Showing posts with label kosovo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label kosovo. Show all posts

Sunday, February 19, 2017

Uncertainties in the Balkans with the new Trump Presidency and the Russians

"Political instability in the Balkans is the last thing the EU needs when it is already faced with geopolitical uncertainty from Brexit, the Trump administration, and the diplomatic conflict with Russia over the war in Eastern Ukraine," writes Wolfgang Münchau in Watch out for instability of the Balkans Eurointelligence 02/17/2017.

Linking to the articles below, he gives this analysis:

In principle, Trump is good news for Putin because he prefers to deal with strong-leder types than with multinational organisations like the EU - or even NATO which Trump has even called obsolete. Possible flashpoints include the increasingly tense relations between Serbia and Kosovo; and the breakdown of Bosnian intercommunity relations as the Serb entity the Republika Srpska increasingly contests Bosnia's constitutional court. The situation in Bosnia directly involves the EU as it oversees the application of the Dayton agreement through its high representative. Montenegro, on the other hand, appears strongly committed to both EU and NATO membership. The US is favourable to Montenegro's accession to NATO, which woud be a setback for Russian designs in the region.
The Balkan Wars of the 1990s sent many refugees into other European countries, who are right now struggling with a major refugee crisis that has been going on since at least 2011. One of the more important inflection points in US-Russia relations was the Kosovo War of 1999. Russia saw Serbia as an ally and having NATO effectively detach the province of Kosovo was by all accounts I've seen interpreted as a serious setback in Russian foreign policy. It didn't help matters that the Kosovars later carried out similar ethnic cleansing actions in the province against Serbs that NATO was intervening to stop when the Serbs were carrying it out against the ethnic-Albanian Kosovars.

As Alberto Call observed in a 2001 essay ("Kosovo and the Moral Burdens of Power" in War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, eds.):

The only power that historically would have had the ability and the inclination to frustrate NATO's actions in Kosovo, Russia, was politically and economically weak and ultimately dependent on Western goodwill. Throughout the crisis, it could play no more than a mildly obstructionist role and, in the end, it encouraged Serbia to give in to Western demands.
The articles Münchau links include:

Dejan Anastasijevic warns about what he sees as pessimistic and alarmist articles in mainstream publications about the possibility of new Balkan Wars in Stirring up the Spectre of New Balkan Wars Balkan Insight 01/30/2017: "the Serbian Army held ten times as many exercises with NATO members than it did with Russia last year."

Leonid Bershidsky, Russia Re-Enacts the Great Game in the Balkans Bloomberg View 01/19-20/2017:

Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Putin's Security Council, recently named a potential expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia among the biggest Western threats to Russia. The Kremlin has already seen Bulgaria, once a key Balkan ally, join NATO and the EU -- and watched it scupper a major Russian natural gas pipeline project.
Florian Bieber, Trump and the Balkan Princes: What Trump’s presidency means for South East Europe EUROPP 02/06/2017:

The shift of thinking, acting and writing about the Balkans from focusing on EU integration, democracy and norms to geopolitical influence, national interests and foreign actors began before Trump, but his presidency has accelerated it. The weakness of the EU has made individual member states broker deals, like Austria in closing the Western Balkan route in Macedonia for refugees, which have little to do with EU integration and more with “good old” national interest.

The emphasis on national interests over norms, shared ideas of democracy and rule of law is giving rise to dangerous pyromaniacs, like Timothy Less in his piece for Foreign Affairs arguing for a redrawing of the borders. Others have since followed suit. They all appear to believe that with Trump in power, there is an opening for a grand redesign.
(For more on the Austrian diplomatic action Bieber references and its political context in Austria, see: Claus Heinrich, Österreich: Neutral und rechts? Blätter 2:2017)

Salvador Llaudes, Los Balcanes Occidentales en la era de Trump por Elanco 15/02/2017, recommends caution at this point in assuming that Trump's well-known present fondness for Vladimir Putin will necessarily translate into common US-Russian positions on the ever-complicated problems in the Balkan states.

John R. Schindler, one of the analysts Dejan Anastasijevic challenges in the article linked above, President Trump’s First Foreign Policy Crisis: Balkan War Drums Beat Again Observer 01/25/2017: "Although most of the world recognizes Kosovo’s independence, Serbia does not. Tensions are on the rise thanks to Belgrade’s mounting provocations."

Monday, August 19, 2013

Is Angela Merkel turning Greece into Kosovo?

Yanis Varoufakis in an August 10 blog post refers us to this article by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Greece becoming new Kosovo as youth jobless hits 65pc Telegraph 08/08/2013, in which Evans-Pritchard writes:

Greek think tank the IOBE said Greece’s economy would contract by 5pc this year. It accused the troika of paying lip service to reform, relying instead on crude austerity to cut the budget deficit. This has proved self-defeating. The scale of economic contraction has overwhelmed any gains from budget cuts.
He also quotes Varoufakis himself:

"Nothing as devastating as this has ever been seen in my country before," said Prof Yanis Varoufakis from Athens University. "The spirit of the Greek people has been broken. They've stopped demonstrating and are licking their wounds at home or leaving the country."

Latest data from the Greek statistics agency showed the overall jobless rate rose to 27.6pc in May, despite a mass exodus of the best-educated young workers to the US, Australia, Britain and Germany.

The figure is likely to rise further as Athens lays off 15,000 public sector workers by the end of next month to comply with European Union-International Monetary Fund (EU-IMF) Troika demands.

"The manic attempt to keep Greece in the eurozone under conditions that are not sustainable is turning the country into a sort of Kosovo, an EU protectorate that produces little but surplus labour," said Prof Varoufakis.
This is really a bad situation.

Varoufakis also uses to comparison to Kosovo, which he explains that in his mind is:

... a pragmatic assessment of the convergence of the Eurozone’s Periphery to the current state of Kossovo’s [sic] social economy. After all, Kossovo [sic] is an EU protectorate, where the major decisions (including privatisation, energy, security) are taken by a Brussels’ functionary, the euro is the country's currency (without of course any Kosovar official playing any role in monetary policy decisions), the local government is monopolised by a local cleptocracy and, tragically, unemployment is so high that the country’s greatest export is its young people. In other words, Kosovo is the limit toward which other EU countries, like Greece, are now tending. Neither Kosovo nor the Eurozone's Periphery deserve this fate. Alas, Europe’s compounded political failures have given rise to this hideous, and yet utterly avoidable, catastrophe. [my emphasis]
And in Germany, the country most responsible for this current situation and the site of the greatest failure of European leadership in this crisis, the campaign for the September election isn't offering any distinct alternative to German Chancellor Angela Merkel's euro policies.

If Shakespeare were still alive, he would be writing a tragedy starring Angela Merkel.

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Monday, March 21, 2011

Kosovo and Libya Wars

The Kosovo War is a model for the Libya War in a number of ways. One thing to keep in mind about the Kosovo War, which is rightly seen as a NATO success, is that it took place in 1999. Today, in 2011, in a friendly ("permissive" in military jargon) environment for NATO after a successful war, the presence of a small number of NATO forces is still requires. As the NATO website reports (n.d., accessing 03/20/2011):

NATO has been leading a peace support operation in Kosovo since June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area.

Today, some 8,700 troops from the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), provided by 32 countries (24 NATO and 8 non-NATO), are still deployed in Kosovo to help maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin.
John Mearsheimer rightly characterizes the Obama Administration's general foreign policy approach as the liberal imperialist variant of a "global dominance" strategy, which the Clinton Administration also pursued. The Cheney-Bush Administration's version of the global dominance strategy was more a neoconservative-militarist one.

One distinction of the liberal-imperialist approach to war is touched on by The Atlantic's James Fallows in On Libya: 'What Happens Then?' 03/20/2011:

[I]t cannot reassure anyone who cares about America's viability as a republic that it is entering another war with essentially zero Congressional consultation or "buy-in," and with very little serious debate outside the Executive Branch itself. And there the debate was, apparently, mostly about changing the President's own mind. I recognize that there are times when national safety requires an Administration to respond quickly, without enduring the posturing and institutionalized dysfunction that is the modern Congress. Without going through all the arguments, I assert that this is not such a moment. To be more precise: the Administration has not made the public case that the humanitarian and strategic stakes in Libya are so unique as to compel intervention there (even as part of a coalition), versus the many other injustices and tragedies we deplore but do not go to war to prevent. I can think of several examples in my current part of the world. [He's writing from China.] [my emphasis]
None of these observations in themselves imply ill-will among the policymakers. Experience shows that ill-will and unworthy are never lacking in decisions to go to war. But the effects of these actions are not dependent on the goodwill or lack thereof of the policymakers.

Andrew Bacevich in " Neglected Trinity: Kosovo and the Crisis in U.S. Civil-Military Relations", his essay in the collection War Over Kosovo (2001), edited by himself and Eliot Cohen, talks about the "remarkable trinity" identified by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), whose work enjoys something like canonical stature with the US military today. For Clausewitz, this trinity of "reason, primordial violence, and chance" (Bacevich's summary) were three major tendencies affecting war.

Bacevich in that essay picks up a different "trinity" from a separate essay by Cohen and talks about how that played out in the US conduct of the Kosovo War. In Bacevich's short version, the new trinity was (1) the "geopolitical upheaval caused by the end of the Cold War," which among other things allowed the US to assert a far bigger military role in the Arab world; (2) "a redefinition of U.S. grand strategy," i.e., the strategy of global dominance begun by the Old Man Bush Administration and continued by the three succeeding Presidential Administrations; and, (3) "a novel conception of warfare that itself is a product of powerful technological and cultural influences have all contributed to this transformation," which in practice involved heavy reliance on airpower.

The latter consideration is focused on the idea of minimizing US casualties. This comes from a flawed but widespread assumption among military and foreign policy theorists that US casualties are the main reason the US public turns against wars, maybe the only reason. As Bacevich describes the approach that played out in several military situations but most especially in the Kosovo War:

... Clinton the commander in chief fashioned doctrine for employing American military power that bridges the gap between his grand strategic objectives and the public's limited willingness to exert itself on behalf of those objectives. The military component of Clinton's strategy requires minimal blood and only modest treasure - indeed, the cash flow on balance may be positive. And it does not unduly tax the nation's attention span. Finessing the deficit between ends and means, the new postliberal civil-military relationship that Clinton ushered into existence seemingly reconciles the irreconcilable. For this achievement, Bill Clinton, in his own way, deserves to rank alongside FDR and Reagan as one of the most influential commanders in chief in modern American history.
Initially, it appears to me that the Obama Administration is trying to pull off something like this in Libya. I doubt it will work very well.

Another similarity to the Clinton Administration's procedure on the Kosovo War: The Kosovo War occurred in 1999. In March 1999, the House voted a nonbinding concurrent resolution to authorize US peacekeepers for Kosovo. The Senate passed a nonbinding concurrent resolution authorizing air and missile operations against Serbia. "The war against Yugoslavia began on March 24 without any statutory or constitutional support," wrote Louis Fisher in Presidential War Power, 2nd edition (2004).

Republican Congressman Ernest Istook of Oklahoma said at the time, "President Clinton asked many nations to agree to attack Yugoslavia, but he failed to get permission from one crucial country, America."

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Monday, March 23, 2009

State Department unhappy about Spain withdrawing from Kosovo

Spain's announcement on Thursday that it was withdrawing its remaining troops from the NATO contingent known as KFOR later this year drew public criticism not only from NATO's Secretary-General but also from the US State Department: U.S. surprised by Spain troop decision on Kosovo Reuters 03/20/09; EEUU dice estar 'muy decepcionado' por la decisión de España de irse de Kosovo El Mundo 20.03.2009; Primer encontronazo con Obama de A. Caño y M. González El País 21.03.2009

Caño and González note that the State Department used "términos inusualmente duros en el lenguaje entre aliados" (terminology unusually harsh in the language among allies). Here was what State Department spokesman Robert Wood said about the matter in his press briefing of 03/20/09:

QUESTION: Any comment or reaction to Spain’s indication it’s going to pull its troops out of the Kosovo peacekeeping force?

MR. WOOD: Yeah, Lach. We are deeply disappointed by this decision taken by Spain. If you recall, in 1999, NATO allies agreed on the principle of “in together, out together.” And so we were surprised by this decision. And we learned of this decision just before it was announced publicly. And so again, deeply disappointed in this decision.

QUESTION: Do you share their view that the mission is essentially over – the Spanish view?

MR. WOOD: Not at all. Not at all.

QUESTION: Have they conveyed their reasoning for doing that?

MR. WOOD: I’d have to refer you to the Government of Spain for the reasoning behind this decision. But again, as I said, it’s deeply disappointing, and no more I can say about it.

Yes, Lach.

QUESTION: How reliable an ally are they if they’ve pulled out of Kosovo and, of course, they’ve pulled out of Iraq after an election, if I remember?

MR. WOOD: Well, Spain is a partner of ours. But this particular decision, as I said, it doesn’t help what we’ve been trying to do in Kosovo. And we regret it. It’s obviously a decision that the Spanish Government made, but nonetheless, we are deeply disappointed in it.
The EU Foreign Affairs Chief Javier Solana, himself a former Foreign Minister of Spain, also criticized the decision publicly, saying a collective decision among the allies involved would have been preferable. (Solana's full title is High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union; he also serves as the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union.)

Spain's responses have been varied. The Spanish President (prime minister) José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero essentially said that Spain made an individual national decision to join the NATO force and is making an independent national decision to leave. Vice President María Teresa Fernández de la Vega said that the other allies had known for months that Spain was considering leaving.

It's hard to say how significant this is, or even what's going on with the public dispute, which doesn't seem to make much sense of face of it. I take the dispute as it's being publicly stated to mean that Spain decided to pull its troops this year, and the other NATO allies didn't want them to. In other words, a "collective" decision would have meant that Spain wouldn't be pulling out all its troops. And there seems to have been an agreement involved to leave them there a couple of months longer than Spain initially intended to when they made the decision.

Is more than that involved? It's entirely feasible to me that the Spanish government just decided that after 10 years, the NATO commitment was beginning to look like a permanent arrangement and they weren't interested in being part of it. There's also the fact that diplomatically, Spain is not in agreement with most of its EU partners and the US on recognition of Kosovo's independence. It would be kind of awkward on the face of it to have troops in a Kosovo defending a country and government that Spain doesn't recognize as a separate country and doesn't acknowledge the government as being the government of a sovereign nation.

I do wonder if part of this is a diplomatic signal to the US and other NATO countries that Spain - and other European countries - are willing to go along with the United States in an open-ended escalation of military operations in Afghanistan. The relative harshness of the official US reaction may be a way of putting pressure on Spain to maintain or increase its commitments to the Afghanistan War.

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Friday, March 20, 2009

Spain to withdraw its troops from Kosovo


Spanish Defense Minister Carme Chacón (r) in Kosovo Chacón with Col. Luis Francisco Rey (Photo ©mde.es)

Spanish Defense Minister Carme Chacón was in Kosovo Thursday to announce the phased withdrawal of the remaining Spanish troops in the NATO contingent there, expected to take place within 4-6 months: Chacón anuncia la retirada de Kosovo El País 19.03.2009; España pone fin a su misión en Kosovo y la OTAN critica la medida El Mundo 19.03.2009; La Ministra de Defensa anuncia el regreso escalaondado de las tropas españoles desplegadas en Kosovo Ministerio de Defensa, España 19.03.2009. She said, "después de 10 años de gran trabajo, la misión está cumplida y es hora de volver a casa". (after 10 years of great work, the mission is completed and it's time to come home)

This is a real reminder that even success story of intervention and occupation came take a long time. The NATO intervention in Kosovo began in 1999, and enjoyed relatively high support from the local Kosovar population, though not from the Serbian inhabitants. Matters didn't go entirely smoothly. Corruption in the Kosovar government has been a major problem. Ethnic cleansing in postwar Kosovo wasn't nearly as bloody as it has been in Iraq, but the Serbs in Kosovo were pushed into a small enclave near Serbia proper, an area whose status remains in dispute. For that matter, the status of Kosovo as an independent country remains in dispute. Kosovo had been part of Serbia and Serbia, along with other countries including Spain, has not recognized Kosovo's independence.

Chacón made her visit to a Spanish military base there and was careful to avoid official contact with the Kosovar government. Fity-seven countries currently recognize Kosovo's independence, including 22 of the European Union's 27 members. Spain currently has 632 troops there as part of the NATO force of around 15,500, known as KFOR. Spain also maintains troops in Afghanistan as part of the NATO contingent there, and in Bosnia, Chad, Lebanon, and Kyrgyzstan.

Kosovo's independence was a point of contention between Russia and the Cheney-Bush administration. Their insistence on proceeding with formal independence for Kosovo is considered to be a major reason for Russia's taking a hard line on the status of Georgia and Ukraine and the nature of its reaction to Georgia's attack on its positions last year.

Spain's withdrawal announcement annoyed NATO's Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to the point that he openly complained that he wasn't happy with the way Spain had proceeded. Even after a decade, De Hoop Scheffer complains that the situation there still isn't stable enough for Spain to be withdrawing its troops this year. Something to keep in mind when considering interventions in places like Darfur for humanitarian reasons.

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Thursday, February 21, 2008

Serbia and Kosovo

The attack Thursday on the American Embassy in Belgrade was really a serious thing. None of the Americans assigned to the embassy were killed, according to this report in Der Spiegel Online (Randalierer stürmen Belgrader US-Botschaft - Gebäude angezündet, ein Toter 21.02.08). But the rioters set the embassy building on fire, killing one of the demonstrators, and burned the American flag and replaced it with a Serbian flag.

Attacking a country's embassy physically is a serious step. The embassy grounds are actually part of the territory of the represented country, so an attack like that is literally an attack on American territory. I guess given the jingoism of the Cheney-Bush administration, I should say at this point that the incident is not a reason to start bombing and killing people.

If this report by Aleksandar Vasovic of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network is accurate (U.S. Embassy Attacked in Protest Over Kosovo Independence PBS Newshour 02/21/08), the attack on the embassy was almost certainly organized by the government. (It was an action by Serbian intelligence that resulted in the death of an Austrian Archduke a century or so ago that started off a pretty big war.)

Spiegel says that demonstrators threw stones at the Turkish, Croatian and Bosnian embassies, at least one McDonald's restaurant was attacked, and there were a number of small fires (including cars) set on fire in the protests. Maverick McCain might want us to believe that such levels of violence are a peaceful day in Baghdad - and, relatively speaking, they would be - but this is a sign that the Serbian government is more than a little unhappy about Kosovo's declaration of independence. Serbian President Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica declared (from Spiegel) "Kosovo ist serbisch und wird es für immer bleiben" (Kosovo is Serbian and will always remain so).

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Wednesday, February 13, 2008

Kosovo independence

I supported the Kosovo War at the time (1999). But I've never thought it was the role of responsible citizens to just mindlessly cheer forever for a war that you supported. War always brings bad results, even in the occasional case where the good outweighs the bad.

Robert Marquand reports for The Christian Science Monitor on the rocky state of affairs in Kosovo even now, as Kosovo tries to launch independence softly 02/14/08 (accessed 02/13/08):

Kosovo's independence closes a chapter of grief and genocide in the Balkans dating from 1992. Analysts concerned about a "domino effect" of a bloody re-ordering of ethnic borders see Kosovo's peaceful evolution as a test for EU and US resolve in southern Europe. But the province's independence is bitterly opposed by Serbia, which enjoys at least rhetorical backing from Russia.

Since 2000, the EU has spent $4 billion here and will send its largest ever (1,800) civil and police mission in days.

Serb Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica stated Tuesday, "We shall not allow a fictitious state to exist for a minute on Serbian territory. It has to be legally annulled."
Kosovo is routinely considered a success story of American intervention. It was a success, in that stopped Serbia from applying massive ethnic cleansing in the long run in Kosovo, which up until now has been a province of Serbia. And it kept Milosovich's Serbia contained and avoided the danger that separatist fighting could spread to wider parts of southern and eastern Europe, with maybe a war between Greece and Turkey in the mix.

But in the short run, the air strategy that NATO applied allowed Serbia to accelerate ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians in the short run. They were mostly able to return. But even the NATO peacekeeping force was unable to prevent the Albanians from largely running ethnic Serbs out of the province. NATO has had to keep some troops there, and the EU is sending in more personnel for aid. And Serbia may start a new war.

And this is an intervention success story!

The seemingly brilliant success in Kosovo in 1999 also provided evidence in the minds of great geopolitical strategists like Rummy and Dick Cheney that the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) had created a new era in warfare. Briefly put, the lesson was that since we can blow hell out of anybody with our air power, the United States can do whatever we want in the world.

Anatol Lieven described the risks a bit more diplomatically in a 2001 collection, War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, edited by Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen. As he put it, "in the estimation of many well-informed analysts, the war for Kosovo provides the first real example of victory achieved through air power alone, a war won without having to engage in ground combat operations." His essay was written before the 9/11 attacks and the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. But the risk to which he pointed is being borne out daily in both wars:

Urban combat against well-armed and fiercely committed, but politically amorphous bands constitutes the kind of warfare that over the next two generations will pose the greatest challenge to Western armed forces. By contrast, major wars between the West and large opposing states are less likely. ... Unless the United States hopelessly mismanages relations with Russia, China or both, it is difficult to see why these or other states would risk directly confronting U.S. military power. ...

Most of the thinking being done by the U.S. armed forces is wholly irrelevant to such conflicts, and the lessons learned from Kosovo have been enitrely the wrong ones. The chief result, as evidenced by the 2000 military budget and the proposed reforms of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, appears to have been even more spending on the airforce and high technology. This spending has gone in part to "smart" weapons, which however useful against enemy armor in the open field, are next to useless in cities and in partisan warfare. The "lesson" of Kosovo has also translated into further development of the joint strike fighter, a weapon designed to fight above all against sophisticated, well-trained, large scale enemy air forces of a kind which simply do not exist in the world today. (my emphasis)
So how are we fighting counterinsurgency wars today?

Well, like this Feb. 11 airpower summary: F-15Es deter enemy activity Air Force Link 02/12/08:

In Iraq, Navy F/A-18 Super Hornets dropped guided bomb unit-38s onto an enemy vehicle that had been destroyed by coalition forces helicopters near Balad. A JTAC declared the mission a success.
Yes, you read that correctly. The bombed an enemy vehicle that had already been destroyed. When the Air Force's press releases from this site say "near Balad" that also means that they could have been inside the named city. Most them I've seen says "near" such-and-such a city, never in. But this next one is an exception(Feb. 10 airpower summary: A-10s conduct shows of force) 02/11/08:

In Basrah, Navy F/A-18 Super Hornets dropped a guided bomb unit-12 and guided bomb unit-38s onto locations containing enemy weaponry. The JTAC confirmed the missions as successful.
In Basra. That would be the large city of Basra, the key port city in the Shi'a south. The Basra that has been safely pacified by the British. The Basra that lies along the main withdrawal route for American troops out of Iraq.

The bombs in those two excerpts are the GBU-38 and the GBU-12, both 500 lb. bombs. Is it any surprise that dropping bombs like this is urban areas cause civilian casualties on a regular basis? The fact that they may be very accurate doesn't decrease the liklihood of civilian casualties. In fact, in urban environments the enhanced accuracy makes civilian casualties more likely.

But the lesson that air power conquers all and quickly was reinforced by the widespread interpreation of the results of the Kosovo War. Still, the neocons' Trotskyist fantasy that bad regimes can be swept away by purging, cleansing violence and a democratic paradise created in a matter of months is not aligned with reality. At least not earthly reality. Maybe in that 13 billion-year-old galaxy that astronomers just discovered. But not here.

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Saturday, November 17, 2007

Kosovo

Remember the Kosovo War? The one that NATO won in 1999? The one where Trent Lott was the leader of the antiwar faction in the Senate?

Kosovo was then and still is legally part of Serbia, though since the war it has operated as de facto independent, with a significant NATO force still stationed there.

Now a former guerrilla with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has won the presidential election there: Hashim Thaci, de guerrillero a primer ministro de Kosovo El Mundo 18.11.2007.

Now he says he intends to declare Kosovo and independent country, which supposedly would be named Kosova (don't ask me what the difference is). Serbia has said they would do whatever they have to in order to block formal Kosovar independence. The Russians have been backing Serbia on this. They prevented a recent UN Security Council vote on the subject.

It's a reminder that even clear successes in these "small wars" leave a lot of complications to be unraveled. Actually, the immediate goal of that war, stopping the Serbian ethnic cleansing of Kosovars, was not immediately achieved, and there is a lot to criticize about that war in retrospect. But in the United States and Europe, it was and is seen as a success.

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Monday, August 27, 2007

Rush Limbaugh and "humanitarian" war

OxyContin (the physical kind)

This little bit of trash in the flotsam and jetsam that flows daily from the rightwing noise machine will likely be swallowed by the news and polemics about the departure of Abu Gonzales the Torture Guy. But I wanted to take note of it while the flows by.

Digby and Steve Benen have called attention to junkie bigot Rush Limbaugh's comment on the air that Democrats support an intervention to stop the killing in Darfur because, he asked, what color are the people in Darfur? "It's black. And who do the Democrats really need to keep voting for them? If they lose a significant percentage of this voting bloc, they're in trouble."

Mr. OxyContin is not known for his thoughtful commentary on foreign policy, and that crack was no different. Rush's fans can't repeat it enough to themselves: black people vote for Democrats, the Democrats are the party of black people, Democrats do things that black people support. And Rush is one of the favorite political commentators among Republicans. On the one hand, we don't need to invest Rush's OxyContin-soaked ravings with more weight than they deserves. On the other, we don't have to go along with the notion that this is "political humor" or pretend that the Republican rank-and-file don't like Rush's bigoted talk. A very substantial portion of them do.

Rush's Darfur comment was meant to be a racial sneer, and that's about all it is.

However, the caller who was calling in trying to sound like a smart-ass dittohead managed, against the odds, to ask a real question:

Hey, Rush. It's great to talk to you. I talked to you once before. I've been listening to you for a couple of years now, and I think I'm getting brighter, but there's a lot to be learned. I know I'm no expert in foreign affairs, but what really confuses me about the liberals is the hypocrisy when they talk about how we have no reason to be in Iraq and helping those people, but yet everybody wants us to go to Darfur. I mean, aren't we going to end up in a quagmire there? I mean, isn't it - I don't understand. Can you enlighten me on this?
In OxyContinLand, everyone "knows" that The Liberals are hypocrites and The Liberals are liars. And this caller was likely trying to toss a softball to give Rush a chance to rave once again about liberal hypocrisy.

I should mention here that I'm not aware myself of any groundswell of enthusiasm among The Liberals for military intervention in Darfur. But OxyContin Vision reveals things to its practitioners that are hidden to us grubby news readers.

But when the caller asked, "I mean, aren't we going to end up in a quagmire there?", he/she managed to touch on a legitimate concern. I don't know if OxyContin Man went on to address that or not.

But one thing that Democrats do need to rethink after the experience of the Iraq War is the whole notion of "humanitarian intervention", or in its variant name, "humanitarian war". Helena Cobban has pointed out what should have been obvious to everyone, but it wasn't really to me before I saw her comment. That is, "humanitarian war" is a grotesque concept, downright Orwellian, actually.

War is about killing people. Bombing and shooting and displacing people. We should never lose sight of the fact that war is about killing people. Sadly, it's all too human to forget it, though. Which is a big part of why wars continue: people listen to sentimental drivel about the glories of war and forget what's really involved.

War is not "humanitarian". A war can be just, it can be necessary, it can have useful or positive or even noble aims, though the latter typically dissolve in the clouds of death and destruction that war involves. But war is not humanitarian. It's about killing and hurting people.

One of these days I'm going to post about the Kosovo War, which I supported at the time, and its aftermath. Although the strategic purpose had to do with controlling the destabilizing effects of Serbian military aggression and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, it is often thought of as a "humanitarian war" because the most immediate problem was the ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars by Serbian forces. Given the devastated state of our Establishment press, most Americans probably think of the Kosovo War as a brilliant success. Since it was fought heavily by bombing, air power zealots have a particular stake in making it sound like a brilliant success.

But, as Jeffrey Record says, the only legitimate goal of war is to establish a better peace. Whether that has been achieved in Kosovo (or "Kosova" as independence advocates prefer) is still in question. The International Crisis Group (ICG) recently issued a report on the political state of Kosovo that presents something other than undiluted optimism, Breaking the Kosovo Stalemate: Europe’s Responsibility 08/21/07. The IGC warns in the executive summary:

The risks to Europe of inaction are substantial. Before the end of the year, Kosovo Albanian leaders will be under what is likely to be irresistible internal pressure to declare independence, with or without external support. If they act and are not supported, Kosovo would fracture: Serbia reclaiming the land pocket north of the Ibar River, Serbs elsewhere in Kosovo fleeing, and eight years of internationally guided institution-building lost. The implosion would destabilise neighbouring countries, increasing pressure for further fractures along ethnic lines. The EU would quickly experience refugee flows and feel the impact of the boost that disorder would give to organised crime networks in the Balkans that already distribute most of Europe’s heroin, facilitate illegal migration and are responsible for nearly 30 per cent of women victims of the sex trade worldwide.
Has that "humanitarian war" succeeded in establishing a better peace? It arguably has for the past eight years, though it didn't prevent widescale Albanian ethnic cleansing against Serbs in Kosovo after the cessation of hostilities with Serbia.

My point is not that the Kosovo War was wrong. I'm not willing to judge it in a simplistic framework of good war/bad war.

My point is that even the best-intentioned military intervention carries substantial risks. Even in a situation like Kosovo, where a substantial multinational coalition was acting (via NATO) and the international environment was substantially permissive, there is far more involved than dropping some bombs, making the bad guys give up, and leaving. A significant-sized NATO force has been present in Kosovo ever since the conclusion of the war. They haven't faced anything like the resistance seen in Iraq. But even that could change if some mutually satisfactory compromise over Kosovar independence from Serbia isn't worked out relatively soon. (Kosovo was and is legally a part of Serbia.)

Violent resistance. A protracted, expensive and frustrating occupation. Potential long-term damage to a country's international position. These are all risks involved in "humanitarian" interventions just like any other kind. And that's true whether the lead party in the intervention is the US, NATO, the UN or anyone else.

The United States is involved in one losing war (Iraq) more-or-less on our own. We're involved in a second losing war (Afghanistan) formally as part of NATO. And even Dick Cheney may not know how many covert interventions we have going, any one of which could blow up into more complications. I don't see right now as a good moment to be searching for other places to send US soldiers to fight.

After the Kosovo War and before the Scalia Five selected Cheney and Bush to be President, there was serious consideration being giving by the major powers to coming up with an improved international legal and political framework to conduct military interventions with UN approval in cases where genocidal killing was being carried out.

That was one of the casualties of the Iraq War. Not that the need is going away, or efforts to deal with it. But the Iraq War created a new context, along with the unilateralist approach of the Cheney-Bush administration, which was far more interested in shredding international frameworks than building them.

Colonialist rhetoric from Spain and Britain and France to the Cheney-Bush administration always promises to bring the blessings of civilization, including democracy these days, to the people who are being bombed, shot and tortured into accepting such blessings. So it's worth remembering in connection with the "humanitarian" Kosovo War that the neoconservatives generally supported it, while the Congressional Republicans were highly critical and even actively opposed. In those days the Reps didn't seem to think it was "aiding the enemy" to criticize the foreign policy of a sitting President, Bill Clinton in that instance.

Seeing the role that the neocons played in agitating for the Iraq War and now for expanding the war to Iran, it's hard not to conclude that for the neocons, the shaky status of the Kosovo War in international law was an appealing aspect of that war. And that they saw that validating the humanitarian justifications for the Kosovo War could prove useful in their already-active agitation for the Iraq War.

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Friday, August 03, 2007

The US and Iran

The policy of the Cheney-Bush administration toward Iran remains a mystery at this point. But here are some articles relating to the current state of play.

Gareth Porter examines the shaky foundations of one of the administration's key accusations against Teheran in The Iran Attack That Wasn't The American Prospect Online 08/0207. The attack in question has to do with the real attack in January in the Shi'a holy city of Karbala in which five soldiers were killed. Articles such as one in the New York Times co-authored by reliable Pentagon flack Michael Gordon blamed the attack on Iran. One account I recall suggested that Iraqi were too stupid to pull off such an effective and well-planned attack.

As Porter points out, this became an excuse for Joe Lieberman to rush out to say that Iran "has declared war on us," and other militant expressions of hostility toward the Shi'a regime in Teheran. Reminding us of the serious dysfunctions in our "press corps", he explains how Pentagon mouthpiece Gordon pumped the Iran-did-it angle even more so that the unconvincing Brig. Gen. Kevin Bergner had in his prepared statement on which Gordon was reporting.

Porter's piece is an excellent example of how even the "quality press" has facilitated and even encouraged irresponsible accusations that could lead to war. It's a disgrace.

Porter also looks at what on its face is a weird twist in U.S. Demanding Iran Restrain Shiite Groups Inter Press Service 08/02/07. Is this an attempt to promote accusations that Iran is aiding attacks against Americans? Is is a serious attempt to get Iran's help while the US is threatening war and promoting economic sanctions even beyond those imposed by the United Nations? Porter sees a shift in the official position against Iran over interfering in Iraq:

A little-noticed statement by U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker after last week's U.S.-Iran meeting revealed that the main demand of the George W. Bush administration to Iran is not to stop supplying weapons to Shiite militias but to use its influence with Shiites in Iraq to reduce their attacks on occupation forces.

That demand, which belies official assertions of certainty that the Iranian government is providing arms to the militias, is consistent with other evidence that the administration was primarily concerned with getting Iranian assistance in restraining its Shiite allies when its campaign over Iranian arms began early this year. (my emphasis)
Porter, who follows the diplomacy over the Iraq War carefully, still sees an administration split over policy:

That sequence of events indicates that the publicity campaign around alleged Iranian provision of arms to the militias was only a part of the larger strategy for increasing the pressure on Iran. For Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice - but not for Vice President Dick Cheney - the objective was to get Iran's cooperation on its Iraqi Shiite allies. (my emphasis)
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) also recently prepared a report on alleged Iranian involvement in Iraqi combat, Iran’s Influence in Iraq by Kenneth Katzman 07/09/07. Katzman's report recounts several official US claims about specific instances of Iranian aid to Iraqi militias without critical comment. But he mainly focuses on the bases of Iranian policy toward Iraq - which, as he points out, has a lot in common with the American position:

For the first two years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran’s leaders and diplomats sought to persuade all Iraqi Shiite Islamist factions in Iraq to work together through a U.S.-led political process, because the number of Shiites in Iraq (about 60% of the population) virtually ensures Shiite dominance of an elected government. To this extent, Iran’s goals in Iraq differed little from the main emphasis of U.S. policy in Iraq, which was to set up a democratic process. Iran’s strategy bore fruit with victory by a Shiite Islamist bloc (“United Iraqi Alliance”) in the two parliamentary elections in 2005. The bloc, which includes the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (SICI),1 the most pro-Iranian
of the groups, and the Da’wa (Islamic Call) party, won 128 of the 275 seats in the
December 15, 2005, election for parliament. Most SICI leaders spent their years of exile in Iran. Like his predecessor as Prime Minister, Ibrahim al-Jafari, Nuri al-Maliki is from the Da’wa Party, although Maliki spent most of his exile in Syria, not Iran. Also in the UIA is the faction of the 32-year-old Moqtada Al Sadr, whose ties to Iran are still developing because his family remained in Iraq during Saddam’s rule. However, the Sadr clan has had ideological ties to Iran; Moqtada’s great uncle, Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr, was a contemporary and ally of Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and was hung by Saddam Hussein in 1980. Iran also sees Sadr’s faction — which has 32 seats in parliament and a large and dedicated following, particularly among lower-class Iraqi Shiites, some of whom are able to receive medical treatment in Iran under Sadr’s auspices — as a growing force in Iraqi politics. (my emphasis)
The administration is applying heavy pressure to get German firms to drop business ties with Iran: US Pressures Germany to Cut Iran Business Ties by Ralf Beste, Christoph Pauly and Christian Reiermann Spiegel International 07/30/07. They report:

But the US government is no longer content with United Nations economic sanctions on Tehran - Washington wants more. And so, US President George W. Bush and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson have directed Levey to form a worldwide economic coalition of the willing to increase the pressure on Iran. Despite their best efforts, American officials are irked that German companies are still doing business worth billions with Tehran. In particular, Washington has little understanding for the export guarantees Berlin still offers firms, effectively helping the mullah regime to buy new ships and power plant technologies.

While in Berlin, [Under Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey] Levey met with Thomas Mirow, a senior official at the Finance Ministry, and Chancellor Angela Merkel's foreign policy advisor Christoph Heusgen. During those talks, he demanded Germany cut its so-called Hermes export credit insurance coverage when it came to deals with Iran. Under ex-chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Germany dramatically increased the permitted volume of export credit insurance. Moreover, Levey told the officials that Washington wanted Germany to scale back all of its other economic ties with Iran as quickly as possible.
Angela Merkel's government, which the Cheney-Bush administration expected to be much more compliant to Washington's wishes than her predecessor, isn't thrilled about the idea:

But Levey ran into resistance from the Germans, who said his demands were understandable coming from a country that has no trade with Iran. Germany, however, exports more than €4 billion ($5.45 billion) in goods to the country each year, creating thousands of jobs. Were Germany to end its Hermes export guarantees, German locomotives might no longer be delivered to Iran, but Chinese and Russian companies would gladly step into the breach. The Americans would end up gaining nothing, while the German economy would stand to lose a lot. Besides, explained the Germans, the Hermes cover has been excluded from UN sanctions against Iran. In short, Levey could forget his request - Germany would stick to the UN resolutions, but would do no more. But officials in Berlin know they have to come up with something to placate Washington and so both the chancellery and the foreign ministry are looking into a sweeping weapons embargo. That might be just enough to appease the Americans. (my emphasis)
The following is also an interesting twist, another situation where the US and Iran would seem to have common interests, independence for the Serbian province of Kosovo: The Balkan Transformation and the Underlying Energy Factor by Ioannis Michaletos, Worldpress.org 07/25/07. He writes:

Since the political strategy of the 1990's is effectively discredited, American foreign policy experts are in a position to reshape their aims without at the same time being seen as blaming themselves for mistakes that were made. The possibility of radical change in the United States' Balkan policy should be excluded since large nations never admit past mistakes for reasons relating to their international prestige and posture. Therefore an engagement with Russia in relation to the Balkans, energy routes, and Kosovo should come about gradually and certainly after careful consideration of possible trade-offs and negotiations between Washington and Moscow, as has recently been seen. As far Kosovo is concerned, Washington supports independence, along with Teheran and many other Islamic states that seek to benefit from the creation of stronger bonds with the a newly created mini-state in the Balkans strongly influenced by "Islamic charities."

The strategic aim of the United States is to at least retain its influence in Eurasia, and the Balkans is an integral part of that. The importance of the region is as a hub for the energy needs of the West and the Russian ambitions. Moreover, its proximity to the Middle East and North Africa reserve a truly unique placement for the Balkans in the strategic considerations of London, Washington, Moscow, Paris, Berlin and Beijing. The coming months will reveal more of the intrigues involved, and, most importantly, the winners and the losers of the "energy game" of the 21st century. (my emphasis)
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