The Johns Hopkins study published estimated Iraqi deaths resulting from the war at 655,000. War fans attacked it, of course, but the methodology appears to have been sound.
But Cordesman used the 100,000 estimate in the context of saying that the actual results of the war have clearly been horrific. He also criticizes the position of war supporters who make propaganda predictions about the disasters that could occur after an American withdrawal without being realistic about the disaster that is occurring:
Partition [resulting from ethnic and sectarian conflict] has not yet meant a full-scale a blood bath, and [m]ay never mean one in the future. Iraq's insurgency and civil conflicts have, however, already done immense damage to virtually every ordinary Iraqi, and there are essentially no provinces where the problem will not produce further hardship and violence, even in a best-case scenario. Iraq may not be Darfur, but to talk about what is happening as something that does not involve immense suffering, that does not involve immense future risk, and for which the US does not have direct moral and ethical responsibility is absurd. (my emphasis)Cordesman estimates that an orderly pullout that included taking out all equipment would take two years:
A secure withdrawal that removed all US stocks and equipment and phased out US bases, however, would take some 9-12 months or longer [estimates of this vary but if it was 10,000 military plus 10,000 civilians and all equipment each month in Kuwait, that would likely take 16 months minimum; 2 years is what many military experts think would be a rapid, but deliberate pace]. It would involve transferring or destroying facilities and stocks that could fuel a civil war, and reaching some decision about the fate of over $20 billion dollars in aid projects. (It also would involve some decision about the immense new US embassy being constructed in Baghdad, which would become the most expensive white elephant in the history of diplomacy and an extraordinary monument to human folly even by the demanding standards of the Middle East.) (my emphasis)As I've said here before, I think that it's helpful if the Congress passes measures requiring the start of troop withdrawals, even without mandating a date certain for a full withdrawal of all troops. But I also think that Cordesman is correct in saying that the notion that is being discussed of somehow leaving troops there indefinitely to fight "Al Qa'ida" is unrealistic, both in political terms (because Bush already calls the enemy there "Al Qa'ida") and in practical military terms in the current situation:
It is also important to understand that reducing troop levels does not reduce risk or casualties unless it is conducted as part of a military plan. Leaving fewer troops exposed in either forward bases or compounds that can be targeted from the outside can easily raise casualties. The idea that the US can some how simply stand aside and deal with Al Qa’ida or the Sadr militia by relying largely on air power and Special Forces is equally absurd. The US could not target, it could not cover the country, it could not secure its bases, and it would lack the force numbers to act decisively without relying on Iraqi forces. Such concepts are little more than childish in practical military terms.Still, if Congress can't get the two-thirds vote necessary to require a full withdrawal, putting upper limits on troop levels and preventing new kinds of escalation is important. We need a policy based on extracting US troops from Iraq, not based on keeping troops there for the indefinite future.
Although he argues for "strategic patience", i.e., staying in the war for years longer, Cordesman also says that the risks like those of post-withdrawal violence or in lowering troop levels do not in themselves justify continuing the Cheney-Bush policy of indefinite war:
None of these factors are reasons for making open-ended commitments to remaining in Iraq or for "staying the course." There is no point in pursuing failed strategies or failed policies. Iraq is a gamble, and one where even the best-managed future US policies may still fail. It is a grim reality that the mistakes and blunders that have dominated US policy in Iraq throughout the US intervention have interacted with Iraqi failures to make any continued US effort one filled with serious risks. (my emphasis)Cordesman lists and discusses the most significant risks he sees facing the US on pp. 15-21 of his paper.
Given the seriousness of the problems he describes, it's amazing that Cordesman is still calling for sticking with the Iraq War. He puts himself on record for one more of what Atrios calls a "Friedman unit", i.e., six months, to see if there's still a chance left:
The bad news – and the key factor that makes the case for strategic patience so tenuous – is that the above list of problems is now so long and so critical that some key steps are already badly overdue. Any major Iraqi failure to move forward over the next six months, to come to grips with the realities described above, and to solidly co-opt the Sunni tribes and put a real end to JAM [Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army] and other Shi'ite sectarian cleansing will make strategic patience of limited value or pointless. (my emphasis)But then on the next page after he goes for one Friedman unit, he ups it to 1-to-2 Friedman units, "a clear need for sustained Iraq political action and success over the next six to 12 months". Maybe we need an update of Bob Dylan's old song, "Blowing in the Wind":
How many Friedman units must a man put down
Before he can see it's a crock?
Cordesman also comes up with a Rummy-esque line that I kind of like: "the critics of the critic are sometimes better critics than the critic". Like Huck Finn used to say about Tom Sawyer's obscure bits of wisdom, I don't know what he's talking about, but, boy, it sure sounds grand!
Tags: anthony cordesman, iraq war
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