Frankfurt School, 1937: Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse define “critical theory” (2)

This is a direct continuation of a discussion of Max Horkheimer's "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie" (1937) begun in Part 1.

I won't try to describe Hegelian and Marxist theories of alienation in this commentary, on which Horkheimer draws. But he argues that the conditions of life in modern capitalist society leave individuals feeling and thinking that their lives are driven by impersonal and invisible forces beyond their control.

This manifests itself in a tendency to reduce scientific knowledge to their immediate technical applications, a tendency Horkheimer argues that pragmatism and positivism encourage. Part of his criticism here is that such theories fail to examine the social contexts in which scientific theories arise and become accepted or not. He uses as an example a description by Henryk Grossmann of the complex interaction between scientific developments and the development of mechanical processes, "Die gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen der mechanisstischen Philosophie un die Manufaktur", which appeared in the 2/1935 number of the Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung.

He is particularly critical of the trend to reduce all sciences to mathematical formulations, which lead to dogmatic and un-dialectical formulations of scientific theories. And he certainly includes social sciences and economics within science. And it's in connection with that argument that he introduces the term "critical theory":

Die Selbsterkenntnis des Menschen in der Gegenwart ist jedoch nicht die mathematische Naturwissenschaft, die als ewiger Logos erscheint, sondern die vom Interesse an vernüftigen Zuständen durchherrschte kritische Theorie der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft.

[Self-knowledge of humanity in the present, however, is not mathematical natural science, which appears as eternal Logos, but rather critical theory, which is completely oriented toward the interest of the future conditions of the present society.]

Horkheimer is concerned that increasing specialization in scientific/academic thought leads to a disinterest in the formation of broader theory that would moves scientific discovery and understanding further, particularly by not at all exclusively in the realm of sociology and politics. In this passage, his focus of the challenge of the danger of fascism/Nazism stands out, though the idea he expresses has a more general application:

Heute wird die Entwicklung ... bestimmt ... durch die nationalen und internationalen Gegensätze und Führercliquen auf den verschiedenen Kommandohöhen in Wirtschaft und Staat. Soweit das theoretische Denken nicht auf höchst spezielle, mit diesen Kämpf zusammenhängende Zwecke, vor allem den Krieg und seine Industrie, bezogen ist, hat das Interesse an ihm abgenommen. Es warden nicht mehr soviel Energien darauf verwendet, die Denkfähigkeit, unabhängig von der Anwendunsart, auszubilden und weiterzuführen.

[Today development ... is determined ... by the national and international contradictions and leadership cliques in the various levels of command in economy and the state. So far as theoretical thinking is not focused on highly specialized on goals that connected with this conflict, above all war and its industry, interest in it was waned. There was no longer so much energy applied to develop facility of thought independent of the manner in which it is applied and to take it further.]

Horkheimer argues that Kant had a better grasp of how social relations affect the concept of spiritual/intellectual forces moving humanity than Hegel. Horkheimer makes the surprisingly conventional argument that Hegel took reality as rational. More precisely, he argues:

Aus der Verlegenheit vor dem allgemeinen Subjekt, das Kant behauptet und doch nicht recht zu absoluten Geist als das Allerrealste setzt. Das Allgemeine hat sich nach ihm bereits adäquat entfaltet und ist identisch mit dem, was sich vollzieht. Die Vernunft braucht nicht mehr bloss kritische gegen sich zu sein, sie ist bei Hegel affirmative geworden, bevor noch die Wirlichkeit als vernüftig zu bejahen ist. Angesichts der real weiterbestehenden Widersprüche der menschlichen Existenz, angesichts der Ohmacht der Individuen vor den von ihnen selbst erzeugten Verhältnissen erscheint diese Lösung als private Behauptung, als persönlicher Friedensschluss des Philosophen mit einer unmenschlichen Welt. (259)

[Out of the embarrassment before the universal Subject, which Kant postulated but did not actually claim as the Absolute Spirit, [Hegel] set it up as the most Real. The Universal had already been adequately developed, according to him [Hegel], and is identical with that which occurs. Reason no longer needs to be critical of itself, by Hegel it has become affirmative, before which even reality is to be affirmed as reasonable. In light of the actually continuing contradictions of human existence, in light of the powerlessness of the individuals before the conditions created by themselves, this solution appears as a private claim, as a personal peace pact of the philosopher with an inhuman world.]

The above is my translation. This is the 1982 rendition by Matthew O'Connell of that same passage (p. 204):

Kant claimed that there existed a universal subject which, however, he could not quite describe. Hegel escaped this embarrassment by postulating the absolute spirit as the most real thing of all. According to him, the universal has already adequately evolved itself and is identical with all that happens. Reason need no longer stand over against itself in purely critical fashion; in Hegel reason has become affirmative, even before reality itself is affirmed as rational. But, confronted with the persisting contradictions in human existence and with the impotence of individuals in face of situations they have themselves brought about, the Hegelian solution seems a purely private assertion, a personal peace treaty between the philosopher and an inhuman world.

I call this a surprisingly conventional view because it is commonly claimed that Hegel viewed the Prussian monarchy of the Restoration period (post-1815) as the ultimate in Reason realized in government. That is, that the social implications of Hegel's philosophy were ultimately passive, demanding acceptance of existing social and political conditions rather than challenging them in either theory or practice.

But at best, that is a narrow reading of Hegel.

The seemingly passive acceptance of the dictatorships by the populations in Fascist Italy, in Austria with its "Standesstaat" clerical-fascist regime, and in Hitler Germany was a major issue to which the Frankfurt School would address themselves. And that concern shows in Horkheimer's essay. Again, he was working broadly from a general Marxist/socialist perspective that assumed that the working class had a fundamental set of class interests that included the establishment of democracy and the elimination of capitalism. And that this set of class interests ultimately represented the well-being of the whole society and would benefit the vast majority, though the big capitalists would obviously be disadvantaged in comparison to their position in the old society.

Whether Horkheimer and his associates were understanding the situation of the actual and potential opposition in Germany, Italy and Austria adequately is an important question. While they may well have underestimated the oppositional movements and tendencies actually at work in those countries at the time, it would be hard to argue that they were wrong in judging that any prospect of overthrowing those regimes by a mass revolutionary movement seemed to be receding.

So we begin to see formulations suggesting that while it was crucially important to make fundamental criticisms of existing capitalist societies, it would take a mass working-class movement to realize the liberating potential of the existing stage of economic and scientific developments. And the prospects for such a movement seemed to be receding. Again, the political developments leading up to the First World War and immediately after had made such a potential to appear very great indeed, and not only to those like Horkheimer who welcomed the prospect.

That is the immediate background for statements like this one of Horkheimer's: "Das Denken, der Aufbau der Theorie, bliebe eine Sache, und sein Gegenstand, das Proletariat, eine andere." (The thinking, the building of theory, would be one thing, and its condition, the proletariat [working class], another.)

Conclusion of the analysis of this article in Part 3 tomorrow.

Tags: critical theory, frankfurt school,, frankfurter schule, kritische theorie, max horkheimer, max horkheimer