The Genoa Bridge collapse, neoliberalism, and the Italian left-right coalition government

The deadly collapse of the Morandi Bridge in Genoa, Italy, on August 14 has focused the attention of numerous journalists and commentators on the economic situation of Italy.

• Hilary Clarke and Gianluca Mezzofiore, Genoa bridge collapse came after years of warnings CNN 08/16/2018
• Italy bridge collapse: Genoa death toll rises to 43 BBC News 08/19/2018
• Franz Kössler, Genua: Der Einsturz der Brücke und der Politik Falter 34:2018 22.08.2018 (momentan hinter Abo)
• Walter Mayr, "Schakale und Lügner" Der Spiegel 34:2018 (18.08.2018)
• Thomas Migge et al, "Ein Sommernachtsalptraum" Profil 34:2018 20.08/.2018
• Paola Subacchi, Hard Lessons from Genoa Project Syndicate 08/21/2018
• Christian Wüst in "Tod im Tragwerk" Der Spiegel 34:2018 (18.08.2018) goes into some of the technical issues around the collapse.

The political background

The EU establishment has been in a tizzy since the current Italian government took office in June. It is a coalition of the left-populist Five Star Movement (5Stars) and the right-populist Lega. The Prime Minister from the senior coalition party 5Stars is Giuseppe Conte and Matteo Salvini, the longtime head of the junior partner Lega, is the Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister, the latter being the country's chief law enforcement official. Conte is an attorney with very little experience in politics. So it's no surprise that Salvini seems to be the actual government leader on policy.

Salvini has been enthusiastically pressing forward an anti-immigrant policy, which has included banning ships carrying passengers rescued at sea from the high risk immigrant route from Northern Africa. (Alexander Stille, How Matteo Salvini pulled Italy to the far right The Guardian 08/09/2018) Such a ban is a serious rejection of international law. Stefan Schmidt, a sea captain with experience in Mediterranean rescues who is current commisioner for asylum and refugee issues in the German state of Schleswig-Holstein, in this interview talks about the broader issue of sea rescues in the Mediterranean, not simply in relation to Malvinini, in this German-language interview, Stefan Schmidt: "Menschenleben stehen bei mir an erster Stelle" Deutsche Welle 19.08.2018:

Salvini's actions on the chronic refugee crisis are anti-EU and narrowly nationalistic.

And defenders of democracy and the EU see good reason to worry about the direction he's going, as Stille reports:

Salvini’s rise to power has heightened concerns in Italy about the escalation of racist and xenophobic violence in the country. Dozens of attacks on black people and Roma have been recorded in the last year, all over Italy, from Treviso in the north to Gioia Tauro in the south, including Florence and Rome. The attacks range from drive-by shootings with air guns, in which the attackers were reported to shout “Salvini!” to the assassination of a Malian trade unionist campaigning for fair pay for migrant workers. An Italian athlete of Nigerian descent, Daisy Osakue, the Italian under-23 champion discus thrower, was hit in the eye by an egg thrown from a car. Police have been pursuing attackers and making arrests, but the government has been more reticent. After a torrent of criticism for his anti-migrant policies – culminating with the headline “Get behind me, Salvini” on the cover of Italy’s largest Catholic magazine – Salvini responded with a favorite phrase of Mussolini: “many enemies, much honor.” He also insisted that the idea of widespread Italian racism was “an invention of the left”.

He's also making a show of forming common fronts with other nationalist (and pro-Putin) groups, even though the whole notion in a Nationalist International is inherently bizarre. Even though that's exactly what far-right parties in Europe are trying to have. Salvini's stunt this week is to advertise his fondness for Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, which joins Poland as one of two countries in the EU who seem to have become authoritarian enough to no longer meet basic EU requirements for democracy and rule of law.

Lorenzo Tondo reports in Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orbán to form anti-migration front Guardian 08/28/2018. "The Italian interior minister, Matteo Salvini, and the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, have said they are “walking down the same path” after discussing the formation of a common anti-migration front they said would oppose the policies of the French president."

Diplomatically, it also strengthens the impression that Malvini and the Lega are in reality the dominant party in the Italian coalition.

But it's not only the anti-EU refugee policies that causes the EU establishment to worry. The new government is also committed, for the moment, to defying Angela Merkel's austerity politics, which is treated like religious truth in EU economic policy.

The obsession with austerity politics of the Herbert Hoover/Heinrich Brüning cast has meant, among other things, delays in upgrades, repair, and expansion of infrastructure. That's been true even in Germany, where Merkel's governments have been restrained on infrastructure projects.

This is a familiar story. When faced with budget shortages, deferred maintenance is one of the first budget-cutting methods governments resort to. Paola Subacchi describes the larger problem this way:

In Western Europe and the United States, bridges, roads, and railways built in the 1950s and 1960s during the post-war reconstruction and economic boom are now old, obsolete, and overused. Does any developed economy have a long-term strategy to manage its essential infrastructure? Are risks being correctly assessed and mitigated? What are the trade-offs between maintaining and replacing infrastructure approaching the end of its life? And how can citizens influence the public debate about who should pay for infrastructure and where it should be built?

It's not just in Italy this problem is occurring. It's a chronic feature of the neoliberal era ushered in by Ronald Reagan in the US and Maggie Thatcher in Britain.

This attitude toward public infrastructure is seriously different from the time before "when demand-management policies went out of fashion," as Subacchi puts it:

The Morandi Bridge was inaugurated in 1967 with great pomp by Italy’s president. Back then, political capital was built around such projects – and not only because of patronage and corruption. Nowadays, modern democracies seem stuck around the trade-off between collective benefits from infrastructure and individual rights, and large projects are often the kiss of death for a politician’s career. ...

With the can continuing to be kicked down the road while existing infrastructure approaches its expiration date, we can expect many more such headlines in the not-too-distant future.

She also means that more broadly than just for Italy.

The bridge

I'm not going to claim to have any special insight into the technical problems involved. Christian Wüst's article talks at length about how the collapse was supposed totally unpredictable. Wüst explains that the bridge was made from a steel-and-concrete combination whose flaws from rust are very difficult to evaluate.

Only very near the end do we read this:

Nur zwei weitere Brucken dieser Art (Patent Morandi M5) wurden damals gebaut, eine in Venezuela, eine in Libyen. Das Konzept erwies sich als Irrweg. Der Beton schützt die Spannelemente nicht auf Dauer var Rost, wie anfangs gedacht, er kann den Verfall sogar beschleunigen, verhindert eine zuverlässige Prüfung und erhöht unnötig die Masse der Konstruktion.

[Only two other bridges of this type (patent Morandi M5) were then built, one in Venezuela, one in Libya. The concept proved to be wrong. The concrete does not protect the elements of the span from rust over a long time, as was originally thought. It can even accelerate the decline, hinders an adequate examination, and increase the mass of the construction unnecessarily.]

In other words, it sounds like there was good reason for the company responsible for the bridge to be very concerned that the bridge posed serious risks. And that measures needed to be taken to mitigate the risks: repairs, restrictions on traffic and vehicle weights, even replacements of the bridge or parts of it.

The neoliberal bridge and Italian populism

What's that you say? The company that was responsible for it? Why, yes, the bridge was being managed by a private, for-profit company, the holding company Atlantia. According to Franz Kössler, Atlantia (he uses the older name Autostrade per l'Italia) "controls about half of the Italian highways." (my translation)

The Morandi Bridge was originally built a state-owned company, IRI, and opened in 1967. But it long since came under the neoliberal gospel, of which privatization is one of the cardinal dogmas. IRI itself, which as Franz Kössler observes, was once "Italy's largest employer and a center of economic miracle of the postwar era," now has "long since fallen victim to the privatization policy."

When a major bridge collapse like this happens, the citizens obviously should demand accountability for the problem and, at a minimum, a serious and honest answer as to what happened in the disaster. And democracies should expect that their government will take the necessary steps to make sure the country's public infrastructure is safe and adequate.

And the Italian government parties are pointing fingers. Prime Minister Conte and 5Stars are blaming Atlantia and calling attention to the large ownership role of the Benetton family of Italian oligarchs. And, as Walter Mayr reports, Atlantia's operational earnings in 2017 was €2.6 billion ($3 billion at current rates).

But Mayr's Spiegel article treat the idea that there could have been any neglect on the part of Atlantia with contempt. And takes the idea that Italy should reduce it's budget deficit to zero without any reference to actual economic conditions as self-evidently sensible.

Which comes to the left side of Italian populism. Both 5Stars and the Lega want to get out of the current fiscal constraints imposed by the EU. Malvini has blamed the EU for the bridge callapse, which conveniently fits with the Lega's narrow-nationalist, anti-EU outlook..

But the Hoover/Brüning economic policies dominant in the EU are bad. And while I've seen no reason to think the EU specifically directed neglect of the Morandi Bridge, it's also not just demagoguery to link the event to EU austerity policies. And Italy's economy does need a boost, even apart from rickety bridges.

Walter Mayr and and Franz Kössler make a point the some 5Stars figures had opposed a proposed road project that could have reduced traffic on the Morandi Bridge. And Profil that 5Stars "rejects big infrastructure programs on principle for ideological reasons." (my translation) Whether that is more a real ideological commitment of 5Stars or more of a "gotcha" point, I don't know. What does seem obvious is that some serious infrastruction

Italy's banks have been wobbly for a while and their economy is still slow in recovering from the Great Recession that began a decade ago. The Conte-Salvini (or Salvini-Conte?) government is pushing for a more expansive fiscal policy than Merkel and the EU want to allow.

But the combination of shaky banks and a government pushing back against Herbert Hooverish fiscal constraints imposed by the EU could bring a re-run of the Greek debt crisis and the eurozone confrontation of 2015. The Profil article cited above observes:

Die Populisten hatten Zeit genug, um erkennen zu konnen: Budgetdisziplin macht unpopular. Das, in Kombination mit ideologischer EU-Feindseligkeit, konnte Italien zum Sprengsatz der Eurozone machen.

[The {Italian} populists had enough time {since the 2008 economic crisis} to recognize: budget discipline makes you unpopular. That, in combination with ideological hostility to the EU, could make Italy into an explosive charge.]

Daniel Gros takes a wonkish look at the current risks in Italian risk spreads: Fiscal versus redenomination risk VoxEU 08/29/2018.

Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis notes in With his choice of prime minister, Italy’s president has gifted the far right Guardian 05/28/2018:

While it is true that Italy is in serious need of reforms, those who blame the stagnation on domestic inefficiencies and corruption must explain why Italy grew so fast throughout the postwar period until it entered the eurozone. Was its government and polity more efficient and virtuous in the 1970s and 1980s? Hardly.

The singular reason for Italy’s woes is its membership of a terribly designed monetary union, the eurozone, in which the Italian economy cannot breathe and which consecutive German governments refuse to reform.

The Genoa bridge collapse is another reminder that chronic austerity has longterm costs. The metaphorical collapse of the banks may be far more damaging to the economy and become the immediate cause of a new euozone crisis. But literal collapses are happening, too. And costing people who have the misfortune of being on the wrong bridge at the wrong time their lives.

"Illiberal democracy" in Hungary

Hungary is currently run by the Fidesz Party of President Viktor Orbán and is the most prominent practioner in the EU of what he calls "illiberal democracy," inspired in significant part by the oligarchical government of Vladimir Putin in Russia. Berhard Knoll and Constanze Jeitler have a very helpful analysis of developments in Hungary in the Vienna weekly Falter (29:2018 17.07.2018), Best of Böse: die Ungarn-Edition.

The whole notion of "illiberal democracy" is what can also be called "plebiscitary democracy," in which voting involves approving or disapproving decisions already taken by the government, like in a plebiscite. But doing so with institutions that effectively prevent free, competitive democractic choice by an informed electorate and allow the governing party to rule without the kinds of formal limitations on abuses like the separation of powers between legislative, executive, and judicial branches that are part of the EU standards of democratic governance.

Hungary (dark green) in Europe

Under the rules set up by Orbán, his Fidesz Party won an overwhelming parliamentary majority in this past April's election, 133-68, large enough to make consitutional changes without any opposition votes, without having to win nearly so large a majority in the popular vote. The New York Times reported on the results of the election (Marc Santora and Helene Bienvenu, Hungary Election Was Free but Not Entirely Fair, Observers Say 04/09/2018):

On the national voting list, Fidesz secured more than 49 percent of the vote, with some 2.6 million voting for the party and its Christian Democratic allies. That was roughly the same as the seven largest opposition parties combined.

Fidesz also won convincingly in local elections, securing a two-thirds majority in Parliament, which will give the party a free hand to pursue still deeper legal and constitutional changes that have already given it firm control over courts and other state institutions.

The April election was formally observed by the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Knoll and Jeitler summarize the OSCE's findings as follows:

Die Überschneidung von Ressourcen des Staates und der Regierungspartei machte es anderen Kandidaten geradezu unmöglich, einen Wahlkampf auf Augenhöhe zu führen. Den Wählern standen viele politische Optionen offen, der Raum für echte politische Debatten war aber beschnitten. Einschüchterungen und fremdenfeindliche Äußerungen, die Voreingenommenheit der Medien und die undurchsichtige Finanzierung des Wahlkampfs behinderten Wähler, eine sachkundige Entscheidung zu fällen, hieß es im Abschlussbericht.

{The overlap of resources of the state and the ruling party made it nearly impossible for other candidates to conduct an election campaign on a equal basis. The voters had many options available to the them, but the space for real political debates was circumcised. Intimidations and xenophoblc declarations, the prejudice of the media, and the untransparent financing of the election campaign hindered voters from making an informed decision, said the final report.}

As they report, there are still independent media in Hungary, but the UN Human Rights Council has warned that the current "Hungarian media laws can no longer fully guarantee that press coverage can occur in an uncensored and unhindered fashion." (my translation)

Knoll and Jeitler describe how government-friendly oligarchs also take part in the subordination of much of the press to the government position:

Die Politik übernahm die Medienlandschaft im Laufschritt. Nicht nur der öffentliche Rundfunk wurde zum Propagandasender der Regierungspartei. Private Medien fürchten um ihre Werbeeinnahmen und verhalten sich deswegen still, oder aber sie werden von regierungsnahen Oligarchen aufgekauft, wie zum Beispiel der Sender TV2. Nachdem der ungarischamerikanische Hollywood-Produzent und Orbán-Intimus Andy Vajna den Sender erworben hatte, wurde er schnell zu einem regierungstreuen Kampfhund, der gerne von der Leine gelassen wird, um Oppositionelle und Redakteure zu attackieren.

{Polical power overtook the media landscape in double-time. Not only did public broadcasting become the propaganda arm of the ruling party. Private media fear for their advertising income and stay quiet because of that, or either they are bought up by government-aligned oligarchs, as for example the station TV2. After the Hungarian-American Hollywood producer and Orbán intimate Andy Vajna had bought the station, it quickly became a loyal government attack dog that likes to be let off the lease to attack opposition figures and editors.}

Knoll and Jeitler highlight Orbán's aggressive campaign against non-governmental organizations (NGOs) promoting mainstream democratic practices and defending human rights. Some of it is in the form of intimidation by the youth wing of Fidesz. But they also describe a new law taking effect at the end of July that imposes a 25% tax on organizations that engage in "propaganda activities," which is aimed in particular at groups supporting immigrants and opposing the government's xenophobic propaganda. George Soros' Open Society Foundation is one of the NGOs targeted.

That is a case in which two favorite Fidesz propaganda themes, xenophobia and anti-Semitism, intersect. Orbán and his cronies are perfectly happy to have one of their Hungarian-American oligarch buddies buy an annoying news outlet on their behalf. But they are very, very unhappy about the alleged dealings of the most famous Hungarian-American, George Soros.

Soros, of course, has been a favorite bogeyman for Jew-haters on both sides of the Atlantic for, well, it seems like forever. George Soros is a real person who is active in politics both in the US and Europe. And, of course, the real-world George Soros is fair game for praise and criticism, just like anyone else active in political affairs.

But the "George Soros" of the anti-Semites is just a symbol for the imaginary Worldwide Jewish Elders of Zion Conspiracy against good Christian white folks. And the Hungarian government and the ruling Fidesz Party promote that version with shameless demogoguery. As Knoll and Jeitler report, during the election they promoted the hate-image of George Soros "as the puppeteer of Muslim mass migration" and declared him an "enemy of the state." Jews as puppet-masters was a stock image of Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda.

Im Wahlkampf hatte die Regierung von Steuergeldern finanzierte Plakate affichiert, die einen geifernd grinsenden George Soros zeigten: „Lassen wir nicht zu, dass Soros als Letzter lacht.“ Im Staatsfernsehen und Rundfunk liefen Spots mit antisemitischen Untertönen. Die Fidesz-Jugend bastelte ein Plakat, das Soros als Puppenspieler zeigte, der ungarische Oppositionspolitiker wie Marionetten tanzen lässt.

{During the election, the government placed placards financed with public funds that showed a greedily grinning George Soros [and capitioned], "Let's don't let Soros have the last laugh". In public TV and radio, spots ran with anti-Semitic undertones. The Fidesz Youth pasted up a placard that showed Soros as a puppetmaster who had Hungarian opposition politicians dancing like marionettes.}

The centerpiece of Fidesz propaganda is the supposed menance of hordes of refugees coming into Hungary. This scare is still riding on the back of the alarm generated by the surge of refugees to Europe from the Middle East and North Africa in 2015, most of whom wound up someplace other than Hungary.

The refugee/immigraiton issue - which European xenophobes prefer to call "migration" because in the current political lingo that sounds like "freeloaders" - has been particularly potent in Hungary. That despite the fact that Hungary has a notably lower percentage of immigrants as part of its population than other European countries like Austria. That may sound superficially paradoxical. But it's a general pattern. In Germany, Austria, the United States, the strongest anti-immigrant sentiment if found in areas with relatively few immigrants. People with actual, real-life contacts with immigrants are distinctly less receptive to xenophobic political demagoguery.

But, in a manner similar to the practices implemented by Donald Trump and Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III in the US, Orbán government uses gratuitous cruelty to immigrants as a way of acclimatizing people to escalating levels of brutuality and human rights violations. Although, to be fair to Hungarian authoritarians, I have not yet seen reports of Hungary systematically kidnapping immigrant children from their parents as ICE does in the US as state terror against immigrants. The reality in Hungary is nevertheless more than ugly enough. Knoll and Jeitler report on immigrant detention camps inside Hungary near the Serbian border:

Die zwei Transitzonen Röszke und Tompa suchen ihresgleichen in Europa. Hochsicherheitskomplexe gleich hinter dem Zaun, den Ungarn 2015 an der Grenze zu Serbien aufgezogen hat. Stacheldraht, Stahldrehtüren, Container und Überwachungskameras. Das Muster für die Pläne von Herbert Kickl und Horst Seehofer? Die ungarischen Behörden haben im Vorjahr knapp 4000 Menschen gestattet, Asylanträge zu stellen. Heute lassen die ungarischen Behörden durchschnittlich pro Arbeitstag zwei Asylwerber in die Transitzonen. Alle anderen, die im Land aufgegriffen werden und nicht eine der beiden Zonen passiert haben, werden, ohne einen Asylantrag stellen zu können, sofort nach Serbien zurückgeschoben.

In den ersten vier Monaten dieses Jahres wurde 267 Menschen, vornehmlich Afghanen, Schutz zugesprochen; 326 Anträge wurden abgelehnt. Das Verfahren innerhalb der Transitzonen dauert zwischen drei und sechs Monate – und das nach durchschnittlich achtmonatigem Warten in offenen Asylzentren in Nordserbien. Medizinische oder psychosoziale Betreuung gibt es genauso wenig wie effektiven Schutz minderjähriger Flüchtlinge vor Misshandlungen und sexueller Ausbeutung. Als Journalist kann man die Transitzonen zwar von außerhalb filmen, sie aber nicht besichtigen. Was in Röszke geschieht, bleibt in Röszke.

Der Europäische Menschenrechtsgerichtshof stellte unter anderem fest, dass zwei Bangladescher, die mit attestierter posttraumatischer Störung vor ihrer Zurückschiebung nach Serbien 2015 drei Wochen in der Transitzone angehalten wurden, ihrer Freiheit unrechtmäßig beraubt wurden und keinen Zugang zu wirksamen Rechtsbehelfen erhielten (die ungarische Regierung hat gegen das erstinstanzliche Urteil Berufung eingelegt). Röszke steht heute für eine weitverbreitete und systematische Rechtsverletzung.

{The two transit zones Röszke und Tompa are without comparison in Europe. High security compounds right behind the fence Hungary erected in 2015 on the border to Serbia. Barbed wire, steel revolving doors, containers, and surveillance cameras. The model for the plans of [Austrian Interior Minister] Herbert Kickl and [German Interior Minister] Horst Seehofer? Hungarian officials have approved barely 4,000 people to make application for asylum last year. Today, Hungarian officials allow on the average two asylum-seekers per day into the transit zones. All others who are captured in the country and haven't passed through either of the two zones are immediately sent back to Serbia without being able to apply for asylum.

In the first four months of this year, 267 people were granted [asylum] protection, primarily Afghans; 326 applicataions were rejected. The processes inside the transit zones last between three and six months - and that after an average eight months waiting in public asylum centers in Northern Seriba. Medical or psychosocial support services as so little present as effective protection of underage refugees from abuse and sexual exploitation. Journalists can only film the transit zones from outside, but are not allowed to visit them. What happens in Röszke stays in Röszke.

The European Court of Human Rights has confirmed that, among others, two Bangladeshis with attested post-traumatic disorders were held for three weeks in the transit zone before being sent back to Serbia in 2015, unjustly deprived of their freedom, and were provided no access to effective legal assistance. (The Hungarian government has appealed the initial ruling.) Röszke today represents a widespread and systematic violation of human rights.} [my emphasis]

To get a sense of proportion, Hungary's population is around 9.8 million and projected to shrink. Admitting 265 asylum-seekers is anything but a flood of newcomers and in no meaningful way can that be called a serious problem. Also, as long as Hungary wants to have a growing GDP, they need immigrants.

What's striking about so much of the anti-immigrant rhetoric in EU politics right now is that the problems are wildly exaggerated and lied about by xenophobic politicians. And the "solutions," when they go beyond rhetorical hot air, tend to be little more than performative brutality against immigrants. And stunningly irrelevant to the very real longterm immigration issues facing Europe, issues which will go through recurrent acute phases, especially as wars in the Middle East and North Africa break out or intensify.

This is what the death of democracy looks like. The Hungarian version of it, anyway.

The Trump-Putin Helsinki summit and nationalism in Europe

The Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki scheduled for July 16 is providing a focal point for political and foreign policy analysts to understand the current state of US-Russia and EU/NATO-Russia relations.

Several parties in power in European governments see Putin and his party as some kind of model for their countries. Viktor Orbán's government in Hungary is currently the leader in EU in moving to what Orbán calls "illiberal democracy," i.e., an autoritarian government validated through elections, on something like CKarl Schmitt's notion of validation through plebiscite.

In the German literature, for example the use of plebiscites was supported by Carl Schmitt, an apologist for the NSDAP-regime, who proposed that a dictator, as a “single trusted representative”, could use plebiscites to “decide in the name of the…people”[v], and it was denounced by democratically inclined writers like Robert Michels, who dismissed the plebiscite as it would allow “a Führer to lead the people astray through unclear questions, which he himself would be solely entitled to interpret afterwards”[vi]. (Encyclopedia Princetoniensis; accessed 07/06/2018)

No, even Hungary isn't that far gone yet. But, yes, Carl Schmitt is in fashion again, it appears. Schmitt would probably approve of Putin's manner of maintaining what is in fact a dictatorship while leaving the empty forms of democracy in place.

But it's also worth noting at this point that the Manichean notion that the US so often uses of democracy (Our Side) vs. dictatorship (The Bad People) is very often more slogan and propaganda than real understanding. Elections in Hungary, for instance, still do happen. And the EU rules do require free elections, which so far has put limits on how far toward authoritarian government EU member states can go. Though the Merkelized EU has far more diligent about enforcing Herbert Hoover-Heinrich Brüning economic policies than it has been about moving against "democractic deficits" in member states' governance. Not least because the EU has its own very real democratic deficits.

The point is that there is a continuum between democracy and dictatorship. And even dictatorships have to secure the practical support of some significant portions of their populations. In the case of "Putinist" parties and groups in Europe, the danger from such groups is not that they will suddenly stage a Putsch. Even Putin didn't come to power that way. The more immediate practical reality is that they are pushing for restrictions on democratic paticipation and seeking to further weaken or undermine the EU and NATO.

In Italy, Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte heads a still-new coalition government of the left-populist Five Star Movement and the right-populist Lega. Wolfgang Münchau's Eurointelligence conveys the concerns of Alberto Nardelli, Europe editor for Buzzfeed, about the Lega and the Interior Minister of that party, Matteo Salvini (What to make of Salvini's relations with Russia? 07/05/2018))

The key issue is the partnership agreement between the Lega and United Russia, Putin's Party. It contains a clause on information-sharing relevant to bilateral and multilateral affairs. The question is whether there is a deeper level of communication happening between the two parties, or whether they are simply united in their distaste for the EU and their admiration for Donald Trump. The diplomats said that European governments were playing close attention to Italy's behaviour especially during international meetings. Nardelli notes that Giuseppe Conte did not make good on previous threats by Italy to refuse a renewal of the Russian sanctions. But Conte took time with the decision, and made the point in the discussions that the sanctions should not hit Russian civil society. The officials Nardelli spoke to expressed concern that Conte may not be his own man, but may be under the direct control of Salvini and [Deputy Prime Minister and Five Star leader] Luigi Di Maio. [my emphasis]

Austria's far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ), currently the junior partner in Chancellor Sebastian "Babyface" Kurz' government, also concluded such a partnership agreement with United Russia in 2016 (Austrian far right signs deal with Putin's party, touts Trump ties Reuters 12/19/2016):

Party leader Heinz-Christian Strache and the FPO’s recently defeated presidential candidate Norbert Hofer attended the signing ceremony in Moscow, as did officials of Putin’s United Russia party including Pyotr Tolstoy, a deputy chairman of the lower house of parliament.

The FPO has long taken a pro-Russia stance, calling for an end to European Union sanctions against Moscow imposed over the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine. It has also denied allegations that it receives funding from Moscow.

Strache is now the Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister for Austria.

Here the questions of pragmatic foreign policy, political ideology, and subversion get mixed together in ways than can be confusing. These partnership agreements with United Russia have at least an analogous relationship to the role of the Soviet Communist Party to other Communist Parties. But historical analogies are often as misleading as they are clarifying. The USSR saw itself as the legitimate leader of the world Communist movement, with the idea that the Soviet leadership provided worldwide guidance for how Communist Parties could come to power in other countries. Not surprisingly, non-Communist governments didn't view that as an entirely friendly arrangement.

But also not surprisingly, the reality was much more complicated. As Communist Parties did come to power in other countries, they had disagreements with the Soviet leadership. Yugoslavia broke with the Soviet leadership in 1948. The split between the USSR and China would become far more significant. Having formal partnerships with parties in other countries did not guarantee the Soviet Union even consistent pro-Soviet foreign policies on their part.

Politics is politics, and countries are countries. So of course countries try to influence other parties and other international actors in their favor. Anyone who is of a mind to do so can paint those influences as subversive or espionage will find some audience for those claims. Although for most people in most circumstances, the difference in admiring a foreign party or leader and committing illegal acts of espionage or treason is a clear one.

All of which is to say that we can view Russian governmental interference in elections in violation of national laws as a legal and factual matter. And the appeal to some constituencies of the Putinist forms of government and doctrine as a political and ideological matter. And the question of a country's relations to Russia as a practical and diplomatic concern.

So, whether a "Putinist" party's position on relations with Russia is good or bad depends very heavily on how one views what national and international interests and goals should be protected. Austria, for instance, gained some definite national advantages from its role as a neutral country between East and West. It would be very much to Austria's benefit as a country if its government was able to contruct a similar arrangement that would enable it to play a genuine role of reconcilation on the lines of its Cold War practice.

But Austria's best chance to do that is to strengthen the EU. And they haven't been good at that for quite a while. Strache's FPÖ has a strong anti-EU bent. In that way, the FPÖ's nationalism and hostility to the EU are in line with Putin's goals of dividing and weakening the EU and NATO. (Austria itself is not a NATO member.) The FPÖ has been banging the drums of xenophobia and Islamophobia for years, something also in line with Russia's own nationalistic policies. But that is a sign of parallel ideological development and not manipulation by Russian "special measures," however much inspiration the FPÖ may draws from Russian-style nationalism. But a policy course that actively undermines the EU and tends toward the Union's dissolution would certainly damage Austria's real interests.

The other factor currently at work is the erratic American President, who has displayed considerable hostility to both NATO and the EU. It's one thing for Austria to act as some kind of diplomatic mediator among the US, Russia, and the EU. But joining the US and Russia in wrecking the EU is a whole different matter. That's not a mediating strategy. It's sucker diplomacy.

Sadly, Chancellor Babyface seems so focused on short-term nationalist demagoguery ("Close the borders!") that he risks squandering the chance to reposition Austria as a more significant European player. Especially since he's been recklessly intervening in internal German politics and is already drawing Angela Merkel's anger and retaliation because of it.

Stephen Walt observes (The EU and NATO and Trump — Oh My! Foreign Policy 07/02/2018):

It is no secret that U.S. President Donald Trump has an instinctive animus against the European Union and NATO. He supported the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, reportedly advised French President Emmanuel Macron that his country should leave the union too, and last week falsely claimed that the EU was created “to take advantage of the United States.” (This last statement raises an obvious question: Does Trump know any history at all? The answer appears to be no.) He has long complained that NATO’s European members aren’t paying enough for defense and has offered only tepid support for the mutual defense clause that is at the heart of the NATO treaty.

So, it’s not surprising that both Europeans and Americans are now looking ahead to the NATO summit in July with a certain foreboding. Coming on the heels of Trump’s petulant tantrums during and after the G-7 summit in June, and taking place just before he is scheduled to meet one-on-one with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the summit could turn out to be the diplomatic equivalent of a 29-car pileup.

Correction 07/15/2018: The Foreign Minister of Austria in the Kurz government from 12/18/2017 to now has been Karein Kneissl; Heinz-Christian Strache has not been Foreign Minister. Strache is Vice Chancellor and Minister of the Civil Service and Sport.

European Trumpism on immigration and refugees

The Hungarian government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán "will introduce measures within weeks to hold immigrants in detention “shelters” indefinitely in order to stop them traveling freely within Europe, his spokesman said on Monday," reports Politico EU (Tom McTague, Hungary hardens immigration line 02/07/2017).

Orbán's approach to government is often called "illiberal democracy." His politics fit broadly into the Trumputist umbrella. And according to McTague's report, Trump is providing validation and encouragement for Orbán's approach, at least by example:

Under Orbán’s proposal, those entering Hungary illegally — even if they are fleeing war-torn countries in the Middle East and Africa — will be kept in government camps, banned from moving freely within Hungary, until their status has been resolved, which could take “months.” ...

Budapest has clashed with Brussels before on the issue, most notably last year when it rejected an EU refugee resettlement plan and in 2015 when Hungarian police fired tear gas and water cannons against migrants on its border. But Orbán’s government has been emboldened by the election of U.S. President Donald Trump. In a speech last month, Orbán welcomed Trump’s election, saying it heralds a new age where countries are free to put their interests first. “The era of multilateralism is at an end, and the era of bilateral relations is upon us,” he said. ...

The election of Trump has also given Hungary’s government fresh confidence to pursue its agenda. “The change in the perception of the United States has helped,” [Orbán spokesman Zoltan] Kovacs said.

With Trump expressing hostility toward the EU as such, the refugee crisis becomes even more of a problem for the EU and its main leader, Angela Merkel.

And this again brings into sharp relief the deficiency of Merkel's extend-and-pretend method of addressing EU problems. I'm including here again a documentary video that I recently posted, the second part of the Aljazeera Big Picture documentary called, The Making And Breaking Of Europe 02/03/2017, which is particularly good in discussing how the nationalist sentiment against Greece over their debt crisis, actively encouraged by Merkel and her party and her coalition partners the Social Democrats, and supported by the other EU countries under pressure from Germany, fed into the narrow nationalist response by so many EU countries over the refugee crisis.

Merkel's policy in Greece was extend-and-pretend on a grand scale, avoiding a full-blown default but imposing draconian austerity measures that not only a healthy economic recovery impossible, but also extends the debt crisis itself indefinitely.

She also applied that approach to the refugee crisis, which has been at the crisis stage since at least 2011. That's six years ago now. Because of the geography, Turkey and EU member Greece landed with heavy responsibility for it from the start. (See Greece completes anti-migrant fence at Turkish border Ekathimerini 17.12.2012)

The Libya intervention gave a significant boost to the refugee flow. EU members France and Britain took the lead in that intervention, with of course support from the US under President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Libya previously absorbed a lot of refugees from Northern Africa, like those from Eritrea. (Migrant crisis: EU leaders agree plan to stop Libya influx BBC News 02/03/2017)

But this BBC News report from 2015 shows the countries of origin of most of the refugees in the year that Merkel was forced to recognize the crisis in a newly dramatic way and failed to push most other EU countries into compliance with her desire to resettle them across the EU: Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts 03/04/2016.

The leading countries of origin reported by the BBC at that time were, largest to smallest numbers, were Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Albania, Pakistan, Eritrea, Nigeria, Iran and Ukraine.

Wars generate refugees. Wars in the Middle East generate refugees into Europe.

Now there are new strains on Greece's capacity to house the refugees. (Commission awards €3.9 million in emergency funding to Greece to help improve reception conditions on the Greek islands European Commission 02/06/2017)

Rescue.org as of this writing has a featured Greece crisis briefing which apparently dates from around September 2016.

And, oh yeah, the Greek debt crisis continues, of course: Investors in Greece fear ‘accident’ as debt payment time nears Ekathimerini 02/07/2017; Helena Smith, Grexit? Greece again on the brink as debt crisis threatens break with EU Guardian 02/03/2017.