Von Lucke is writing about the rise in popularity of far-right parties in Europe, fed by the horrible conditions produced in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain by the Herbert Hoover/Heinrich Brüning austerity economics on which Merkel has insisted since 2009. She has even succeeded in getting other members of the eurozone to lock austerity policies into their constitutional structures, a mess which will be difficult to unravel, even without the large EU structure.
Von Lucke points out that one attraction for Merkel of a policy of NATO confrontation with Russia over Ukraine or whatever new occasions arise is to rally people around her leadership and provide a helpful distraction from the awful economic conditions her policies have done so much to create.
This is not such an easy course for her to take, though. The eurozone is on the verge of deflation and therefore on the verge of a potentially long period of stagnation. Sweden (not a eurozone member) is already in deflation. The restraint that the Ukraine crisis is already putting on investment in Russia by foreign firms and on trade with the West is already putting more downward pressure on the European economy. Further sanctions from the West would only magnify the problem.
Axel Berger in Sanktionen, die nicht weh tun sollen Jungle World/17 24.04.2014 estimates the number of German businesses active in Russia at 6,200. Many of them are medium-sized Mittelstand firms, but among them are DAX-listed large firms like Adidas, Siemens und Thyssen-Krupp. For Germany the dependence on Russian energy supplies is particularly significant.
Etwa 35 Prozent aller Öl- und 30 Prozent aller Gasimporte in Europa stammen aus Russland. Für Deutschland ist die Bedeutung sogar noch größer. So machen russische Lieferungen derzeit 38 Prozent der Erdgas-, knapp 35 Prozent der Rohöl- und 27 Prozent der Steinkohleneinfuhren aus.Berger quotes IFO Institute President, Hans-Werner Sinn, a loyal supporter of Merkel's austerity policies, saying, "We simply could not bear a sanctions policy because in the course of the energy change [conversion away from nuclear power], we are increasingly reliant on Russian gas supplies" (»Wir können uns eine Sanktionspolitik gar nicht leisten, weil wir im Zuge der Energiewende zunehmend auf russische Gaslieferungen angewiesen sind«).
[About 35% of all oil and 30% of all gas imports in Europe come from Russia. For Germany the significance is even greater. So, at the present time, Russian deliveries constitute 38% of the natural gas importation and just under 35% of the crude oil and 27% of the coal imports.]
Gerhard Schröder, who has done considerable business with the Russians since leaving the German Chancellorship, raised some eyebrows this week allowing his friend Vladimir Putin to throw him a 70th birthday party. Schröder feiert mit Putin 70. Geburtstag nach Spiegel Online 29.04.2014)
Schröder has opposed a European policy of confrontation with Russia over Ukraine. His business ties to Russia don't necessarily boost his credibility on the sanctions issue. But Schröder as Chancellor also pursued a policy of good relations with Russia. Along with his Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who is now calling for a hard line against Russia. (Christian Rothenberg, "Russen werden höchsten Preis zahlen": Fischer lobt Merkel und schweigt zu Schröder n-tv.de 21.03.2014)
During Schröder's Chancellorship, Puting famously addressed the German Budestag in September 2001. In fluent German:
German transcript here.
Schröder the former Social Democratic Chancellor is also a long-time friend of German business lobbies, as Wolfgang Münchau points out in Der Genosse und sein Boss Spiegel Online 30.04.2014. He notes of Schröder and Putin:
Sie haben aber etwas Wichtiges gemeinsam: ein altbackenes, längst überkommenes Verständnis von Wirtschaft. Für Schröder ist es die Reduzierung der Wirtschaft auf die Interessen von Großkonzernen. Für Putin ist es die Illusion wirtschaftlicher Autarkie als Grundlage russischer Machtpolitik.I confess that I just saw a news item that almost made me sympathize with Angela Merkel for a moment.
[But they have something important in common: a stale, long-criticized understanding of business. For Schröder, it is the reduction of business to the interests of large businesses. For Putin, it is the illusion of economic autarky as the basis of Russian power politics.]
That great American statesman and bold Maverick McCain says he doesn't like Merkel's leadership style. He criticizes her for being too responsive to the industrial lobby, so much so that, "We could just as well have them sitting in the government, it's a shame." (I haven't found a version in English, so that's a re-translation.)
I don't know which is better: McCain describing Merkel's government accurately, or him bitching about a government being controlled by lobbyists. He's upset because Merkel's dragging her feet on sanctions against Ukraine. Last year, Mean Mister Mustard was demanding that Obama apologize to poor Angie for bugging her phone. I guess we can say he was for Angie before he was against her. [groan]
Von Lucke characterizes the current situation in the EU as follows:
Heute steht Europa an einem historischen Scheideweg: Auf der einen Seite droht die Renationalisierung, nun auch via Straßburg. Die Alternative dazu ist eine verstärkte demokratische Europäisierung, was jedoch keineswegs bloße Euro-Verteidigung bedeutet. Im Gegenteil: Ein primär monetäres Europa, das allein auf dem Euro gründet, gibt offenbar nicht die taugliche Antwort auf die aktuelle Krise Europas. Gerade angesichts der Krimkrise kann die EU lernen, dass ein gemeinsamer europäischer Markt samt einheitlicher Währung keineswegs ausreicht, um zu einer echten politischen Union zu werden. Ohne eine europaweite Diskussion über die Finalität – nämlich Ziel und Zweck der EU – wird die erforderliche demokratische Vertiefung Europas letztlich nicht zu erreichen sein. Die Krise um die Ukraine bietet durchaus die Chance, den Wert der EU neu zu ermessen und ihren Zusammenhalt zu stärken. Der bisherige Weg einer bloßen Erweiterung (nun auch um die assoziierte Ukraine) wird dafür allerdings nicht ausreichen.Well put.
[Today Europe stands at an historic turning point: One the one side threatens the re-nationaization, now even via Strassburg. The alternative to that is a strenghtened democratic Europization, which in no way means simply defense of the euro. Just the opposite: A primarily monetary Europe that is founded only on the euro, clearly does not provide the suitable answer to the current crisis. Precisely in light of the Crimean crisis, the EU can learn that a common European market with an unified currency in no way suffices in order to become an actual political union. Without a Europe-wide discussion on the finality - namely the goal and purpose of the EU - the necessary democratic deepening of Europe in the end will not be achievable. The crisis over Ukraine conceivably offers the chance to arbitrate the
EU anew and to strengthen its coherence. The previous way of a simple expansion (now even to the associated Ukraine) will in any case not suffice.]
Tags: angela merkel, austerity economics, eu, euro, european union, ukraine
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