Showing posts with label russland. Show all posts
Showing posts with label russland. Show all posts

Monday, October 20, 2008

Russia, the US and the EU

Ivan Krastev of the Bulgarian Center for Liberal Strategies (CLS) wrote about the more assertive foreign policy of Russia in a paper that preceded the recent Georgia conflict by several months, The Crisis of the Post-Cold War European Order: What to do about Russia’s newfound taste for confrontation with the West (German Marshall Fund of the United States; Mar 2008). He sees the European Union (UE) and Russia as having moved into a situation of increased conflict, based on their differing views of nationalism in the current world system. His own assessment has a pessimistic tone:

The European illusion that Russia can be a partner of the European Union in its struggle for a multipolar world based on international law is dead. For Moscow, support of multilateralism and the advocacy of a multipolar world were simply tactical weapons for contesting American hegemony. In reality, Russia’s foreign policy instincts are more “American” than European. Russia believes in power, unilateralism, and an unrestrained pursuit of national interest. From the Kremlin’s point of view, sovereignty is not a right; its meaning is not a seat in the United Nations. For the Kremlin, sovereignty is a capacity. It implies economic independence, military strength, and cultural identity. In the Kremlin’s vocabulary, sovereign power is a synonym for great power. While the European Union was founded as a response to the perils of nationalism and the catastrophic rivalries of European nation-states in the first half of the 20th century, Russia’s current foreign policy thinking is shaped by the perils of the post-national politics and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. European nightmares are rooted in the experience of the 1930s. Russia’s nightmares are shaped by the Russian experience of the 1980s and 1990s. The European Union views the lack of democracy as a major source of instability in Eurasia. Russia views weak democracies and the Western policy of exporting democracy as the major source of instability in the post-Soviet space. The clash between these contrasting views of the European order was unavoidable. [my emphasis]
Krasnev dissents from the neocon view that spreading democracy and capitalism necessarily lead to greater international cooperation:

Russia is both a rising global power and a weak state with corrupt and inefficient institutions. Putin’s Russia is more democratic but less predictable and reliable than the Soviet Union. Putin’s regime seems rock solid and at the same time extremely vulnerable. Russia’s economic growth looks both impressive and unsustainable. The more capitalist and Westernized Russia becomes, the more anti-Western its policies become. [my emphasis]
Krasnev also argues that the concept of "sovereign democracy" currently defended by Russia is in large part a response to Russia's dim view of the idea of the EU extending its borders further to the east, in particular to Ukraine and Georgia:

Moscow realized that the European Union is the only great power with unsettled borders and that the urge to expand its principles and institutions are built into the European project. In response to the explosion of the “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine and America’s endorsement of regime change as a legitimate policy objective, Putin adopted the concept of sovereign democracy - security understood as absolute sovereignty - as the less interference from the outside, the safer you are. [my emphasis]
He points out differences, perhaps insurmountable ones, between the current policy aims of the US and the EU in relation to Russia:

Treating Russia as an effective authoritarian state will be a mistake. Putin’s regime is less stable and more ineffective than most observers believe. The hope that Russia’s revisionism gives a new rationale for enlarging NATO and anchoring countries like Georgia and Ukraine to the West is also illusory. In the long-term, Putin’s Russia cannot play the role once played by the Soviet Union, and making NATO and EU enlargement the West’s principal and only strategy could also backfire. Such a strategy overestimates the EU’s and NATO’s transformational power. The recent developments in the Balkans demonstrate that the soft power of the EU and NATO is in decline. It is also obvious that NATO and EU enlargements are not a panacea for weak states and divided societies. The adoption of a strategy of further NATO enlargement in the post-Soviet space risks importing instability into the European Union and NATO instead of exporting stability into Eurasia. Secondly, the EU and the United States view Russia differently. For the United States, Russia is primarily a global power and Washington is interested in Moscow’s cooperation in sustaining the global order. For the European Union, Russia is first and foremost a European power. Brussels is interested in preserving the post-modern nature of the European order. A common transatlantic strategy is viewed as desirable by both the Uni[t]ed States and the European Union, but it will be extremely difficult to achieve.
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Friday, September 12, 2008

Georgia and NATO

I don't really mind seeing McCain and his White Princess get embarassed about her somewhat artless responses to Charlie Gibson's softball questions on Georgia. Press misunderstanding and affection for "gotcha" lines work so often again Democrats that it's hard not to enjoy seeing such things sting the Republicans every now and then.

But she was really just stating the policy shared by McCain, Obama and Biden, which is that the US wants Georgia added to NATO. As I said yesterday, a real journalist would have pressed her on the practical questions involved.

Monica Friedlander at the UC-Berkeley Web site reports on a Sept. 4 panel about the Georgia crisis in Berkeley Professors Weigh in on the Crisis in the Caucasus by (n.d., accessed 09/12/08) featuring Edward Walker, Yuri Slezkine, Steven Fish and Johanna Nichols.

They weren't in doubt about the practical upshot of recent events: "Meanwhile, the panelists said, Georgia’s prospects for NATO membership have collapsed and the fate of the people of South Caucasus remains dire for the foreseeable future."

That sums it up well. Diplomatically, the US will have to maintain a negotiating position insisting on Western freedom of action in leaving the prospect of Georgian NATO membership open and opposing the independence of the breakaway provinces South Ossetia and Abkhasia.

But Russia has killed any practical prospect of Georgian membership in NATO. And very likely the chances for such membership by Ukraine.

As Joschka Fischer and others have observed, Russia's power has been growing over the last couple of decades despite chronic economic problems. And in the Caucuses, they have a conventional military superiority that they showed in August they are willing to use in defense of their perceived national interests.

Friedlander reports:

“Russia drew a line in sand,” said Edward Walker, associate adjunct professor of political science and director of the Berkeley Program in Eurasian and East European Studies. “They said, ‘Do not recognize Kosovo and do not incorporate Georgia into NATO. We see this as a threat to our national security. If you do, bad things will happen.’ We ignored those warnings.”

What’s more, the panelists said, the war in the Caucasus strengthened Russia’s position in the region and embarrassed Washington, which has precious few cards to play in this conflict.

“The U.S. built an ally and abandoned it, or else tried to support it and failed. Regardless, it looks weak,” said Yuri Slezkine, a professor of history and director of the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies.
The US and NATO were essentially bluffing over Georgia and Ukraine, in other words. And the Russians successfully called the bluff.

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Monday, September 08, 2008

Georgia-Russia conflict and the US

Dick Cheney is still working hard to build up military tensions and increase the danger of war, including in the Caucuses: Cheney backs membership in NATO for Georgia by Steven Lee Myers International Herald Tribune 09/05/08; Cheney visit: U.S. treads tightrope on Georgia aid by Howard LaFranchi Christian Science Monitor 09/05/08. Myers reports:

Cheney spent only four and a half hours in Georgia, but the visit included a strong rebuke to Russia's behavior and a highly symbolic visit to American troops unloading humanitarian supplies at the airport here within sight of an airplane factory that Russian bombs had damaged.

He arrived a day after the United States pledged $1 billion to help Georgia recover from its defeat by Russia's armed forces, which continue to control two breakaway regions, as well as buffer zones in Georgia.

Standing beside President Mikheil Saakashvili, Cheney said that the United States had strongly supported Georgia since protests in 2003 ushered a democratic government to power and that it would continue to do so despite Russia's proclamations that Saakashvili's government was illegitimate.
George Friedman of Stratfor.com gives his views on Georgia and the Balance of Power in the New York Review of Books 08/28/08 (09/25/08 issue). His analysis seems to implicitly assume that the differences between Russia and the West will be central to Russia's external challenges in the coming years. That contrasts with the explicit analysis of Joschka Fischer that China and Islamic nations and movements to the South of Russia will be considerably more important strategic challenges from Russia's point of view.

But Friedman provides a lot of useful information and background:

The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in Eurasia. It has simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted. The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing situation in Pakistan. It has no strategic ground forces in reserve and is in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery. This has opened an opportunity for the Russians to reassert their influence in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow did not have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States or Europe; hence, the balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when to make this public. They did that on August 8. [my emphasis]
One thing I don't understand about his analysis is his (qualified) argument that "Russia had laid a trap" for Georgia and their Western allies.

This may well be true. But I haven't seen anyone lay out the evidence for this specific claim, though the neocons and other advocates of a New Cold War have been repeating it. There is no real dispute that Russia was prepared to respond quickly to military action initiated by Georgia. And its certainly reasonable to assume that made the kind of calculations about the effect of such a response on Russia's larger foreign policy. But that's not really the same as saying the Russians "laid a trap". That only makes sense if Russia actually did something to trick them into attacking. Friedman doesn't describe any such action.

But he does make it clear that the Georgian leaders almost certainly had some indication that the US approved of their attack on Russian positions in South Ossetia:

It is difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against US wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first is a huge breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the deployments of Russian forces or knew of them but - along with the Georgians - miscalculated Russia's intentions. The second is that the United States, along with other countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when its military was in shambles and its government was paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 1970s and 1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for years. The United States had assumed that they would not risk the consequences of an invasion. [my emphasis]
Friedman also explains the various factors which, he argues, appear to the Russians as hostile moves by the US and NATO aimed against Russian vital interests. It's worth saying here that recognizing that the Russians have rational reasons to perceive such a threat is not the same as saying that Western leaders necessarily intend such a threat.

Two of the critical issues from Russia's viewpoint were the US/NATO support for the independence of Kosovo and the decision to put Ukraine on the track to NATO membership:

... the discussion of including Ukraine in NATO represented to them a fundamental threat to Russia's national security. It would, in their calculations, have rendered Russia indefensible and threatened to destabilize the Russian Federation itself. When the United States went so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO deeper into the Caucasus, the Russian conclusion - publicly stated - was that the United States in particular intended to encircle and break Russia.

The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the United States to back Kosovo's separation from Serbia. The Russians were friendly with Serbia, but the deeper issue for Russia was this: the principle accepted in Europe since World War II was that, to prevent conflict, national borders would not be changed. If that principle were violated in Kosovo, other border shifts—including demands by various regions for independence from Russia —might follow. The Russians publicly and privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but instead continue its informal autonomy, which was the same thing in practical terms. Russia's requests were ignored.

From the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined to respond in Kosovo, they decided to respond where they had all the cards: in South Ossetia. [my emphasis]
That last sentence could be read to imply that the Russians were somehow baiting Georgia into attacking them. As I say above, I haven't seent he evidence for that.

This could also be read that way:

Putin did not want to reestablish the Soviet Union, but he did want to re-establish the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet region. To accomplish that, he had to do two things. First, he had to reestablish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force, at least in its own region. Second, he had to establish that Western guarantees, including NATO membership, meant nothing in the face of Russian power. He did not want to confront NATO directly, but he did want to confront and defeat a power that was closely aligned with the United States, had US support, aid, and advisers, and was widely seen as being under American protection. Georgia was the perfect choice. [my emphasis]
Friedman also points out that current US policies in the GWOT (global war on terror) leave the US with very limited military options in the Caucuses (Georgia and Ukraine):

Therefore, the United States has a problem - either it must reorient its strategy away from the Middle East and toward the Caucasus, or it has to seriously limit its response to Georgia to avoid a Russian counter in Iran. Even if the United States had an appetite for war in Georgia at this time, it would have to calculate the Russian response in Iran - and possibly in Afghanistan (even though Moscow's interests there are currently aligned with those of Washington).[my emphasis]
On a related issue, see Israel of the Caucasus by Arnaud de Borchgrave (UPI/Middle East Times 09/02/08.

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Sunday, August 24, 2008

Randy Scheunemann


Tom Hayden and Bob Dreyfuss discuss McCain's top foreign policy adviser Randy Scheunemann in, respectively, The Neo-Cons Who Fabricated Evidence for the Iraq War Are Back Huffington Post 08/20/08 and Scheunemann, Iraq and Georgia The Nation 08/21/08.

Hayden comes to the more drastic judgment about Scheunemann's influence on the Georgia-Russia conflict this summer:

Barack Obama and the Democrats are heading towards trouble in November because of a new Cold War with the Russians triggered largely by a top John McCain adviser and the same neo-conservative clique who fabricated evidence to lobby for the Iraq War.

This is not a conspiracy theory but a conspiracy fact, stated as boldly as possible before it is too late.
Dreyfuss also discusses Schuenemann's career as a Georgia lobbyist and active advocate for the Iraq War. But he contents himself with the conclusion about Scheunemann's highly-profitable Georgia connection and his role as McCain's adviser: "It's a blindingly obvious conflict of interest, and frighteningly it's one that conceivably could drag the United States into yet another war in that unstable part of the world."

Hayden may well be correct, though he establishes a broad circumstantial case rather than anything so specific it could legitimately be called a conspiracy. His main point is that the neocons and other advocates of militarism see the Georgia-Russia conflict as the chance to open a New Cold War. And he believes that the peace movement needs to make its opposition to such policies clear, even though that involves criticizing Obama and Biden during the election campaign. The following sounds like good advice to me:

At the very least, Obama can stop going out of his way to celebrate McCain as a great American war hero, which only reinforces McCain's strongest rationale for victory. And Obama's surrogates might delicately suggest that McCain shoots before he thinks. McCain was the pointman pushing the neo-conservative war against "islamo-fascism", centered in Baghdad, months before the Bush Administration revealed its intentions. While Obama urged caution about a "dumb war", McCain was supporting Ahmad Chalabi's misleading assertions about weapons of mass destruction and Iraq-al-Qaeda ties that didn't exist.

The broad peace movement has to awaken a burning memory from below. Everyone recalls George Bush declaring "Mission Accomplished", but does anyone recall John McCain standing on another aircraft carrier on January 2, 2002, yelling to young Navy pilots like himself during Vietnam, "Next up, Baghdad!" (my emphasis)
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Wednesday, June 06, 2007

Arms race: Bush postures against Putin

Bush is scheduled to meet with Vladimir Putin this week at the G-8 summit in Heliegendamm, Germany. He prepared for it by giving a speech defending the stationing of the Star Wars "missile defense" system in Poland and the Czech Republic: President Bush Visits Prague, Czech Republic, Discusses Freedom 06/05/07.

Speaking in the Czernin Palace in Prague, Bush welcomed three of his guests as "three of the great advocates for freedom in our time". One was Vaclav Havel, former democracy activist in Cold War Czechslovakia and former president of the Czech Republic; no real argument about his role as an advocate for democracy and human right. José María Aznar, the former Spanish prime minister and former head of the conservative People's Party (Partido Populár, PP), who backed Bush's invastion of Iraq; Aznar was widely credited with bringing the PP (which is the "postfascist" descendent of dictator Francisco Franco's party) into the mainstream of European conservatism. The third was Natan Sharansky, who Bush sees as an advocate for Bush's self-claimed mission to spread democracy by force in the Middle East.

Giving a litany of various states that Bush considers hostile in some way to the US, he expressed his warm support for "freedom" in those countries. Including Putin's Russia:

In Russia, reforms that were once promised to empower citizens have been derailed, with troubling implications for democratic development. Part of a good relationship is the ability to talk openly about our disagreements. So the United States will continue to build our relationships with these countries - and we will do it without abandoning our principles or our values.
Not surprisingly, Russian positions and responses on this sort of thing are not given very thorough coverage by our Potemkin press corps. But Putin laid out the broad outlines of his current, more confrontive approach, at the Munich Security Conference this past February (Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, Delivered Feb. 10, 2007 Washington Post 02/12/07). Putin also indicated his willingness to talk openly, as Bush put it:

This conference's structure allows me to avoid excessive politeness and the need to speak in roundabout, pleasant but empty diplomatic terms. This conference's format will allow me to say what I really think about international security problems. And if my comments seem unduly polemical, pointed or inexact to our colleagues, then I would ask you not to get angry with me. After all, this is only a conference. And I hope that after the first two or three minutes of my speech Mr Teltschik will not turn on the red light over there.
In other words, sure, Mr. Tough Guy From Texas, if you want to have these frank and uninhibited talks, as the diplomats say, and if you want to carry them on in public, well, shoot, I can talk tough, too.

He proceded to address the "anti-missile" issue:

Plans to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defence system to Europe cannot help but disturb us. Who needs the next step of what would be, in this case, an inevitable arms race? I deeply doubt that Europeans themselves do.

Missile weapons with a range of about five to eight thousand kilometres that really pose a threat to Europe do not exist in any of the so-called problem countries. And in the near future and prospects, this will not happen and is not even foreseeable. And any hypothetical launch of, for example, a North Korean rocket to American territory through western Europe obviously contradicts the laws of ballistics. As we say in Russia, it would be like using the right hand to reach the left ear.
Today, Wednesday, Bush claimed that those defenses are not aimed at Russia (Bush reiterates: Russia not an enemy by Terence Hunt AP 06/06/07):

"Russia is not an enemy," Bush said, seeking not to inflame a heated exchange of rhetoric between Washington and Moscow. "There needs to be no military response because we're not at war with Russia. ... Russia is not a threat. Nor is the missile defense we're proposing a threat to Russia."
Apparently, he did not say against what other threat they were directed, though the official line is that they are meant to protect against Iran (see below)..

With no small bit of irony, Putin in his February speech declared his country to be non-threatening to the West because of Russian democracy; democracies in the Bush/ Sharansky ideology don't go to war against other democracies. Putin said:

It is sufficient to look at recent history. Did not our country have a peaceful transition to democracy? Indeed, we witnessed a peaceful transformation of the Soviet regime - a peaceful transformation! And what a regime! With what a number of weapons, including nuclear weapons! Why should we start bombing and shooting now at every available opportunity? Is it the case when without the threat of mutual destruction we do not have enough political culture, respect for democratic values and for the law?
And as the Cheney-Bush administration complains about the "democratic deficit" in today's Russia, Putin has also begun pointing at alleged deficits in the democratic practice of Western democracies. And part of that, in his February speech, is the role of international law and the unilateralism of the Bush administration:

We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state's legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?

In international relations we increasingly see the desire to resolve a given question according to so-called issues of political expediency, based on the current political climate.

And of course this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe. I want to emphasise this - no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race. (my emphasis)
And, as Terence Hunt of the AP reports:

Asked if he anticipated a tense encounter, Bush replied "Could be. I don't think so ... I'll work to see that it's not a tense meeting."

Putin has accused the U.S. of starting a new arms race and said if the U.S. pressed ahead with its plan, Russia would revert to targeting its missiles on Europe as it did during the Cold War. China joined Russia in saying the missile defense plan could touch off a new escalation in nuclear weapons.

The move to put the missile defense shield in former Warsaw Pact nations — purportedly as a defense against a future missile launch from Iran — clearly fanned Putin's anger.
William Arkin looked at the current budding arms race and observes (Live by the Cold War, Die by the Cold War Washington Post 06/05/07):

... the missile strategy arises from the kind of Cold War thinking that we should have left behind with, well, the Cold War. Not only does it complicate relations with our allies in Europe, it's also unlikely to be effective in the new kind of war the Bush administration says we are fighting. ...

Technically, of course, the puny system planned for Poland and the Czech Republic doesn't threaten anything in Russia. ...

I'm arguing instead that missile defenses are so old-think. First, Iran's ballistic missile force is hardly the most significant or pressing threat, especially when stacked up against terrorism, a Persian Gulf war, even potential WMD. Second, by the time a workable system is up and running in Europe, even if that is possible, technologies will have changed. Third, "missile defenses" connotes the very kind of passivity that the Bush administration usually decries. We are going to wait for Iran to develop an arsenal of threatening ballistic missiles to threaten Europe? The United States has a policy of preemption, supported by both parties, and it has the means of attack that makes it clear to Iran that if it wanted to lash out with conventional military force, it will be destroyed. ...

We have fanned the flames in Russia, complicated life for NATO members Poland and the Czech Republic, and rewarded Iran. An improvement in our defenses indeed.
It's also worth remembering the basic flaw in the missile defense system, even if it ever starts working on any kind of reliable basis. For the system to really be a missile shield, it has to be very close to 100% effective in shooting down all incoming missiles. If even a few nuclear warheads get through, it could still impose unacceptable losses on the target country.

But the "missile defense systems" are very expensive to build. And the systems to evade them, like the mobile missiles Russia recently tested, are much cheaper to construct. That may make American missile manufacturers and suppliers happy. But it's not the optimal way to spend defense dollars.

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