A constructive proposal for after the Israel-Lebanon War (UPDATED)

When I first saw this Spiegel article, I was ready to start harshing on my man Joschka Fischer: "Krieg gegen die Existenz Israels" ("War against the existence of Israel") Der Spiegel Online 25.07.06. But whoever wrote the Spiegel report screwed it up.

I'm still a bit disappointed to see that Fischer, the former German Foreign Minister and former leader of the German Greens, has endorsed Israel's position in the war with Lebanon to the extent he has, in calling the Hizbollah attacks a war against Israel's existence. (This is also called an "existential war", which does not mean it has anything to do with Albert Camus.) But, as often is the case in diplomacy, context matters.

And the brief Spiegel article gives an inadequate impression of Fischer's position, especially in saying, "Joschka Fischer hat sich in der Nahost-Krise sehr deutlich auf die Seite Israels gestellt" (Joschka Fischer has placed himself squarely on the side of Israel in the Near East crisis).

Fischer is one of my favorite politicians anywhere. But he can't seriously believe that Hizbollah's July 12 raid on the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and its subsequent rocket attacks on Israeli civilians, as bad and as criminal as they are, represent a proxy war by Iran and Syria against the existence of Israel. Maybe Iran and Syria and Hizbollah would prefer that Israel didn't exist as a state. But none of those three or Hamas either seriously can threaten Israel's existence. Israel is a regional superpower with up to 300 nuclear weapons. Despite the surprising problems the IDF seem to be having in Lebanon, it is more than capable of preventing any serious attempt to destroy the country.

The Spiegel article is actually a report on this analysis by Fischer in the Süddeutsche Zeitung: Krieg gegen die Existenz Israels 26.07.06. I'm willing to cut Fischer some slack on the "war against the existence of Israel" framing. Because the thrust of his article is to insist on the importance of the "Quartet" - the US, the EU, the UN and Russia - pushing in a serious way for a settlement of the outstanding territorial and political issues between Israel and its neighbors, especially the Palestinian problems.

Fischer writes:

Israel wäre gut beraten, auch die politischen Möglichkeiten dieses Krieges zu nutzen und aus einer Position der Stärke heraus initiativ zu werden: mit einem umfassenden Friedensangebot an all diejenigen, die zur Anerkennung Israels nicht nur in Worten, sondern vor allem in Taten bereit sind und auf dauerhaften Gewaltverzicht setzen.

Think big! Dies gilt aber nicht nur für Israel, sondern auch und gerade für die USA und Europa. Der Krieg eröffnet eine Chance für den Frieden, die nicht vertan werden sollte.

[Israel would be well-advised to also use the political possibilities of this war and to take the initiative out of a position of strength: with a comprehensive peace offer to all those who are ready to recognize Israel not only in words, but above all in deed and to conclude a lasting peace.

Think big! This goes not only for Israel, but also and particularly for the USA and Europe. The war opens up a chance for the peace that should not be frittered away.]

Such a comprehensive peace offer is something that Israel has resisted for years. Reading between the lines here just a bit, Fischer is suggesting that this is an excellent opportunity for the EU to raise its profile and increase its influence in the Middle East. Because Fischer obviously knows that the Cheney-Bush administration is never going to do anything like this.

The rest of Fischer's article is interesting, and far more worthwhile than anything we're remotely likely to see from any spokesperson of the Cheney-Bush administration.

Die Hisbollah (und nicht die libanesische Regierung und deren Armee) kontrolliert seit dem israelischen Rückzug aus dem Südlibanon die libanesisch-israelische Grenze.

[Hizbollah (and not the Lebanese government and its army) have controlled the Lebanese-Israeli border since the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.]

Fischer is saying that everyone concerned, including Israel, is very aware that the Lebanese government is not responsible for the attack of July 12 or Hizbollah's actions generally, which claim is a key part of Israel's justification for wholesale attacks on Lebanon, including areas not remotely controlled by Hizbollah.

Fischer argues that Hizbollah is not pursuing any Lebanese national interest, but more the interests of Syria and Iran. I'm leery of this particular formulation, because there is no reason that I've yet seen to believe that either country operationally controls Hizbollah. And its by no means clear that Hizbollah expected the July 12 raid, which Israel used as a justification for making war against Lebanon, to initiate this kind of war.

Still, Fischer's description of the goals in the current situation of what he calls the "rejectionist front" of Lebanese Hizbollah, Iran and Syria is certainly worth considering:

Die Ablehnungsfront suchte aus drei Gründen die Eskalation: erstens, um dem innerpalästinensischen Druck auf die Hamas zur Anerkennung Israels zu entgehen. Zweitens, um den libanesischen Demokratisierungsprozess zu erledigen. Und drittens, um den sich aufbauenden Konflikt um das iranische Atomprogramm in den Hintergrund zu drängen und dem Westen die „Werkzeuge“ für einen möglichen Konflikt zu demonstrieren.

[The rejectionist front sought the escalation for three reasons: first, to relieve the intra-Palestinian pressure on Hamas to recognize Israel. Second, to harm the Lebanese democratization process. And third, to push the building conflict over the Iranian nuclear program into the background and to demonstrate to the West the "tools" [that they have] for a possible conflict.]

Even the "war for Israel's existence" phrase is misleading in itself, and may even be the product of the headline-writer. (By Hera, the Spiegel article was a screwed-up report on Fischer's column!)

Freilich kann sich diese Strategie, bestehend aus einem Angriff auf Israel und einem Krieg im Libanon und Gaza, als Fehlkalkulation erweisen. Durch den Raketenbeschuss von Haifa, der drittgrößten Stadt Israels, wurde eine Grenze überschritten, die weit reichende Konsequenzen haben wird. Es geht ab sofort nicht mehr überwiegend um Territorium, um Rückgabe oder Besetzung, um ein oder zwei Staaten im Nahostkonflikt, sondern nun wird die strategische Bedrohung Israels (und das heißt: seine Existenz als solche) im Vordergrund stehen.

Die Ablehnungsfront hat die israelische Entschlossenheit und Abschreckungsfähigkeit unterschätzt. Sie hat die Unmöglichkeit einer Rückkehr zum Status quo im Libanon bewiesen. Und sie hat die hegemonialen Ansprüche, vor allem Teherans, sichtbar gemacht. Diese Fehlkalkulation wird vor allem dann sichtbar werden, wenn erstens Israel bei dem begrenzten Ziel massiver Abschreckung bleibt und sich nicht in einen Bodenkrieg im Libanon hineinziehen lässt.

[Certainly this strategy, based on an attack on Israel and a war in Lebanon and Gaza can turn out to be a miscalculation. By the rocket attacks on Haifa, the third-largest city of Isreal, a border was crossed that will have far-reaching consequences. No it has to do not primarily with territory, with withdrawal or occupation, with one or two states in the Near East conflict, but now the strategic threat to Israel (and that means: its existence as such) will be standing in the foreground.

The rejectionist front underestimated Israel's determination and readiness to practice deterrance. They have proven the impossibility of a return to the status quo in Lebanon, and they have made the hegemonial aspirations, of Iran above all, apparent. This miscalculation will become most clearly visible, if Israel first sticks to the limited goal of massive deterrence and does not let itself be drawn into a ground war in Lebanon.]

Fischer here is using diplomatic language that can be read flexibly. But it's clear to me that he's saying that the attacks on Haifa had a drastic effect on Israelis' perception of the war. And it's hard to miss that Fischer is saying that Israel would be very ill-advised to be sucked into the ground war in Lebanon that's starting to look inevitable. Doing so would mean that Israel would forfeit some of the benefits that could come from the new view of the situation that Fischer describes.

Fischer proceeds to outline a strategy - the first point of which he describes in the quote just given, that Israel not get sucked into a land war - that would go far toward neutralizing the "rejectionist front" and move the peace process along. The second element would be restoring the status quo in Lebanon but with the disarming of Hizbollah mandated by UN Resolution 1559, which would be accomplished with international assistance to Lebanon. Third would be to build on the possibilities opened up briefly by the position of concern about Hizbollah's actions taken by the (he-doesn't-call-them-Sunni-but-that's-what-he-means) states of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt to push forward the peace process.

Fourth and finally, the "Quartet" would have to get serios about pushing for a comprehensive settlement "led by the USA".

What Fischer is laying out here is a diplomatic proposal that has already to some extent been taken over by events. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is positioning itself more clearly on Lebanon's side despite its anti-Shi'a position toward Hizbollah.

But he's mainly trying to orient the players' strategic thinking towards a meaningful peace process. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a leading European Green, has suggested Fischer as a mediator in the Israel-Lebanon War. So Fischer surely has in mind in writing this that he could be asked by the EU to play a direct diplomatic role in the crisis.

Und Israel selbst? Hat die Erkenntnis einer neuen strategischen Bedrohung nicht ein neues Nachdenken eingeleitet, das in der Zeit nach dem Krieg manche Kontroversen um Gebiete und Siedlungen überholt erscheinen lassen wird? Dieser Krieg richtet sich gegen die Existenz Israels als solchem. Gewinnt daher die strategische und damit regionale Sicherheit in Zukunft nicht eine wesentlich größere Bedeutung? (my emphasis)

[And Israel itself? Has the recognition of a new strategic threat not introduced a new reflection, that in the post-war period some controversies about territories and settlements will appear to be overshadowed? This war is directed against the existence of Israel as such. Does not strategic and along with it regional security gain a essentially larger significance in the future?]

What Fischer is saying to Israel is, okay, Hizbollah has been able to strike cities with missiles that you didn't think they could. It seems to you like a war for the survival of Israel. So, why not take a new look at a peace process that could really guarantee security for Israel by settling the outstanding issues, including the settlements in the occupied West Bank?

How in the name of Apollo who strikes from afar did Spiegel manage to make this into Fischer positioning himself "squarely on the side of Israel in the Near East crisis"? That's the kind of bonehead thing we expect as a matter of course from our Potemkin "press corps" in America. But Spiegel has a reputation of doing real journalism.

Update: Edward M. Gomez at the World Views blog also gives a brief summary of the Fischer article, which is at least a better summary than Spiegel gave, in the following post: Views from abroad: Israel vs. Hezbollah, with Lebanon in the middle 07/26/06.