Obama's predecessors on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

God Shows Moses the Promised Land by Luca Signorelli

Hussein Agha and Robert Malley wrote in a review of three books by experienced Middle East hands, How Not to Make Peace in the Middle East New York Review of Books 12/17/08, before the current Israeli offensive in Gaza began, about the general approach of the Cheney-Bush administration to Israeli-Palestinian peace and of the Clinton administration before it. They disagree sharply with the common criticism that George W. Bush as President has been "disengaged" from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

It is a curious charge, at once too mild and off-target. It suggests a passive, flaccid, laissez-faire attitude that could hardly be further from the historical truth and that would have been far preferable to it. Bush's policies did not reflect disengagement; they were the outcome of a uniquely ambitious, often brutal, and always intensely engaged effort to reshape the Middle East. At its core, Bush's Middle East strategy was as intrusive and interventionist as one could imagine.

Almost from the outset, the administration clumsily intervened in Palestinian politics, helped rewrite the Palestinian Basic Law, proclaimed Arafat a pariah, anointed its own favorite substitute leaders, insisted on Palestinian internal reform as a precondition for peace, took positions on a final agreement in a 2004 letter from Bush to then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that tilted the playing field, encouraged confrontation between the nationalist Fatah and Islamist Hamas, imposed sanctions on Syria, and discouraged the resumption of Israeli–Syrian talks. Throughout, the Bush administration misread local dynamics, ignored the toxicity of its embrace, overestimated the influence of money and military assistance, and neglected the impact of conviction, loyalty, and faith.

On the dubious premise that talking to an enemy is a reward, the administration cut itself off from, and left itself with little leverage over, the region's more dynamic actors, whether Islamist organizations, Syria, or Iran. It propped up local Palestinian and Lebanese allies, who mimic the West's language, depend upon the US for resources and support, yet lack an effective domestic base. In short, it helped them in ways that hurt. How much more the US could have achieved by doing much less. [my emphasis]

Referring to the books they are reviewing, they write of Clinton's policy on the Israeli-Palestinian issues:

For all its positive qualities, the books argue, the Clinton approach was excessively undisciplined; it privileged process to the detriment of substance, and too often failed to hold parties accountable. [Martin] Indyk argues that as Clinton's presidency came to a close, he projected his timetable on Israelis and Palestinians who lacked his sense of urgency. He assumed they were driven by the sort of American pragmatism for which they had little appetite. [Daniel] Kurtzer and [Aaron David] Miller complain that the US kept potential Arab and European allies at arm's length and sought to resolve the conflict step by step rather than aim for a final resolution. They also regret the insularity of an American peace team whose insufficient balance and diversity led it to see things, according to Miller, "mainly from an Israeli perspective." Mostly, they fault the Clinton administration for lacking a coherent strategy that would have enabled it to promote its own ideas rather than be subject to the parties' will and whims. [my emphasis]

Martin Indyk is a close adviser of incoming Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Daniel Kurtzer is one of President-elect Obama's main advisers on the Middle East.

And the authors in question also take issue with the general American view that Yasser Arafat was primarily to blame for the failure of the Camp David Summit during the Clinton administration:

Outwardly, Miller, Kurtzer, and Indyk do not claim to take part in the debate over who lost Camp David, though, practically speaking, they close it. They castigate Arafat and the Palestinians for excessive passivity and an inability or unwillingness to seize the moment. But they do not stop there. Miller, who attended the summit, contradicts the accepted view with a detailed account demonstrating that each party bears heavy responsibility. Barak eroded the Palestinians' confidence during the months preceding the summit by renegotiating past agreements and reneging on promises. The Israeli proposals at Camp David, says Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israel's foreign minister at the time, "fell far short of even modest Palestinian expectations." The Americans had "no sustained strategy," did not put a negotiating text on the table, and caved in when faced with the parties' objections. They did not consult with other Arab countries and, in deciding to blame Arafat at Barak's request, betrayed a prior commitment not to do so and also jeopardized hopes for a peaceful aftermath of the conference.

Likewise, Kurtzer and Lasensky describe the US as "unprepared," lacking its own positions on fundamental issues, and, eager to embrace "Barak's priorities...but also Barak's tactics," ultimately "ced[ing] effective control over US policy to the Israelis." Even Indyk, the harshest of the three toward Arafat, disputes the conventional wisdom. "Camp David," he writes, "was hardly a good laboratory" for Barak's proposition that the Palestinian leader was unwilling to reach a historic deal, because no Arab statesman could have accepted what had been presented. [my emphasis]

That position is surprising to hear from Indyk, a former US Ambassador to Israel, who has a reputation as a pro-Israeli hardliner.

Agha and Malley observe, "There is a long tradition of former US Middle East officials retroactively bemoaning the strategies they once helped shape. Retrospective hand-wringing, far from an anomaly, has become something of a job hazard."

Agha and Malley suggest that the Obama administration approach his predecessors' past efforts at US-sponsored bilateral negotiations between Israel and Palestinian representatives with a healthy skepticism. They haven't been successful in producing peace, after all. And they note some of the more recent changes affecting the conflict:

... the region into which the new president is being pressed to plunge has changed dramatically over the past decade. During recent years, the transformations include the death of Arafat, father of Palestinian nationalism, and the incapacitation of Sharon, Israel's last heroic leader; the spread and further entrenchment of Israeli settlements; Hamas's electoral triumph; Israel's withdrawal from Gaza; the Palestinian internal conflict and Hamas's seizure of Gaza; the withering away of Fatah; Israel's failure in the 2006 Lebanon war; US setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan; Iran's increased influence; and the growing role of other regional actors like Turkey and Qatar. This is not a mere change in scenery. It is a new world. [my emphasis]

And they point out the diminishing enthusiasm among Palestinians for a two-state solution. The Israelis may have succeeded in postponing that option long enough that it is no longer viable. The alternative in the not-so-long term being a single Jewish and Palestinian state among the present-day Israel and the occupied territories. A state that would either have to cease being a Jewish state or cease being a democratic state.

Like most such advice seems to wind up being, Agha and Malley caution Obama about putting forward another two-state solution peace plan right away and try to understand the situation better. "Obama could do worse than consider some simple advice. Don't rush. Take time, take a deep breath, and take stock."

Maybe he could appoint a commission.

Fortunately for us and the world, in just about two weeks Dick Cheney and George Bush will be private citizens again. And we'll see what President Obama has in mind, on the Middle East and a lot of other things.

Tags: israel, obama administration, palestinians