Showing posts with label adorno. Show all posts
Showing posts with label adorno. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 05, 2016

Peter Gordon on the "Adorno et al" study about the authoritarian personality

Peter Gordon brings the ideas of Theodor Adorno to bear on current American politics in The Authoritarian Personality Revisited: Reading Adorno in the Age of Trump Boundary 2 Online 06/15/2016.

Author of the forthcoming book Adorno and Existence, Gordon provides some refreshingly Adornian social criticism in this article. He even indulges a bit of Situationist thinking, "But what passes for politics today in the United States has its etiology not in determinate forms of psychological character but rather in modes of mindless spectacle that may awaken doubt as to whether the 'mind' remains a useful category of political analysis."

But his argument about how Adorno's social-political outlook refutes the basic premise of the famous "Adorno et al" study on The Authoritarian Personality (1950) is not convincing. This was the book presenting the findings of a pioneering sociological study in which Adorno was a leading figure. The project was sponsored by the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and focused on defining the potential constituency for a Hitler-type political movement in the United States.

And his observations on the "Trump phenomenon" provide confirmation for the the individual-psychological findings of the study, the very thing he argues that Adorno's own broader theoretical outlook undermines. At the same time, his attempt to read very broad implications for the total American culture into the popularity of Trump comes off as kind of a backhanded normalization of Trump's politics.

It seems to me that Gordon is making too much of the differences between Adorno's sociological-political view of the effects of social structures on individuals and the individual-focused nature of the AJC study. It was focused, after all, on the kind of authoritarianism and anti-Semitism that had brought Europe and the US to a massive war view the Nazi government in Germany. That was very much a political and social phenomenon. But doing a study like The Authoritarian Personality that focused on individual psychology doesn't contradict understanding political and social phenomena as such. Unless we adopt a Robinson Crusoe view of the individual - and even Robinson Crusoe needed his human companion Friday to survive on his fictional island - individual psychology is inseparable from society, and societies are organized agglomerations of individuals.

Later in the article, Gordon invokes Adorno's sociological/political outlook as being helpful in understanding the "Trump phenomenon." But he uses that argument as a rejection of the findings of the Authoritarian Personality studies. He's making a kind of imminent criticism of Adorno's work on individual psychology.

It strikes me that Gordon makes two different distinctive points on methodology: (1) The "authoritarian personality" studies were empirically invalid in some important sense because Adorno, and by implication the other participants of the study, made broader assumptions about social constraints and influences on the individual that were not clearly specified in the text reporting the study; and, (2) that Adorno's broader social views were in major part prima facie invalid - even though his overriding argument is to use Adorno's social theories to reject the "authoritarian personality" study's work on individual psychology.

The real value of Adorno’s critical outlook, he writes, "is the fact that he refused to identify such social pathologies with specific personalities or social groups." But how could there be social pathologies at all without "specific personalities" or "social groups"? Adorno's criticism of the totalizing tendencies of capitalist society did not assume that all meaningful distinctions between groups and classes had been erased.

Gordon takes the previously unpublished Adorno quotes that he cites as a sort of "smoking gun" that shows Adorno himself rejected the basic notion of the individual on which the study was based. But I don't read them that way. Adorno had a dynamic/dialectical view of the relationship between society, capitalist society in particular, and the individual. So the fact that Adorno, for instance, saw the nature of individuality in modern society changing over time with the shrinkage of the spheres of life previously considered as private or as part of "civil society," doesn't mean that he was repudiating the basic assumptions of the authoritarian personality study or the earlier Frankfurt School studies on family and society, which Deborah Antunes recently described at length in her book Por um Conheciment o Sincero no Mundo Falso: Teoria (2013). Gordon even reads Adorno's comment, “Psychological dispositions do not actually cause fascism,” as a repudiation of the whole concept of individual psychology.

Ironically, or perhaps just inconsistently, Gordon makes a plausible case for how applicable the "authoritarian personality" model applies to the "Trump phenomenon":

It would be hard to deny, of course, that many items from the original list of features describing the authoritarian personality map all too easily onto Trumpism, especially its chauvinism and swagger, and its “toughminded” style. (Curiously, sexual repression would seem to be a point of discontinuity: Trump has traded the older American convention of sexual moralism for sexual boasting, a change that has not inhibited his growing appeal among American evangelicals.) [my emphasis]
What's striking to me about this is that he doesn't seem to realize that the support of the Christian Right for a notorious libertine like Donald Trump is also confirming evidence for the authoritarian-personality model. The authoritarian aspect is more important to their political preferences than their professed convictions on sexual morality. One "tell" is that polls show support for torture is highest among those identifying themselves as evangelical Christians (which in America means conservative Protestants). The contempt for feminism and women's rights among the Christian Right voters is also a important connection to Trump's brand of politics. Both those factors are explicable in terms of the findings of The Authoritarian Personality.

Adorno's use of phrases like "omnipotent social adjustment" if taken in isolation might seem to be repudiating the whole concept of individual psychology. But that is very much part of Adorno's style, to state one side of a dialectical relationship in a drastic way, maybe even melodramatically.

And that basic idea of the increasing authoritarian tendencies of society was certainly not unique to Marxism or any other left political view as such. Freud made essentially the same argument in Civilization and Its Discontents. He described it in psychoanalytic terms as the increasing external demands of society (civilization) increasing the demands that individual superegos make, which he saw as creating a greater inclination to aggression and violence. And though Freud regarded the problem at least as seriously as Adorno did, he definitely did not see it as abolishing the validity of individual psychology entirely.

When he applies his approach to the Trump campaign, Gordon writes, "Trumpism, though it masquerades as society’s rebellion against its own unfreedom, represents not an actual rebellion but the standardization of rebellion and the saturation of consciousness by media forms."

And he argues, "If Adorno was right, then Trumpism cannot be interpreted as an instance of a personality or a psychology; it would have to be recognized as the thoughtlessness of the entire culture." But that is only true if one accepts Gordon's more-than-dubious argument that Adorno's social/cultural/political theories refute the findings that Adorno himself drew from the AJC studies on the authoritarian personality.

And on Trump's appeal, Gordon is casting his net far too wide. Trump's campaign style and particular brands of hate-mongering are distinguished from the standard Republican appeal of the last 20 years or mostly by being more crass and not so rhetorically linked to doctrinaire conservative economic policy ideas. The Republicans have pretty consistently used rightwing populist ideas and styles as a major part of their messaging since 1968. Richard Nixon's Vice President Spiro Agnew was pretty much as obnoxious as Donald Trump. But he used better syntax. And "reality TV" as we know it today hadn't yet come onto the scene. Gordon acknowledges this history in passing at one point, "Even [Trump's] unabashed misogyny, racism, and demagogic remarks about Muslims merely recapitulate a repertoire of stereotyped attitudes that have long characterized American public discourse."

And if "Trumpism" is equivalent to "the thoughtlessness of the entire culture," how would we explain the fact that, for all his popularity among the Republican base, he is still notably behind Hillary Clinton in most Presidential polls despite Hillary's own remarkably high negative ratings? And how is then that most of the know-nothing, flat-earther position on Islam, economics, climate science and most other kinds of science are to be found distinctly more concentrated in the Republican Party than the Democrats?

Put another way, if half or more of the voting public is ready to see Trump as an undesirable and even dangerous character to put in the Oval Office, then the only way for "Trumpism" to be equivalent to "the thoughtlessness of the entire culture," is that supporters of Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders would also have to be expressing such thoughtlessness. In fact, if "Trumpism" represents the entire culture, the Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders supporters would also have to represent Trumpism. Even allowing for some melodrama of Gordon's own in stating the point, this line of argument just doesn't hold together very well.

And I'm 100% sure - okay, maybe only 99.9999% sure! - that Theodor Adorno would perceive some very clear distinctions among "Trumpism," Bernie Sanders brand of militant social democracy, and Hillary Clinton's tepid and vague centrist neoliberalism.

Gordon even indulges in his own version of the favorite pundit trope that Both Sides Do It:

The eclipse of serious journalism by punchy soundbites and outraged tweets, and the polarized, standardized reflection of opinion into forms of humor and theatricalized outrage within narrow niche markets makes the category of individual thought increasingly unreal. This is true on the left as well as the right, and it is especially noteworthy once we countenance what passes for political discourses today. Instead of a public sphere we have what Habermas long ago called the refeudalization of society and the mere performance of publicity before an abject public that has grown accustomed to inaction. [my emphasis]
Except in one political party this year, the Democrats, we've seen a distinct fight between Clinton's hawkish neoliberalism and Sanders' antiwar New Deal approach. On the Republican side, we pretty much saw a contest among several different versions of howling at the moon. That's a meaningful distinction from a view anywhere below the proverbial 30,000 foot level.

He goes further, "Name just about any political position and what sociologists call 'pillarization' — or what the Frankfurt School called 'ticket' thinking — will predict almost without fail a full suite of opinions. This is as true for enthusiasts in the Democratic Party as it is for the zealots who support Trump." (my italics) Having just been through the primary season in which Clinton was attacked by the Sanders camp for being committed to the current system of campaign financing which has become virtually indistinguishable from legalized bribery, and having the Clinton people attack Sanders and his supporter as barbarian rabble and woman-haters to boot, I would say it would take a pretty broad definition of "a full suite of opinions" to have that be a meaningful description of the 2016 Democratic primary process.

The conformity on major issues by most measures of public opinion is much more homogenous among the Republican base, consistent with what one would expect from the prevalence of the "authoritarian personality" in a political party.

In a way, Gordon is doing a conceptual slight-of-hand trick here. He takes an Adornian-sounding phrase like, "This phenomenon of standardization through the mass media signifies not the return of fascism but the dissolution of critical consciousness itself." And then uses it to make a superficial Both Sides Do It argument about Trump and the Democrats.

One of the challenges of reading Adorno is that he makes statements like that seem like hugely sweeping generalizations. That additionally sound like versions of, "Abandon hope all ye who enter here." But for Adorno, those statements represent one side of what he understands as a dialectical process. And he always gets around to referencing the other side of that contradiction. Sometimes including a quick move from broad philosophical observations to very empirically specific observations.

Friday, August 07, 2015

Trump authoritarianism

I've recently gone back to the various reports collected in The Authoritarian Personality (1950), the famous study by "Adorno et al," as it's usually cited. The was a major study headed by Max Horkheimer, head of the Institute for Social Research, more widely known as "the Frankfurt School." It is part of the Studies in Prejudice series that was a product of a project on prejudice and anti-Semitism sponsored by the American Jewish Committee (AJC) in the 1940s.

I was reminded that it is a rich source that I still hadn't fully explored by my friend Deborah Antunes in her recent book, Por um Conhecimento Sincero no Mundo Falso: 1 (2014) that discusses how this work fits into the development in the thought of Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno and in the development of the larger field of Critical Theory.

In the strange precincts of the far right, this work was a target of one of the many paranoid political conspiracy theories on the crackpot right, "Cultural Marxism." But that's another story.

Trying to milk quotable stand-alone zingers out of the The Authoritarian Personality isn't an advisable undertaking. It involves the explanation and interpretation of a major sociological study, involving some complex philosophical, historical and psychological assumptions. And it is a publication from 65 years ago, discussing field work that took place several years before that. But there are nevertheless themes that resonate with today's Radical Right politics.

And Radical Right politics is more prevalent in the Republican Party today than ever before. Writing about today's party and its currently leading Presidential candidate for 2016, Donald Trump, Paul Krugman says (From Trump on Down, the Republicans Can’t Be Serious New York Times 08/07/2015):

For while it’s true that Mr. Trump is, fundamentally, an absurd figure, so are his rivals. If you pay attention to what any one of them is actually saying, as opposed to how he says it, you discover incoherence and extremism every bit as bad as anything Mr. Trump has to offer. And that’s not an accident: Talking nonsense is what you have to do to get anywhere in today’s Republican Party. ...

Or to put it another way, modern Republican politicians can’t be serious — not if they want to win primaries and have any future within the party. Crank economics, crank science, crank foreign policy are all necessary parts of a candidate’s resume. [my emphasis]
And David "Bobo" Brooks has offered his Deep Thoughts on Donald Trump's surge in popularity in the Republican Party, Donald Trump’s Allure: Ego as Ideology New York Times 08/04/2015. Bobo's analysis of today's political scene isn't quite so, uh, nuanced as Theodor Adorno's in 1950. Bobo:

The times are perfect for Donald Trump. He’s an outsider, which appeals to the alienated. He’s confrontational, which appeals to the frustrated. And, in a unique 21st-century wrinkle, he’s a narcissist who thinks he can solve every problem, which appeals to people who in challenging times don’t feel confident in their understanding of their surroundings and who crave leaders who seem to be. ...

When Trump is striking populist chords, he appeals to people who experience this invisibility. He appeals to members of the alienated middle class ... who believe that neither the rich nor the poor have to play by the same rules they do. He appeals to people who are resentful of immigrants who get what they, allegedly, don’t deserve.
Bobo's concluding sentence illustrates the profundity of his analysis, "He is deeply rooted in the currents of our time." As opposed to, I guess, people who died 100 years ago?

He also offers this puzzling description of Trump's message: "Society is led by losers, who scorn and disrespect the people who are actually the winners."

Adorno's famously dense prose is direct and clear compared to that!

Bobo in his column is using words and phrases which, strung together competently, sound Very Serious because they are so familiar. But these are the kinds of observations that politicians and pundits use to describe demagogues without saying their are appealing to hateful and violent impulses among their supporters.

Adorno in his chapter Politics and Economics in the Interview Material, isn't so delicate.

Here, I want to concentrate on Adorno's observations on what he calls "pseudoconservatism." Political terms like right, left, liberal, conservative, radical are famously plastic. Adorno in 1950 defined the difference between "genuine" and "pseudo" conservatives this way:

[A differentiation between scores in a group surveyed] was interpreted in terms of genuine and pseudoconservatives, the former supporting not only capitalism in its liberal, individualistic form but also those tenets of traditional Americanism which are definitely antirepressive and sincerely democratic, as indicated by an unqualified rejection of antiminority prejudices. ...

The idea [of pseudoconservatism] is that the potentially fascist character, in the specific sense given to this concept through our studies, is not only on the overt level but throughout the make-up of his personality a pseudoconservative rather than a genuine conservative. The psychological structure that corresponds to pseudoconservatism is conventionality and authoritarian submissiveness on the ego level, with violence, anarchic impulses, and chaotic destructiveness in the unconscious sphere. [my emphasis]
Which more meaningfully describes the kind of voters to whom a rich, egotistical, belligerent bully like Donald Trump appeals? Bobo's "members of the alienated middle class ... who believe that neither the rich nor the poor have to play by the same rules they do"? Or Adorno's "authoritarian submissiveness on the ego level, with violence, anarchic impulses, and chaotic destructiveness in the unconscious sphere"? I'm thinking the 1950 characterization works better than the 2015 one does.

Adorno goes on to say:

This break-through of the nonconservative element is enhanced by certain supra-individual changes in today's ideology in which traditional values, such as the inalienable rights of each human being, are subject to a rarely articulate but nevertheless very severe attack by ascendent forces of crude repression, of virtual condemnation of anything that is deemed weak. There is reason to believe that those developmental tendencies of our society which point into the direction of some more or less fascist, state capitalist organization bring to the fore formerly hidden tendencies of violence and discrimination in ideology. All fascist movements officially employ traditional ideas and values but actually give them an entirely different, antihumanistic meaning. (p. 676) [my emphasis]
The "supra-individual changes" he talks about there probably refers in particular to the concern Sigmund Freud expressed in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930, German: Das Unbehagen in der Kultur) that the increasing complexity of modern society brings with it an increase in internal feelings of guilt in individuals that also boosts aggressive impulses. Adorno's Frankfurt School colleagues Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm would elaborate on such concerns in the following decades.

He mentions two key things about the authoritarian inclination: contempt for the weak, and the use of "traditional values" to justify hostility, exclusion and violence rather than the building of community.

Authoritarian Ibérico Saint-Jean (1922-2012)

There is an infamous quote illustrating authoritarian attitudes toward the weak. It's from General Ibérico Saint-Jean, military governor of Buenos Aires Province 1976-1981:

Primero mataremos a todos los subversivos; luego mataremos a sus colaboradores, después a sus simpatizantes, enseguida a aquellos que permanecen indiferentes y, finalmente, mataremos a los tímidos

[First we kill all the subversives; later we kill their collaborators, then their sympathizers; after that, those who remain indifferent and, finally, we kill the timid.]
(See: Ibérico Saint-Jean Wikipedia, accessed 08/07/2015; ¡Basta de confrontación, argentinos! La batalla cultural n/d, accessed 08/07/2015)

Richard Hofstader also famously used the term "pseudoconservative" to describe the Radical Right of the 1950s: The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt The American Scholar Winter 1954-55. He said explicitly that he borrowed the term from The Authoritarian Personality. He framed it this way:

... its exponents, although they believe themselves to be conservatives and usually employ the rhetoric of conservatism, show signs of a serious and restless dissatisfaction with American life, traditions and institutions. They have little in common with the temperate and compromising spirit of true conservatism in the classical sense of the word, and they are far from pleased with the dominant practical conservatism of the moment as it is represented by the Eisenhower Administration. Their political reactions express rather a profound if largely unconscious hatred of our society and its ways — a hatred which one would hesitate to impute to them if one did not have suggestive clinical evidence.
Here was Donald Trump's closing statement at the August 6 Republican Presidential debate, the last of the evening (Transcript of the 2015 GOP debate (9 pm) 08/07/2015):

Our country is in serious trouble. We don't win anymore.

We don't beat China in trade. We don't beat Japan, with their millions and millions of cars coming into this country, in trade. We can't beat Mexico, at the border or in trade.

We can't do anything right. Our military has to be strengthened. Our vets have to be taken care of. We have to end Obamacare, and we have to make our country great again, and I will do that.

Thank you.
This attitude, of course, simultaneously trashes conditions as they are and promises to "make our country great again."

Digby Parton notes of the August 6 debate (Fear & loathing at the GOP debates Salon 08/07/2015):

These Republicans are running on fear and anger and nothing more. Even their various ways of saying “let’s make America great again” are demoralizing. It’s understandable. They know they are unlikely to win the presidency as long as their angry, fearful, conservative white base insists on insulting everyone who doesn’t look like them but they have no choice but to roll with it.
One always has to keep in mind in talking about American politics prior to 1965, the left-right/liberal-conservative divide overlapped the two parties. On a variety of issues including segregation, there were liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats, as well as conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats.

Hofstadter used these examples of the pseudoconservative phenomenon:

The lady who, when General Eisenhower’s victory over Senator Taft had finally become official, stalked out of the Hilton Hotel declaiming, “This means eight more years of socialism” was probably a fairly good representative of the pseudo-conservative mentality. So also were the gentlemen who, at the Freedom Congress held at Omaha over a year ago by some “patriotic” organizations, objected to Earl Warren’s appointment to the Supreme Court with the assertion: “Middle-of-the-road thinking can and will destroy us”; the general who spoke to the same group, demanding “an Air Force capable of wiping out the Russian Air Force and industry in one sweep,” but also “a material reduction in military expenditures”; the people who a few years ago believed simultaneously that we had no business to be fighting communism in Korea, but that the war should immediately be extended to an Asia-wide crusade against communism ...
Adorno addressed the situation of people with no realistic prospect of becoming very wealthy themselves who nevertheless identify with wealthy people who advocate policies designed to benefit people like themselves primarily or exclusively:

This socioeconomic aspect of pseudoconservatism is often hard to distinguish from the psychological one. To the prospective fascist his social identification is as precarious as that with the father. At the social root of this phenomenon is probably the fact that to rise by the means of "normal" economic competition becomes increasingly difficult, so that people who want to "make it"-which leads back to the psychological situation-are forced to seek other ways in order to be admitted into the ruling group. They must look for a kind of "co-optation," somewhat after the fashion of those who want to be admitted to a smart club. Snobbery, so violently denounced by the fascist, probably for reasons of projection, has been democratized and is part and parcel of their own mental make-up: who wants to make a "career" must really rely on "pull and climbing" rather than on individual merit in business or the professions. Identification with higher groups is the presupposition for climbing, or at least appears so to the outsider, whereas the "genuine" conservative group is utterly allergic to it. However, the man who often, in accordance with the old Horatio Alger ideology, maintains his own "upward social mobility" draws from it at least some narcissistic gratifications and felicitously anticipates internally a status which he ultimately hopes to attain in reality. [my emphasis]
He also addresses the superficially odd combination of hyperconservatism and identification with traditional values, on the one hand, and revolutionary/subversive rhetoric on the other. The latter is a common feature of gun-proliferation advocates and neo-Confederates, both of which are very common in today's Republican Party base, despite the recent image problems of the Confederate battle flag.

Rand "Baby Doc" Paul used such a combination last night when talking about his opposition to same-sex marriage and his support of religious-liberty arguments to justify persecution of LGBT people outside of the personal-life and church contexts:

Look, I don't want my marriage or my guns registered in Washington. And if people have an opinion, it's a religious opinion that is heartly felt, obviously they should be allowed to practice that and no government should interfere with them. One of the things, one of the things that really got to me was the thing in Houston where you had the government, the mayor actually, trying to get the sermons of ministers. When the government tries to invade the church to enforce its own opinion on marriage, that's when it's time to resist. [my emphasis]
Baby Doc was carefully hinting that resistance with guns against the lesbian mayor of Houston might have been justified in the issue to which he refers (and describes inaccurately).

The urban-legend analysis site Snopes explains the incident to which Baby Doc referred in Houston Hustle 10/17/2014. (Short version: it wasn't what conspiracy-theory fan Baby Doc made it sound like.) See also: Katie Zavadski, Is Houston’s Lesbian Mayor Really Out to Get Conservative Preachers? New York 10/15/2014, who explains that Houston's Mayor Annise Parker, actually criticized attorneys working on behalf of the city over the subpoena in a case which, like many topics that the Republicans and other conspiracy theorists blow up into tales of persecution, was actually a fairly obscure legal question on a narrow issue.

Adorno notes that for subjects who scored high on the authoritarianism scale, conspiracy theories were among their "favorite subjects." (p. 709)

He also notes that "conspiracy fantasies ... are so highly characteristic of the usurper complex." (p. 689) The topic of the "usurper complex" focused on Franklin Roosevelt during the time the study was done. It's notable that the theme of usurper has become now a standard Republican attitude toward Democratic President. And not just for official partisans. Sally Quinn's famous column expressing the contempt of the Beltway Village toward Bill Clinton, In Washington, That Letdown Feeling Washington Post 11/02/1998, gives great examples of this. She quotes the man who was for many years called The Dean Of The Washington Press Corps: "'He [Clinton] came in here and he trashed the place,' says Washington Post columnist David Broder, 'and it's not his place.'"

The usurper charge has more recently been embodied by the "birthers" like Donald Trump who have insisted that the first African-American President wasn't born in the US and is therefore ineligible to be President.

Adorno quotes an accountant in their study who:

... states quite clearly and in fairly objective terms the contradiction which seems at the hub of anti-Roosevelt sentiment:

Subject did not like Roosevelt because of WP A. It creates a class of lazy people who would rather get $20 a week than work. She feels that Roosevelt did not accomplish what he set out to do - raise the standard of the poorer classes.
The conceptions of communist, internationalist, and war-monger are close to another one previously mentioned-that of the snob. Just as the fascist agitator persistently mixes up radicals and bankers, claiming that the latter financed the revolution and that the former seek financial gains, the contradictory ideas of an ultraleftist and an exclusive person alienated from the people are brought together by anti-Roosevelt sentiment. One may venture the hypothesis that the ultimate content of both objections is the same: the resentment of the frustrated middle-class person against those who represent the idea of happiness, be it by wanting other people-even the "lazy ones" - to be happy, be it that they are enjoying life themselves. This irrationality can be grasped better on the level of personality than on that of ideology. [my emphasis]

Obviously, the rage of Republicans against the lazy is a favorite topic of conservation and of campaign appeals to "individual responsibility."

Adorno also notes the wide latitude that foreign policy gives leaders to offer a focus for expressing aggression and rage:

During the last several years all the propaganda machinery of the country has been devoted to promoting anticommunist feeling in the sense of an irrational "scare" and there are probably not many people, except followers of the "party line," who have been able to resist the incessant ideological pressure. At the same time, during the past two or three years it may have become more "conventional" to be overtly opposed to anti-Semitism, if the large number of magazine articles, books, and films with wide circulation can be regarded as symptomatic of a trend. The underlying character structure has little bearing on such fluctuations. If they could be ascertained, they would demonstrate the extreme importance of propaganda in political matters. Propaganda, when directed to the antidemocratic potential in the people, determines to a large extent the choice of the social objects of psychological aggressiveness. (p. 726) [my emphasis]
The pseudoconservatives of the postwar period still showed signs of prewar Isolationism. Hofstadter wrote of the pseudocon, "He is the most bitter of all our citizens about our involvement in the wars of the past, but seems the least concerned about avoiding the next one."

But the underlying nationalist belligerence was still there. The "libertarian" trend represented most prominently by Baby Doc Paul today has a similar posture. Baby Doc is critical of aspects US war policy. But he wants to bomb ISIS anyway.

Least surprising of all to those familiar with American politics is that subjects scoring high on the authoritarianism scale also expressed a higher intensity of white racism against blacks. This is from the chapter by William Morrow, Criminality and Antidemocratic Trends: A Study of Prison Inmates:

In the interviews, the principal traits ascribed to Negroes by high scorers are uninhibited sexuality, "laziness," "dirtiness," crude aggression, asocial acquisitiveness (petty thievery), pathological (infantile) lying, and exhibitionism. In a word, Negroes are held to be characterized by "untamed instincts," which keep them "primitive" and "childish." This imagery is partly expressed in questionnaire Item p: Negroes are "lazy, ignorant, and without self-control."

The most conventional of the prejudiced interviewees, Robert, summarizes this idea in general terms: "They have more of a primitive nature ... just want to exist as the cannibal type of man." The fascists tend to be more picturesque: "They're very closely linked with the jungle. They're built for it" (Floyd). Or, Negroes "originated from the apes" (Buck), and are "still half-African savage, no matter how dressed up they get" (Adrian).

Digby in Untitled Hullabaloo 08/06/2015 comments on the importance of race for the authoritarian base voters of today's Republican Party:

For all the blabber about Trump being the avatar of "tell-it-like-it-is", anti-Washington fervor, they [Republican base voters] really just love him for articulating their hatred for people who don't look and sound like them. That's what powers right wing populism, here and elsewhere. Sure they are against Big Gummint and bailouts etc. But mostly they just hate foreigners and African Americans taking things they don't deserve.

Regular Republican elites are nervous about all this because they can see the demographic problem they face nationally if large numbers of young American Latinos come to identify as Democrats and see Republicans as their enemies. (Party ID tends not to change.) It wouldn't last forever but it's likely to be a problem for quite some time, particularly since Mexican and Central American migration is different than earlier waves of immigration. It's always there. [my emphasis]

Sunday, March 10, 2013

Theodor Adorno's "Jargon of Authenticity" and Adorno's criticism of existentialism

I just read Theodor Adorno's Jargon der Eigentlichket. Zur deutschen Ideologie [Jargon of Authenticity: On German Ideology] (1969; written in 1962-64) for the first time. It's largely an argument that the "authenticity" which is a key element of existentialism is largely a vague notion that promotes superficiality. He directs his argument largely against Martin Heidegger, though Husserl's phenomenology and Karl Jaspers' version of existentialism, a variety more humane than that of Heidegger, also come under Adorno's criticism. He even gets in a dig at the end-of-ideology notion made famous in the US by Daniel Bell, a delusional technocratic daydream that Barack Obama has revived in his hopeless quest for postpartisan harmony.

(I'm working from the edition in Adorno's Gesammelte Schriften, Bd 6 (Suhrkamp; 1996; 5th edition); all translations are mine. Adorno isn't easy to translate, so though I wouldn't be using them if I didn't think they were reasonably good, I wouldn't want to blame anyone else for these.)

Adorno took Heidegger's attraction to the Nazi cause into account in his evaluation of his philosophy. Heidegger's focus on the importance of death in his existentialism Adorno finds particularly objectionable. "'Das Opfer wird uns frei machen', schrieb, in polemischer Variation einer sozialdemokratischen Parole, 1938 ein NS-Funktionär. Heidegger ist damit einig." In that passage, he quotes a sentence that plays on the meaning of "das Opfer" as both "victim" and sacrifice": "'Das Opfer will make us free,' an NS {Nazi} functionary wrote in 1938 in a polemical variation on a Social Democratic slogan. Heidegger is in full agreement with that." He argues that Heidegger makes death "into the core of the self." (p. 504) Adorno characterizes the central role of death in Heidegger's existentialism in the following passage. Reference is made here to "ontic" as material, empirical existence as distinct from ontological, which has to do with the nature of Being:

Der Tod wird zum Stellvertreter Gottes, für den der Heidegger von Sein und Zeit noch sich zu modern war. Auch nur die Möglichkeit der Abschaffung des Todes zu denken, wäre ihm blasphemisch; das Sein zum Tode als Existential ist von der Möglichkeit seiner bloß - bloß! - ontischen Abschaffung ausdrücklich getrennt. Weil er, als existentialer Horizont des Daseins, absolut sei, wird er zum Absoluten als dem Venerabile. Regrediert wird auf den Todeskultus; deshalb hat der Jargon seit den Anfangen mit der Aufrüstung gut sich vertragen. Heute wie damals gilt der Bescheid, den Horkheimer einer Ergriffenen erteilte, die sagte, Heidegger habe doch wenigstens die Menschen endlich wieder vor den Tod gestellt: Ludendorff habe das viel besser besorgt.

[Death becomes the representative of God, who was still too modern for the Heidegger of Being and Time. Even just the possibility of thinking of the abolition of death would be blasphemous for him; the Being for death as existential is expressly separated from the possibility of its mere - mere! - ontic abolition. Because it {death} as existential horizon of Dasein is absolute, it becomes the Absolute as the Venerable One. This is a regession to the death cult; therefore jargon since the beginning goes well with increasing armaments. Today as then, the information holds good that an enthusiast shared with {Max} Horkheimer, which said that Heidegger had nevertheless at least stood humanity against before death: Ludendorff took care of it much better.
The reference there is to Gen. Erich Ludendorff (1865-1937), who by the end of the First World War had become the de facto military dictator of Germany.

Though Adorno makes a good point about how the existentialists' view of death may provide substantial points of contact with ideologies and movements, the perspective and mood of existentialist philosophy emphasize the precariousness of the human condition generally and the individual condition more particularly. Karl Löwith in "Heidegger: Problem and Background of Existentialism" (Social Research 15/3; Sept 1948) talked about how existentialism "is shaping, with ultimate logic, the basic mood of modern man's worldly existence." It poses the question of why is there something rather than nothing. "Even those who have never read a line of Heidegger, Jaspers, or Sartre are so familiar with such typical categories of existential philosophy as 'contingency' and 'finiteness' of our existence, 'anxiety' and 'care' and all that which Jaspers calls 'extreme situation,' that they can hardly imagine a normalcy apart from mediocrity," he wrote.

And he describes the mood of existentialism this way, illustrating it with a quote from Kierkegaard:

The fundamental question, therefore, is not what is but that I am. "My life has been brought to an impasse, I loathe existence, it is without savor, lacking salt and sense. ... One sticks one's finger into the soil to tell by the smell in what land one is: I stick my finger into existence - it smells of nothing. Where am I? Who am I? How came I here? What is this thing called the world? What does this world mean? Who is it that has lured me into the thing, and now leaves me there? Who am I? How did I come into the world? Why was I not consulted, why not made acquainted with its manners and customs ... ? How did I obtain an interest in this big enterprise they call reality? Why should I have an interest in it? Is it not a voluntary concern? And if I am to be compelled to take part in it, where is the director? I should like to make a remark to him." [emphasis and ellipses in original; Kierkegaard quote is from Repetition (Princeton 1941)]
Löwith's reference to those who toss around such concepts without having ever "read a line of Heidegger, Jaspers, or Sartre" could be read as referring to the jargonization of the philosophy. Though Adorno regards Heidegger and Jaspers as having generated a lot of superficial jargon first-hand. His quote from Kierkegaard also illustrates that some of the existential jargon even preceded Heidegger.

Adorno also savages Heidegger's pretensions of drawing his wisdom from the soil and the people who work it for a living.

Adorno is not writing "history of philosophy" here, a field which philosophers tend to regard as inferior to the real business of philosophy. Readers familiar with Adorno's work will not be surprised that he engages with Heidegger's philosophical ideas as such here. Adorno's writing may sometimes border on the obtuse. But a reductionist he certainly is not. He deals here with Heideggerian concepts of Sein (Being) and Seiendes (Becoming) and why Heidegger's attempt to collapse the two together is problematic for his notion of Dasein, which for Hegel was a mode of existence but which for Heidegger stood for a self-aware existence in the moment, a being-there (Da-sein) in the sense of intensely conscious experience.

Part of the promise in the jargon of existentialism is to humanize the specialization of knowledge that is so much a part of our daily lives in the present-day world. Adorno invokes a memorable image in commenting on the problem with this promise, which he sees as pretentiously pedantic:

Das Quid pro quo des Personalen und Apersonaelen im Jargon; die scheinhafte Vermenschlichung von Saclichem; die reale Versachlichung von Menschlichem ist das leuchtende Abziehbild der Verwaltungssituation, in der abstraktes Recht und objektive Verfahrensordnung jeweils in Entscheidungen von Angesicht zu Angesicht sich vermummen. Unvergeßlich aus der Frühzeit des Hitlerschen Reiches der Anblick jener SA-Leute, in denen Verwaltung und Terror sichtbar sich zusammenfanden, oben die Aktenmappe, unten die Stulpenstiefel. Etwas von diesem Bild bewahrt der Jargon der Eigentlichkeit auf in Worten wie Auftrag, wo der Unterschied zwischen einem von gerechten oder ungerechten Instanzen Verfügten und einem absolute Gebotenen, zwischen Autorität und Sentiment berechnet verschwimmt.

[The quid pro quo of the personal and impersonal in jargon; the apparent humanization of the specialized; the real specializing of the human is the radiant transfer of the administrative situation in which abstract right and objective rules of conduct disguises themselves. Unforgettable from the early time of the Hitlerian regime is the glimpse of an SA person {a Brownshirt}, in whom administration and terror found themselves visibly united: above, the file folder; below, the top boots. The jargon of authenticity preserves something of this image in words like Auftrag {order/instructions/assignment}, where the difference between having the disposal of {being able to distinguish beteen} a right or wrong instance and an absolute order, what is counted as {a distinction} authority and sentiment, is blurred.]

Adorno, like others of the Frankfurt School and like a large part of 20th century philosophy and theology, was heavily influenced by existentialism. But it was a highly critical engagement, and was heavily conditioned by Heidegger's enthusiastic embrace of National Socialism. Adorno in this essay seems to regard Kierkegaard, the reactionary 19th-century Danish philosopher who nevertheless produced important insights that a wide variety of social critics found useful, as more substantial than the 20th-century existentialists.

But he also traces the individualism valued abstractly in nominal disregard of its social content that he finds so problematic in Heidegger and Jaspers to Kierkegaard's perspective:

Nicht umsonst ist bei Kirkegaard, dem Urvater aller Existentialphilosophie, richtiges Leben definiert durch Entscheidung schlechthin. Mit ihr halten es alle seine Nachzügler, auch die dialektischen Theologen und die französischen Existentialisten. Subjecktivität, Dasein selber wird aufgesucht in der absoluten Verfügung des Einzelnen über sich, ohne Rücksicht auf die Bestimmungen der Objektivität, in die er eingespannt ist, in Deutschland limitiert durch die ganz abstrakte und darum je nach Machverhältnissen zu konkreitisierende "Bindung an den Befehl", wie in dem Wortfetisch "soldatisch".

[Not for nothing is true life defined by Kirkegaard, the founding father of all existential philosophy, through decision absolutely. All his stragglers, even the dialectical theologians and the French existentialists, hold to it. Subjectivity, Dasein itself is sought out in the absolute disposal of the single person over himself, without regard for the rules of objectivity in which he is clamped, in Germany limited by the very abstract, and therefore depending on the power relationships to concretize, "commitment to the order," as in the word "soldierly."]
In terms of philosophical heft, Heidegger comes off better than Jaspers in Adorno's essay. He tends to regard Jaspers as even more superficial in his existential concepts than Heidegger. Adorno also isn't pleased with Martin Buber's adaptation of Kierkegaard's existentialism:

Die hinter dem Jargon waltende These von der Ich-Du-Beziehung als dem Ort der Wahrheit schwärzt deren Objecktivität als dinghaft an und wärmt insgeheim den Irrationalismus auf. Als solche Beziehung wird Kommunikation zu jenem Überpsychologischen, das sie einzig durchs Moment der Objecktivität des Kommunizieren wäre; am Ende Dummheit zum Stifter der Metaphysik.

[The thesis {Buber's}, which works behind jargon, of the Ich-Du {I and Thou} relationship, as the place of truth denigrates its objectivity as thing-like and secretly warms up irrationality. As such a relationship, communication become something super-psychological, which it would be only through the moment of the communicating; in the end, gabbiness as the founder of metaphysics.]
Adorno addresses Heidegger's pose of being nonideological, and the end-of-ideology notion more generally, in the following passage, part of which is challenging to translate into English, because he refers in a very compact way, and almost as an aside, to Heidegger's philosophy regarding ideology as of so little value that it resembles the curve in a calculus function that comes infinitely close to the line of the axis without actually touching it, i.e., that Heidegger regards ideology as being as near worthless as it can possibly be. And yet , Adorno argues, Heidegger winds up with an anti-ideology ideology:

Nennte man unideologisch ein Denken, das die Ideologie dem Grenzwert des Nichts annähert, dann wird Heidegger unideologisch. Aber seine Operation wird durch den Anspruch, sie erschließe den Sinn von Dasein, abermals zur Ideologie, ähnlich wie die heute gängige Rede vom Ideologieverlust, welche auf die Ideologie schlägt und die Wahrheit meint.

[If one calls a {system of} thought nonideological that positions ideology as being borderline worthless, then Heidegger is nonideological. But his operation becomes ideology again and again through the claim that it finds the sense of Dasein, similar to today's popular talk of the loss of ideology, which strikes out against ideology, but really targets the truth.]
True in 1964, true today. End-of-ideology aspirations or schemes of thought, especially when it comes to political theories, always wind up being heavily ideological.

Tags: , , , ,

Thursday, March 10, 2011

Frankfurt School, 1939-40: Adorno on Kierkegaard

Theodor Adorno’s essay "On Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of Love" appeared in English in the 3/1939 number of the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Due to the German invasion of France this issue could not be published in Paris as had preceding issues. It was actually published in New York in 1940 under the English title Studies in Philosophy and Social Science. Adorno first presented it, in English, at a conference in New York on February 23, 1940. A German version of Adorno's essay, "Kierkegaards Lehre von der Liebe," appeared in the 3/1951 number of the Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte. The German essay also appears in the second volume of Adorno’s Gesammelte Schriften (1979).

Søren Kierkegaard, circa 1840

Adorno had written about Kierkegaard for his doctoral dissertation, Kierkegaard. Konstruction des Ästhetischen, originally published as a book in early 1993. That work is also included in the Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 2, along with at 1963 essay, "Kierkegaard noch einmal" ("Kierkegaard Once Again"). A 1966 publisher's note in the Gesammelte Schriften edition notes of the 1933 book that it was "overshadowed from the beginning by political troubles." The 1963 essay looks at Kierkegaard's influence on philosophy and theology, calls his arguments against Hegel's dialectic a form of the "unhappy consciousness" Hegel discusses in his Phenomenology of Spirit, and comments on on Kierkegaard’s application of the "power of powerlessness" in his attacks on the established Protestant Church in Denmark in his day.

Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813–55) was an eccentric Danish theologian who is mainly remembered for having provided some of the conceptual background for existentialist philosophy. His religious perspective is often called "existential theology" and is known for his concept of the Leap of Faith. Kierkegaard is credited for the concept "existentialism." He had a great influence on Christian theology and the existential philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers.

Adorno in his 1940 paper seems to have been reaching hard to find progressive elements in Kierkegaard's very conservative general attitude. This is a tricky business. Because although Kierkegaard had a sharp critical eye for problems in the developing mass society of 19th century European capitalism, his criticisms often stemmed from a retrograde perspective based in the mystical/pietistic version of the Christian faith in which he was raised. For example, his opposed marriage and the existing system of family, a view very much connected with his mysticism. But his critical perspectives on the family didn't stem from a perspective like Robert Owen's or Charles Fourier's. Kierkegaard was very much opposed to women's rights. And that was one overtly political issue in which he took an interest.

The most intriguing part of Adorno’s essay on love is his discussion of Kierkegaard's thoughts on love for those who have died, which he elaborated in a sermon called, "Wie wir in Liebe Verstorbener gedenken" ("How We Think of Love for The Dead") Adorno quotes him as saying (all quotes here from this essay come from the 1940 English version):

Truly, if you thoroughly wish to ascertain, how much love is in you or in another person: watch only the behavior to a dead one… For the dead man is cunning. He has really drawn himself totally out of any entanglements. He has not the slightest influence which could aid or hinder his opposite neighbor, the loving one ... That we think lovingly of those who passed away is a deed of truly unselfish love.
Adorno points out the obvious limitation of this, because one’s love for the dead is not living, reciprocal relationship. It could be seen as a love that is essentially abstract. Or, to use Adorno terminology, reified and fetishized. On the other hand, love for the departed is a very real thing, a real part of life and of individual experience and personality. Adorno writes of love for the dead:

... it is love absolutely void of any barter, of any "requital," and, therefore, the only unmutilated love permitted by our society. The paradox that the only true love is love for the dead is the perfect expression of our situation.
Adorno explains, "The relation to the dead is characterized as one free of aims," and therefore one that is beyond the dictates of the economic marketplace.

But this is a very unsatisfying way of pulling a social-critical conclusion out of an interesting insight of Kierkegaard's. Yes, love for the dead is love for one who cannot reciprocate, and is insofar unselfish. Someone somewhere has probably done a critical interpretation of William Faulkner's story "A Rose for Emily" in light of Kierkegaard's theory of love for the dead. Although I’m guessing Kierkegaards wasn't exactly thinking of the topic in that way.

Yet it's also obvious that there are ego interests involved with the love of the departed, as well, from prestige considerations to material inheritance to complying with the standards of one's community for mourning. The sentimentalizing of deaths in war can certainly have a selfish side, i.e., he died instead of me.

Love for the dead may hold up a revealing mirror to the limits society puts on love among the living. And such critical perspectives are still urgently needed. But our understanding of death is heavily conditioned by the societies in which we live. And while love for the departed is a special case that sheds light on other relationships of love, it's not at all clear that such love is particularly free of egoistic elements or chosen more freely than other types of love.

He connects Kierkegaard's concept of love for the dead with this observation from Max Horkheimer, who is identified in the German version by name but in the English version (in a journal edited by Horkheimer), he is called only "a secular philosopher of our own time":

On the death bed, when death is certain, the rich and the poor are alike in many regards. For with death a man loses his ‘relationships’: he becomes nothing. The proudest kings of France had to have this experience. The enlightened and humane physician who tries to help the lonely dying man in the hour of his last ordeal, not for the sake of economic or technical interest but out of pity – this physician represents the citizens of a future society. His situation is the present image of a true humanity.
But for Kierkegaard, the dying person does not become "nothing." The Christian in good standing has a share in eternal life with God. To Kierkegaard, in a quote Adorno goes on to give, death involves a kind of joke, "the roguishness to resurrection."

In most of this essay, Adorno is actually highly critical of Kierkegaard's ideas on love as expressed in his book Works of Love (1847), of which the sermon on love of the dead is part. The core of his criticism is that Kierkegaard takes the Christian concept of love for one’s neighbor and puts it on such a very abstract basis that it makes love into something unsubstantial, love without a real object. Adorno sees Kierkegaard’s concept of a Christian duty to love others as making love valid only as a "'breaking down' of nature." Adorno connects this with Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the "pure inwardness" of the individual's ego and his mystical outlook with its ascetic tendency. By making love into a duty, "The creo quia absurdum [I believe because it is absurd] is translated into the amo quia absurdum [I love because it is absurd]."

He gives credit to Kierkegaard for perceiving that the society of his time the concept of "neighbor" had become much more transitory than it had been for most people for most of history. "The neighbor no longer exists," as Adorno puts it, in contrast to the situation in the Gospels: "The neighbor of the Gospels implies fishermen and peasants, herdsmen and publicans, people whom one knows and who have their established locus in a life of simple production which can be realized adequately by immediate experience."

But he argues that Kierkegaard's solution to the problem presented by this radical change in the nature of "neighbor" is to make it so abstract as to deprive it of all real-world meaning. He writes of Kierkegaard's discourse on mercifulness:

He modifies, as it were, biblical parables, in order to make them fit present reality. He tells the story of the Samaritan with the alteration that the Samaritan is incapable of saving the unfortunate man. Or he assumes that the sacrifice of the poor widow, which is supposed to be worth more than that of the rich, has been stolen without her being aware of it. Of course he maintains that her behavior is still that of true love. I should like to emphasize the configuration of the motives at hand. Pure inwardness is made the only criterion of actions at the very moment at which the world no longer permits an immediate realization of love. Kierkegaard is unaware of the demonic consequence that his insistence on inwardness actually leaves the world to the devil.
Kierkegaard makes love of the neighbor into a mystical abstraction, not related it real social conditions. The Biblical teaching of the equality of the believers and of humanity can and has been used to encourage activism and change. Kierkegaard uses it as a substitute. Freedom and equality, like neighborly love, become inner qualities whose violation and denial in the real world ceases to be a special problem for the Christian believer.

But Adorno finds that Kierkegaard's view of historical development as de-humanization, one he shared with the Left Hegelians, gave him the ability to describe some of the effects of that process with real insight:

The thesis underlying the present study, the thesis which I should like to put forward for discussion, may be expressed as follows: Kierkegaard’s misanthropy, the paradoxical callousness of his doctrine of love enables him, like few other writers, to perceive decisive character features of the typical individual of modern society. Even if one goes so far as to admit that Kierkegaard’s love is actually demonic hatred, one may well imagine certain situations where hatred contains more of love than the latter's immediate manifestations. All Kierkegaard’s gloomy motives have good critical sense as soon as they are interpreted in terms of social critique. Many of his positive assertions gain the concrete significance they otherwise lack as soon as one translates them into concepts of a right society.

... Kierkegaard regards the criticism of progress and civilization: as the criticism of the reification of man. He belongs to the very few thinkers of his epoch (apart from him I know only Edgar Allan Poe and Baudelaire) who were aware of the truly chthonian changes undergone by men, as it were, anthropologically, at the beginning of the modern industrial age: by human behavior and the total setting of human experience. It is this awareness which invests Kierkegaard’s critical motives with their genuine earnestness and dignity. [my emphasis]
The German version includes Alexis de Tocqueville along with Poe and Baudelaire in that group.

Adorno thought that Kierkegaard recognized the downside of democratic mass culture, "the mutilation of men by the very mechanisms of domination which actually change men into a mass." But he notes that what Kierkegaard expresses is "a hatred of the mass" which "styles itself" conservatively. Still, he finds a humane element within what is often a conservative hull: "Kierkegaard's doctrine of hope protests against the seriousness of a mere reproduction of life which mutilates man. It protests against a world which is determined by barter and gives nothing without an equivalent."

All in all, Adorno in this essay appears to be looking for a way to link the insights and concerns of a more strictly materialistic outlook with considerations that are at the center of religious thinking. He concludes with the thought that Kierkegaard's notion of the love for the dead and his understanding of death are ultimately in the service of "the hope of the reality of redemption." In the German version it reads, "Die Hoffnung ... auf die leibhafte Wirlichkeit der Erlösung," which I would translate as "the hope for the bodily reality of salvation" and which better expresses the attempt to find a connecting point between materialism and religion.

Tags: , , , ,

Wednesday, March 09, 2011

Frankfurt School, 1939: Max Horkheimer on "The Jews and Europe"

Max Horkheimer wrote on "Die Juden und Europa" in the 1-2/1939 number of the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. A note at the end says that it was completed in the first days of September 1939, which meant just as the Second World War had broken out with Germany’s invasion of Poland. He refers in this article to the "second world war."

In the last paragraph, he refers to the fascist governments in Europe and particularly to the Nazi regime in Germany as the "Iron Heel," a reference to the 1908 novel of the same name by Jack London, which projected with a dictatorship in an advanced capitalist society might look like.

This essay strikes me as not being very good on its stated subject. It’s more interesting in terms of the dismay on Horkheimer's part as he begins to evaluate the new situation of the World War that had just begun.

Most of this essay elaborates Horkheimer's Marxist understanding of fascism as the more-or-less inevitable development of capitalism.

Theordor Adorno deals more explicitly, though also not at great length, with anti-Semitic ideology in the same issue of ZfS in "Fragmente über Wagner" ("Fragments on Wagner").

Tags: , , , ,

Sunday, February 27, 2011

Frankfurt School, 1938: Adorno on Fetishism in Music and Regressive Listening


Theodor Adorno really, really didn't like jazz music.

That’s the most obvious conclusion that emerges from his essay "Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens" (The Fetish Character of Music and the Retrogression of Listening), the lead piece in the 3/1938 issue of the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Adorno (1903-1969) by this time was using the last name Adorno rather than Wiesengrad-Adorno by this time.

It's a substantial article, dealing with the philosophical concept of how music acquires the character of a "fetish" in the mass market. He is not referring to a psychological, sexual fetish, but to the concept in Marxist philosophy and economics in which the products of human activity come to appear to people as something objective, as something independent of human activity. And his concept of "regressive hearing" is an interesting and provocative one. The notion is that commercialized music becomes one more factor in integrating people into a capitalist system that restricts human freedom in major ways.

Still, much of this essay reads like a philosophical-minded fan of art music (popularly called "classical music") who just doesn't understand why the kids today like all this jangly jazz and pop music and why they are into all this wild, decadent dancing. Adorno was in his mid-30s in 1938, a little young to be sounding like a grouchy uncle who doesn't like any music written in the last 20 years. (It’s interesting in this regard to note that he could get pretty grumpy about student radicals in the late 1960s in Germany, even though many of them were inspired by the ideas of the Frankfurt School itself.) This was the year he emigrated to the United States from England and became a member of the Institute for Social Research (Frankfurt School) in exile.

But his argument in this article comes down to argue for the superiority of art music to popular music. It is important to understand how the market and changing technology affects the reception of art of all kinds. Up until around 1900, music was experienced as a live experience. You played music yourself, or heard your neighbors play music, or participated in music performances at church or community events, or went to live concerts, whether in Western bar or Stephen Foster music show or an opera or symphony concert. With the technologies of phonographs, radio, talkie movies, television, tape recordings, the Internet, I-phones, and other variations in the way we experience music today, music as a whole is a different experience in 2010 than it was in 1938, which in turn was a very different experience than in 1900 or 1850.

So it makes plenty of sense for an aesthetic and social philosopher like Adorno to look at how those changes affect our understanding of music. One could take from Adorno's essay the sense that with the mass-production of music, so that one hears music seemingly everywhere all the time, often in the context of commercials for products, the function of music that allows one to step back from the fog of daily life, to experience life in a different way for some period of time, is being severely diminished.

I once heard the folk singer Nanci Griffith say that a song should be a way of letting people be somewhere else for a few minutes. Nobody is going to go start a revolution, or even campaign for more humane immigration laws, just because they stop and listen to a Beethoven symphony or a Lady Gaga song. But entirely apart from any explicit messages in the lyrics, music can give people a sense of perspective that is potentially progressive in the sense that it provides a hint, a sense, a new perspective on things that reinforce a person’s ability to imagine better and more humane conditions of life.

Religious fundamentalists and political dictatorships tend to grossly overestimate the subversive potential of musical productions. But they aren't entirely wrong in worrying that something happens in musical experience that can promote impulses toward freedom that can escape the control of the religious or political authorities. On the other hand, it’s not as though even in the most repressive societies that music is suppressed altogether. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was unusual in that regard. People can have good taste in art music and support some very repressive political ideas. David Koch, one of most important financial patrons of the Tea Party, is also a generous financial patron of the arts in New York City, serving as a member of board of trustees of the American Ballet Theatre. (See Jane Mayer, Covert Operations: The billionaire brothers who are waging a war against Obama New Yorker 08/30/2010.)

The progressive folk music tradition is closer to understanding the democratic impulses in popular music than Adorno was in this 1938 essay. In the United States around the time of Adorno’s essay, singers like Jimmie Rodgers, the Carter Family and Woody Guthrie were tapping the traditions of American folk music to not only produce great entertainment but also to continue the tradition of expressing the real troubles that ordinary people experience in everyday life, making a protest against unjust conditions and situations even without being explicitly "political" songs.

Adorno was onto something real with his notion of "regressive listening." But he also seemed to be missing the simultaneous opportunity that the mass media was opening to people to tap into the riches of music, including the kind of musical experience that expanded people's consciousness of the potential for a better life. And that would help them develop personal perspectives that could go beyond the limitations of prevailing repressive ideologies.

Tags: , ,