Russia, the US and the EU

Ivan Krastev of the Bulgarian Center for Liberal Strategies (CLS) wrote about the more assertive foreign policy of Russia in a paper that preceded the recent Georgia conflict by several months, The Crisis of the Post-Cold War European Order: What to do about Russia’s newfound taste for confrontation with the West (German Marshall Fund of the United States; Mar 2008). He sees the European Union (UE) and Russia as having moved into a situation of increased conflict, based on their differing views of nationalism in the current world system. His own assessment has a pessimistic tone:

The European illusion that Russia can be a partner of the European Union in its struggle for a multipolar world based on international law is dead. For Moscow, support of multilateralism and the advocacy of a multipolar world were simply tactical weapons for contesting American hegemony. In reality, Russia’s foreign policy instincts are more “American” than European. Russia believes in power, unilateralism, and an unrestrained pursuit of national interest. From the Kremlin’s point of view, sovereignty is not a right; its meaning is not a seat in the United Nations. For the Kremlin, sovereignty is a capacity. It implies economic independence, military strength, and cultural identity. In the Kremlin’s vocabulary, sovereign power is a synonym for great power. While the European Union was founded as a response to the perils of nationalism and the catastrophic rivalries of European nation-states in the first half of the 20th century, Russia’s current foreign policy thinking is shaped by the perils of the post-national politics and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. European nightmares are rooted in the experience of the 1930s. Russia’s nightmares are shaped by the Russian experience of the 1980s and 1990s. The European Union views the lack of democracy as a major source of instability in Eurasia. Russia views weak democracies and the Western policy of exporting democracy as the major source of instability in the post-Soviet space. The clash between these contrasting views of the European order was unavoidable. [my emphasis]

Krasnev dissents from the neocon view that spreading democracy and capitalism necessarily lead to greater international cooperation:

Russia is both a rising global power and a weak state with corrupt and inefficient institutions. Putin’s Russia is more democratic but less predictable and reliable than the Soviet Union. Putin’s regime seems rock solid and at the same time extremely vulnerable. Russia’s economic growth looks both impressive and unsustainable. The more capitalist and Westernized Russia becomes, the more anti-Western its policies become. [my emphasis]

Krasnev also argues that the concept of "sovereign democracy" currently defended by Russia is in large part a response to Russia's dim view of the idea of the EU extending its borders further to the east, in particular to Ukraine and Georgia:

Moscow realized that the European Union is the only great power with unsettled borders and that the urge to expand its principles and institutions are built into the European project. In response to the explosion of the “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine and America’s endorsement of regime change as a legitimate policy objective, Putin adopted the concept of sovereign democracy - security understood as absolute sovereignty - as the less interference from the outside, the safer you are. [my emphasis]

He points out differences, perhaps insurmountable ones, between the current policy aims of the US and the EU in relation to Russia:

Treating Russia as an effective authoritarian state will be a mistake. Putin’s regime is less stable and more ineffective than most observers believe. The hope that Russia’s revisionism gives a new rationale for enlarging NATO and anchoring countries like Georgia and Ukraine to the West is also illusory. In the long-term, Putin’s Russia cannot play the role once played by the Soviet Union, and making NATO and EU enlargement the West’s principal and only strategy could also backfire. Such a strategy overestimates the EU’s and NATO’s transformational power. The recent developments in the Balkans demonstrate that the soft power of the EU and NATO is in decline. It is also obvious that NATO and EU enlargements are not a panacea for weak states and divided societies. The adoption of a strategy of further NATO enlargement in the post-Soviet space risks importing instability into the European Union and NATO instead of exporting stability into Eurasia. Secondly, the EU and the United States view Russia differently. For the United States, Russia is primarily a global power and Washington is interested in Moscow’s cooperation in sustaining the global order. For the European Union, Russia is first and foremost a European power. Brussels is interested in preserving the post-modern nature of the European order. A common transatlantic strategy is viewed as desirable by both the Uni[t]ed States and the European Union, but it will be extremely difficult to achieve.

Tags: center for liberal strategies, ivan krastev, russia, russland