism were central themes in the thinking of most of them." This group, however, did not want the United States to be entirely isolated. One of its leaders, Senator Borah, was willing to consider working with the Soviets in order to stop Japan. Indeed, many isolationists wanted to help China. They just opposed military involvements in Europe. They received support for their anti-European views in 1934—1935 when a congressional committee under Republican senator Gerald P. Nye from North Dakota investigated the causes of American involvement in World War I. The Nye committee concluded that bankers and arms exporters (the "Merchants of Death") had, for their own profit, pushed the country into the conflict. In truth, the explanation for that involvement was much more complicated. (Nye himself, for example, thought that the entire American system, not just a few "Merchants of Death," was at fault.) But the public liked to label J. P. Morgan and the arms traders as the villains. Americans vowed never again to allow the profiteers to take them into world war. Pacifist groups also determined not to be misled again as they felt they had been by Wilsonian ideals ("make the world safe for democracy") in 1914-1917. (my emphasis)
LaFeber gives the following description of "internationalism", the other main trend in foreign policy thought in Congress in the 1930s:

"Internationalists," on the other hand, assumed that new technology (such as the airplane, now flying regularly across the Atlantic and Pacific) had drawn the world together and that U.S. prosperity depended on orderly world markets. Americans consequently bore responsibility for cooperating in the maintenance of a stable world that was in their own selfish interest. Historian Robert Divine notes that most internationalists were old-stock Protestants, felt close to Great Britain, and believed that America had replaced Britain as the world's great power. They cared about Europe while "they took Latin America for granted and neglected the Orient."
His description does get a bit complicated, though, when he expands on it this way:

This group [the internationalists] included executives of the great multinational, capital-intensive corporations - IBM, General Electric, Eastman Kodak, Standard Oil. They wanted an open world and low tariffs. Some firms, led by du Pont, Standard Oil, General Motors, and Union Carbide, even worked closely - sometimes secretly and illegally - with Nazi German firms until the late 1930s, or in some cases, even to 1941. At one point, Ford and General Motors subsidiaries actually produced half of Hitler's tanks in the 1930s. (my emphasis)
In other words, large corporations with international operations provided significant support for the "internationalist" outlook. But that doesn't mean they were always 100% in agreement with the more Wilsonian internationalists who saw the need for active involvement by the United States in restraining German aggression in Europe. Some of them were happy to make profits helping Germany rearm.

The truth of it is, though, there was very little support in the United States for assertive American measures for any kind of collective security arrangements against Germany until after 1938, which saw Hitler's takover of Austria, the seizure of the Sudentenland portion of Czechoslovakia and the Kristalnacht riots directed against Jews and Jewish establishments in Germany. Congress passed Neutrality Acts in 1935 and 1936 to ban the shipment of arms to any belligerents in a war. After the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, with Hitler and Mussolini backing Francisco Franco's military rebellion against the democratic Spanish Republican government, Congress "extended the 1936 Neutrality Act so the nation would not become involved in such civil wars as Spain's." (LaFeber)

The observation by Wayne Cole above ("Unilateralism and non-interventionism were central themes in the thinking of most of them") is important in understanding the continuities between prewar and postwar trends of isolationism and unilateralism. The "internationalist" viewpoint dominated US foreign policy from the end of the Second World War until the Cheney-Bush Presidency, though the "liberal internationalist" approach competed with the "realist" school of internationalism.

In his book American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (2002), Andrew Bacevich points out how "isolationism" in more recent decades has been used as a bogeyman by both Democratic and Republican Presidents. Referring to the days of Old Man Bush's Presidency, he writes that Bush the Elder seemed to consider the looming threat of isolationism a far more serious problem for America in the post-Cold War world than others he warned of, including "narcotrafficking, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction". Bacevich writes of Old Man Bush's pitch against the dreaded isolationism:

No cause was more important than that of saving his fellow citizens from that error. Decrying the danger of isolationism became a frequent theme of the president's speeches. Bush denounced those who would "retreat into an isolationist cocoon." He railed against those "on the right and left [who] are working right now to breathe life into those old flat-Earth theories of protectionism, of isolationism." He even resorted to unvarnished demagoguery. At ceremonies marking the fiftieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor, the president declared that "isolationism flew escort for the very bombers that attacked our men 50 years ago," thereby finding the millions who before December 7, 1941, opposed U.S. entry into World War II guilty not simply of bad judgment but of treason. (my emphasis)
It wasn't the only instance of Bush's carelessly slinging around treason smears. Though his son Little George has far surpassed him on that practice.

Bacevich continues:

For Bush, the parallels between the end of the Cold War and the aftermath of the two world wars were self-evident. "As in 1919 and 1945, we face no enemy menacing our security," he remarked at Pearl Harbor. "And yet we stand here today on the site of a tragedy spawned by isolationism. And we must learn, and this time avoid, the dangers of today's isolationism and its economic accomplice, protectionism. To do otherwise, to believe that turning our backs on the world would improve our lot here at home, is to ignore the tragic lessons of the 20th century."

There were in fact few indications that the American people after the Cold War were inclined to "turn their backs on the world" - few, indeed, that they had ever done so throughout their history. But by reviving this shopworn refrain - and by portraying every foreign policy issue as a test of whether Americans would stay the course or shirk their duty to the world - Bush used isolationism as a calculated device for shoring up popular and congressional deference to the executive branch. Bill Clinton would do likewise. (my emphasis)
Bacevich's observation here is important. Isolationism as such plays a very limited role in American politics, and hasn't really since Sen. Robert Taft's losing rearguard action against the Truman Doctrine.

But the fact that isolationism of the type LaFeber describes in the 1930s plays a limited role doesn't mean that it's totally disappeared. Ron Paul's foreign policy ideas are classic Old Right isolationism. And those ideas do have some influence among antiwar activists, as someone browsing around at Antiwar.com would discover.

The real live heritage of 1930s isolationism, though, is in the unilateralism that the Cheney-Bush administration has made the core of US foreign policy. Unilateralism and narrow nationalism was the core of Old Right isolationism. It's also the core of neoconservatism and its less clean-shaven twin sibling, Cheney-Rumsfeld nationalism and militarism; there is a strand of continuity that runs through nuclear first-strike theories, which those nasty twins haven't yet given up. The same unilateralism is also the core of Ron Paul's preserved-in-formaldehyde brand of Old Right isolationism.

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Thursday, October 11, 2007

Cold War "revisionism" - how "left" is it?

Historian Walter LaFeber

I've been reading some of The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750 (1989) by Walter LaFeber. LaFeber was one of the most prominent "Cold War revisionist" historians during the 1960s, which challenged the mainstream consensus on the origins of the Cold War.

The Cold War revisionists were often considered to be taking a "leftist" position. That's in part because their analyses sometimes agreed on particular points with official Soviet versions of events. It was partly because the anti-Vietnam War movement found many of their findings and their approach sympathetic.

Back in July, I posted three times about William Appleman Williams, perhaps the best known of the Cold War revisionist historians: Farm roots of American imperial policy; William A. Williams on the Civil War; and, William Appleman Williams' Empire as a Way of Life - and the tragedy of Williams' life. While he definitely has some useful insights, especially in his work up to 1969 or so. But certainly in his later work, it would be more meaningful to call him a reactionary than a liberal or "leftist".

From other things I've read, LaFeber kept his analyses on more solid ground than Williams did. But I was struck by this passage in The American Age about the Revolution of 1775-83:

That the Americans ended the conflict with their independence and a large landed territory is remarkable. That they did so with so little bloodshed and class conflict is astonishing. Unlike the great revolutions that later struck France, Mexico, China, and Russia, the American Revolution did not become radical and kill off the class that started the revolt. John Adams led the revolutionaries in 1776 and insisted that maintaining order would be "the most difficult and dangerous Part for Americans in "this Mighty Contest." Adams and his colleagues, however,maintained not only order, but, remarkably, their own political power.

In this sense, the American Revolution was not revolutionary at all. Instead. it was the first modern anticolonial war. With rich opportunities for landed settlement and money-making, and having decades of experience in the art of self-government, Americans just wanted the British to get out of the way. The legacy of this experience turned out to be momentous for U.S. foreign policy. Henceforth, Americans smiled on anticolonial wars but frowned on revolution - unless it resembled their own. Given their own unique history, no other revolution could be the same. (my emphasis)
I find this whole argument strange. Whatever its merits, it certainly looks like a conservative version of the American Revolution to me.

To what degree the Revolution involved social conflicts in addition to the war against Britain is in part a matter of judgment, of course. I tend to come down more on the side of recognizing a significant amount of social conflict.

But unless we adopt a fairly eccentric view of what terms like "class conflict" or "radical" would mean in that context, it's hard to see how that view of the American Revolution could be sustained. It looks like he is adopting an eccentric view of what constitutes a revolution, apparently defining it as an event that "become[s] radical and kill[s] off the class that started the revolt."

Whether that definition even fits the situations he cites, which is arguable, by that definition we would have to say the Vietnamese revolution, the Cuban revolution and the peaceful revolutions in the former Warsaw Pact countries in 1989 and afterward also weren't "real" revolutions. Whatever philosophical appeal that might have to some conservatives (and I'm not even quite sure what that would be), it doesn't make much sense in terms of describing historical revolutions.

I suppose in other parts of the book he will elaborate on the observation that since this allegedly non-revolutionary Revolution, "Americans smiled on anticolonial wars but frowned on revolution - unless it resembled their own." Is that really true of the revolutions that followed in the early decades of the nineteenth century all across Latin America? It's hard to picture.

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