The whole notion of "illiberal democracy" is what can also be called "plebiscitary democracy," in which voting involves approving or disapproving decisions already taken by the government, like in a plebiscite. But doing so with institutions that effectively prevent free, competitive democractic choice by an informed electorate and allow the governing party to rule without the kinds of formal limitations on abuses like the separation of powers between legislative, executive, and judicial branches that are part of the EU standards of democratic governance.
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| Hungary (dark green) in Europe |
Under the rules set up by Orbán, his Fidesz Party won an overwhelming parliamentary majority in this past April's election, 133-68, large enough to make consitutional changes without any opposition votes, without having to win nearly so large a majority in the popular vote. The New York Times reported on the results of the election (Marc Santora and Helene Bienvenu, Hungary Election Was Free but Not Entirely Fair, Observers Say 04/09/2018):
On the national voting list, Fidesz secured more than 49 percent of the vote, with some 2.6 million voting for the party and its Christian Democratic allies. That was roughly the same as the seven largest opposition parties combined.
Fidesz also won convincingly in local elections, securing a two-thirds majority in Parliament, which will give the party a free hand to pursue still deeper legal and constitutional changes that have already given it firm control over courts and other state institutions.
The April election was formally observed by the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Knoll and Jeitler summarize the OSCE's findings as follows:
Die Überschneidung von Ressourcen des Staates und der Regierungspartei machte es anderen Kandidaten geradezu unmöglich, einen Wahlkampf auf Augenhöhe zu führen. Den Wählern standen viele politische Optionen offen, der Raum für echte politische Debatten war aber beschnitten. Einschüchterungen und fremdenfeindliche Äußerungen, die Voreingenommenheit der Medien und die undurchsichtige Finanzierung des Wahlkampfs behinderten Wähler, eine sachkundige Entscheidung zu fällen, hieß es im Abschlussbericht.As they report, there are still independent media in Hungary, but the UN Human Rights Council has warned that the current "Hungarian media laws can no longer fully guarantee that press coverage can occur in an uncensored and unhindered fashion." (my translation)
{The overlap of resources of the state and the ruling party made it nearly impossible for other candidates to conduct an election campaign on a equal basis. The voters had many options available to the them, but the space for real political debates was circumcised. Intimidations and xenophoblc declarations, the prejudice of the media, and the untransparent financing of the election campaign hindered voters from making an informed decision, said the final report.}
Knoll and Jeitler describe how government-friendly oligarchs also take part in the subordination of much of the press to the government position:
Die Politik übernahm die Medienlandschaft im Laufschritt. Nicht nur der öffentliche Rundfunk wurde zum Propagandasender der Regierungspartei. Private Medien fürchten um ihre Werbeeinnahmen und verhalten sich deswegen still, oder aber sie werden von regierungsnahen Oligarchen aufgekauft, wie zum Beispiel der Sender TV2. Nachdem der ungarischamerikanische Hollywood-Produzent und Orbán-Intimus Andy Vajna den Sender erworben hatte, wurde er schnell zu einem regierungstreuen Kampfhund, der gerne von der Leine gelassen wird, um Oppositionelle und Redakteure zu attackieren.
{Polical power overtook the media landscape in double-time. Not only did public broadcasting become the propaganda arm of the ruling party. Private media fear for their advertising income and stay quiet because of that, or either they are bought up by government-aligned oligarchs, as for example the station TV2. After the Hungarian-American Hollywood producer and Orbán intimate Andy Vajna had bought the station, it quickly became a loyal government attack dog that likes to be let off the lease to attack opposition figures and editors.}
Knoll and Jeitler highlight Orbán's aggressive campaign against non-governmental organizations (NGOs) promoting mainstream democratic practices and defending human rights. Some of it is in the form of intimidation by the youth wing of Fidesz. But they also describe a new law taking effect at the end of July that imposes a 25% tax on organizations that engage in "propaganda activities," which is aimed in particular at groups supporting immigrants and opposing the government's xenophobic propaganda. George Soros' Open Society Foundation is one of the NGOs targeted.
That is a case in which two favorite Fidesz propaganda themes, xenophobia and anti-Semitism, intersect. Orbán and his cronies are perfectly happy to have one of their Hungarian-American oligarch buddies buy an annoying news outlet on their behalf. But they are very, very unhappy about the alleged dealings of the most famous Hungarian-American, George Soros.
Soros, of course, has been a favorite bogeyman for Jew-haters on both sides of the Atlantic for, well, it seems like forever. George Soros is a real person who is active in politics both in the US and Europe. And, of course, the real-world George Soros is fair game for praise and criticism, just like anyone else active in political affairs.
But the "George Soros" of the anti-Semites is just a symbol for the imaginary Worldwide Jewish Elders of Zion Conspiracy against good Christian white folks. And the Hungarian government and the ruling Fidesz Party promote that version with shameless demogoguery. As Knoll and Jeitler report, during the election they promoted the hate-image of George Soros "as the puppeteer of Muslim mass migration" and declared him an "enemy of the state." Jews as puppet-masters was a stock image of Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda.
Im Wahlkampf hatte die Regierung von Steuergeldern finanzierte Plakate affichiert, die einen geifernd grinsenden George Soros zeigten: „Lassen wir nicht zu, dass Soros als Letzter lacht.“ Im Staatsfernsehen und Rundfunk liefen Spots mit antisemitischen Untertönen. Die Fidesz-Jugend bastelte ein Plakat, das Soros als Puppenspieler zeigte, der ungarische Oppositionspolitiker wie Marionetten tanzen lässt.The centerpiece of Fidesz propaganda is the supposed menance of hordes of refugees coming into Hungary. This scare is still riding on the back of the alarm generated by the surge of refugees to Europe from the Middle East and North Africa in 2015, most of whom wound up someplace other than Hungary.
{During the election, the government placed placards financed with public funds that showed a greedily grinning George Soros [and capitioned], "Let's don't let Soros have the last laugh". In public TV and radio, spots ran with anti-Semitic undertones. The Fidesz Youth pasted up a placard that showed Soros as a puppetmaster who had Hungarian opposition politicians dancing like marionettes.}
The refugee/immigraiton issue - which European xenophobes prefer to call "migration" because in the current political lingo that sounds like "freeloaders" - has been particularly potent in Hungary. That despite the fact that Hungary has a notably lower percentage of immigrants as part of its population than other European countries like Austria. That may sound superficially paradoxical. But it's a general pattern. In Germany, Austria, the United States, the strongest anti-immigrant sentiment if found in areas with relatively few immigrants. People with actual, real-life contacts with immigrants are distinctly less receptive to xenophobic political demagoguery.
But, in a manner similar to the practices implemented by Donald Trump and Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III in the US, Orbán government uses gratuitous cruelty to immigrants as a way of acclimatizing people to escalating levels of brutuality and human rights violations. Although, to be fair to Hungarian authoritarians, I have not yet seen reports of Hungary systematically kidnapping immigrant children from their parents as ICE does in the US as state terror against immigrants. The reality in Hungary is nevertheless more than ugly enough. Knoll and Jeitler report on immigrant detention camps inside Hungary near the Serbian border:
Die zwei Transitzonen Röszke und Tompa suchen ihresgleichen in Europa. Hochsicherheitskomplexe gleich hinter dem Zaun, den Ungarn 2015 an der Grenze zu Serbien aufgezogen hat. Stacheldraht, Stahldrehtüren, Container und Überwachungskameras. Das Muster für die Pläne von Herbert Kickl und Horst Seehofer? Die ungarischen Behörden haben im Vorjahr knapp 4000 Menschen gestattet, Asylanträge zu stellen. Heute lassen die ungarischen Behörden durchschnittlich pro Arbeitstag zwei Asylwerber in die Transitzonen. Alle anderen, die im Land aufgegriffen werden und nicht eine der beiden Zonen passiert haben, werden, ohne einen Asylantrag stellen zu können, sofort nach Serbien zurückgeschoben.To get a sense of proportion, Hungary's population is around 9.8 million and projected to shrink. Admitting 265 asylum-seekers is anything but a flood of newcomers and in no meaningful way can that be called a serious problem. Also, as long as Hungary wants to have a growing GDP, they need immigrants.
In den ersten vier Monaten dieses Jahres wurde 267 Menschen, vornehmlich Afghanen, Schutz zugesprochen; 326 Anträge wurden abgelehnt. Das Verfahren innerhalb der Transitzonen dauert zwischen drei und sechs Monate – und das nach durchschnittlich achtmonatigem Warten in offenen Asylzentren in Nordserbien. Medizinische oder psychosoziale Betreuung gibt es genauso wenig wie effektiven Schutz minderjähriger Flüchtlinge vor Misshandlungen und sexueller Ausbeutung. Als Journalist kann man die Transitzonen zwar von außerhalb filmen, sie aber nicht besichtigen. Was in Röszke geschieht, bleibt in Röszke.
Der Europäische Menschenrechtsgerichtshof stellte unter anderem fest, dass zwei Bangladescher, die mit attestierter posttraumatischer Störung vor ihrer Zurückschiebung nach Serbien 2015 drei Wochen in der Transitzone angehalten wurden, ihrer Freiheit unrechtmäßig beraubt wurden und keinen Zugang zu wirksamen Rechtsbehelfen erhielten (die ungarische Regierung hat gegen das erstinstanzliche Urteil Berufung eingelegt). Röszke steht heute für eine weitverbreitete und systematische Rechtsverletzung.
{The two transit zones Röszke und Tompa are without comparison in Europe. High security compounds right behind the fence Hungary erected in 2015 on the border to Serbia. Barbed wire, steel revolving doors, containers, and surveillance cameras. The model for the plans of [Austrian Interior Minister] Herbert Kickl and [German Interior Minister] Horst Seehofer? Hungarian officials have approved barely 4,000 people to make application for asylum last year. Today, Hungarian officials allow on the average two asylum-seekers per day into the transit zones. All others who are captured in the country and haven't passed through either of the two zones are immediately sent back to Serbia without being able to apply for asylum.
In the first four months of this year, 267 people were granted [asylum] protection, primarily Afghans; 326 applicataions were rejected. The processes inside the transit zones last between three and six months - and that after an average eight months waiting in public asylum centers in Northern Seriba. Medical or psychosocial support services as so little present as effective protection of underage refugees from abuse and sexual exploitation. Journalists can only film the transit zones from outside, but are not allowed to visit them. What happens in Röszke stays in Röszke.
The European Court of Human Rights has confirmed that, among others, two Bangladeshis with attested post-traumatic disorders were held for three weeks in the transit zone before being sent back to Serbia in 2015, unjustly deprived of their freedom, and were provided no access to effective legal assistance. (The Hungarian government has appealed the initial ruling.) Röszke today represents a widespread and systematic violation of human rights.} [my emphasis]
What's striking about so much of the anti-immigrant rhetoric in EU politics right now is that the problems are wildly exaggerated and lied about by xenophobic politicians. And the "solutions," when they go beyond rhetorical hot air, tend to be little more than performative brutality against immigrants. And stunningly irrelevant to the very real longterm immigration issues facing Europe, issues which will go through recurrent acute phases, especially as wars in the Middle East and North Africa break out or intensify.
This is what the death of democracy looks like. The Hungarian version of it, anyway.
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