Showing posts with label patrick cockburn. Show all posts
Showing posts with label patrick cockburn. Show all posts

Saturday, October 15, 2011

Drugs, politics and the "Iranian" Mr. Magoo plot (or is it the Mr. Bean plot?)

This is a report from The Real News interviewing historian/journalist Gareth Porter, Alleged Iranian Assassination Plot Appears an FBI Sting 10/14/2011:



In the interview and in FBI Account of "Terror Plot" Suggests Sting Operation Inter Press Service 10/13/2011, Gareth suggests another theory of the case in which the defendants were originally working on a drug deal. Reuters also reports on the drugs and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) aspects of the case in Iran case a sign of drugs agency's new roleby Basil Katz 10/14/2011:

The case is as notable for the increasing involvement of America's anti-drug agency in national security investigations, including a number of such stings in recent years, as a sign of any new threat from Mexico, security experts and U.S. officials say.

"If you are a member of organized crime ... you are there for a business, your business is not killing people, your business is to transport humans, to sell illegal goods, that's your line of business. Assassination attempts are not what they do for a living," said Alberto Islas, from security consultancy Risk Evaluation.
Jasmin Ramsey in Alleged Iran Terror Plot tied to Mr. Bean, Saudia Arabia, Iraq and Bahrain LobeLog Foreign Policy 10/15/2011 uses "Mr. Bean" instead of "Mr. Magoo" to describe the apparently hapless Mansour Arbabsiar, the Iranian-American indicted in the case and who has provided much of the testimony on which the government's case relies. She also points out that even if the argument for Iranian government involvement in the Arbabsiar case can still serve as longer-term propaganda for war:

Again, the question is not whether Iran is capable of terrorism (because it is) or about Arbabsiar's guilt, but whether the Iranian government was behind an act of international terrorism on U.S. soil. When the media headlines pieces on this case using phrases like "Iran plot" it is going to be remembered by readers as such regardless of the facts presented. The long-term effects of this on the U.S. psyche remain to be seen, but is there enough evidence to even make that claim at this point? This question is particularly important when prominent pundits such as those that pushed for the invasion of Iraq are pushing for a military response to Iran.
She has a point. In the current spate of articles about Iran's acts of international terrorism, the case of the 1994 attack on the AMEA Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires is routinely cited as a clear instance of it. Even though that was a far more professional and successful act of terror and mass murder than the one Mansour Magoo-Bean is alleged to have cooked up, the evidence linking in to Iran via Lebanese Hizbullah was actually pretty thin. But it has become an accepted fact in American press reporting.

Ramsey also points out the following:

Just consider the elaborateness of these allegations: not only did the conspiracy allegedly involve an Iranian assassination plot against a diplomat from Saudi Arabia on U.S. soil, it’s also being tied to the unrest in Bahrain and U.S. losses in Iraq. Thus, the unnamed “cousin,” who Arbabsiar described as a “big general in [the] army,” according to the complaint, is identified in a press release about new OFAC sanctions as Abdul Reza Shahlai — the same man who, as reported by Laura Rozen, was previously designated as the Qods Force deputy commander behind the 2007 raid in southern Iraq by a Shiite militant group that killed five U.S. soldiers. Robert Mackey of the New York Time’s blog The Lede also informs us that Saudi scholar and former royal family adviser Nawaf Obeid told McClatchy that Gholam Shakuri, the other Qods officer behind the alleged plot, was suspected by Saudi intelligence of “fomenting unrest in Bahrain on behalf of Iran’s government.”

So the first conspirator named by Arbabsiar is said to have harmed the U.S. in Iraq, and the second is allegedly behind the protest movement in Bahrain which is ongoing despite the crackdown by Bahrain's ruling family with the help of some 1,500 Saudi and Emirati troops. Could this really be possible? Always. Is it likely or even plausible? Not really.
And though she doesn't single it out, if these stories of their previous exploits are true, do they seem like the sorts who try to carry out such as clumsy scheme as the Arbabsiar plot is described in the government's complaint as being.

It's worth noting that at this point, Arbabsiar is not under indictment in the case. Marcy Wheeler does some informed speculation in Government Remains Mum about When It First Charged Arbabsiar and For What Emptywheel 10/14/2011 based on what she's been able to research on the case. The complaint the Administration publicly announced this past week is an amended complaint. Bmaz is working with her on researching this and found (who says bloggers don't do original reporting?) that there was a previous complaint filed again Arbabsiar "which Chief Judge Loretta Preska had approved having sealed".

I should point out here that speculation is part of any serious analysis of a case like this. The prosecution comes up with a "theory of the case" and defense attorneys try to find any problems in the prosecution's theory and, if feasible, offer an alternative theory of the case in hopes of establishing reasonable doubt about their client's guilt. Outside reporters and researchers don't have the responsibility of prosecutors or defense attorneys to provide zealous advocacy for guilt or innocence. It doesn't mean that someone is pushing a "conspiracy theory" if they are offering plausible alternative theories of the case. There's a point in the video above at about 10.20 where the interviewer Paul Jay asks Gareth Porter about another possible theory of the case, which Gareth explains is not likely in the current case.

In a case like this one where the public story is "so difficult to believe" as Gareth says in that interview, it's especially necessary to test alternative theories as a framework for what we know in the public record. It seems to me that the best alternative version of Arababsiar's case is something like the one that Gareth suggests: Arbabsiar had a contact in Iran with whom he thought he could do a drug deal of some kind. When he wound up contacting a DEA informant who posed as part of Los Zetas drug cartel, the DEA worked with the FBI and the CIA to draw him into this unlikely plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the US in Washington in a terrorist attack that would have involved multiple deaths.

The largest context is that the Obama Administration has continued the US policy of hostility toward Iran, in part over legitimate concern about Iran's nuclear program. And both Israel and Saudi Arabia are interested in polarizing American and world opinion against Iran. So the uses people make of the charges in this case also have to be understood in that larger foreign policy context.

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Friday, October 14, 2011

Patrick Cockburn on the Iran/Mr. Magoo case

Patrick Cockburn, who has been one of the best reporters on the Iraq War, writes about the alleged Iran/Mr. Magoo plot in This bizarre plot goes against all that is known of Iran's intelligence service Independent 10/13/2011:

The confident announcement of this bizarre plot by the US Attorney General Eric Holder sounds alarmingly similar to Secretary of State Colin Powell's notorious claim before the UN in 2003 that the US possessed irrefutable evidence Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction.
Cockburn also refers to money coming from "a known IRGC bank account to hire assassins in Mexico," but I still haven't seen if there's any official US claim to that effect.

Cockburn reminds us of some of the current politics involved with Iran:

In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have been vociferously asserting that Iran is orchestrating Shia pro-democracy protests, but without finding many believers in the rest of the world. Their claims are now likely to be taken more seriously in Washington. There will be less pressure on countries like Bahrain to accommodate their Shia populations.

In Iraq, the US and Britain were always seeing Iran's hidden hand supporting their opponents, but they could never quite prove it. It was also true, to a degree never appreciated in the US, that Washington and Tehran were at one in getting rid of Saddam Hussein and installing a Shia government. There were points in common and a struggle for influence. The same has been true in Afghanistan, where Iran was delighted to see the anti-Shia Taliban overthrown in 2001.
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Monday, August 01, 2011

Patrick Cockburn on the mess known as the Libya War

Patrick Cockburn consistently did some of the best reporting on the Iraq War. Which means you don't see him on the Sunday morning talking-heads shows in the US. But it's worth paying attention to what he is writing about the Libya War in Why the West is committed to the murderous rebels in Libya Independent 07/31/2011:

The Libyan rebels are even weaker than those in Afghanistan and Iraq where the Western-backed opposition had a core of loyal and well-trained fighters. In Afghanistan, these were the mostly Tajik forces of the Northern Alliance and in Iraq the Kurds had a well organised and well led army in the north of the country. In Libya, rebel forces have always been more meagre, inexperienced and often appear to be one side in hitherto obscure tribal confrontations which have turned into mini civil wars.

The nature of the civil war in Libya has been persistently underplayed by foreign governments and media alike. The enthusiasm in some 30 foreign capitals to recognise the mysterious self-appointed group in Benghazi as the leaders of Libya is at this stage probably motivated primarily by expectations of commercial concessions and a carve-up of oilfields.
And he comments on the success of the Free Libya propaganda campaign in the Western media, no doubt assisted by the usual bank of consultants available to exile governments supported by friendly NATO governments:

In one respect, the foreign media has been more culpable than governments in giving credibility to the TNC as an alternative to Gaddafi's regime. Official rebel statements and claims have been treated with respect, as if they were not geared to winning the propaganda war. Atrocity stories, such as the use of the mass rape of women as a weapon of war, were broadcast uncritically by CNN and others. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International as well as a UN commission, found there was no evidence for the allegations, but there was no retraction by the media. How could it be that for month after month Gaddafi's forces were still fighting when he was meant to have no support? One answer was that he had hired mercenaries from black Africa. Frightened labourers with no documents were arrested and presented by the rebels at TV press conferences as mercenaries and later quietly released. In contrast to their limited military capabilities, the rebels have proved extremely effective in cultivating the foreign media. [my emphasis]
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Saturday, March 12, 2011

France recognizes a rebel government in Libya: why?

Patrick Cockburn discusses France's surprising decision to recognize a rebel government in Libya in France has clearly not learnt lesson of history Independent 03/11/2011:

The recognition of unelected and self-appointed leaders in countries in which civil war is raging is a reminder, rather, of 19th century imperialism, when the British, for instance, would choose a leader in a country like Afghanistan who was most likely to be co-operative. There is usually a price to be paid for this. Leaders backed by outside powers may obtain arms and money, but their local credibility is unlikely to be enhanced. In Libya, Gaddafi can more easily deride his opponents as foreign dupes. If recognition of the Benghazi junta is aimed at providing political cover for later military intervention it is again unlikely to convince anybody that Libyans are taking the decisions.
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Saturday, September 27, 2008

Iraq War "success" and The Surge

I've been very disappointed in general in the way that Obama's campaign has downplayed the Iraq War. Not only because it's a winning issue and a good way to distinguish himself clearly from McCain on foreign policy. But because this war is the greatest strategic disaster in the history of American foreign policy (so far, if McCain gets elected).

Patrick Cockburn in Iraq: Violence is down – but not because of America's 'surge' The Independent 09/14/08 reviews the reasons for the reduction in violence in Iraq since 2007. Stress should be on reduction, because conditions are still very violent there. The recent disturbances in Bolivia that threaten to set off a civil war there are like routine daily occurrences in Iraq. Cockburn says bluntly, "Ongoing violence is down, but Iraq is still the most dangerous country in the world." His reasons for what improvement there has been, an improvement that McCain attributes exclusively to The Surge, include:

  • The Shi'a won the sectarian war in Baghdad. They didn't drive the Sunnis out of the city altogether. But the neighborhoods are more homogeneous religiously.
  • A large number of Iraqis (4.7 million) are refugees, both in and out of the country, having left their homes to get away from the violence. Both that and the results of the sectarian war in Baghdad effectively means there are not as many people left to kill.
  • Sunni insurgent leaders shifted their focus from fighting Americans to fighting Salafi extremists ("Al Qa'ida in Iraq", or AQI). This is one factor that the Americans did not initiate but did play a key role in encouraging. The US has been paying former Sunni insurgent groups to fight AQI instead of the US. This bribery worked in the short run, at the expense of strengthening local warlords and militias and thus making national unification even more difficult. Presumably, this is much of what Cockburn has in mind when he writes, "General Petraeus has had a measure of success in Iraq less because of his military skills than because he was one of the few American leaders to have some understanding of Iraqi politics."
  • Iran backs the Shi'a government of Iraq under Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Iran also persuaded nationalist Shi'a militant Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army (JAM) to stand down on fight Americans. For now. "It is very noticeable," Cockburn writes, that in recent weeks the US has largely ceased its criticism of Iran." A state of affairs he attributes in part to "an implicit recognition that US security in Iraq is highly dependant on Iranian actions". That's also an encouraging sign for US policy, and I hope it continues in that vein.
Cockburn notes the grim oddity of current discussion and reporting on the war in the United States:

In Mosul, Iraq's northern capital and third largest city, with a population of 1.8 million, the government was trumpeting its success only a few months ago. It said it had succeeded in driving al-Qa'ida from the city, while the US said the number of attacks had fallen from 130 a week to 30 a week in July. But today they are back up to between 60 and 70 a week. Two weeks ago, insurgents came close to killing Major-General Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq in Nineveh province, of which Mosul is the capital, with a roadside bomb.

The perception in the US that the tide has turned in Iraq is in part because of a change in the attitude of the foreign, largely American, media. The war in Iraq has now been going on for five years, longer than the First World War, and the world is bored with it. US television networks maintain expensive bureaux in Baghdad, but little of what they produce gets on the air. When it does, viewers turn off. US newspaper bureaux are being cut in size. The result of all this is that the American voter hears less of violence in Iraq and can suppose that America's military adventure there is finally coming good. [my emphasis]
The implication of Cockburn's analysis is that if McCain becomes President and takes seriously his own rhetoric about the magic results of The Surge, that could not only lead him to actions that would inflame anti-American sentiment in Iraq but to adopt reckless policies in Afghanistan.

It's also important to note that part of the short-term reduction in violence has also been due to the effectiveness of death squads who have been assassinating resistance leaders, a program modeled on the infamous Phoenix program in the Vietnam War. Tom Hayden writes about the Iraqi death squads in Woodward book reveals extra-judicial killings in Iraq San Francisco Chronicle 09/15/08:

The silence so far toward Bob Woodward's reporting of secret extra-judicial killings by American forces in Iraq shows a worrisome collapse of public debate about the war.

During the Vietnam War, by contrast, revelations about torture, tiger cages and the Phoenix program were headline news that sent protesters into the streets and produced congressional hearings. William Colby, then leading pacification efforts in Vietnam, testified that the Phoenix program killed 20,587 Vietcong "suspects," while Sen. William Fulbright suggested it meant indiscriminate killings of anyone resisting the U.S. and Saigon governments. ...

Now the Woodward book reports a series of top secret special operations, launched in May 2006, to "locate, target, and kill key individuals in extremist groups," a campaign that may have been the greatest factor in reducing the violence in Iraq. President Bush told Woodward that the secret program was "awesome." Derek Harvey, the top intelligence adviser to Petraeus on the secret operations, told Woodward that the "lightning quick" assaults gave him "orgasms.".

Orgasms? Is this what we've come to?
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Thursday, June 05, 2008

How Cheney and McCain plan to "win" the Iraq War (again)

Patrick Cockburn in Revealed: Secret plan to keep Iraq under US control The Independent 06/05/08 reports on some of the details of the long-term commitment the administration is negotiating with the Maliki government in Iraq:

But the accord also threatens to provoke a political crisis in the US. President Bush wants to push it through by the end of next month so he can declare a military victory and claim his 2003 invasion has been vindicated. But by perpetuating the US presence in Iraq, the long-term settlement would undercut pledges by the Democratic presidential nominee, Barack Obama, to withdraw US troops if he is elected president in November.

The timing of the agreement would also boost the Republican candidate, John McCain, who has claimed the United States is on the verge of victory in Iraq – a victory that he says Mr Obama would throw away by a premature military withdrawal.

America currently has 151,000 troops in Iraq and, even after projected withdrawals next month, troop levels will stand at more than 142,000 – 10 000 more than when the military "surge" began in January 2007. Under the terms of the new treaty, the Americans would retain the long-term use of more than 50 bases in Iraq. American negotiators are also demanding immunity from Iraqi law for US troops and contractors, and a free hand to carry out arrests and conduct military activities in Iraq without consulting the Baghdad government. (my emphasis)
In Constitutional terms, no Executive agreement can bind the United States to keep troops in Iraq. A treaty could, but even with a Democratic caucus that's far more timid on such matters than it should be, Cheney and Bush are not getting such a treaty ratified before the November election. Normally, treaties also include exit provisions.

But it would complicate matters. Unless Obama were to just embrace the agreement and say, yeah, this means everything's ducky in Iraq now - which he won't do - it's hard for me to imagine that it will much improve the public's view of the Iraq War. People can only take so many turning points and tipping points and the-next-six-months-are-critical periods and endless reports of endless victory before they just stop believing them. Even with a broken media, military propaganda isn't all-powerful, though our infallible generals seem to think so.

Military analyst William Arkin warned about the defense establishment's maneuvering to restrict the new President's options in Tying Obama's Hands?, Early Warning blog 05/20/08:

So when the national security professionals increasingly speak of ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, suggesting that the new president - read Barack Obama particularly - be careful not to make precipitous announcements or decisions that might threaten the troops in the field or increase American dangers at home, what are they really saying?

The argument goes like this: An announcement of withdrawal from Iraq or negotiations with Iran or any kind of olive branch fluttering in an inaugural could lead to danger for the troops, "miscalculation" on the part of our enemies, or might embolden terrorists: In short, unless the new president adheres to the national security professional's guidance regarding continuity, he could be endangering America.
McCain would presumably set up an argument like that around the new long-term security agreement Cheney and Bush are trying to put into place. The argument would be that we have made a formal long-term defense agreement with Iraq and our "credibility" would be undermined if we don't keep the war going forever.

There is substantial opposition to such an agreement in Iraq. On the Iraqi side, the agreement could very possibly lead to immediate problems for the Maliki government and increase the level of violence. Cockburn reports:

Mr Bush is determined to force the Iraqi government to sign the so-called "strategic alliance" without modifications, by the end of next month. But it is already being condemned by the Iranians and many Arabs as a continuing American attempt to dominate the region. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the powerful and usually moderate Iranian leader, said yesterday that such a deal would create "a permanent occupation". He added: "The essence of this agreement is to turn the Iraqis into slaves of the Americans."

Iraq's Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, is believed to be personally opposed to the terms of the new pact but feels his coalition government cannot stay in power without US backing. ...

Although Iraqi ministers have said they will reject any agreement limiting Iraqi sovereignty, political observers in Baghdad suspect they will sign in the end and simply want to establish their credentials as defenders of Iraqi independence by a show of defiance now. The one Iraqi with the authority to stop deal is the majority Shia spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. In 2003, he forced the US to agree to a referendum on the new Iraqi constitution and the election of a parliament. But he is said to believe that loss of US support would drastically weaken the Iraqi Shia, who won a majority in parliament in elections in 2005.

... The influential Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has called on his followers to demonstrate every Friday against the impending agreement on the grounds that it compromises Iraqi independence.

The Iraqi government wants to delay the actual signing of the agreement but the office of Vice-President Dick Cheney has been trying to force it through. (my emphasis)
The Independent is also running a column by Ali Allawi, who has served in the post-Saddam Iraqi government as minister of defense, finance and trade, (not to be confused with long-time CIA asset Iyad Allawi), This raises huge questions over our independence 06/05/08. He writes:

The Bush administration has set 31 July as the deadline for the signing of the agreement. Under the present plan, the draft of the agreement will have to be brought to Iraq's parliament for approval. Parliament, however, is beholden to the political parties that dominate the present coalition, and there is unlikely to be substantive debate on the matter. The Shia religious leadership in Najaf, especially Grand Ayatollah Sistani, has not clearly come out against the agreement, although his spokesmen have set out markers that must be respected by the negotiators. The Najaf religious hierarchy is probably the only remaining institution that can block the agreement. But it is unclear whether the political or religious leadership are prepared to confront the US. President Bush, with an eye on history, is seeking to salvage his Iraq expedition by claiming that Iraq is now pacified and is a loyal American ally in the Middle East and the War on Terror.
Cheney and Bush also have the current year's election very much in mind. The danger of having an honest Attorney General take office in 2009 is in itself enough to make them want to help McCain get elected.

In his prepared remarks for his AIPAC appearance Monday, McCain framed our continuing brilliant victories in the Iraq War as follows (Remarks By John McCain at AIPAC 06/02/08) McCain campaign Web site):

Another matter of great importance to the security of both America and Israel is Iraq. You would never know from listening to those who are still caught up in angry arguments over yesterday's options, but our troops in Iraq have made hard-won progress under General Petraeus' new strategy. And Iraqi political leaders have moved ahead – slowly and insufficiently, but forward nonetheless. Sectarian violence declined dramatically, Sunnis in Anbar province and throughout Iraq are cooperating in the fight against al Qaeda, and Shia extremist militias no longer control Basra – the Maliki government and its forces are in charge. Al Qaeda terrorists are on the run, and our troops are going to make sure they never come back.

It's worth recalling that America's progress in Iraq is the direct result of the new strategy that Senator Obama opposed. It was the strategy he predicted would fail, when he voted cut off funds for our forces in Iraq. He now says he intends to withdraw combat troops from Iraq – one to two brigades per month until they are all removed. He will do so regardless of the conditions in Iraq, regardless of the consequences for our national security, regardless of Israel's security, and in disregard of the best advice of our commanders on the ground.

This course would surely result in a catastrophe. If our troops are ordered to make a forced retreat, we risk all-out civil war, genocide, and a failed state in the heart of the Middle East. Al Qaeda terrorists would rejoice in the defeat of the United States. Allowing a potential terrorist sanctuary would profoundly affect the security of the United States, Israel, and our other friends, and would invite further intervention from Iraq's neighbors, including an emboldened Iran. We must not let this happen. We must not leave the region to suffer chaos, terrorist violence and a wider war. (my emphasis)
In his speech in Kenner LA Tuesday night, widely panned for its stiff style, he said (A Leader We Can Believe In prepared remarks, McCain campaign Web site 06/03/08):

I disagreed strongly with the Bush administration's mismanagement of the war in Iraq. I called for the change in strategy that is now, at last, succeeding where the previous strategy had failed miserably. I was criticized for doing so by Republicans. I was criticized by Democrats. I was criticized by the press. But I don't answer to them. I answer to you. And I would be ashamed to admit I knew what had to be done in Iraq to spare us from a defeat that would endanger us for years, but I kept quiet because it was too politically hard for me to do. No ambition is more important to me than the security of the country I have defended all my adult life.

Senator Obama opposed the new strategy, and, after promising not to, voted to deny funds to the soldiers who have done a brilliant and brave job of carrying it out. Yet in the last year we have seen the success of that plan as violence has fallen to a four year low; Sunni insurgents have joined us in the fight against al Qaeda; the Iraqi Army has taken the lead in places once lost to Sunni and Shia extremists; and the Iraqi Government has begun to make progress toward political reconciliation.

None of this progress would have happened had we not changed course over a year ago. And all of this progress would be lost if Senator Obama had his way and began to withdraw our forces from Iraq without concern for conditions on the ground and the advice of commanders in the field. Americans ought to be concerned about the judgment of a presidential candidate who says he's ready to talk, in person and without conditions, with tyrants from Havana to Pyongyang, but hasn't traveled to Iraq to meet with General Petraeus, and see for himself the progress he threatens to reverse.

I know Americans are tired of this war. I don't oppose a reckless withdrawal from Iraq because I'm indifferent to the suffering war inflicts on too many American families. I hate war. And I know very personally how terrible its costs are. But I know, too, that the course Senator Obama advocates could draw us into a wider war with even greater sacrifices; put peace further out of reach, and Americans back in harm's way. (my emphasis)
It's going to be critical for Obama to stay on the offense about the Iraq War and not let the McCain campaign fudge his all-out support for endless war by jive-talk like, "I disagreed strongly with the Bush administration's mismanagement of the war in Iraq."

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Friday, April 25, 2008

McCain's war

Scott Horton of Antiwar Radio interviews historian Gareth Porter in this session dated 04/24/08, though it apparently took place on 04/21/08.

Porter credits this report by conservative column by Jim Hoagland, Best-Selling Global Fictions Washington Post 04/20/08:

President Bush and his aides emphasize that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki deserves both credit and blame for acting on his own and precipitously sending a division-size force of Iraqi soldiers and police to Basra last month to attack Shiite militiamen. Maliki miscalculated, but he showed himself to be decisive and independent, goes the official version.

But the weight of the unacknowledged continuing American occupation broke through as soon as Maliki's offensive faltered. The prime minister's own chief of security, Salim Qassim, was shot dead by a sniper as he stepped out of Basra Palace to use his cellphone on March 28. Maliki, nearby, was in physical danger as the fighting raged, according to intelligence reports.

The CIA flashed word to Washington that the offensive - and Maliki's government - was about to collapse. That was when U.S. units were ordered into action to save Iraq's sovereign but defenseless prime minister, according to U.S. and Iraqi sources. (my emphasis)
Porter also suggests that Al Maliki's Iraq government could have planned the Basra offensive with the idea that Iran would negotiate a peace that the United States would feel required to respect. Wheels within wheels. But he notes that what is developing looks like a major military conflict between the US forces and Muqtada al-Sadr's JAM (Mahdi Army) is developing.

He further suggests that a new emphasis by the US military on showing some kind of apparent military success in the coming months may bring a de-emphasis on the alleged Iranian role in Iraq. He thinks the biggest reason for using that accusation in various forms up to this point has been to shift the blame for the failures in Iraq from the US and Maliki's government. But he warns in the interview that the public needs to be alert for a Cheney-Bush military attack on Iran.

And two days later, he was emphasizing the possibility that Petraeus' promotion to CENTCOM commander is likely to mean more Cheney threats against Iran in Petraeus Promotion Frees Cheney to Threaten Iran Inter Press Service 04/23/08:

The nomination of Gen. David Petraeus to be the new head of the Central Command not only ensures that he will be available to defend the George W. Bush administration's policies toward Iran and Iraq at least through the end of Bush's term and possibly even beyond.

It also gives Vice President Dick Cheney greater freedom of action to exploit the option of an air attack against Iran during the administration's final months. ...

Cheney aggressively solicited political support from Turkish leaders for a U.S. strike against Iranian nuclear facilities during his visit to Turkey last month, according to a source familiar with Cheney's meeting in Ankara.

Cheney was "very aggressive" in asking Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, as well as Turkey's chief of general staff Gen. Yasar Bukyukanit to get "on board" with such an attack, according to the source, who has access to reports from the Cheney visit. ...

After the meeting between Cheney and King Abdullah on the same trip, Saudi sources let it be known to the media that Abdullah had told Cheney that his government opposed any U.S. military strike against Iran. That suggested that Cheney had brought up the military option in Ryadh as well.

One of Cheney's main objectives on the trip appears to have been to get the message to Iran that the option of a strike against its nuclear facilities is still very much alive.
Here are two recent takes from Patrick Cockburn on the Iraqi situation:

Sadr threatens 'open war' as Iraqi army attacks base The Independent 04/21/08

A New Struggle is Beginning in Iraq Counterpunch 04/19-20/08

In the latter piece, he explains that the escalating intra-Shi'a struggle, with the government parties on one side and Muqtada's forces on the other, could well dominate the Iraqi scene this year, as it has so far.

The largest government party is SIIC, formerly known as SCIRI - and to make it more complicated, Cockburn and some other use ISCI for the current initials. Al Maliki has been aligned with the Dawa Party, also part of the governing coalition but less influential in no small part because it lacks its own militia. The Badr Organization, aka, Badr Corps, is the paramilitary wing of SIIC and many Badr militia members are also part of the government security force. Al Maliki relies primarily on SIIC and the Badr Corps for his support. Cockburn:

The Shia community is splitting apart after five years of solidarity. It is a split not just between the government and the militias but between rich and poor. Maliki’s main supporters - his own Dawa party has a small base - are the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and its Badr militia. ISCI draws its support primarily from the established Shia clergy, the merchants and the Shia middle class. But ever since ISCI was founded in Iran in 1982 at an early stage in the Iraq-Iran war the party has always lacked popular backing. It won an unsavory reputation for interrogating and torturing Iraqi prisoners: this did not stop it becoming a firm ally of the US occupation after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
He also address the role of Iran and the state of The Surge's "success" in the context of the Shi'a vs. Shi'a civil war:

The new conflict has another aspect: it is also a proxy struggle between the US and Iran. This has been going on ever since the American invasion. But, for all Washington’s attempts to prove otherwise, the Sunni insurgency was primarily supported by the Sunni Arab states to the west of Iraq. The Sadrists have traditionally been highly suspicious of the Iranians. From the beginning, Muqtada was the only Shia leader who has always opposed the US occupation. His militiamen fought two furious battles with US Marines for the Shia holy city of Najaf in April and August 2004. They suffered heavy casualties, but survived; and Muqtada became politically stronger. In public he said he was shifting from military to political resistance. But, in confronting the US, he is forced to look to Iranian political and military support. 'The Iranians cannot afford to see Muqtada eliminated or seriously weakened,' says Ghassan Attiyah, an Iraqi political scientist. In Iran's battle with the US for influence over the Iraqi Shia, Muqtada plays too important a role for Iran to see him crushed.

Confrontation, and even war, with Iran is politically easier to sell in the US than support for the continuing war inside Iraq. The Democratic Party may want to withdraw troops from Iraq but its leaders try to outdo each other in condemning Iran. General David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq, has been blaming Iran as the hidden hand behind the latest fighting in Baghdad and Basra. He [did] the same when he appeared before Congress on April 8 to give evidence about why, over the last few months, Iraq has become more and not less violent. He had a lot of explaining to do. With US television showing armed men in the streets, burned-out vehicles and smoke rising over Baghdad and Basra, his claims about the success of the 'surge' looked much less convincing than they did at the end of last year.Petraeus says that the number of American soldiers in Iraq should not be reduced below the level they were at before the surge started - which makes his claims of military success look dubious. The 3.2 million Iraqis, one in nine of the population, who fled to Syria, Jordan and elsewhere in Iraq, have not been coming home because they think it is too dangerous for them to do so; they are right. (my emphasis)
Iran's role in Iraq is real. In the larger strategic picture, that has been the main result of the Iraq War: to strenthen Iran's influence in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular.

But Iran's influence isn't as simple as SIIC and Dawa, pro-Iran; Muqtada, anti-Iran. Remember that stereotypically complex and devious Persian diplomacy. Iran is most closely tied to the government parties. But that doesn't mean that those parties are its puppets, or that Iran would unconditionally back them in conflicts with Muqtada.

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has out a paper that talks about the complexities of the intra-Shi'a politics in Iran, including a discussion of the recent Maliki offensive in Basra, The Shi'ite Gamble: Rolling the Dice for Iraq's Future 04/21/08. The only odd thing I noticed in it was this assessment of the military outcome in the Basra offensive:

Again, there is a heavy layer of fog over the outcome. It is important to note, however, that the Sadrists [Muqtada's forces] did not win any previous clashes with MNF-I, have not won significant clashes in this round of fighting, seem to have lost in Basra, and have not had any overt Iranian encouragement and support. Iraqi forces—for all their very real and all too obvious weaknesses—are now much stronger and are slowly becoming more effective.
Since Muqtada's goal for his JAM militia was to survive and not be disarmed, and since after Iran brokered a cease-fire deal JAM survived and was not disarmed, this is an odd comment. Compare that conclusion to the description in the latter Patrick Cockburn article. It's possible that Cordesman was talking in purely conventional military terms, i.e., Muqtada didn't capture large numbers of government troops and make them surrender, but otherwise it doesn't make much sense.

Cockburn talks about that deal and what the Basra offensive meant to the US administration, and gives another illustration of how hard the Maverick has to work to keep his Straight Talk straight:

As the Iraqi army began to fail the Americans moved quickly to prop it up. Air controllers to marshal air strikes were sent to Iraqi army units. A team of senior American advisers was sent to Basra. This may explain why Muqtada agreed to a ceasefire. The Mehdi Army had already shown it could fight off the Iraqi army and police, but the Americans might be a different matter. Even so, the short war between Muqtada and the government was revealing as to who really holds power in Iraq. A delegation of Shia leaders went to Iran. They talked to Muqtada in the holy city of Qom, and to General Qassem Sulaymani, the head of the Quds Brigade of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, who oversees Iranian involvement in Iraq. He has long been an American bête noir and last year US special forces tried to kidnap him during an official visit to the Kurdish president. Maliki seems to have been told of the agreement only after it was reached, but its terms were that the Mehdi Army would not give up its arms, the government offensive would stop and militia members would no longer be arrested without warrants. The Americans, who normally react furiously to any sign of Iranian interference in Iraq, said nothing about the fact that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards were negotiating peace terms between the government and its enemies.

The Americans said nothing because the abortive attack on Basra was, for them, a nightmare. The claim that the surge was the first step in restoring peace to Iraq was exposed as a myth. American military casualties might be down -- but some two thousand Iraqis were killed in March. American politicians ran for cover. While I was in Baghdad in March, Senator John McCain visited, at the same time as Vice-President Dick Cheney. Both expressed confidence that security was improving. McCain happily told CNN that Muqtada’s 'influence has been on the wane for a long time'. Three weeks later, McCain was denying he had ever said such a thing; what he had said, he insisted, was that ‘he was still a major player and his influence is going to have to be reduced and gradually eliminated.’ Given that Muqtada is the most powerful Shia leader, and that his militiamen had just shown they could defeat the Iraqi army, this would mean that McCain, if elected president, would fight a war with Iraq’s 17 million Shia. (my emphasis)
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Sunday, April 13, 2008

Patrick Cockburn on Muqtada al-Sadr


Muqtada al-Sadr: the white clothing indicates that he expects martyrdom and is prepared for it

Patrick Cockburn, author of a new book on Iraqi Shi'a leader Muqtada al-Sadr, describes him in this article, Warlord: The Rise of Muqtada al-Sadr Independent 04/11/08, which is an excerpt from the book.

It's also good to see Cockburn's work appear in the Los Angeles Times, A cleric, a pol, a warrior 04/12/08.

Cockburn's Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq was released this month. It's a "life and times" biography of the Iraqi Shi'a leader that gives some very helpful background on the recent history of the Iraqi Shi'a and their relationships to Iran.

In the LA Times piece, Cockburn talks about the recent attempt by Al-Maliki's government to crack down on JAM (Muqtada's Mahdi Army):

The [I]raqi government has decided that the moment has come to crush the Mahdi Army and the followers of Muqtada Sadr once and for all. Despite its failure to eliminate his militiamen in Basra at the end of March, the government, with American backing, is determined to try again, according to senior Iraqi officials.

It is a dangerous strategy for both Prime Minister Nouri Maliki and the U.S. Sadr remains one of the most powerful and revered leaders of the Shiite community -- and the Shiites make up 60% of Iraq. What's more, the 34-year-old Sadr is not exactly the mercurial "firebrand" or "renegade" cleric portrayed by journalistic cliche-mongers; rather, he has repeatedly shown himself to be a cautious and experienced political operator. (my emphasis)
His book offers a plausible explanation for this disconnect in the standard perception of Muqtada's capabilities. His father was an important Shi'a political leader, who was murdered along with Muqtada's brothers under Saddam. Muqtada was the youngest son. Cockburn suggests that he deliberately created a public reputation for himself as not especially capable as a leader in order to be able to survive inside Iraq.

But he has clearly shown since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 that he is a shrewd political operator and a capable leader. The fact that he's a leader of death squads who have committed terrible atrocities is something no one should forget. But he's not simply a hothead or a figurehead for his movement. Cockburn continues in the LA Times article:

What makes Sadr different from other Shiite leaders, and gives him credibility among the Shiite masses, is that he opposed the U.S. occupation from the beginning. When the U.S. invasion overthrew Hussein, Sadr said that "the big snake has succeeded the small snake." He pulled his followers out of the Iraqi government in 2006 because Maliki would not condemn the occupation. He also became increasingly reliant on Iran in the face of U.S. hostility.

The once impressive political unity of the Shiite community is now collapsing. Maliki (who is a Shiite) and his small Dawa Party, along with his main ally, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, believe that they can isolate the Sadrists and, with American help, marginalize them before the October provincial elections in which the Sadrists were expected to do well. The long rivalry of the Sadr family and the Hakim family (the founders of the Supreme Islamic Council in 1982) has once again exploded. The U.S. may come to regret taking sides against the Sadrists in this intra-Shiite feud. (my emphasis)
Iran is clearly supporting both the Sadrist JAM as well as the governmental Shi'a party's, primarily the SIIC (formerly SCIRI), which is the main governmental party and the partner of the also-savage Badr Brigade militia, although Al-Maliki himself is associated with the Dawa Party.

Cockburn says of the current moment in Iraq:

Ever since the battles for Najaf four years ago, Sadr has tried to avoid direct military confrontation with U.S. military forces. He has agreed to truces and cease-fires, and two weeks ago, he even called his militiamen off the streets in Baghdad and Basra when they seemed to be winning.

But for the Iraqi government, those clashes were only the first round in a battle to crush the Sadrists as a political and military force. Going by past experience, Sadr will try to arrange a compromise to avoid the destruction of his movement. But if he is forced to fight, the U.S. will face a whole new front in the war in Iraq.
The fact that Sadr's JAM militia mostly held back from attacks against Americans during The Surge helped the escalation to show a decrease in violence by the end of 2007. Surge partisans can even argue with some plasibility that JAM's stand-down during that period was in response to the surge.

But focusing too much on momentary talking points can hide the meaningful trends. It make good strategic sense in 2007 for JAM to let the US and its new Sunni friends in the Awakening Councils fight the nastiest of the Sunni extremists, "Al Qa'ida", as the administration and the generals like to call them. But except for the wilfully delusional (Fred Kagan, for instance), the fight over Basra, Baghdad and other cities in the south showed the political strength and improving military performance of Muqtada's movement.

This article, U.S. Cites Planning Gaps in Iraqi Assault on Basra by Michael Gordon, Eric Schmitt and Stephen Farrell New York Times 04/03/08, shows the US trying to distance itself from Maliki's assault on Basra, which proved to be a military and political disaster for the Shi'a government in the Green Zone. Note that the reporter listed first is Judith Miller accomplice Michael Gordon, who can usually be relied upon to give the Pentagon's preferred version without much pretense of journalistic vetting. I approach news articles with Gordon in the by-line the same way I approach Pentagon PR releases from Defense Department Web sites.

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Sunday, March 30, 2008

Continuing success in McCain's War


Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and George W. Bush, two of Maverick McCain's running mates

The Party line from the Republicans is that the current wave of fighting in Iraq is a sign of progress and the success of The Surge (of course!). Because, they say, this was undertaken by the Iraqi government with Iraqi security forces in the lead.

I'm guessing - and this is a guess based on the circumstances and personalities involved - that Dark Lord Cheney on his recent visit to Iraq directed Prime Minister al-Maliki to undertake this operation in Basra. And, like pretty much everything else Cheney takes the lead on, it became a fiasco. The administration's thinking was probably that the Iraq forces would go in and shoot up a few neighborhoods in Basra, claim they had killed a bunch of "terrorists" and "outlaws" and our Savior-General Petraeus could use this next week in his visit to Washington as evidence of continuing spectacular success.

As always, the Savior-General, Maverick McCain and the Cheney-Bush administration will claim this as a success anyway. But in actuality, Muqtada al-Sadr's JAM (Mahdi Army) fought back quite successfully, adopting a defensive strategy incorporating lessons from Hizbollah's successful resistance to the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006. Fighting spread quickly from Basra to Baghdad, Kut, Karbala, and Diyala and Al-Anbar provinces. The Green Zone where the Iraqi government and the American imperial embassy are located has been under daily mortar and rocket attack.

There was a telltale fact about the first days of the Iraqi government assault on Basra that our lazy media for the most part seemed to have completely missed. Which was that from the start, the air support for the operation was provided by the US. This is a warning sign that even if the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which include police and paramilitary forces as well as regular army, had held up well, they are operating under methods that require continued American air support. Of course, American advisers were involved. And, in another guess, I quite sure we'll find out that the American advisory role was always larger than the early official claims suggested.

But the ISF didn't hold up very well. The police especially defected in large numbers to the JAM, as did many soldiers. El Mundo is reporting at about 10:00 US West Coast time that Muqtada ("Mookie" is the popular nickname for him among US troops) has ordered another cease fire: Al Sadr: 'Cualquiera que porte armas y apunte al Gobierno no será de los nuestros' 30/03/2008. It's not clear at this point from this report whether this represents another stand-down by JAM or a propaganda attempt to put the blame for continued violence on the Maliki government and the US.

El Mundo's report says that fighting in Baghdad, including attack on the Green Zone, is continuing. Many hundreds are reported injured and short of medical care. This is an ugly reality of this war. The US has been attacking urban neighborhoods in Badhdad's Sadr City from the air. While legitimate in the sense that JAM is attacking the US forces and the ISF from there, it still winds up with the US blasting a lot of civilian noncombatants.

Something like two-thirds of Iraq's oil exports pass through Basra. Someone, presumably JAM, successfully sabotaged one of the oil pipelines last week. Shutting down two-thirds of the oil exports would be a heavy blow for Maliki's Green Zone government.

Meanwhile, the government is saying they will continue the offensive against JAM. (Actually, he says it's not against JAM but against "criminals".) On Saturday, it says, JAM forces captured a third police station in Basra, in the Jamhuriya neighborhood.

El Mundo quotes Azzaman, which it calls the "principal" newspaper in Baghdad, as saying that in the last five years the Iraqis have paid a terrible price for the serious errors, first of the foreign occupiers, and then from the Iraqis that they themselves installed to run the country. Iraq has become a nation of armies and militias, it said, every one of them with a different agenda. Even the American today have their own militia, Azzaman said, although it's not entirely clear what that means (ISF? The US official forces? Mercenaries, aka, "security contractors"?) It also said that the Americans and their Iraqi lackeys are equally responsible for the current situation. (I haven't used quotation marks here, although I tried to render it from the Spanish directly, because presumably the original was in Arabic. A lot can be lost in two translations.)

Reuters reports on US ground troops fighting JAM in Basra, U.S. says special forces fight in Basra 03/30/08:

The United States confirmed on Sunday that U.S. special forces units were operating alongside Iraqi government troops in Basra, where the government is battling militants loyal to Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

A U.S. military statement described a joint raid by Iraqi and U.S. special forces units which killed 22 suspected militants, including "16 criminal fighters" strafed in an air strike on three houses.

The raid showed U.S. forces are being drawn deeper into the Iraqi-led crackdown, launched on Tuesday by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Basra, Iraq's second-biggest city.

The Iraqi special forces team killed four suspected militants in a house and two on a roof before calling in the air strike, the statement said.
Again, even the most discriminating attacks in a populated urban area are going to kill some noncombatants. But air strikes vastly increase the incidence of this occurring. This report quotes the bland press release saying three houses were hit, killing "22 suspected militants". What, did the pilots see them through the windows carrying AK-47s and chanting "Death to Al-Maliki"? One can only guess what distinguishes "militants" and "criminal fighters".

Reuters also suggests that "Mookie's Boys" are now considered the primary enemy in Iraq: "The fighting has established a new main adversary for U.S. forces, whose main military effort for the past year had been against Sunni Arab groups such as al Qaeda."

Leila Fadel also reports for McClatchy Newspapers on the cease-fire Muqtada just announced, Sadr orders his militia to end military operations in Iraq 03/30/08:

Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr issued the statement on the sixth day of a government offensive that had been intended to dislodge his supporters from their strongholds in Basra, Iraq's second largest city, but instead turned into a pitched battle in Baghdad and elsewhere in which the Mahdi Army proved a match for the U.S.-backed government of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki. (my emphasis)
Muqtada conditioned his unilateral cease-fire on the ISF ending their attacks on JAM and their arrests of JAM supporters, as well as on the release of JAM prisoners now in custody:

The statement would allow Sadr to claim the role of peacemaker, though its practical impact was unclear. A Mahdi Army commander in Basra said his men would continue to defend themselves in the face of government attacks.

“We will stay in our positions because the government didn’t stop the raids and the attacks against the Mahdi Army and their areas,” Abu Muamal said. “We are waiting for clear orders from our command and we will not withdraw until the situation is clarified.”
Here's a Reuters video on Iraqi news. I still can't get the Reuters embed code to work here.

Reporting for the Sunday Observer, Shia fighting threatens to bury hope of united Iraq 03/30/08, Sam Kiley opens with an interesting comment:

For once, George Bush's open-faced incomprehension - at Nouri al-Maliki's decision to set off a civil war inside Iraq's Shia community - seems entirely appropriate. When the American President admitted he did not know why the Iraqi Prime Minister had launched an offensive in Basra saying, 'I'm not exactly sure what triggered the Prime Minister's response', he was not alone. (my emphasis)
Maybe Dick Cheney forgot to tell him.

British forces are also engaging in direct fighting;

Iraqi officials said at least 220 people had been killed in southern Iraq and 550 injured since clashes started last Monday. In Baghdad, the health directorate said the number raised to 90 killed and 480 injured in clashes and by US air strikes in Sadr City. The district's two hospitals, serving its two million people, are overflowing and understaffed.

Meanwhile, in Basra, British troops have been supporting the Iraqi troops who have been struggling to take ground against the Iranian-backed militia. American jets have been in action supporting the Iraqi army and there is even talk of US troops being sent south into what has been a British-run zone. The ceasefire with al-Sadr has been an essential part of the success of US general David Petraeus's 'surge' - the deployment of an extra 28,000 American troops into Baghdad and nearby cities. Assured of quiet on the Shi'ite front, US forces have been free to concentrate on battling al Qaeda and Ba'athist insurgents among the Sunni community. (my emphasis)
We need to remember that if JAM takes effective control of Basra and southern Iraq, American supply lines from Kuwait become far more vulnerable than they have been.

Patrick Cockburn, who has consistently been one of the best Western reporters on the Iraq War, also reports, British and US forces drawn into battle for Basra Independent 03/30/08:

A US warplane strafed a house in Basra killing eight civilians, including two women and a child, Iraqi police said yesterday. The house was in the city's Hananiyah district, which is a stronghold of the Mehdi Army militia of the Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. ...

Five days after the start of the offensive ordered by the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, US military intelligence says that the Iraqi army holds less than a quarter of Basra, which has a population of two million. In east Baghdad, meanwhile, five hospitals have received 133 bodies and 647 wounded since the start of the fighting.

Mr Maliki's confident prediction that he would crush the Mehdi Army is turning out to be a dangerous gamble that is fast eroding his authority. It is damaging to President Bush, who had claimed the US "surge" had brought about a turning point in America's five-year-old war to pacify Iraq. Mr Bush had praised the offensive as showing that the Iraqi security forces, trained and supported by the US, could at last stand and fight on their own. So far, the gun battles in Baghdad and the Shia south of Iraq are providing evidence that exactly the opposite is true.

Mr Sadr told al-Jazeera TV yesterday that Arab leaders meeting in Damascus should support the "resistance" to US occupation. The leader of the most powerful political movement in Iraq draws his support from the Shia poor, while his rival, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), is supported by Shia clerics, merchants and property owners. The Sadrists-SIIC rivalry is behind the timing of Mr Maliki's Basra assault. Though he said it was aimed at all militias and illegal armed movements, the attack has only been against the Mehdi Army and not against the Fadhila party and the SIIC, which both control parts of the city. The SIIC is now the main support behind Mr Maliki. ...

If US and British forces engage in direct military action on a wide scale with the Sadrist militia, then Mr Sadr could call for a general uprising, which would engulf all of Shia Iraq in war. The Mehdi Army already controls half of Baghdad. ...

Mr Maliki has said there will be "no retreat" and has boxed himself into a corner by ruling out compromise. Critics of US policy will attack the official picture of progress in Iraq as a mirage. Mr Sadr and the Mehdi Army could emerge from the crisis stronger than before. (my emphasis)
Cockburn has a new book being officially released in the US Tuesday, a biography of Muqtada al-Sadr.

Tom Hayden reports on how the Iraq Crisis Threatens Bush-Petraeus "Surge" Strategy As Bankrupt Huffington Post 03/29/08:

Maliki agreed to the provincial elections, it appears, in exchange for Bush's and Petraeus' permission to launch a crushing offensive against the Sadr forces who have come to power on the streets of Basra in the wake of Britain's withdrawal. Maliki and his US sponsors call them "criminal gangs", but it is clear that Maliki's intent is to weaken or destroy the Sadr forces before the [October] election.

The four-day offensive has failed so far, provoking widespread violence from Basra to Mahmudia, Hilla, Diwaniya, Kut and the streets of Baghdad. Hundreds have been killed or wounded. Maliki's forces are being exposed as unable to fight without US airpower bombarding positions as small as those for mortar crews. The prospect of US or British intervention in Basra grows by the hour. Tens of thousands of Shi'a are protesting on the streets of Sadr City.

So much for the surge. The US is now in panic mode, trying to ensure the survival of its unpopular client regime in Baghdad. (my emphasis)
Apollo the far-shooter

That last observation is an important one to understand. Things have gone seriously bad for the American position in Iraq during the last week. The fact that the American Establishment press is mostly snoozing through the crisis so far doesn't change the seriousness of it. Snoozing on important facts is now the standard operating procedure for our "press corps".

By Apollo the far-shooter, what a mess Cheney and Bush and their boy Rummy have created there!

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Wednesday, March 26, 2008

Different types of reporting on McCain's War

Here is Patrick Cockburn, the Arab-speaking Iraq correspondent for the London Independent, Violence erupts in Basra as Iraqi forces battle Mehdi Army 03/26/08.

The US has been eager for the central government to regain control of Basra, which sits on top of Iraq's oil reserves and is also close to the American army's main supply line that runs west of the city up the main highway from Kuwait to Baghdad. Basra has hitherto been run by competing local warlords, each of whom has been seeking to gain control of valuable local concessions and rackets such as fuel and the ports of Basra and Umm Qasr. One Iraqi businessman who dispatched a container from Umm Qasr port to Arbil in Iraqi Kurdistan says he paid $500 (£250) in transport costs and $3,000 in bribes to ensure safe passage.

Mr Sadr has been keen to avoid an all-out military confrontation with the US army or Iraqi units backed by the Americans ever since he fought the US Marines in Najaf in 2004. Although his Mehdi Army militiamen suffered heavy losses because of the American force's superior arms, they showed that they were prepared to fight to the end. In the warren of slums in Basra, they could do the same and they could also spread the fighting across the overwhelmingly Shia south of Iraq. (my emphasis)
Here are Sholnn Freeman and Sudarsan Raghavan of the Washington Post in Iraqi PM Gives Basra Gunmen Ultimatum 03/26/08:

It was unclear why U.S. forces would take part in a broad armed challenge to Sadr and his thousands-strong militia on the eve of Petraeus's assessment, which the Bush administration has said would greatly influence its decision on whether to draw down troop levels. (my emphasis)
Now, in the paragraph just prior, they reported that Basra is "the conduit for Iraq's oil exports". It doesn't seem to have occurred to the folks at the Post that it's also strategically vital for the US supply lines. Maybe they should read Patrick Cockburn's reports to find out why, why, why might the Americans be concerned about fighting in Basra. Or they could check Pat Lang's column from the 07/21/06 Christian Science Monitor, The vulnerable line of supply to US troops in Iraq.

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Tuesday, March 18, 2008

Patrick Cockburn on the Iraq War's fifth birthday


Dick Cheney in Iraq Napoleon in Spain

I generally dislike use of the "Munich analogy", for reasons I've blogged about more than once. But I thought I would pass this one along, from A gross failure that ignored history and ended with a humiliating retreat The Independent by Patrick Cockburn 03/17/08:

How we got into this situation needs to be inquired into and also how we avoid falling into it again. The worst failings were political. In many ways Tony Blair in 2002-03, when he decided to join America in the war, resembled Neville Chamberlain in 1938. He ignored expert professional advice. He had no alternative plan if anything went wrong. He lived in a world of propaganda and fantasy. He would spring from his plane in Baghdad to be greeted by Iraqi politicians who did not dare leave the Green Zone.
But, of course, I don't like people using the "Munich analogy". So naughty, naughty, reporter for doing that!

This is a good quote, too, from Cockburn's article: "The Duke of Wellington, who had seen what had happened to Napoleon in Spain, said that 'Great powers do not have small wars'." What "happened to Napoleon in Spain" was that he ran into a nasty guerrilla war. In fact, I believe that's where and when the term "guerrilla" was first used. The Spanish war of independence against France broke out 200 years ago this year, in 1808. France lost.

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Monday, February 18, 2008

Progress in The Surge


McCain's War in Iraq goes on. Patrick Cockburn, who has been one of the best Western reporters on the war, writes in Is the US really bringing stability to Baghdad? The Independent 02/15/08:

In the US and Europe, the main measure of whether the war in Iraq is "going well" or "going badly" is the casualty figures. The number of American soldiers and Iraqi civilians being killed went down to 39 US soldiers and 599 Iraqi civilians in January. The White House is promoting the idea that the United States is finally on the road to success, if not victory, in Iraq.

On the back of this renewed optimism about the war, Senator John McCain, the premier hawk among the Republican candidates for the presidency, has been able to revive his foundering campaign and is set to be his party's nominee. Despite the scepticism of many US journalists permanently stationed in Iraq, television and newspaper newsrooms in New York and Washington (in London they are more sceptical) have largely bought into the idea that "the surge" – the wider deployment of 30,000 extra US troops since February 2006 – has succeeded.

But any true assessment of the happiness or misery of Iraqis must use a less crude index than the number of dead and injured. It must ask if people have been driven from their houses, and if they can return. It must say whether they have a job and, if they do not, whether they stand a chance of getting one. It has to explain why so few of the 3.2 million people who are refugees in Syria and Jordan, or inside Iraq, are coming back.
Of the capital city, he reports:

For all the talk of Baghdad being safer, it remains an extraordinarily dangerous place. One Western security company is still asking $3,000 to pick a man up at the airport and drive him six miles to his hotel in central Baghdad. The number of dead bodies being picked up by the police every morning in the capital is down to three or four when once it was 50 or 60.
And he explains that there has been some political improvement in Iraq because in 2007 the much-discussed Sunni Awakening Councils made fighting Salafi extremists (loosely known as Al Qa'ida in Iraq) a higher priority than fighting the Shi'a government. According to Cockburn, "the Sunni community could also see that, although its guerrilla war was effective against the US, it was being defeated by the Shia who controlled the Iraqi government and armed forces after the elections of 2005." (my emphasis)

It's important to recognize that the relative reduction of violence in Baghdad is largely the result of successful ethnic cleansing:

The "surge" – the 30,000 extra US troops implementing a new security plan in Baghdad – has helped to make Baghdad safer. In effect, they have frozen into place the Shia victory [in the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad] of 2006. The city is broken up into enclaves sealed off by concrete walls with only one entrance and exit.

Areas that were once mixed are not being reoccupied by whichever community was driven out. Bassim [a Sunni forced out of his home] can no more reclaim, or even visit, his house in the Jihad district of Baghdad than he could a year ago. He can still work as a taxi driver only in Sunni areas. The US military and the Iraqi government are wary of even trying to reverse sectarian cleansing because this might break the present fragile truce.

"People say things are better than they were," says Zanab Jafar, a well-educated Shia woman living in al-Hamraa, west Baghdad, "but what they mean is that they are better than [during] the bloodbath of 2006. The situation is still terrible." (my emphasis)
But the McCain escalation of 2007 has strengthened the Sunni guerrillas, as well. The Surge didn't do a more thorough job of fighting Sunni guerrillas, it partnered with them. It produced a short-term result favorable to the US, at the cost of making long-term reconcilation between the Sunni and Shi'a more problematic:

The new element in Iraq is the development of the Awakening Council, or al-Sahwa, movement. Suddenly there is a Sunni militia, paid by the US, that has 80,000 men under arms. This re-empowers the Sunni community far more than any legislation passed by the Iraqi parliament. But it also deepens the divisions in Iraq because the leaders of the Awakening do not bother to hide their hatred and contempt for the Iraqi government. ...

In his State of the Union address, President Bush spoke of the 80,000 Awakening Council members – also labelled "concerned local citizens", as if they were respectable householders who have taken up arms against "terrorists".

The picture Bush evoked is similar to that often seen in Hollywood Westerns when outraged townsfolk and farmers, driven beyond endurance by the crimes of a corrupt sheriff or saloon owner and their bandit followers, rise in revolt. In reality, in Iraq the exact opposite has happened. The Awakening Council members of today are the "terrorists" of yesterday.

Even the police chief of Fallujah, Colonel Feisal, the brother of Abu Marouf, cheerfully explained that until he was promoted to his present post in December 2006 he was "fighting the Americans". Abu Marouf is threatening to go back to war or let al-Qa'ida return unless his 13,000 men receive long-term jobs in the Iraqi security services. The Iraqi government has no intention of allowing this because to do so would be to allow the Sunni and partisans of Saddam Hussein's regime to once again hold real power in the state. (my emphasis)
And this is the war in which Maverick McCain wants the United States to stay for 10,000 years!

It's true, as advocates of withdrawal have consistently pointed out - though war fans accuse war opponents of never doing so - that there is a real possibility that the civil war will intensify if the Americans withdraw. The best chance to minimize that - and "best" has long since come to mean the least bad among bad alternatives - is to set a near (6-12 months) deadline for full withdrawal of US troops and mercenaries, and use the time to try to bring the warring parties together diplomatically. It's unlikely to work. But the McCain plan of endless war certainly won't. Cockburn reports:

All the Iraqi players are waiting to see at what rate the US will draw down its troop levels. The Mehdi Army is discussing ending its six-month ceasefire, but does not want to fight its Shia rivals if they are supported by American military power. Al-Qa'ida is wounded but by no means out of business. Four days after I had seen Abu Marouf, who was surrounded by bodyguards and maintains extreme secrecy about his movements, al-Qa'ida was able to detonate a bomb in a car close to his house and injure four of his guards.

Protestations of amity between Shia security men and Awakening members should be treated with scepticism. My friend, the intrepid French television reporter Lucas Menget, filmed a Shia policeman showering praise on the Awakening movement. He introduced two of its members, declaring enthusiastically to the camera: "You see, together we will defeat al-Qa'ida." Back in his police car, the policeman, lighting up a Davidoff cigarette and shaking his head wearily, explained: "I don't have a choice. I was asked to work with these killers."

Iraq remains a great sump of human degradation and poverty, unaffected by the "surge". It was not a government critic but the civilian spokesman for the Baghdad security plan, Tahseen Sheikhly, who pointed out this week that the city is drowning in sewage because of blocked and broken pipes and drains. In one part of the city, the sewage has formed a lake so large that it can be seen "as a big black spot on Google Earth". (my emphasis)
Cockburn's final verdict on McCain's War: "It has destroyed Iraq."

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Saturday, February 02, 2008

What the great progress of The Surge (aka, the McCain esclation) looks like

Despite Maverick McCain's unbounded faith in his Surge plan and the claims of brilliant success from our Savior-General Petraeus, the Iraq War goes on. Juan Cole comments on the horrific double-suicide bombings on Friday in Baghdad (91 Dead in 2 Baghdad Blasts Informed Comment blog 02/02/08):

Two women set off separate suicide bombs in two markets in Baghdad on Friday, killing at least 91 persons and wounding a similar number. Contrary to what this AP squib implies, the bombings suggest neither that "al-Qaeda" is running out of men nor that it is desperate. Women were used because they would be less likely to be closely searched, in a society where gender segregation and female honor and chastity are important values. The story that the women had Downs syndrome seems unlikely to be true; you wouldn't trust a sensitive terror plot to someone without their full faculties. Rather, the bombings show that the Sunni Arab guerrillas seeking to destabilize Iraq have not been defeated and are still capable of making a big strike right under the noses of the surge troops. And that is how guerrilla war is-- large conventional forces find it difficult to curb it.
McClatchy News (formerly Knight-Ridder) is still doing a good job on reporting on the war as they have since the buildup to the invasion, making them nearly unique among major American journalistic enterprises: Iraqi insurgents find female bombers can skirt security by Leila Fadel and Hussein Kadhim 02/01/08. Fadel and Kadhim note in their report, "As is frequently the case in accounts of violence, U.S. officials offered a death toll that was only half that of Iraqi authorities'."

See also Women suicide bombers kill 72 in attacks on Baghdad markets by Patrick Cockburn The Independent 01/02/08. Cockburn is still doing reporting from Iraq despite the not-inconsiderable dangers. He also speaks Arabic, which many of the US reporters who have done Iraq War reporting do not. He writes:

Al-Qa'ida has mounted a series of attacks in the past week, mostly targeting leaders of the Sunni tribal militia, al-Sahwah, which opposes al-Qa'ida. The bombing of Ghazil, in a predominantly Shia part of the city, will also have been aimed at provoking Shia retaliation against Sunni Muslims, who might then look again to al-Qa'ida for protection. ...

Al-Qa'ida has increasingly been using women as suicide bombers because they are never searched by male police officers men or soldiers, and there is a shortage of women to do the job in Iraq's overwhelmingly male security forces.

The atrocities show that al-Qa'ida is still a powerful force with many recruits willing to kill themselves, and is backed by an organisation with intelligence, explosives and the means to detonate them. In recent weeks, it has been targeting al-Sahwah leaders and has often succeeded in penetrating their security. Last week, a car bomb exploded next to the house of Abu Marouf, an al-Sahwah leader commanding 13,000 men, in the village of Khan Dari, between Baghdad and Fallujah.

When I met him four days earlier, he was surrounded by guards and chose which of his many vehicles to travel in at the last moment to prevent assassination. Even so, al-Qa'ida was able to get a bomb close to his home and wounded four of his guards.

Despite improving security, Baghdad was a very fearful city even before yesterday's attacks and will now be more so.
Hasn't Cockburn heard from Savior-General Petraeus and Maverick McCain that things are going great in Iraq?


And, whatever the mix of motivations that produced the 2003 invasion, oil revenues are very much part of what is at stake in Iraq. The Information Clearing House in reports on a 01/31/08 item in on Akhbar Alkhaleej newspaper (Iraqi sister paper to Bahrain's Gulf Daily News):

An Iraqi MP preferred to remain anonymous told the newspaper that highly confidential negotiations took place by representatives from American oil companies, offering $5 million to each MP who votes in favor of the Oil and Gas law.
Juan Cole also corrects the record that Hillary Clinton misstated about the 1998 end of weapons inspections in Iraq which was used as the justification of the Operation Desert Fox bombing in 1998. (Probably not the most inspired name for an American military operation in light of the fact that the Second World War German Gen. Ernst Rommel was famously known as the "Desert Fox".) Our crack "press corps" manages to pretty much ignore the periodic bombing that the US conducted against Iraq throughout the 1990s, of which Operation Desert Fox was the most significant. Cole writes (Iraq and Iran in the Democratic Debate 02/01/08):

It is worth noting that Clinton misstated the 1998 events. The US did not bomb Iraq because Saddam "kicked out" the UN weapons inspectors. The US decided to bomb Iraq for other reasons and therefore ordered the inspectors out of the country. The myth that Saddam "kicked out" the inspectors just won't die.
For more of the details, see the links above and also Fairness and Accuracy in Media (FAIR): Common Myths in Iraq Coverage 11/27/02; USA Today Repeats Myths on Iraq Inspectors 08/12/02.

Additional Iraq War news and commentary:

Bomb takes death toll of journalists in Iraq war to 126 by Patrick Cockburn The Independent 01/31/08.

Torture does not work, as history shows by Robert Fisk The Independent 02/01/08:

"Torture works," an American special forces major – now, needless to say, a colonel – boasted to a colleague of mine a couple of years ago. It seems that the CIA and its hired thugs in Afghanistan and Iraq still believe this. There is no evidence that rendition and beatings and waterboarding and the insertion of metal pipes into men's anuses – and, of course, the occasional torturing to death of detainees – has ended. Why else would the CIA admit in January that it had destroyed videotapes of prisoners being almost drowned – the "waterboarding" technique – before they could be seen by US investigators?

Yet only a few days ago, I came across a medieval print in which a prisoner has been strapped to a wooden chair, a leather hosepipe pushed down his throat and a primitive pump fitted at the top of the hose where an ill-clad torturer is hard at work squirting water down the hose. The prisoner's eyes bulge with terror as he feels himself drowning, all the while watched by Spanish inquisitors who betray not the slightest feelings of sympathy with the prisoner. Who said "waterboarding" was new? The Americans are just apeing their predecessors in the inquisition. ...

Torture does not obtain truth. It will make most ordinary people say anything the torturer wants. Why, who knows if the men under the CIA's "waterboarding" did not confess that they could fly to meet the devil. And who knows if the CIA did not end up believing him. (my emphasis)
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Tuesday, January 22, 2008

War and the Presidential election

Monday's Democratic Presidential debate provided a Clinton/Obama squabble that gave the Establishment press a good "horse race" story. But, as Juan Cole points out in Iraq Dominates Testy Dem Debate Informed Comment blog 01/22/08, the Iraq War was very much on the candidates' minds and agendas, because it's very much on the minds and agendas of the Democratic base and the public at large. Even though the lords of the press corps keep repeating that nobody cares about it any more, that it's disappeared as an issue.

But The Surge, aka the McCain escalation, hasn't worked those miracles that the war fans fantasize that they see. Andrew Bacevich has some pointed comments on the topic in the Washington Post 01/20/08 in Surge to Nowhere:

As the fifth anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom nears, the fabulists are again trying to weave their own version of the war. The latest myth is that the "surge" is working. ...

As the violence in Baghdad and Anbar province abates, the political and economic dysfunction enveloping Iraq has become all the more apparent. The recent agreement to rehabilitate some former Baathists notwithstand ing, signs of lasting Sunni-Shiite reconciliation are scant. The United States has acquired a ramshackle, ungovernable and unresponsive dependency that is incapable of securing its own borders or managing its own affairs. More than three years after then-national security adviser Condoleezza Rice handed President Bush a note announcing that "Iraq is sovereign," that sovereignty remains a fiction.

A nation-building project launched in the confident expectation that the United States would repeat in Iraq the successes it had achieved in Germany and Japan after 1945 instead compares unfavorably with the U.S. response to Hurricane Katrina.
Patrick Cockburn reports on some very recent violence in Iraq toll mounts as forces fight cult The Independent 01/21/08:

Some 276 people were killed, wounded or captured by government forces fighting a millenarian Shia cult in southern Iraq over the past three days, the Iraqi Ministry of Defence said in Baghdad yesterday.

The heavy losses in gun battles between the 'Supporters of the Mahdi' group and the police and army in Basra and Nasiriya underlines how swiftly violence can explode in Iraq where everybody is heavily armed. In Nasiriya three senior officers were among the dead.

The movement, led by Ahmad al-Hassani, also known as Ahmad al-Yamani, believes in the imminent return of the Messiah but exactly why its members should have taken to the streets in several cities remains unclear. In Basra they reportedly first killed several traffic policemen and commandeered six empty vehicles and two police cars. They later captured an oil facilities building and a hospital. At one point there was fighting in 75 per cent of Basra, a city of two million people, according to the police chief Abdul Jalil Khalaf.

It is a measure of the lack of information on what is happening outside central Baghdad that casualty figures vary widely with one source claiming that 97 died and 217 were wounded in Basra alone. In Baghdad the National Security Adviser Muwafaq al-Rubaie was trapped in a Shia mosque in the Sh'la district in west Baghdad but it is not clear if his attackers were also from the 'Supporters of the Mahdi' movement, that appears to have supporters in every Shia city. (my emphasis)
Basra is a key port city that is on the route US troops would need to use in a large-scale withdrawal from Iraq. That 75% of the city could be engulfed in what sounds like serious fighting can't be comforting news to US commanders.

But what about the idea of Petraeus '12 (The American Prospect Online 01/22/08)? Spencer Ackerman thinks he sees a glimmer of a Presidential campaign in four years by the Savior-General himself!

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