The US and Iran

The policy of the Cheney-Bush administration toward Iran remains a mystery at this point. But here are some articles relating to the current state of play.

Gareth Porter examines the shaky foundations of one of the administration's key accusations against Teheran in The Iran Attack That Wasn't The American Prospect Online 08/0207. The attack in question has to do with the real attack in January in the Shi'a holy city of Karbala in which five soldiers were killed. Articles such as one in the New York Times co-authored by reliable Pentagon flack Michael Gordon blamed the attack on Iran. One account I recall suggested that Iraqi were too stupid to pull off such an effective and well-planned attack.

As Porter points out, this became an excuse for Joe Lieberman to rush out to say that Iran "has declared war on us," and other militant expressions of hostility toward the Shi'a regime in Teheran. Reminding us of the serious dysfunctions in our "press corps", he explains how Pentagon mouthpiece Gordon pumped the Iran-did-it angle even more so that the unconvincing Brig. Gen. Kevin Bergner had in his prepared statement on which Gordon was reporting.

Porter's piece is an excellent example of how even the "quality press" has facilitated and even encouraged irresponsible accusations that could lead to war. It's a disgrace.

Porter also looks at what on its face is a weird twist in U.S. Demanding Iran Restrain Shiite Groups Inter Press Service 08/02/07. Is this an attempt to promote accusations that Iran is aiding attacks against Americans? Is is a serious attempt to get Iran's help while the US is threatening war and promoting economic sanctions even beyond those imposed by the United Nations? Porter sees a shift in the official position against Iran over interfering in Iraq:

A little-noticed statement by U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker after last week's U.S.-Iran meeting revealed that the main demand of the George W. Bush administration to Iran is not to stop supplying weapons to Shiite militias but to use its influence with Shiites in Iraq to reduce their attacks on occupation forces.

That demand, which belies official assertions of certainty that the Iranian government is providing arms to the militias, is consistent with other evidence that the administration was primarily concerned with getting Iranian assistance in restraining its Shiite allies when its campaign over Iranian arms began early this year. (my emphasis)

Porter, who follows the diplomacy over the Iraq War carefully, still sees an administration split over policy:

That sequence of events indicates that the publicity campaign around alleged Iranian provision of arms to the militias was only a part of the larger strategy for increasing the pressure on Iran. For Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice - but not for Vice President Dick Cheney - the objective was to get Iran's cooperation on its Iraqi Shiite allies. (my emphasis)

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) also recently prepared a report on alleged Iranian involvement in Iraqi combat, Iran’s Influence in Iraq by Kenneth Katzman 07/09/07. Katzman's report recounts several official US claims about specific instances of Iranian aid to Iraqi militias without critical comment. But he mainly focuses on the bases of Iranian policy toward Iraq - which, as he points out, has a lot in common with the American position:

For the first two years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran’s leaders and diplomats sought to persuade all Iraqi Shiite Islamist factions in Iraq to work together through a U.S.-led political process, because the number of Shiites in Iraq (about 60% of the population) virtually ensures Shiite dominance of an elected government. To this extent, Iran’s goals in Iraq differed little from the main emphasis of U.S. policy in Iraq, which was to set up a democratic process. Iran’s strategy bore fruit with victory by a Shiite Islamist bloc (“United Iraqi Alliance”) in the two parliamentary elections in 2005. The bloc, which includes the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (SICI),1 the most pro-Iranian
of the groups, and the Da’wa (Islamic Call) party, won 128 of the 275 seats in the
December 15, 2005, election for parliament. Most SICI leaders spent their years of exile in Iran. Like his predecessor as Prime Minister, Ibrahim al-Jafari, Nuri al-Maliki is from the Da’wa Party, although Maliki spent most of his exile in Syria, not Iran. Also in the UIA is the faction of the 32-year-old Moqtada Al Sadr, whose ties to Iran are still developing because his family remained in Iraq during Saddam’s rule. However, the Sadr clan has had ideological ties to Iran; Moqtada’s great uncle, Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr, was a contemporary and ally of Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and was hung by Saddam Hussein in 1980. Iran also sees Sadr’s faction — which has 32 seats in parliament and a large and dedicated following, particularly among lower-class Iraqi Shiites, some of whom are able to receive medical treatment in Iran under Sadr’s auspices — as a growing force in Iraqi politics. (my emphasis)

The administration is applying heavy pressure to get German firms to drop business ties with Iran: US Pressures Germany to Cut Iran Business Ties by Ralf Beste, Christoph Pauly and Christian Reiermann Spiegel International 07/30/07. They report:

But the US government is no longer content with United Nations economic sanctions on Tehran - Washington wants more. And so, US President George W. Bush and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson have directed Levey to form a worldwide economic coalition of the willing to increase the pressure on Iran. Despite their best efforts, American officials are irked that German companies are still doing business worth billions with Tehran. In particular, Washington has little understanding for the export guarantees Berlin still offers firms, effectively helping the mullah regime to buy new ships and power plant technologies.

While in Berlin, [Under Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey] Levey met with Thomas Mirow, a senior official at the Finance Ministry, and Chancellor Angela Merkel's foreign policy advisor Christoph Heusgen. During those talks, he demanded Germany cut its so-called Hermes export credit insurance coverage when it came to deals with Iran. Under ex-chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Germany dramatically increased the permitted volume of export credit insurance. Moreover, Levey told the officials that Washington wanted Germany to scale back all of its other economic ties with Iran as quickly as possible.

Angela Merkel's government, which the Cheney-Bush administration expected to be much more compliant to Washington's wishes than her predecessor, isn't thrilled about the idea:

But Levey ran into resistance from the Germans, who said his demands were understandable coming from a country that has no trade with Iran. Germany, however, exports more than €4 billion ($5.45 billion) in goods to the country each year, creating thousands of jobs. Were Germany to end its Hermes export guarantees, German locomotives might no longer be delivered to Iran, but Chinese and Russian companies would gladly step into the breach. The Americans would end up gaining nothing, while the German economy would stand to lose a lot. Besides, explained the Germans, the Hermes cover has been excluded from UN sanctions against Iran. In short, Levey could forget his request - Germany would stick to the UN resolutions, but would do no more. But officials in Berlin know they have to come up with something to placate Washington and so both the chancellery and the foreign ministry are looking into a sweeping weapons embargo. That might be just enough to appease the Americans. (my emphasis)

The following is also an interesting twist, another situation where the US and Iran would seem to have common interests, independence for the Serbian province of Kosovo: The Balkan Transformation and the Underlying Energy Factor by Ioannis Michaletos, Worldpress.org 07/25/07. He writes:

Since the political strategy of the 1990's is effectively discredited, American foreign policy experts are in a position to reshape their aims without at the same time being seen as blaming themselves for mistakes that were made. The possibility of radical change in the United States' Balkan policy should be excluded since large nations never admit past mistakes for reasons relating to their international prestige and posture. Therefore an engagement with Russia in relation to the Balkans, energy routes, and Kosovo should come about gradually and certainly after careful consideration of possible trade-offs and negotiations between Washington and Moscow, as has recently been seen. As far Kosovo is concerned, Washington supports independence, along with Teheran and many other Islamic states that seek to benefit from the creation of stronger bonds with the a newly created mini-state in the Balkans strongly influenced by "Islamic charities."

The strategic aim of the United States is to at least retain its influence in Eurasia, and the Balkans is an integral part of that. The importance of the region is as a hub for the energy needs of the West and the Russian ambitions. Moreover, its proximity to the Middle East and North Africa reserve a truly unique placement for the Balkans in the strategic considerations of London, Washington, Moscow, Paris, Berlin and Beijing. The coming months will reveal more of the intrigues involved, and, most importantly, the winners and the losers of the "energy game" of the 21st century. (my emphasis)

Tags: germany, iraq war, iran, kosovo