Showing posts with label angela merkel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label angela merkel. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 02, 2018

Is Angela Merkel's Chancellorship About to End?

The German-language press has been full of stories recently about the impending end of Angela Merkel's Chancellorship. I doubt that it is quite so eminent as the headlines suggest.
The recent flap started with Hans-Georg Maaßen, the head of the Verfassungsschutz, the internal security agenca charged with monitoring and countering groups that aim to undermine the democratic order, which typically means political groups with a possible violent tendency. After recent anti-immigrant violence in the city of Chemnitz, Maaßen made public comments that seemed to minimize anti-immigrant violence and even to sympathize with the extremists.

The opposition called for his ouster over those comments and for "allegedly providing members of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) with confidential material." (Judith Mischke, Merkel admits mistakes in case of domestic intelligence chief Politico EU 09/24/2018) The agreement the coalition reached was to take him out of that office and give him a promotion. The SPD rank-and-file and the opposition were outraged. So they moved him to a vaguely defined advisory position in the Interior Ministry.

Then came what Merkel expected to be a routine vote to re-elect Volker Kauder as the head of the CDU parlimentary club. Merkel supported Kauder, but the former deputy leader Ralph Brinkhaus was elected instead with 125 votes to 112 for Kauder. As Matthew Karnitschnig reports (Merkel loses key ally in conservative rebellion Politico EU 09/26/2018),
Before the vote, Merkel made a personal plea to the group at a meeting in the historic Reichstag building, telling members that she considers Kauder to be crucial to the stability of her coalition government. By selecting Brinkhaus against Merkel’s wishes immediately following her remarks, conservative MPs left no doubt that they are dissatisfied with the chancellor’s stewardship.
Merkel has been Chancellor at the head of a GroKo (Grand Coalition) of the CDU, CSU, and SPD since 2005, the exception being in 2009-11 when she headed a CDU/CSU/FDP coalition.

It's unlikely that either Merkel's CDU or the SDP would want to have a new national election after just having one last year.

Both the CDU and the SPD are facing political challenges. Merkel has to worry about pressure from the right from the CSU and the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland), especially on immigration. The SPD has been losing support dramatically over the last 15 years. After the 2013 election, they had a chance to build a majority "red-red-green" coalition of the SPD, the Left Party, and the Greens. They didn't even try, they were so eager to be Angela Merkel's junior partner for four more years. After the 2017 election, the three parties together no longer have a parliamentary majority. If the SPD over the next few years shrinks to a minor party - a real possibility - 2013 will stand out as a key moment on that journey to irrelevance.

Sunday, August 19, 2018

Putin drops by in middle Europe

Vladimir Putin made his trip to Austria and Germany on Saturday.

The optics of Putin's appearance at the wedding of Austria's Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl. From a pro-EU standpoint, the optics were pretty bad. (Melissa Eddy, The Bride Was a Dream in a Dirndl, but Putin Stole the Show New York Times 08/18/2018)

The Russian state channel RT ran this report on the event. It includes Kneissl dancing with Putin. With Kneissel bowing and kneeling to him at the end, Putin dances, speaks German at Austrian FM’s wedding 08/18/2018)



If Chancellor Sebastian "Babyface" Kurz' government wanted to send a message that they are copying the deferential posture Trump took toward Putin in Helsinki this summer, I think they succeeded.

Vice Chancellor Hans-Christian Strache seemed to be pleased to be part of the event.

Strache is the head of the junior partner in Chancellor Babyface's governing coalition, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), which has a formal "working agreement" with Putin's Russia United party.

Kurz claims he got to chat with the Russian President about various issues, including Syria and Ukraine. (Kanzler Kurz sprach mit Putin über "Krisenherde" Die Presse 19.08.2018)

Putin flew on to Germany to meet with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. (Melissa Eddy, Merkel and Putin Sound Pragmatic Notes After Years of Tension New York Times 08/18/2018)

That meeting was a more normal one by diplomatic standards and almost certainly more productive. Eddy notes that Syria is a major issue on which Germany and Russia can find common ground:
Both leaders could benefit from finding a way to ensure sufficient political stability in Syria to allow Germany to begin encouraging refugees to return, while Mr. Putin is seeking support from Berlin and the European Union to help rebuild the country, said Stefan Meister of the German Council on Foreign Relations.

“It is in the domestic political interest of the German government that Syrian refugees be able to return to a stable Syria,” Mr. Meister said.

Monday, August 13, 2018

Iran and immigrtion to Europe

The flaws in the eurozone and mass immigration are two major problems of the EU that in some ways reinforce each other. And either of them individually could cause a serious breakdown in the EU or an even moer drastic reduction in its size than Brexit provides.

Christiane Hoffmann highlights the Middle East foreign policy aspects of the immigration crisis in a way that, it seems to me, the major media in Austria and Germany seriously neglect: the connection between American/NATO policies and actions in the Middle East and the immigration pressures on Europe. ("Die kommende Krise", Der Spiegel 33-2018/11.08.2018)

There are two centrally important pieces to the real existing immigration problem in Europe, as opposed to the phony ones created in the minds of xenophobic European politicians. (And the Russian propaganda that sometimes utilizes them for their own purposes.) One is that the world is undergoing a mass movement of people that seems to be more drastic than anything before in human history. This is being driven by climate change and various effects of globalization, like the driving down of wages, and the climate crisis and digitial communication.

Second are the wars in the Middle East. The acute phase of the immigration crisis in 2015 on which the rightwing populists are still surfing politically was driven in major part by the Syrian civil war - which was generated at least in part by a severe draught - as well as by the war in Afghanistan, which is part of what Andrew Bacevich calls the Greater Middle East, though the term hasn't caught on widely yet. The spectacularly ill-advised NATO intervention in Libya which resulted in Libya falling into a failed-state condition also contributed mightily.

I call mass immigration issue as a longterm crisis for Europe, that has acute phases like 2015. (That terminology also seems not to have caught on beyond myself, but I'm sticking with it!) A new acute wave could be activated by a war with Iran or by a decision on Turkey's part to stop holding the nearly 3 million refugees they are now housing and sending some large portion of them to Europe.

What Hoffmann says about EU policy in relation to Iran sounds to me like straighforward realism, which more often than not is a good thing:
Anfang November will Trump eine weitere Sanktionsrunde folgen lassen, dann soll Iran kein Öl mehr exportieren können, die USA wollen die Lebensader der iranischen Wirtschaft kappen. Die EU bemüht sich um das Atomabkommen, sie leistet Widerstand gegen die US-Sanktionen und sucht nach Wegen, um den Iranhandel trotz der amerikanischen Strafmaßnahmen aufrechtzuerhalten. Das ist richtig, aber nicht genug. Die Gefahr geht mittlerweile weit über ein Ende des Atomabkommens hinaus.

Es reicht deshalb nicht mehr, dass sich die Europäer für das Atomabkommen einsetzen. Sie müssen in Washington sehr deutlich sagen, dass die Politik der Destabilisierung Irans und des Nahen Ostens gegen die Sicherheitsinteressen Europas verstößt. Trumps Nahostpolitik muss zu einer Priorität der europäischen Politik werden. Deutschland und Europa brauchen jetzt, anders als in den vorangegangenen Krisen, endlich eine vorausschauende, präventive Außenpolitik.

{At the beginning of November, Trump wants to impose a wider round of sanctions, which are expected to stop Iran from exporting any more oil, because the US wants to cut off the vital lines of the Iranian economy. The EU is trying to stick with the nuclear agreement, it is resisting the US sanctions, and is looking for ways to maintain Iranian trade despite the American punitive measures. That is correct, but not enough. The danger in the meantime reach much further than the end of the nuclear agreement.

It is no longer sufficient for the Europeans to adhere to the nuclear agreement. The must also say very clearly to Washington that the policy of destabilization violates Europe's security interests. Trump's Near East policy needs to become a priority of European politics. Germany and Europe now reallyneed, differently than in the previous crises, a far-sighted, preventive foreign policy.}
Angela Merkel is rightly criticized for her extend-and-pretend solutions to problems of the EU. The classic example was the "bailout" of Greece in 2015, which imposed severe Herbert Hoover/Heinrich Brüning austerity policies on a Greek economy already suffering a severe depression. And did so knowing that the measures would fail to fulfill their claimed purpose of restoring the economy - the "pretend" part. But the "extend" part was that it crushed the Greek opposition to the austerity madness and maintained the general neoliberal economic policies dominating the EU and did so without breaking up the eurozone with all the far-reaching consequences that would imply.

It's hard not to admire Merkel's skills as a political leader, however bad her policies may be. And it's true that kicking the can down the road, to use an American expression for extend-and-pretend, is usually an attractive option for politicians. And, in practical terms, sometimes the only feasible course when there is a political deadlock over an issue.

But it's one thing to kick the can down the road on a county zoning regulation. Doing so on the major problems that could wreck the EU is a whole different thing. As Hoffmann notes, Merkel herself has stated that ignoring the immigration issue too much prior to 2015 was a bad idea. And, to be realistic, Merkel during the immigration crisis in 2015 did seriously try to implement an EU-wide rule that actually would have provided a sensible and practical revision of the Dublin Regulations regime that had by then very plainly failed. But it was blocked by Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Also to be realistic, that failure during the acute immigration situation in 2015 was in significant part due to the stunning arrogance Merkel and other EU leaders showed in the Greek crisis that year. But that's a story for another time.

Hoffmann may be over-estimating the chances of Iran becoming a "second Syria," i.e., a country with a full-blown civil war. An external war initiated or encouraged by the Trump Administration is probably the greater danger. But Hoffmann's advice would still be well-taken. And at some point with real crises, the extend-and-pretend possibilties run out.

This is an August 5 English-language documentary on Iran from Deutsche Welle, Iran: from theocracy to regional superpower?


Sunday, August 12, 2018

Merkel still pushes for a European solution to immigration issues

German Chacellor Angela Merkel is still trying to put her "European solution" to the immigration crisis together, nearly three years since the effort failed during the acute phase of the crisis in 2015.

On a visit to Spain's Social Democratic Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, Merkel's renewed her push for an EU agreement establishing mandatory targets, i.e., quotas (although she doesn't use the word) for accepting the resettling immigrants to Europe that arrive in a irregular manner. That it, asylum seekers or refugees. The xenophobic parties and groups prefer to call them all "migrants," because that sounds more like voluntary or opportunistic immigration.

The overall number of refugees to Europe has declined drastically since the high point of 2015. But Spain is experiencing a higher number of arrivals this year compared to last. The xenophobes would like to claim that is because Spain now has a Social Democratic Chancellor that is open to immigration solutions compatible with EU and international law, as well as with some decent humane standard. The rightwing-dominated Italian government is claiming credit for causing the shift by refusing to accept emergency landings of ships that have rescued refugees at sea.

Fiona Ehlers et al explain the shift in "Aufruhr am Strand" Der Spiegel 32/2018 (04.08.2018). The translation below is mine from the print edition. Spiegel International has an English version, Spain Becomes New Target for Migrants 08/03/2018.
Es liegt aber nicht an Spanien, sondern vor allem an Marokko, dass immer mehr Migranten über die westliche Mittelmeerroute Europa erreichen. Spanische Seenotretter beobachteten schon im Juni, wie Menschen auf instabilen Schlauchbooten sogar tagsüber ungehindert in See stechen konnten - von Stränden nahe Tanger aus, aber auch aus Buchten im Osten bei Nador. Mehr als drei Dutzend Afrikaner segelten sogar auf einem Dinghi durch die Meerenge zu einem Strand im spanischen Tarifa. Am vorvergangenen Donnerstag gelang es rund 600 Migranten in der Exklave Ceuta den Grenzzaun zu überwinden.

Daten der EU-Grenzschutzagentur Frontex legen nahe, dass die Schleusermafia die Nachlässigkeit der marokkanischen Sicherheitskräfte ausnutzt. Offenbar versucht Marokko, der EU Zugeständnisse abzupressen, indem Spanien durch kaum kontrollierte Zuwanderung unter Druck gesetzt wird. Schon vor dem Regierungswechsel in Spanien fühlten sich Marokkos Regierende schlecht behandelt. Wahrend der Türkei von der EU sechs Milliarden Euro zugesagt wurden, hat Marokko für die Eindämmung der Flüchtlingsstrome in den vergangenen zehn Jahren nur hundert Millionen Euro erhalten. Seit Jahresbeginn wartet man außerdem auf Gelder, um die Grenzsicherung zu verstärken. Jetzt hat Kommissionspräsident Jean-Claude Juncker eine baldige Oberweisung zugesichert, der EU-Flüchtlingskommissar wollte in die Region reisen.

{It [the responsibility for the shift of migration routes more to Spain] is not because of Spain, but above all because of Morocco, which more and more migrants reach. Spanish sea rescuers observed already in June how people on unstable tube boats could enter the see unhindered for days at a time - coming from beaches near Tangier [in Morrocco] but also from bays near Nador [in Morocco].

Data from the EU border security agency Frontex indicates that the people-smuggling mafia are exploting the casual attitude of the Moroccan security forces. Morocco is obviously extorting EU officials to get concessions by putting Spain under pressure over its lightly controlled immigration. Even before the change of government in Spain [in June 2018], Morocco's rulers considered themselves poorly treated. While Turkey is given €6 billion [for detaining refugees headed to Europe], Morrocco in the last ten years has received only €100 million for the control of the refugee stream. In addition, they have waited since the beginning of the year to strenghen border security. Now the [EU] Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has assurred an immediate review; the EU refugee commissioner would like to travel for the region.}

This is the kind of extend-and-pretend solution on which the EU relies, especially since 2015. The Dublin Regulation has governed EU immigration policy since 1997. It requires that refugees be registered in the first EU country in which they land and required to stay there until their cases are resolved. In the recent wave of refugees, that meant that Italy, Greece, and now Spain receive a large portion of the refugees. Merkel also made a key deal with Turkey in 2015, the one referred to in the Spiegel piece, by which Turkey to agreed to hold refugees. The number there is now approaching three million.

Turkey can do the same thing that Morocco is doing at any time and, if they choose, open a new round of inter-EU disputes like those that have been raging since 2015, despite the number of refugees in Europe having gone down drastically since 2015. This is how Turkey is intimately related to refugees in the EU. And why tensions with Turkey from the EU and within NATO involve a country that holds a big club it can whack them with. That's not at all to say that such an action by Turkey would be legal or defensible. But it's an important part of the web of relationships between Turkey and the EU.

Merkel, to her credit, is using the current time in which immigration to the EU has receded to try to work out a more practical and comprehensive solution.

At the EU summit this summer, Merkel secured a vague commitment for a European solution. But how long it will take for concrete steps to be taken in that direction is anybody's guest. Many EU countries are in no hurry.

Antonio Avendaño reports in Llámame Pedro. Llámame Angela El Plural 11.08.2018 that the Merkel-Sánche meeting seems to have been a friendly one. The two visited an immigration center. They seem to be on the same page on immigration, at least in the current moment.

Thomas Urban reports in Merkel fordert Neuordnung der europäischen Asylpolitik Süddeutsche Zeitung 11.08.2018 that Merkel reiterated that the Dublin Regulation is non-functional:
Die Bundeskanzlerin fügte hinzu: "Nach der Theorie dürfte nie ein Migrant oder ein Flüchtling in Deutschland ankommen." Die Realität sei jedoch eine andere. Seit langem fordern Politiker aus den EU-Staaten am Mittelmeer das Ende des Dublin-Systems. Denn laut dem Vertrag müssten sie die ganze Last der Migration tragen, während die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, die nur EU-Staaten zu Nachbarn hat, faktisch keine Asylanten aufnehmen müsste - es sei denn, diese erreichten einen deutschen Flughafen.

Kritisiert wurde auch, dass die Rahmenbedingungen für das Dubliner Abkommen von Anfang an nicht stimmten. Denn während die meisten südeuropäischen Staaten Asylbewerbern nur Kost und Logis stellen, können sie in der Bundesrepublik mit einer zusätzlichen Unterstützung von mehreren Hundert Euro pro Monat rechnen, ganz abgesehen davon, dass die Behörden bislang nur einen Bruchteil der Ausreisepflichtigen wirklich abschoben.

Die Kanzlerin sprach sich nun für ein neues Abkommen aus, das eine "gerechte Verteilung" der Asylbewerber unter den EU-Staaten vorsieht. Doch müssten auch die Migranten ohne Bleiberecht konsequent in ihre Heimatländer zurückgebracht werden. Bislang sind ihre Versuche, eine EU-weite Regelung durchzusetzen, allerdings an Polen, der Slowakei, Tschechien und Ungarn gescheitert. Dort wird argumentiert, dass es sich vor allem um ein deutsches Problem handle, da die allermeisten Migranten dorthin wollten.

{The Chancellor added: "In theory, [under the Dublin rules] there should never be a migrant or a refugee arriving in Germany." She says that the reality is different. For a long time, politicians from EU states on the Meditteranean Sea have requested the end of the Dublin system. Because according to the treaty's terms, they have to carry the complete burden of migration, while the Federal Republic of Germany, which has only EU states as neighbors, in fact is not required to take any asylum-seekers - even those that arrive at a German airport.

The legal framework of the Dublin Agreement has also been criticized from the start for being inappropriate. Because while most of the southern European states provided asylum-seekers only room and board, in Germany there can expect an additional support of more than €100, completely apart from the fact that the officilas up until now have really expelled only a small number.

Now the Chancellor spoke out for a new agreement that envisions are "just division" of asylum-seekers among the EU states. But the migrants that don't have a right to stay must be consistently returned to their home countries. So far, her attempts to push through an EU-wide regulation have run to ground, at least with PolandSlovakia, Czechia, and Hungary. There it is argued that this involves a German problem above all, because most all of the migrants want to go there.}
Clearly, once you get past the empty slogans of "close the borders" and the like, this is a very complicated political, logistic, and administrative problem. The left and center-right parties will have to find a way to defang the rightwing populist demogogy that has recently been disturbingly prominent in European politics.

Sunday, July 08, 2018

The politics of fakery on European immigration

Immigration makes some people crazy. And crazy, as a general rule, is a bad basis for policymaking. (Marc Brost et al, Tage des Irrsinns Die Zeit 04-05.07.2018)

With both Putin and Trump eager to weaken the European Union, the EU countries are floundering on the twin dilemma of a "the obscenity of a currency union which imposes a strict system of rules to the benefit of its strongest member states but does not in compensation provide the latitude for joint political action on the European level" (Jürgen Habermas, Die Zeit 06.07.2018) and the inability to set up an effective and fair system for handling refugees and asylum-seekers.

The EU continues to deal with the problems of the eurozone by what amounts to magic conjuring with the holy phrases of Herbert Hoover/Heinrich Brüning economics. And with the immigration crisis by staging bad theater. But since we're dealing with major government policies here, the fakery comes with real costs to real people.

In a recent lecture, Jürgen Habermas described how Angela Merkel's nationalistic posturing during the debt crisis fed nationalistic sentiments in the EU, a process that is backfiring on Germany in visible ways (Sind wir noch gute Europäer? Die Zeit 04.07.2018; English: Are We Still Good Europeans? 06.07.2018):
If you listen closely to the German chancellor, it is striking that she makes rather peculiar use of the words "loyalty" and "solidarity." During a recent appearance on a talk show hosted by Anne Will, Merkel demanded joint political action on asylum policy and in the tariff conflict with the United States, and in this context called for the "loyalty" of the EU partners. Generally, it is the boss who expects loyalty from her employees, while joint political action generally requires solidarity rather than loyalty. Depending on the constellation of interests, it is sometimes the one, sometimes the other, who must subordinate their own interests to those of the whole. When it comes to asylum policy, for example, not all countries – because of their geographical locations, for example – are equally affected by migration nor do they all have the same capacity to take people in. To take another example, tariffs on automobile imports threatened by the U.S. would hit some, Germany in this case, harder than others. In such cases, joint political action means that one party takes the interests of others into consideration and takes on its share of responsibility for the jointly approved political resolution. Germany's interest is obvious in these two examples, just as it is in the insistence on a joint European foreign policy.

The fact that the chancellor speaks of "loyalty" in such cases is likely a consequence of her having spent years using the world "solidarity" in a different, strictly economic context. "Solidarity in return for each country's own responsibility" is the euphemistic slogan that became familiar in the course of the [debt] crisis, a reference to the conditions imposed on credit recipients by those granting the credits. What I am getting at is the conditional redefinition of the term solidarity: that is the semantic breaking point where cracks are now showing in the certainty that we Germans are the best Europeans. Contrary to the raving clamor about transfer payments, which have never actually come to pass, what is slowly creeping into the public awareness is both the lack of legitimacy and the dubious effects of investment-hampering budgetary constraints, along with labor market reforms that result in entire generations being jobless. [my emphasis]
Habermas refers to the nationalistic demagogues and policies that are currently threatening the EU's existence as "the Trumpian dissolution of Europe."

There was a political confrontation the last few weeks between German Interior Minister Ernst Seehofer (CSU) over a narrow slice of the current set of immigration and asylum issue in which Austria's Chancellor Sebastian "Babyface" Kurz intervened in a reckless way that was over an issue whose substance seems almost esoteric. (Wolfgang Münchau, German refugee compromise ignores underlying issues Financial Times 07/05/2018; Andrea Böhm, Europas Flucht vor der Realität Die Zeit 07.07.2018; Max Fisher and Katrin Bennhold, Germany’s Europe-Shaking Political Crisis Over Migrants, Explained New York Times 07/03/2018)

But too much of the immigration debate - far, far too much - depends on symbolic posturing that translates into headlines the xenophobes can exploit for their own demagoguery.

I saw a small example in a local insert for the state/province of Upper Austria from the Austrian Neues Volksblatt ", Hoamatland for July 2018, which is associated with the politics of the Chancellor's conservative People's Party (ÖVP). The second half of page 6 carries three headlines: "Christliche Werte zu OÖ!" ("Christian values appertain to Upper Austria!"), "Zwei Moscheen in OÖ geschlossen" ("Two mosques in Upper Austria closed"), and "Bevölkerung für strikten Kurs" ("Population for a strict course"). Christian values, closing mosques, a strict course against "migration" - all are favorite framing constructs for Austrian xenophobes.

But if the reader bothers to look closely, something odd is happening. The first is a report about a new "integration" policy statement for immigrants by the Upper Austrian state government, featuring the leading government officials of the government coalition, Landeshauptmann (Governor) Thomas Stelzer (ÖVP) and deputy governor Manfred Haimbuchner, together with representatives of the opposition SPÖ and Greens, the same photo featured in this story at Volksblatt.at, „Kompass für das Zusammenleben“ 04.07.2018. It's about the release of a general policy statement called Integration Verbindlich Gestalten - Zusammenhalt Stärken. The "Christliche Werte" article certainly leaves the impression that all parties in the state Landtag were endorsing a policy that specified "Christian values" as government policy, which is understood in the present context as a anti-Islamic framing.

But the Hoamatland article doesn't include the quote cited in the headline. Nor does the longer Volksblatt are includes a statement supporting "Christian values and traditions," in a context which quotes the title of the Integration Verbindlich document and leaves a clear impression that it includes a Bekenntnis ("profession" or "allegiance to") "our Christian values and traditions." Here's the paragraph in German:
Unter dem Titel „Integration verbindlich gestalten — Zusammenhalt stärken“ bringe das neue Leitbild Ziel und Aufgabe der Integrationspolitik zum Ausdruck und stelle einen Handlungsrahmen für die zukünftige Integrationspolitik und Integrationsarbeit einschließlich des Förderwesens im Land auf, heißt es in einer Stellungnahme der Landesregierung. Und, so wird betont: „Wesentliche Grundlagen und Schlüsselfaktoren für ein gelungenes Zusammenleben sind unter anderem das Bekenntnis zur gemeinsamen Sprache Deutsch, das Bemühen um Selbsterhaltung und die Teilhabe am Arbeitsmarkt sowie das Bekenntnis zu unseren christlichen Werten und Traditionen.“
But the thing is, the Integration Verbindlich statement on the Upper Austria official website does not say that. A simple Cntl-F search shows 25 instances of "Werte" (values) in the 20-page document, none of which are identified as "Christian". Or "Islamic" or "Muslim" or "religious". The same combination of Windows keyboard, Adobe Acrobat, and my own eyeballs search combination finds only one reference to "Christian": "Österreich ist ein offenes, christlich geprägtes Land,
das dem Humanismus und der Aufklärung verpflichtet ist." ("Austria is an open country shaped by Christianity and which is committed to humanism and the Enlightenment.") And the document is explicit about what it assumes to be Austrian values in a section called "Central Basic Values":
  • Democracy and the rule of law ("Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit")
  • Separation of church and state/religious freedom ("Trennung von Staat und Religion/Glaubensfreiheit")
  • Integrity of body and spirit ("Körperliche und geistige Unversehrtheit")
  • The individual right to shape one's life and freedom of opinion ("Recht auf individuelle Lebensgestaltung und Meinungsfreiheit")
  • Equality of the sexes ("Gleichstellung der Geschlechter")
  • Educational opportunities and educational responsibilities ("Bildungschancen und Bildungspflicht")
In other words, like any official document passed through endless committees and designed to be acceptable to the entire ideological spectrum of the parties in a state legislature, it's a safely bland statement of general liberal democratic values of tolerance and mutual respect.

So why present the story with a headline that makes the whole thing sound like a defiant declaration of the primacy of Christianity as such in Austrian identity? Even allowing for Austrian journalistic practice of putting quotation marks in headlines around summary statements that aren't exact quotes, it's an odd presentation. I was unable to locate the quote from the Hoamatland headline in a Google search.

Briefly, the other two headlines have similar issues. Two mosques in Upper Austria were closed, it reports, a move announced in a June 8 press conference statement Chancellor Babyface, Vice Chancellor HC Strache, and Interior Minister Herbert Kickl. The article leads with a quote from Landeshauptmann Stelzer to crow about fighting "political Islam," hostile subcultures ("Gegengesellschaften"), radicalization, and violence. All associated with the closed mosques.

In reality, there was much less to the June 8 announcements that the PR hype suggested. The announcement was about withdrawing official recognition from some small Islamic associations. As Austrian specialist on rightwing extremism, Thomas Rammerstorfer, explains in Der große Schmäh mit der bösen Moschee Falter 13.06.2018, not only were the grounds for the closures practically and legally questionable. But also their practical effect on Islamic affairs and "political Islam" in Austria is to strengten the relative prestige and influence of groups friendly to Turkey's authoritarian President Tayyip Erdoğan, which were not touched by the actions. Erdoğan is a favorite bogeyman for the Austrian far right despite the similarities between his autoritarian leanings and theirs. Turks form the largest group of Austrian Muslims, all of whom are regularly trashed by rightwingers. None of that would be conveyed by the Hoamatland piece.

The third article is an uncritical paragraph saying that 83% approve of German classes for children who haven't managed German sufficiently for their grade level in school. This sounds perfectly harmless, a liberal and generous measure. But the current national government has been pushing for a particular kind of German classes in publisc schools for foreign children that would tend to segregate them in schools from their native German-speaking peers, a position means to promote stigmatization of immigrant children and make it even harder for them to integrate successfully into Austrian society. That really is just a filler article. But it fits with the other two in promoting a very superficial picture of current policies on immigration and their practical effects.

There's quite a bit of discussion in American politics right now about whether countering far-right Trumpist with facts is effective, or even counter-productive. But as these Austrian examples illustrate, the left and pro-democracy centrists have to counter these propaganda claims with facts. But they also have to be very mindful of countering the framing of the issues as well. When the right peddles with deceptive framing and appeals to fear and hatred, their opponents also have provide attractive framing and persuasive emotional appeals at the same time as countering false claims with facts. A big part of the advantage of advocates for "reality-based" understandings and advocacy for realistic policies based on facts is that reality has a persistent ability to impose itself on crackpot theories and policies.

Tuesday, July 03, 2018

The Empire (Angela Merkel) strikes back at Austria's Chancellor Babyface

The EU countries are going through their own version of coming up with non-solutions to not-really-problems of immigration.

The latest round was a compromise on Tuesday between German Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) and her Interior Minister Horst Seehofer (CSU). Which seems to have resolved a power struggle between the two. (Angela Merkel's last-ditch migrant compromise under scrutiny Deutsche Welle 03.07.2018) At least for this week. Wolfgang Munchau suggests that Merkel's trademark extend-and-pretend solutions are having "rapidly declining half-life."

The EU's immigration crisis is real, in my view. It's a long-term problem since at least 2011 that will not go away any time soon. People fleeing war and civil violence and desperate conditions in war-torn countries like Afghanistan, Syria, and Libya. There was a crisis moment in 2015, when a big surge of refugees headed north, most of which Germany absorbed.

The current EU solution - arguably the only one in place - is that Turkey, Italy, and Greece are holding large numbers of refugees from North Africa and the Middle East in camps of varying quality. Under the "Dublin" rules governing EU immigration, the EU country of first entry is responsible for processing asylum applications. So the burdens really are unfairly distributed to Greece and Italy, and other EU countries have not been forthcoming, to put it mildly, in accepting refugees that initially enter the EU through other countries.

But for the EU as a whole, the crisis is a longer one, and 2015 was an unusual event in terms of the suddenness of the influx for much larger numbers of refugees. In countries like Germany and Austria, the influx of asylum-seekers has declined year by year since the drastic high of 2015 and can't reasonably be said to be serious problems for either of those two countries in 2018.

But rightwing demagogues have made hay with the issue through anti-immigrant agitation.

While the long-term immigration crisis is a distinct issue itself, in the EU it is intimately connected with the ongoing euro crisis, which is currently in a dormant stage but can break out against at almost any moment. Joe Stiglitz gives a good description of the interconnection in How to exit the eurozone 07/02/2018:
The resulting schisms [in the EU over the euro crisis] have also made it harder to solve other problems, most notably the migration crisis, where European rules impose an unfair burden on the frontline countries receiving migrants, such as Greece and Italy. These also just so happen to be the debtor countries, already plagued with economic difficulties. No wonder there is a rebellion.
In the current situation, Italy is in a particularly volatile moment because it's a country where the immigration and eurozone crises intersect in a particularly visible way.

Ruth Wodak of the Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right describes several factors on which people need to focus if we want to have a realistic picture of the current immigration issue in Europe in her The Revival of Numbers and Lists in Radical Right Politics 06/30/2018.

The German compromise on Tuesday was mainly a cosmetic one for (at the moment) a non-problem. Leading up to it, Austria's 31-year-old Chancellor Sebastian "Babyface" Kurz meddled in an unusual way in German internal politics. He very publicly supported Seehofer in his power play against Merkel. The provocative nature of this is compounded by the fact that Merkel's party (CDU) and Seehofer's party (CSU) are international "sister" parties of Kurz's Christian Democratic People's Party (ÖVP). And Babyface started on July 1 as the President of the Council of Europe the European Union, a position that rotates to different EU countries every six months.

I'm very critical of Angela Merkel in many ways. But she is one of the most accomplished politicians of my lifetime. And she knows how to shove the (political) knife. So I expected retaliation on her part. And part of it has begun. The Merkel-Seehofer deal said Germany wouldn't accept new asylum-seekers entering from neighboring countries. This is to be handled by bilateral deals. And other countries like Czechia or Poland who doesn't want to accept their return will be sent to Austria under a bilateral agreement with them. An agreement that, uh, doesn't yet exist.

This is the visible beginning of Angie's payback to Babyface. It won't be the last. She's telling him, hey, you want "closed borders" to Austria, fine. We'll close the German border and any people we get we don't want, we'll dump them back onto you, you silly whining twat.

If you take a political shot like this at Angie, you'd better makes sure it hits its mark. Otherwise, there will be repercussions.

This is mostly Kabuki theater at the moment. Because there aren't hordes of scary immigrants pouring over the border into Germany. Or Austria either.

The even the Kabuki illustrates some of the limits of trying to operate in an international movement of nationalists.

Stay tuned. There will be more. It's unlikely that Babyface will fare any better in the next rounds.

[Minor updates included]

Saturday, January 20, 2018

A faithful journalistic fan of Angela Merkel discovers she plays cynical politics on refugees

Dirk Kurbjuweit of Der Spiegel has been embarrassing himself for years with his fawning coverage of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. See, for instance, my post of 08/05/2013, German siesta? Or neoliberal demobilization?

Now he seems to be actually surprised at the calculating and cold-hearted posture she is now displaying on the refugee issue: "Die Kanzlerin der Grimmigen" Der Spiegel 4:2018 20.1.2018 (print edition). Merkel had an intense year in 2015. After soundly defeating Greece's attempt to get out from under the absurd EU debt policies that were keep Greece in a state of severe depression, her image had take a hit. The cold, dogmatic, destructive stance she took in the Greek crisis had tarnished her reputation as a world leader.

Klaus Stuttmann captured this image of her in a cartoon of 28.06.2012 depicting her as Frau Fritz, a takeoff on a famous portrait of Frederick the Great, aka, Old Fritz:

Angie is saying in the caption, "Thrift, incorruptibility, efficiency and discipline: THAT's what Europe has to learn!!"

The refugee inflow to Europe has been a chronic crisis, as well, at least since 2011. But it hit an acute phase in 2015, when large numbers poured into Europe. Merkel and the EU had been handling the EU crisis according to her signature extend-and-pretend style, i.e., do enough to stave off immediate disaster but don't do the hard task of actually solving the problem. So in 2015, the EU countries were insufficiently prepared in emergency services. And, critically, they had not made long-term plans for burden-sharing among the EU countries.

Dirk Kurbjuweit has discovered in 2018 that Merkel displays "the arrogance of power." In 2015, she announced that Germany was taking a large number of refugees that year, which turned out to be around one million. She clearly thought that she could force her EU partners, who she sometimes seems to regard more as vassals, into taking significant quotas as the refugees. It doesn't speak well of the EU governments like France and Britain that failed to take what would arguably have been a fair share of them. But Merkel had momentarily solved the problem for them.

And she got a momentary bonanza in the short-term, transforming her image from that of Frau Fritz to the Compassionate Pastor's Daughter. A Spiegel cover that September featured her as Mother Theresa:


In that same Spiegel, (Der alte Kontinent 19.09.2015), Peter Müller succinctly described in inadequacy of extend-and-pretend on the refugee crisis:
Ähnlich wie in der Eurokrise die Währungsunion durch eine gemeinsame Finanzpolitik ergänzt werden muss, können Schengen und Dublin in Zukunft nur funktionieren, wenn die Europäer Asylstandards angleichen, sich auf einen festen Verteilungsschlüssel einigen und endlich damit beginnen, die Ursachen der Migration ernsthaft zu bekämpfen: Dazu gehören eine effektive Entwicklungshilfe, eine Klimapolitik, die ihren Namen verdient, und gemeinsame, legale Zuwanderungsmöglichkeiten. Fast alles Jahrhundertaufgaben.

"Zur Herausbildung einer europäischen Identität gibt es nur eine Alternative", schreibt Jürgen Habermas. "Der alte Kontinent verschwindet von der weltpolitischen Bühne." Der Philosoph hat recht. Aber die Flüchtlingskrise zeigt, wie weit der Weg noch ist.

[Similar to the way that, in the euro crisis, the currency union has to be widened with a common financial policy, the Schengen and Dublin [treaties on borders] can function in the future only if the Europeans equalize their asylum standards, come together on a firm allocation formula [for refugees], and finally start to seriously engage with the basic causes of migration. Included among them are effective developmental assistance, a climate policy that deserves the name, and common legal immigration possibilities. Almost all of them tasks of a century.

"To construct a European identity there is only one alternative," writes Jürgen Habermas. "The Old Continent will disappear from the world stage." The philosopher is right. But the refugee crisis shows how far the way still is.]
Since 2015, rightwing parties have exploited xenophobia to demagogue against foreigners and Muslims. Meanwhile, the Compassionate Pastor's daughter worked out an extend-and-pretend "solution" to contain the number of refugees from Africa and the Middle East. Literally to contain the refugees in overcrowded refugee camps in Turkey and Greece (!). In order to reduce the high-risk flights by sea from North Africa, the EU worked with what currently constitutes government in Libya to also establish refugee camps, or prisons, there. The stories coming out of there have been horrific, e.g., Emma Graham-Harrison, Migrants from west Africa being ‘sold in Libyan slave markets’ Guardian 04/10/2017.

Deutsche Welle reports in Outrage across Africa after report exposes slave trade in Libya USA Today 11/23/2017:
Politicians in Africa have expressed their outrage at the scandal — especially in West Africa where most African migrants originate. President of Niger Mahamadou Issoufou felt particularly revolted by the reports, summoning the Libyan ambassador to Niger and demanding the International Court of Justice investigate Libya for trading slaves.

Meanwhile the foreign minister of Burkina Faso, Alpha Barry, told the press that he had also summoned the Libyan ambassador to the capital Ouagadougou for consultations. The issue has since been added to the agenda of next week's African Union meeting in Ivory Coast, to take place on November 29 and 30.

The issue has made waves in the Ivory Coast itself — 155 Ivorian refugees, including 89 women and underage migrants, were returned from Libya to the Ivory Coast earlier this week as part of a reintegration initiative launched by the European Union. Representatives of the Ivorian government, however, said that the health of those migrants returned from Libya was in a "deplorable state."
As part of the coalition agreement among the CDU, SPD and CSU that at this writing may or may not result in a new Grand Coalition government headed bgy Merkel sets an annual "upper limit" of 220,000 per year on the number of refugees Germany will accept.

Dirk Kurbjuweit is very disappointed by this policy. "Sie ist Ausdruck einer scharfen Kurve in der Flüchtlingspolitik, von den offenen Grenzen zur harschen Abwehr." ("It is the expression of a sharp turn in refugee policy, from open borders to harsh rejection.")

That's true so far as it goes. But, as shown above, there were plenty of reasons prior to this to regard Merkel's refugee policy as more hard political calculation with a preference for extend-and-pretend measures than the vision of the Compassionate Pastor's Daughter ludicrously constructed by Merkel's admirers in 2015. Still, Kurbjuweit seems to be quite disturbed by this latest position:
Nun zeigt Deutschland ein grimmiges Gesicht, und die Bundeskanzlerin hat kein Land mehr. Das stört sie jedoch nicht. Sie sieht das alles inzwischen ohnehin ganz anders. [Now Germany is showing a grim face, and the Chancellor no longer has a country. Now she sees everything very differently anyway.]
He sounds downright heartbroken! "The Chancellor" that he admired as the Compassionate Pastor's Daughter has been abandoned by her unworthy country. And (sob!) even she sees things differently now! Heartbreak is sad.

He's also noticed that the family-values parties have gaps in their family values:
Ausgerechnet der Familiennachzug wird begrenzt, von den Oberfamilienparteien CDU und CSU, obwohl allen klar sein muss, dass Männer die besten Chancen auf eine Integration haben, wenn sie hier mit ihren Familien zusammenleben. [Precisely the family unification {for some immigrants} will be restricted by the supreme family parties CDU and CSU, even though it must be clear to everyone that men have the being chance of being integated if they are living together with their families here.]
I hope nobody tells Dirk Kurbjuweit that Donald Trump is a foul-mouthed, woman-hating racist. He might be shocked at that revelation, too. Golly, it never occurred to him that xenophobes don't actually give a s*** about their "family values" pretensions when it comes to immigrants they regard as subhuman enemies of good German white folks!

Snark aside, he actually has a good point when he observes that Merkel's embrace of the xenophobic agenda is actually a slap in the face to voters and especially to all the volunteers in Germany who stepped up to compensate for the inadequancies of Germany's and the EU's insufficient emergency preparedness in the 2015 situation:
Nicht nur Politiker haben die Flüchtlingspolitik des Jahres 2015 getragen. Das waren auch viele, viele Bürger. Sie haben dem Staat, der nicht gut vorbereitet war, geholfen, haben Flüchtlinge willkommen geheißen, unterstützt, bei sich zu Hause aufgenommen. Sie waren Akteure der Politik, und viele sind es immer noch, weil sie dabei helfen, Flüchtlinge in diese Gesellschaft zu integrieren.

[It was not only politicians who supported the refugee policy of the year 2015. There were also many, many citizens. They helped the government that was not well prepared, they called the refugees welcome, supported them by taking them into their homes. They were political actors {in doing so}, and there are still many, because they still are there to help refugees to integrate into this society.]
Kurbjuweit also recognizes that Merkel is helping xenophobes in the AfD (rightwing Alternative for Germany) party in promoting nationalist hatreds by not only adopting their framing of the refugee issue but also adopting policies in line with theirs:

An deren Land baut Merkel gerade mit, für deren Sicht auf die Lage macht sie Politik. Natürlich gab und gibt es enorme Probleme mit Flüchtlingen. Aber es gibt auch eine hysterische Sicht darauf, die wenig mit der Realität zu tun hat. Silvester 2015/16 in Köln war fürchterlich, doch die Jahre danach haben bewiesen, dass man solche Probleme in den Griff bekommen kann. Jede Vergewaltigung ist eine zu viel, aber Recherchen des SPIEGEL (Heft 2/2018) haben gezeigt, dass interessierte Kreise dazu falsch informieren, um Flüchtlinge zu diffamieren.

Merkel is building on their land with them {the AfD}, she is making policy with an eye on them. Of course, there are enormous problems with refugees. But there is also a hysterical view of them that has little to do with reality. New Year's Eve 2015-16 in Cologne {sexual assaults on women by foreigners} was horrible, but the years since have shown that such problems can be handled. Every rape is one too many, but research by SPIEGEL (issue 2:2018) has shown that interested circles provide false information on that in order to defame refugees.] (my emphasis)
Defining the Other as a criminal, dangerous, threatening collective is standard procedure for bigots and demagogues of all sorts. Anyone familiar with the history of lynch murder in the United States will know how big a role false accusations and hysteria over sexual assault played in the murder of so many African-Americans. Sadly, the example can be multiplied many times in other countries, as well.

It's worth noting that there have been reports in the mainstream press about Russian cyber-operations using rape propaganda in exactly that way in western Europe.

As we know from long experience, countering such propaganda, from Russia or from homegrown agitators or wherever, isn't easy. Many countries, maybe all of them, have a hard core of authoritarians who are eager to believe and spread such hysteria, whether they actually believe it or not. In one way or another, advocates of democracy and decency always have to struggle with that problem at some level of intensity.

Kurbjuweit may have been starry-eyed about how the Compassionate Pastor's Daughter has been handling the refugee crisis and immigration issues. He may not have noticed in 2015. But a highly skilled politician like Merkel surely knew that whatever genuine humantiarian motives she may have had for taking on such a large number of refugees into Germany in 2015, it also had the practical advantage of giving her international image a big boost after the throttling of Greece that year. And it did, she was right about that. It also gave her a potential tool to force other EU countries to take on quotas of refugees and institute a de facto allocation formula. But that didn't work out that way.

Those of us who never bought into the exaggerated Mother Angela image of 2015 are not nearly as surprised as Dirk Kurbjuweit at the recent turn of events. As his Spiegel colleague Peter Müller recognized even then, the EU wasn't even beginning to grapple with the real dimensions of the refugee issue. With politicians all over the EU posturing with cheap nationalism and promising the "secure the borders," that is still true in 2018. And if Turkey decides for its own political reasons to send its refugees on to Europe, how illusionary the close-the-borders blather is will become very apparent once again.

Wednesday, November 22, 2017

Germany's non-crisis crisis

Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel hasn't yet negotiated a new government coalition after last month's election. She has been working on a coalition government with her conservative CDU, the even more conservative CSU, the liberal (in the European sense) FDP, and the center-left Greens, a so-called "Jamaica coalition." The name comes from the party colors of those parties being included on the Jamaican flag.


The FDP withdrew from the coalition talks this week. Assuming those don't resume, the two alternative coalition combinations would be another Grand Coalition (GroKo) with the CDU and CSU with the Social Democrats (SPD). The other would be a minority government in which the CDU/CSU form a government that is "tolerated" by one or more parliamentary parties, meaning a parliamentary majority would vote to form a government that includes only CDU/CSU members.

Failing either of those alternatives, a new election would be likely.

This situation has sent some commentators' imaginations soaring that Germany is now in the middle of a serious political crisis.

The usually safely mainstream Deutsche Welle fed the hype a bit with a tweet that on its face seems to be poking fun at the panic:



Joerg Wolf of Atlantic-Community.org tweeted in response:



Jacob Heilbrunn gives some background on the coalition talks in Is Germany's Angela Merkel Really in Danger? National Interest 11/22/2017:

The idea of a Jamaica coalition has long been the dream of centrist Germans who were enraptured by the idea that the Greens, once vilified by conservatives as bunch of sandal-wearing, peacenik, environmental fruitcakes, could work together with the Christian Democrats. It’s already occurred at the state level, and the Greens have in fact moved a long way from their early days when “realos”—or realists—would duke it out with the “fundis”—fundamentalists. Since then the Greens have, by and large, gone mainstream. The last time the Greens were in government was under Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder when Joschka Fischer served as foreign minister.

As for the Free Democrats, it should come as no real surprise that they are reluctant to enter government. In terms of the party’s political future, it was probably the right move to pull out of the coalition talks with Merkel. The FDP’s last coalition with Merkel did not end well. Voters saw the party as a mere appendage of the Christian Democrats and the party failed to pass the 5 percent hurdle to enter the Bundestag, or federal parliament, in 2013. It was a painful climb to resuscitate the party’s political fortunes. [FDP party leader Christian] Lindner, a clever and ambitious politician, has reinvented the FDP, including taking a harder line on immigration. He can continue to push the party to the right in opposition and raise its profile ala Sebastian Kurz who heads the Austrian People’s Party. ““I have the feeling that Lindner has been looking a little too much towards Austria recently,” Green party head Cem Ozedemir said.

The SPD leaders were nuts from a party-political point of view in 2013 when they didn't even try to form a red-red-green coalition with the Greens and the Left Party. They would have had a majority in the national Bundestag. They don't in 2017. Heilbrunn points out that another four years of a GroKo would likely weaken one or both of the coalition parties by making them seem more and more alike.

Germany and the EU face two chronic, big, serious crises: the euro crisis, because the euro does not constitution an "optimal currency zone," as the economist call it; and the refugee crisis, which is being driven by wars in the Middle East and Africa as well as climate change.

But Germany in November 2017 is not in any kind of political crisis. As Joerg's tweet indicates, Angela Merkel is still Chancellor and there is still a Cabinet and parliament is functioning.

Rudolf Walther has the right idea in Mehr Mut zur Minderheitsregierung Blätter 11/2017. He points out that parliamentary systems in Denmark, Sweden and Canada have had minority governments for various periods of time. And it wasn't like President Hindenburg dismissing Parliament over and over and enabling Chancellors like Heinrich Bruning to rule in a quasi-authoritarian way, which did in the Weimar Republic.

In a minority government, the Chancellor would build a majority not with party-line majorities with the governing parties who form with government. Instead, she would need to put together different majorities in the legislature on the legislation she needs to pass. Which is similar to what happens in the executive systems in the US and Latin America. It's a different kind of challenge than a majority coalition government. But it doesn't mean that the political system is some kind of fundamental crisis. Or any crisis at all.

So when the Washington Post editorial board is saying today that Germany has been plunged "into an unprecedented postwar political crisis," well, that's just goofy. (Germany’s political crisis is the last thing the West needs right now Washington Post 11/22/2017)

Saturday, June 17, 2017

Merkel tries to negotiate the new US/Europe environment

The Trump Family Business Administration has a number of traits that can add up to risky and poorly-considered foreign policy moves: extreme arrogance, contempt for understanding relevant data, a glorification of war, the desire to effect drastic changes quickly in major foreign policy and military alignments.

We have the complicated and obscure dealings with Russia. Trump has expressed his support for a Saudi-lead, anti-Shi'a/anti-Iran push in the Middle East. The immediate consequence was Saudi Arabia began a siege of neighboring Qatar - that is not yet a blockage - that includes the unusual aspect of seriously interfering with deliveries of food and medicine. (Gary Sick, The Siege of Doha LobeLog Foreign Policy 06/16/2017) These moves, and a further escalation of tensions with Iran, could have huge consequences.

So it's stunning that the Senate passed new sanctions against Russia and Iran with little public discussion and no votes against them by Democrats.

One of the most consequential shifts in US foreign policy under Trump has been his Administration's distancing of the US from European allies and its obvious hostility to the EU as an institution.

This kind of unilateralism is not new. Before the Iraq War turned into a disaster too serious for all but the clinically delusional to ignore, the Cheney-Bush Administration was gleefully demanding European submission to US demands on "out of area" military matters. Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro examined that US ploy in Allies At War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq (2004) with particular emphasis on possible diplomatic paths to mending the damaged relationships.

They may have been eager to apply a both-sides-do-it perspective in some cases. But this observation is a good reminder of the contempt Cheney's Administration showed for the European allies:

The combustible interaction of politicians on both sides also deeply exacerbated the transatlantic split. On the American side, the self-assured, moralistic, and often condescending attitude of much of the Bush administration - particularly Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Richard Cheney, but often the President himself - made many Europeans even more determined to resist American leadership. From the start, Americans, including the President, gave the impression that they considered the Iraq decision - and indeed all decisions about global peace and security - solely for them to make, and that Europeans had little choice but to follow their lead or get out of the way. This was an attitude almost designed to provoke opposition from those in Europe who were reluctant to accept unquestioningly the virtues of American leadership or the merits of a unipolar world. [my emphasis]

Former Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer writes about Angela Merkel's German perspective on countering the Trump unilateralism in Angela Merkel’s Challenge to Europe Project Syndicate 06/05/2017:

Anyone who has been paying attention has known for some time that the historic changes taking place today did not originate in Germany. Rather, they are emanating from the geopolitical West’s two founding members: the United States and the United Kingdom. Prior to Trump’s election and the UK’s Brexit referendum, Germans saw no reason to make fundamental changes to the existing geopolitical order.

But those two events have shaken the foundation upon which Europe’s peace and prosperity have rested since World War II.
Britain’s decision to withdraw from the European Union could inspire other countries to follow suit. And Trump’s isolationist, “America first” agenda implies that the US will abdicate its leadership role in the world, and possibly abandon its security guarantee for Europe.

Europeans avoided a disaster of historic proportions in last month’s French presidential election. If Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Front had been elected, she would likely have brought an end to the euro, the EU, and the common market. Continental Europe would now be mired in a deep economic and political crisis. [my emphasis]
What Fischer doesn't say here is that without abandoning the austerity economics she has successfully imposed on the EU, including writing it into national constitutions of the members with things like the Fiscal (Suicide) Compact, it will be extremely difficult to rectify that "deep economic and political crisis." The nationalist polarization against EU members like Greece, Irealand, Portugal and Spain and, soon enough, Italy, runs directly contrary to the kind of xenophobia that has given a surge in electoral popularity to Trump-Putin type parties in the EU like Le Pen's National Front in France.

Fischer, who was Foreign Minister during the NATO crisis over Iraq, argues that Merkel isn't trying to further undermine the NATO alliance:

A careful analysis of Merkel’s words shows that she was not questioning the future of the transatlantic alliance. Rather, she was calling for a stronger Europe. Merkel knows that if the US sacrifices its place at the top of the international order for domestic political reasons, it will not be replaced by a new leading power, nor will a new world order emerge. What we will have is a power vacuum, marked by chaos. And as the world becomes less stable, we Europeans will have no choice but to come together to defend our interests. No one else will do it for us.

So, Merkel’s speech was first and foremost about strengthening Europe. And, fortunately, she has found a partner in French President Emmanuel Macron. Both leaders want to stabilize the eurozone, restore economic growth, and strengthen Europe’s security with a joint border force and a new refugee policy.
Of course, anti-Europe politicians and pundits in the United States can always argue that any defiance of orders from Washington by Merkel or other NATO members is to blame for undermining the alliance. Because that's basically what the usual suspects argued during the NATO crisis over the US preventive war against Iraq.

Thursday, June 08, 2017

NATO in a new light in the Trump Era

Der Spiegel's most recent cover story about Trump's anti-European position on the Paris Accord on global warming is available in English, and it's quite an interesting one: Donald Trump's Triumph of Stupidity 06/02/2017.

This was the cover for the German version of the story:


There are a number of passages in the article that helps put the current state of relations between the EU and the United Statesss. Like these:

Merkel's verdict following Trump's visit to Europe could hardly be worse. There has never been an open break with America since the end of World War II; the alienation between Germany and the U.S. has never been so large as it is today. When Merkel's predecessor, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, refused to provide German backing for George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq, his rebuff was limited to just one single issue. It was an extreme test of the trans-Atlantic relationship, to be sure, but in contrast to today, it was not a quarrel that called into question commonly held values like free trade, minority rights, press freedoms, the rule of law -- and climate policies. ...

Merkel, who grew up in the Soviet sphere of influence, never had much understanding for the anti-Americanism often found in western Germany. U.S. dependability is partly to thank for Eastern Europe's post-1989 freedom.

Merkel has shown a surprising amount of passion for the trans-Atlantic relationship over the years. She came perilously close to openly supporting the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and enjoyed a personal friendship with George W. Bush, despite the fact that most Germans had little sympathy for the U.S. president. Later, Merkel's response to the NSA's surveillance of her mobile phone was largely stoic and she also didn't react when Trump called her refugee policies "insane."

As such, Merkel's comments last Sunday about her loss of trust in America were eye-opening. It was a completely new tone and Merkel knew that it would generate attention. Indeed, that's what she wanted. ...

In the past, it had always been the British and the Eastern Europeans who stood in the way of the joint efforts promoted by Germany and France -- for the most part out of fear that an internal European competitor to NATO could result. But Britain's decision to leave the EU also means that it will no longer be able to block such efforts. The Eastern Europeans, meanwhile, who see themselves as being on the front against Russia, have lost faith in Trump's pledges to the alliance. [my emphasis]
This is a good reminder that the rift between the US and leading NATO allies like Germany and France over the Iraq War was dramatic and serious.

The current tensions in the NATO alliance continue that earlier confrontation in some important ways. Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer was an especially popular spokesperson for neoconservative advocates of war with Iraq. In the light of objections to preventive war in Iraq from NATO allies Germany and France, Krauthammer mocked NATO as essentially militarily useless to the United States (U.S. power rises as NATO fades into irrelevance Chicago Tribune/Washington Post wire 05/27/2017 05/27/2002)

NATO may still have a role in peacekeeping (especially in Europe's own Balkan backyard) but not in war-making. As a serious military alliance it is finished. But there is no need for a funeral. NATO can be usefully re-imagined. Its new role should be to serve as incubator for Russia's integration into Europe and the West.

It is precisely because NATO has turned from a military alliance into a trans-Atlantic club of advanced democracies that it can now safely invite Russia in--and why Russia has so reconciled itself to NATO. Russia recognizes NATO's shift from a military to a political organization. That is why it has so muted its objection to NATO's expansion into the former Soviet republics of the Baltic states.

That idea used to make the Russians apoplectic. But with NATO a hollow shell, they are relaxed about having us in, and we are relaxed about having them in. The unprecedented place at the NATO table recently offered Russia by the Bush administration is the correct next step in NATO's transformation. Join the club.

NATO is dead. Welcome, Russia, to the new NATO. [my emphasis]
Chris Patten, then the EU Commissioner for External Relations, reacted publicly to George W. Bush's use of the phrase "axis of evil" including Iraq in his 2002 State of the Union Address, a speech which seemed to signal a determination to go to war with Iraq (Jonathan Freedland, Patten lays into Bush's America The Guardian 02/08/2002):

Chris Patten, the EU commissioner in charge of Europe's international relations, has launched a scathing attack on American foreign policy - accusing the Bush administration of a dangerously "absolutist and simplistic" stance towards the rest of the world.

As EU officials warned of a rift opening up between Europe and the US wider than at any time for half a century, Mr Patten tells the Guardian it is time European governments spoke up and stopped Washington before it goes into "unilateralist overdrive".

"Gulliver can't go it alone, and I don't think it's helpful if we regard ourselves as so Lilliputian that we can't speak up and say it," he says in today's interview.
Those were the days when the national press was treating Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld like a rock star. Remember this? Defence Secy comments on Europe, France, Germany AP 07/30/2015:



Rummy didn't have no use for "Old Europe" (Outrage at 'old Europe' remarks BBC News 01/23/2003):

"Germany has been a problem and France has been a problem," Mr Rumsfeld told Washington's foreign press corps on Wednesday.

"But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe, they're not with France and Germany... they're with the US.

"You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't," he said. "I think that's old Europe."

On Thursday, the French and German leaders reiterated their opposition to war as they continued celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty between their two countries.

"We are both of the opinion... that one can never accept it when it is said that war is unavoidable," [SPD German] Chancellor [Gerhard] Schroeder said in an address to hundreds of French and German students in Berlin attended by Mr Chirac.

"War may never be considered unavoidable."

A spokeswoman for Mr [conservative French President Jacques] Chirac called for calm in the dispute.
Joachim Fritz-Vannahme discussed how Rummy and the Cheney-Bush Administration differentiated between Old and New Europe in that context (“Falke, Hahn, Taube. Washingtons Schmähung trifft die Europäer im Augenblick der größten Uneinigkeit” Die Zeit 6 Feb 2003; translation by Allison Brown at GHDI, accessed 06/08/2017):

How quickly a banality can turn into an insult! Donald Rumsfeld’s apt expression “New Europe,” meaning a Europe whose focus is shifting from Western to Central Europe, already enjoyed great popularity as a key geostrategic term years ago. This was especially true in Paris, the stronghold of “Old Europe,” where, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, many worried about the role they would play.

Rumsfeld’s invective hit Europeans at the moment of their greatest discord. The common foreign policy that they so readily invoke still remains a Cloud Cuckoo Land where everyone can build his or her own nest, whether he be a British hawk, a German dove, or a French rooster. This could be seen on Monday, when the EU foreign ministers were able to muster only a minimum of unity at their meeting in Brussels. The inspectors,* they demanded, should be given more time. But not even behind closed doors did they discuss what would happen when time ran out, or how Great Britain, France, Spain, and Germany – the four EU members on the UN Security Council – would vote: individually or (as virtually no one in Brussels believes) in concert for Europe?

Everything seems crystal clear from Rumsfeld’s perspective. His reference to Old Europe is an attack on the insubordinate German-French entente. Spain, Portugal, and Italy, on the other hand, are being entered on the map of well-behaved New Europe by the Pentagon surveyor.
What that translated into is that a few long-time NATO members with conservative governments, along with "Bush's Poodle" Tony Blair of British New Labour, wanted to kiss up to the Cheney-Bush Administration over invading Iraq.

But Rummy was also favoring newer NATO members who also wanted to do so. Fritz-Vannahme quotes Le Monde from that time, "A large internal market with the protection of NATO. That is the image of the EU that people have in Prague, Warsaw, or, say, Budapest. That is opportune for the United States, since that's its idea of Europe as well."

That last point is important. The United States historically favored European unity, which now takes the form of the European Union. But the US has also favored a broader but relatively weak EU, one that in particular would not be able to unite around a common foreign policy or form a significant central EU military force of its own. So under the three previous administrations, the US encouraged the US to expand EU membership to former Warsaw Pact countries sooner rather than later. On the one hand, this provided EU aid for their development. But it also expanded the number of countries that had to be brought into unison for major decisions in the EU, thus making the prospects for greater unity dimmer and more distant.

Something similar was taking place in NATO, an alliance that in reality has always been under American direction despite considerable time and effort placed on consultation. The alliance undertook and enlargement of its membership after the fall of the Berlin Wall. German unification added the former East Germany to NATO. The NATO website conveniently provides this historical sketch (Enlargement 06/07/2017):

Based on the findings of the Study on Enlargement, the Alliance invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in 1997. These three countries became the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO in 1999.

At the 1999 Washington Summit, the Membership Action Plan was launched to help other aspirant countries prepare for possible membership.

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks at the Alliance’s Prague Summit in 2002 and joined NATO in 2004. All seven countries had participated in the MAP.
NATO's website says of the process, "The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe were eager to guarantee their freedom by becoming integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions."

The Cheney-Bush Administration used the desire of those Central and Eastern European countries to be part of NATO, in significant part out of continuing fear of future Russian aggression, as a way to exert counterbalancing influence to German and French dissent within the alliance. And those new members were particularly interested in having American guarantees against outside aggression.

What the Spiegel article cited at the start of this post brings out significantly changes that situation. "The Eastern Europeans, meanwhile, who see themselves as being on the front against Russia, have lost faith in Trump's pledges to the alliance." (my emphasis)

Britain is now leaving the EU, as well. Britain has what is fondly called the "special relationship" with the United States, which means that since the Suez Crisis of 1956, British policymakers have tried to avoid being in opposition to the US on any major foreign policy issue, though they tended not to be thrilled by the US war in Vietnam. But this gave the US a major way to influence decisions of the EU, since Britain was more likely to side with the US on major issues than France or Germany, which was also the case with the invasion of Iraq.

Now Britain is out of the EU. And the Eastern European countries will have to look more to their European partners now for assurances of assistance against military threats from Russia. Which has become more urgent over the last 15 years as Russia has pushed back hard in Georgia and Ukraine against the prospects of those countries aligning more formally with the EU and NATO.

This creates a significantly new situation, in which the EU countries are now likely to perceive much greater urgency in cooperation with each other. Including in opposition to policies from Washington that they find undesirable.

And the EU's principal leader, Angela Merkel, isn't feeling inclined to make things easier for Washington this time around. On the contrary, she's rallying other European countries to create a major effective counterbalance to US power.

Thursday, May 25, 2017

Conservatives celebrate together in Berlin?

Barack Obama showed up in Berlin for a joint appearance with Chancellor Angela Merkel. Obama receives rock star welcome in Germany as he appears alongside Merkel and says 'we can't hide behind a wall' Daily Mail AP/Daily Mail 05/25/2017.

Supposedly, the timing of the event being just before Merkel is scheduled to meet with Bush in Brussels was entirely coincidental. Barack Obama tells Berlin audience: ‘We can’t hide behind a wall’ Guardian 05/25/2017

Barack Obama joins Angela Merkel in Berlin Guardian Wires 05/25/2017:



National elections are coming in Germany on September 24. That's four months away, so this isn't exactly like Obama joining Merkel on the campaign trail. But almost. Of course, we know it's only those wicked Russians who interfere in other countries' election.

I recall that Obama shortly after his election as President commented that in the European context he would be considered a conservative. I thought of that when I read the news about his meeting with Merkel.

Angela Merkel seems to have a very good image in the United States. Her Compassionate Pastor's Daughter posturing seems to have convinced much of the American media. But the hallmark of her tenure has been to respond to the euro crisis in the wake of the economic crisis that began in 2007-8 with Herbert Hoover/Heinrich Brüning econmic policies that severely damaged countries like Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain and Portugal. She has recast the European Union as being a German-dominated political bloc suffering from a severe "democratic deficit."

Her welcoming of large numbers of refugees into Germany in 2015 looked very good to liberal-minded people. And her praise for that is well deserved.

But the refugee inflow was at crisis levels already in 2011, and Merkel handled it with her signature extend-and-pretend style, which lead to the acute phase that made it a worldwide scandal in 2015. The problem is far from over. And she has basically outsourced it to Turkey and Greece. And the conditions in the refugee camps in both countries has been downright nightmarish for many.

The refugee crisis is back in extend-and-pretend mode. It's not going away. And it constantly generates humanitarian horrors: Dozens on sinking dinghy lost at sea, rescued migrants tell UNHCR AFP/Japan Times 05/24/2017 (this week); Refugee crisis: Dozens feared dead in new boat sinking off Libyan coast The Independent 05/26/2016 (almost exactly a year ago); UNICEF: Number of unaccompanied refugee children soars Aljazeera 05/18/2016; Giorgos Christides, Unaccompanied Migrant Boys in Greece Turn to Prostitution Spiegel International 05/19/2017.

Obama and Merkel are both major examples of liberal-minded proponents of TINA (There Is No Alternative) neoliberal economic policies and the suspicion of popular democratic participation. Obama's initial stimulus package was a significant departure from the neoliberal playbook. And it was enough to push the economy back to recovery and made the US recovery from the Great Recession a healthier one than the eurozone experienced. But he spent the rest of his term advocating cuts to Social Security and Medicare and hopelessly trying to work out bipartisan budget deals that resulted in things like the sequester that achieved far more Republican than Democratic goals. Obama's health care plan was a big improvement and also added a stimulative effect to the economy. But it didn't even get the United State as far down the road as Germany in the health care system.

Obama was the head of the American center-left party. And he left office with his party at historic lows in office-holding strength. Merkel is the head of the center-right party in Germany (CDU), with the center-left SPD as her junior coalition partner. The results for the German center-left party looks to be about the same as for the American Democrats. The SPD had been doing well in the polls earlier in the year. But their prospects aren't looking so good lately. (Umfrage sieht Mehrheit für Schwarz-Gelb im Bund FAZ 23.05.2017)

Wednesday, October 05, 2016

Joschka Fischer on Angela Merkel and the 2017 election

This is really sad. It's Joschka Fischer pumping up Angela Merkel as the savior of The West: "Den Westen" könnte es bald nicht mehr geben Süddeutsche Zeitung 29.09.2016. Fischer is the formerly radical Green Party leader who served as Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister in the red-green national government in Germany in 1998–2005.

I appreciate Fischer's "realist" view on foreign policy. But his position in this article is a lazy centrism over the problems of the EU. He argues that both the right (the AfD/Alternative for Germany) and the Left Party are pursuing a nationalist course and both want to kiss up to Russia.

So Angela Merkel is the last, best hope for saving "the West," i.e., the European Union.

Say what?!

Yes, that's really what he says:

Man kann nur hoffen, dass diese Kelche allesamt an uns vorübergehen. Und man sieht auch, was vom Verbleiben Angela Merkels im Amt der Bundeskanzlerin über 2017 hinaus abhängt - für Deutschland, für Europa und den Westen.

[One can only hope the this cup will pass from all of us. And one also sees how much is dependent on Angela Merkel staying in office as Federal Chancellor after 2017 - for Germany, for Europe and the West.]

Monday, June 27, 2016

Negotiating over negotiating Brexit

Anything can happen with Brexit. But it sounds unlikely to me that it's going to be a smooth process.

European Parliament President Martin Schulz is from the German SPD. But he's a shameless Angiebot, not that this makes him any different than most other SPD leaders, a related but different story. He demanded that Britain make their Article 50 application by this Tuesday! Probably not going to happen. In theory, the SPD (Angie's junior coalition partner) is pressing for a rapid British exit while Angie and her CDU/CSU are being more cautious.

But there's no way Schulz made that kind of statement without Merkel's approval. If Merkel is going to preserve her current EU, she has to punish the defiant, like she punished Greece. I'm convinced that Merkel sees the EU as a neoliberal version of the Warsaw Pact; that's a big reason I call her East Germany's Last Revenge on the West. Since Britain is not a part of the euro, she has more flexibility to make concessions to Britain and did make some prior to the Brexit vote. But punishment and intimidation is how she rolls in these things, with the full support of the SPD.

I'm very sure Angie doesn't give a flying flip that a majority of British voters elected to leave. At his first meeting with Yanis Varoufakis as Finance Minister of Greece when the Syriza government took power in 2015 with a clear electoral mandate to end the Herbert Hoover austerity programs, Angie's Finance Minister and fellow CDU leader Wolfgang Schäuble told Varoufakis, “Elections cannot be allowed to change an economic programme of a member state!” (Why we must save the EU Guardian 04/05/2016)

Angie's close ally and Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen is saying, "No one will have to chance to play for time. The economy will demand quick clarity. Investors will hold back until they know what's going on now: in or out." ("Es wird niemand die Chance haben, auf Zeit zu spielen. Die Wirtschaft wird schnelle Klarheit einfordern. Investoren werden sich zurückhalten, bis sie wissen, was jetzt gilt: drinnen oder draußen."; Schulz fordert Austrittsantrag der Briten bis Dienstag Spiegel Online 25.06.2016)

The negotiating over negotiating is already well underway (Jon Henley et al, European leaders rule out informal Brexit talks before article 50 is triggered Guardian 06/27/2016):

On the eve of a crunch summit in Brussels, the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, said she, president François Hollande of France and Italy’s prime minister, Matteo Renzi, had agreed at their meeting in Berlin that “there will be no formal or informal talks about Britain’s exit” until the UK has triggered article 50, the untested procedure that governs a member state leaving.

Hollande urged Britain to “not waste time” in launching the leaving process. “Being responsible means not wasting time in engaging with the question of Britain’s departure and setting this new impulse we want to lend the new European Union,” he said, adding that “nothing is worse than uncertainty – and Britain has already had painful experience of this”.
France and Italy, not surprisingly, are on board with Merkel's approach. The German SPD, which still passes for a center-left party and serves as Merkel's junior coalition partner, is playing its part by publicly insisting on a hard line with Britain:

The president of the European parliament, Martin Schulz, warned this weekend that a period of limbo would “lead to even more insecurity” and said the Brussels summit was the right time to begin formal exit proceedings.

There was pressure, too, from within Merkel’s own government: the head of her Social Democrat coalition partners, Sigmar Gabriel, called for “decisive action instead of indecision”.