Frankfurt School, 1937: Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse define “critical theory” (4)

The separate essays by Horkheimer and Marcuse in the 3/1937 number of the Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung, both titled "Philosophie und kritische Theorie", are further elaborations of the definition of critical theory that Horkheimer made in "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie" (2/1937).

Horkheimer in this essay sketches the distinction between critical theory, on the one hand, and, on the other: the "vulgar materialism of bad praxis", by which he more specifically means the "volkish" philosophy and ideology associated with the Nazi movement and its active sympathizers; and, the idea that specialized academic/scientific thinking can be fully separated from value judgments. He opposes critical theory to the type of collectivity that the Nazi movement praised, the community of race and nation, which rejected the constructive aspects of liberal thought while retaining the basic capitalist economic structure that liberalism defends.

Horkheimer explains that critical theory has in common with German Idealism the idea that ideas shape reality, though critical theory understands that the specific context and limitations of present economic relationships also are a fundamental part of the formation of those ideas. Ideas interact with the given social reality in a dynamic relationship. But where German Idealists like Kant and Fichte understood the development of historical reality as ultimately spiritual/intellectual, critical theory understands that it is essentially a materialist process. Critical theory seeks to articulate the possibilities in current realities for "the rational organization of human activity." Critical theory, he writes, shares with Idealism the understanding that humanity has other options than "the accumulation of power and profit."

The goal of critical theory is not abstract or academic (though it’s form certainly can be!) ; its goal is "not the increase of knowledge as such", but rather "the emancipation of humanity from enslaving conditions." He cites the thought of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans as having this broad orientation, as well.

He claims that conventional economics has "lost its relationship to the fundamental relationships of the [current] epoch." Presumably he is here referring to the shift in economics from the focus on production relationships – which Marxist economics retained – to a focus on exchange, on prices and markets. The same issue of the journal contains an essay by Paul Sering on Alfred Marshall's neoclassical economics, which exemplifies that shift in emphasis. He cites the ultimate classical economist, Adam Smith, as a positive example of an economic analysis that pointed the way forward to a higher form of economic development, e.g., industrial capitalism.

He also separates critical theory from the Communist doctrine of the time that held to a rigid defense of the Soviet model. The criticism here is not so clear, in that he pointedly omits reference to the Soviet Union by name. But in the context of 1937, it's hard to see how it could refer to anything else. He discusses the concept of socialization of production, noting that the key thing about it from the standpoint of critical theory is not the legal form of the ownership but the actual individual and social outcomes it creates:

Das Unterstellen der industriellen Produktion unter die Kontrolle eines Staats ist ein geschichtliches Faktum, dessen Bedeutung im Sinn der kritischen Theorie jeweils erst zu analysieren ist. Ob es sich um Vergesellschaftung in ihrem Sinn handelt, inwiefern also darin ein höheres Prinzip zur Entfaltung kommt, hängt nicht etwa bloss von der Änderung bestimmter Eigentumsverhaltnisse, von der Steigerung der Produktivität in neuen Formen gesellschaftlicher Zusammenarbeit ab, sondern ebensosehr von Wesen und Entfaltung der Gesellschaft, in der sich all dies vollzieht. Es kommt darauf an, wie die neuen Verhältnisse der Produktion genau beschaffen sind. Auch wenn die durch individuelle Begabung und Leistungsfähigkeit bedingten ,,naturlichen Privilegien" zunächst noch fortbestehen, so dürfen jedesfalls keine neuen gesellschaftlichen Privilegien an ihre Stelle treten. In diesem vorläufigen Zustand darf die Ungleichheit nicht fixiert, sie muss vielmehr in steigendem Mass uberwunden werden. Das Problem, was und wie produziert wird, ob relativ feste Gruppen mit speziellen Interessen existieren, soziale Unterschiede festgehalten werden oder sich gar vertiefen, ferner die aktive Beziehung des einzelnen zur Regierung, das Verhältnis aller entscheidenden, die Individuen betreffenden Verwaltungsakte zu ihrem eigenen Wissen und Willen, die Abhängigkeit aller vom Menschen beherrschbaren Zustande von wirkliclier Übereinkunft, kurz, der Entwicklungsgrad der wesentlichen Momente realer Demokraties und Assoziation gehört mit zum Inhalt des Begriffs der Vergesellschaftung.

[The subordination of industrial production under the control of a state is an historical fact whose meaning in the sense of critical theory has yet to be analyzed. The question of whether this is socialization in the sense that it is also a higher principle of development, does not depend solely on the change of particular ownership relations and the increase of productivity under new form of social cooperation. It depends just as much on the essence and development of the society in which all this occurs. It depends upon how the new relations of product are specifically obtained. Even if the “natural privileges” related to individual ability and productivity are continued for the time being, at the minimum in any case no new social privileges should emerge in their place.

In this progressing situation the inequality should not become fixed, it must far more be overcome to an increasing extent. The problem, what is produced and how, whether relatively established groups with special interests exist, social difference held in place or even becoming deeper, further the active relationship of the individual to the government, the conduct of all decision-makers, the relationship of the administrative acts that touch the individual in his own knowledge and will, the dependence of all condition truly under the mastery of humanity on genuine agreements, in short, the level of development of the essential moments of real democracy and association, belong to the content of the concept of socializing society (Vergesellschaftung).]

In 1937, not only was the Soviet Union an active opponent of Hitler Germany in international politics. But anti-Communism was a major element of Nazi propaganda, both in Germany and in its international politics. Anyone focused on the menace Germany Nazism represented in the world would be cautious in how they articulated criticism of the USSR, so as not to facilitate having their words being misused.

Horkheimer goes on to address the situation in "totalitarian" states – clearly not including the USSR in the meaning of that description here – in which there was partial nationalization of private businesses. He points out that this form of nationalization does not constitute "socialization" in the sense critical theory understands it.

Tags: critical theory, frankfurt school,, frankfurter schule, kritische theorie, max horkheimer, max horkheimer

Frankfurt School, 1937: Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse define “critical theory” (3)

This is a direct continuation and conclusion of the discussion of Max Horkheimer's "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie" (1937) begun in Part 1 and continue in Part 2.

Politicians and organizers trying to rally workers to the democratic and socialist causes couldn't have been pleased with arguments like this:

Aber auch die Situation des Proletariats bildet in dieser Gesellschaft keine Garantie der richtigen Erkenntnis. Wie sehr es die Sinnlosigkeit als Forbestehen und Vergrösserung der Not und des Unrechts an sich selbst erfährt, so verhindert doch die von oben noch geförderte Differenzierung seiner sozialen Struktur und die nur in ausgezeichneten Augenblicken durchbrochene Gegensatzlichkeit von persönlichem und klassenmässigem Interesse, dass diese Buwusstsein sich unmittlebar Geltung verschaffe. An der Oberfläche sieht vielmehr die Welt auch für das Proletariat anders aus. Eine Haltung, welche seine wahren Interessen und damit auch die der Gesellschaft im ganzen nicht auch ihm selbst entgegenzusetzen imstande wäre, sondern ihre Richtschnur von Gedanken un Stimmungen der Massen hernähme, geriete selbst in sklavische Abhängigkeit vom Bestehenden. (267-8)

[But the situation of the working class does not constitute a guarantee of the correct perception in this society. However much they {the working class} experience themselves of the senselessness as the continuation and sharpening of need and injustice, nevertheless the differentiation of their social structure imposed from above and the fact that only in exceptional moments does the contradictoriness of personal and class interest break through prevent this directly effective {class} consciousness from intensifying. On the surface, even for the working class the world appears differently. An attitude that is unwilling to defend their {the working class’} true interests and thereby also that of society as a whole even against the working class itself, but rather takes takes its guidelines from the thoughts and attitudes of the masses, itself gets into a slavish dependence on existing conditions.]

This is a statement of a particular twist on Marxist assumptions – which were theoretically shared by Social Democratic and Communist parties at the time – that actually states a common political marketing problem in terms that sound exotic today, even for those who consider themselves on the left side of the political spectrum: people don't always vote for the policies that are in their own best interests. The Frankfurt School was concerned in particular with the prospects for the coming to power of left parties which considered themselves as parties of the working class. Their more immediate concern was the overthrow of the Nazi dictatorship in Germany, whose only internal possibility their saw as coming from a socialist revolution against not only the Hitler government but against capitalism as such. In traditional Marxist thought, the coming to power of the working class meant the coming to power of the majority, which is to say the triumph of democracy, which would lead to a much better society that would eventually do away with existing class divisions and therefore would act in the ultimate best interests of society as a whole. But the working class could achieve this only by pursuing its objective (“true”, “genuine”) class interest in the shorter term.

Such formulations as that just quoted could be used to justify cynicism or to write off the writer using them as a hopeless academic elitist. But what he says there is fundamentally no different from what anyone who tries to convince someone else to change their opinion on a topic.

And, once again, despite the general language he uses, he's drawing heavily on the experience of the fascist and Nazi dictatorships:

Unter den Verhältnissen des Monopolkapitalismus und der Ohnmacht der Arbeiter vor den Unterdrückungsapparaten der autoritären Staaten ist die Wahrheit zu bewunderungswärdigen kleinen Gruppen geflüchtet, die, unter dem Terror dezimiert, für die Schärfung der Theorie wenig Zeit haben. Die Scharlatane profitieren davon, und der allgemeine intellktuelle Zustand der grossen Massen geht rapide zurück.

[Under the conditions of monopoly capitalism and the powerlessness of the worker before the suppressive apparatuses of the authoritarian states, the truth has fled to amazingly small group which, decimated by {state} terror, have little time for the sharpening of theory. Charlatans profit from that and the general intellectual condition of the great masses is receding rapidly.]

In a couple of places, Horkheimer expresses what seems to be criticism of the particular development of the socialist system in the USSR (pp. 290-1 in the original). But it is worded very generally and without specific reference to the Soviet Union. His concerns in this essay are directed primarily toward the capitalist countries, especially to Nazi Germany.

In his concluding paragraph, Horkheimer argues that critical theory represented in the Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung summarizes the social and theoretical goals of critical theory this way:

Allgemeine Kriterien für die kritische Theorie als ganzes gibt es nicht; denn sie beruhen immer auf der Wiederholung von Ereignissen und somit auf der Existenz einer sich selbst reproducierenden Totalität. Ebensowenig existiert eine gesellschaftliche Klasse, an deren Zustimmung man sich halten könnte. Das Bewusstsein jeder Schicht vermag unter den gegenwärtigen Verhältnissen ideologisch beengt und korrumpiert zu werden, wie sehr sie ihrer Lage nach auch zur Wahrheit bestimmt sei. Die kritische Theorie hat bei aller Einsichtigkeit der einzelnen Schritte und der Übereinstimmung ihrer Elemente mit den fortgeschrittensten traditionellen Theorien keine spezifische Instanz für sich als das mit ihr selbst verknüpfte Interesse an der Aufhebung der Klassenherrschaft. Diese negative Formulierung ist, auf einen abstrakten Ausdruck gebracht, der materialistische Inhalt des idealistischen Begriffs der Vernunft. In einer geschichtlichen Periode wie dieser ist die wahre Theorie nicht so sehr affirmativ als kritisch, ebenso wie das ihr gemässe Handeln auch nicht ,,produktiv" sein kann. An der Existenz des kritischen Verhaltens, das freilich Elemente der traditionellen Theorien und dieser vergehenden Kultur überhaupt in sich einschliesst, hangt heute die Zukunft der Humanität. Eine Wissenschaft, die in eingebildeter Selbständigkeit die Gestaltung der Praxis, der sie dient und zugehort, bloss als ihr Jenseits betrachtet und sich bei der Trennung von Denken und Handeln bescheidet, hat auf die Humanität schon verzichtet. Selbst zu bestimmen, was sie leisten, wozu sie dienen soll, und zwar nicht bloss in einzelnen Stücken, sondern in ihrer Totalität, ist das auszeichnende Merkmal der denkerischen Tätigkeit. Ihre eigene Beschaffenheit treibt sie daher zur geschichtlichen Veränderung. Unter dem lauten Ruf von sozialem Geist und Volksgemeinschaft vertieft sich heute der Gegensatz von Individuum und Gesellschaft mit jedem Tag. Die Selbstbestimmung der Wissenschaft wird mehr und mehr abstrakt. Der Konformismus des Denkens, das Beharren darauf, es sei ein fester Beruf, ein in sich abgeschlossenes Reich innerhalb des gesellschaftlichen Ganzen, gibt das eigene Wesen des Denkens preis.

[There are no general criteria for critical theory. Because they always touch on the repetition of experiences and thereby on the existence of a totality which reproduces itself. Just as little does there exist a social class on whose agreement {with critical theory} one can depend. The consciousness of every stratum may be ideologically cramped and corrupted under the present conditions, however much {critical theory} may be decidedly true in terms of their situation.

Critical theory, by all the insight it provides for individual steps and its agreement of its elements with the most progressive traditional theories, has no specific instance for itself besides its own basic interest in the lifting of class domination. {This is an elaborate way of saying no political party represents the particular viewpoint of critical theory as Horkheimer is defining it.} This negative formulation is, to use an abstract expression, the materialist content of the idealist concept of Reason.

In an historical period such as this one, true theory is not so much affirmative as critical, even while that of its appropriate implementation also cannot be “productive”. On the existence of the critical conduct, which obviously contains in itself elements of traditional theory and certainly of its culture which is passing away, today depends the future of humanity. A science {a type of knowledge} that treats the practice which belongs to it and serves it as simply another world from itself, and which contents itself with the division of thinking and acting, has already given up on humanity.

To decide for itself what it can manage, and certainly not just simply in individual piece but rather in its totality, is the distinctive characteristic of thoughtful action. Its own qualities drive it to change history. Today, under the loud cry [in Nazi ideology] of social Spirit and People's Community, the contradiction between the individual and society is intensifying ever day.

The self-definition of knowledge is becoming more and more abstract. The conformity of thought, the insistence on a defined calling, a defined kingdom in itself within the social whole, surrenders the very essence of thought.]

Tags: critical theory, frankfurt school,, frankfurter schule, kritische theorie, max horkheimer, max horkheimer

Frankfurt School, 1937: Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse define “critical theory” (2)

This is a direct continuation of a discussion of Max Horkheimer's "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie" (1937) begun in Part 1.

I won't try to describe Hegelian and Marxist theories of alienation in this commentary, on which Horkheimer draws. But he argues that the conditions of life in modern capitalist society leave individuals feeling and thinking that their lives are driven by impersonal and invisible forces beyond their control.

This manifests itself in a tendency to reduce scientific knowledge to their immediate technical applications, a tendency Horkheimer argues that pragmatism and positivism encourage. Part of his criticism here is that such theories fail to examine the social contexts in which scientific theories arise and become accepted or not. He uses as an example a description by Henryk Grossmann of the complex interaction between scientific developments and the development of mechanical processes, "Die gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen der mechanisstischen Philosophie un die Manufaktur", which appeared in the 2/1935 number of the Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung.

He is particularly critical of the trend to reduce all sciences to mathematical formulations, which lead to dogmatic and un-dialectical formulations of scientific theories. And he certainly includes social sciences and economics within science. And it's in connection with that argument that he introduces the term "critical theory":

Die Selbsterkenntnis des Menschen in der Gegenwart ist jedoch nicht die mathematische Naturwissenschaft, die als ewiger Logos erscheint, sondern die vom Interesse an vernüftigen Zuständen durchherrschte kritische Theorie der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft.

[Self-knowledge of humanity in the present, however, is not mathematical natural science, which appears as eternal Logos, but rather critical theory, which is completely oriented toward the interest of the future conditions of the present society.]

Horkheimer is concerned that increasing specialization in scientific/academic thought leads to a disinterest in the formation of broader theory that would moves scientific discovery and understanding further, particularly by not at all exclusively in the realm of sociology and politics. In this passage, his focus of the challenge of the danger of fascism/Nazism stands out, though the idea he expresses has a more general application:

Heute wird die Entwicklung ... bestimmt ... durch die nationalen und internationalen Gegensätze und Führercliquen auf den verschiedenen Kommandohöhen in Wirtschaft und Staat. Soweit das theoretische Denken nicht auf höchst spezielle, mit diesen Kämpf zusammenhängende Zwecke, vor allem den Krieg und seine Industrie, bezogen ist, hat das Interesse an ihm abgenommen. Es warden nicht mehr soviel Energien darauf verwendet, die Denkfähigkeit, unabhängig von der Anwendunsart, auszubilden und weiterzuführen.

[Today development ... is determined ... by the national and international contradictions and leadership cliques in the various levels of command in economy and the state. So far as theoretical thinking is not focused on highly specialized on goals that connected with this conflict, above all war and its industry, interest in it was waned. There was no longer so much energy applied to develop facility of thought independent of the manner in which it is applied and to take it further.]

Horkheimer argues that Kant had a better grasp of how social relations affect the concept of spiritual/intellectual forces moving humanity than Hegel. Horkheimer makes the surprisingly conventional argument that Hegel took reality as rational. More precisely, he argues:

Aus der Verlegenheit vor dem allgemeinen Subjekt, das Kant behauptet und doch nicht recht zu absoluten Geist als das Allerrealste setzt. Das Allgemeine hat sich nach ihm bereits adäquat entfaltet und ist identisch mit dem, was sich vollzieht. Die Vernunft braucht nicht mehr bloss kritische gegen sich zu sein, sie ist bei Hegel affirmative geworden, bevor noch die Wirlichkeit als vernüftig zu bejahen ist. Angesichts der real weiterbestehenden Widersprüche der menschlichen Existenz, angesichts der Ohmacht der Individuen vor den von ihnen selbst erzeugten Verhältnissen erscheint diese Lösung als private Behauptung, als persönlicher Friedensschluss des Philosophen mit einer unmenschlichen Welt. (259)

[Out of the embarrassment before the universal Subject, which Kant postulated but did not actually claim as the Absolute Spirit, [Hegel] set it up as the most Real. The Universal had already been adequately developed, according to him [Hegel], and is identical with that which occurs. Reason no longer needs to be critical of itself, by Hegel it has become affirmative, before which even reality is to be affirmed as reasonable. In light of the actually continuing contradictions of human existence, in light of the powerlessness of the individuals before the conditions created by themselves, this solution appears as a private claim, as a personal peace pact of the philosopher with an inhuman world.]

The above is my translation. This is the 1982 rendition by Matthew O'Connell of that same passage (p. 204):

Kant claimed that there existed a universal subject which, however, he could not quite describe. Hegel escaped this embarrassment by postulating the absolute spirit as the most real thing of all. According to him, the universal has already adequately evolved itself and is identical with all that happens. Reason need no longer stand over against itself in purely critical fashion; in Hegel reason has become affirmative, even before reality itself is affirmed as rational. But, confronted with the persisting contradictions in human existence and with the impotence of individuals in face of situations they have themselves brought about, the Hegelian solution seems a purely private assertion, a personal peace treaty between the philosopher and an inhuman world.

I call this a surprisingly conventional view because it is commonly claimed that Hegel viewed the Prussian monarchy of the Restoration period (post-1815) as the ultimate in Reason realized in government. That is, that the social implications of Hegel's philosophy were ultimately passive, demanding acceptance of existing social and political conditions rather than challenging them in either theory or practice.

But at best, that is a narrow reading of Hegel.

The seemingly passive acceptance of the dictatorships by the populations in Fascist Italy, in Austria with its "Standesstaat" clerical-fascist regime, and in Hitler Germany was a major issue to which the Frankfurt School would address themselves. And that concern shows in Horkheimer's essay. Again, he was working broadly from a general Marxist/socialist perspective that assumed that the working class had a fundamental set of class interests that included the establishment of democracy and the elimination of capitalism. And that this set of class interests ultimately represented the well-being of the whole society and would benefit the vast majority, though the big capitalists would obviously be disadvantaged in comparison to their position in the old society.

Whether Horkheimer and his associates were understanding the situation of the actual and potential opposition in Germany, Italy and Austria adequately is an important question. While they may well have underestimated the oppositional movements and tendencies actually at work in those countries at the time, it would be hard to argue that they were wrong in judging that any prospect of overthrowing those regimes by a mass revolutionary movement seemed to be receding.

So we begin to see formulations suggesting that while it was crucially important to make fundamental criticisms of existing capitalist societies, it would take a mass working-class movement to realize the liberating potential of the existing stage of economic and scientific developments. And the prospects for such a movement seemed to be receding. Again, the political developments leading up to the First World War and immediately after had made such a potential to appear very great indeed, and not only to those like Horkheimer who welcomed the prospect.

That is the immediate background for statements like this one of Horkheimer's: "Das Denken, der Aufbau der Theorie, bliebe eine Sache, und sein Gegenstand, das Proletariat, eine andere." (The thinking, the building of theory, would be one thing, and its condition, the proletariat [working class], another.)

Conclusion of the analysis of this article in Part 3 tomorrow.

Tags: critical theory, frankfurt school,, frankfurter schule, kritische theorie, max horkheimer, max horkheimer

Frankfurt School, 1937: Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse define “critical theory” (1)

Max Horkheimer introduced the term "critical theory" as a description for the approach directing the Frankfurt School's Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung in "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie" in the 2/1937 edition of the journal. An English version, Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays (1982), is available as of this writing in SCRIBD, translation by Matthew O'Connell. The translations in this commentary are mine, based on the original text unless otherwise noted.

He and Herbert Marcuse would follow up in the 3/1937 number with separate essays, both under the title of "Philosophie und kritische Theorie."

Critical theory is an appeal in the broadest sense for critical thinking, including in particular critical thinking about society and the role of individuals and classes in it.

Expressed at such a high level of generalization, this could be taken as an innocuous statement of the ideal of a liberal education, or the mission statement of a humanities department. But for Horkheimer and Marcuse, the point is that logical and scientific theories should not be innocuous.

Horkheimer in this essay indicates some major themes of critical theory:

• Critique of positivism and pragmatism

• An analytical perspective keeping in focus the mutual interactions of social relations (particularly class) and scientific theories

• Rejection of relativism: scientific theories describe reality but are also limited by the social perspectives of the thinker and by the social determinants of the reception of the theories

• Focuses on ways society can lead individuals to embrace ideas that are irrational and poorly descriptive of their own reality

• Radio and film created opportunities for mass manipulation that would have been almost unthinkable in 1900 and critical theory gives considerable attention to understanding the implications of that

At a surface level, Horkheimer’s formulation of critical theory in this essay has a romantic appeal, despite the thoroughly academic form. He pictures the critical thinker as one with clear insight into secrets hidden from the majority (at least for the moment). The critical thinker is called upon to be a leader, to spur people into action against an unjust and dehumanizing system. And not just a system of government, but also of classes, economic organization, personal relationships, even the consciousness and feelings of individuals in their surroundings.

Their thinking takes place in within particular philosophical and political traditions. And their particular development in the 1930s was overwhelmingly influenced by the realities of National Socialism in Germany. And they were viewing this phenomenon not only through their own experience of exile from Germany, but also in terms of their pre-1933 political perspective.

That perspective lay between that of the Social Democratic and Communist Parties, generally leaning toward the militant perspective of the latter, though the Institut für Sozialforschung was an independent group, not a Party organization required to reflect a Party line. Both streams of left thought understood themselves still in the 1930s as working within the Marxist tradition of thought, though each group condemned the other for operating on wrong interpretations and making bad political decisions.

The perspective that Horkheimer labels "critical theory" for the first time in this essay combined other strains of thought, as well, notably Freudian psychology and existentialism. It's hard to avoid the impression that, while continuing to identify themselves as Marxists, that creating the notion of critical theory as a school of thought was a way of asserting and recognizing that their approach was dealing with conditions that had developed and changed considerably since the latter decades of the 19th century, when Marxism represented the general perspective of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Formulations like this one of Horkheimer's reflect that rich combination of broad theoretical perspectives:

... kritische Denken heute [ist] durch den Versuch motiviert, die Spannng real zu überwinden, den Gegensatz zwischen der im Individuum angelegten Zielbewusstheit, Spontaneität, Vernüftigkeit und der für die Gesellschaft grundlegenden Beziehungen des Arbeitsprozesses aufzuheben. Das kritische Denken enthält einen Begriff des Menschen, der sich selbst widerstreitet, solange diese Identität nicht vollzogen ist.

[... critical thought today {is} motivated by the attempt to overcome in reality the tension, the opposition between the goal-consciousness, spontaneity and rationality founded in the individual and the work processes that lie at the basis of social relationships. Critical thinking contains and concept of humanity which contradicts itself, so long as this identity isn't realized.]

Without understanding this background, some of what they wrote in the 1930s can sound downright cryptic. The cataclysmic events of the First World War, in which four major empires came to an end (the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman) and which brought a government to power in Russia that understood itself as a workers' regime, had shown them that sweeping changes could come relatively suddenly and unexpectedly. The coming to power of Social Democratic Parties in Germany and Austria at the end of the war boosted this sense of what they saw as historical processes moving toward a higher, freer level of development.

But the time between the end of the war and 1937 had also given them major reasons for pessimism. Given the wartime devastation and the Carthaginian peace imposed at Versailles on Germany, the political success of the SPD was seriously limited. The early postwar split between the SPD and the KPD (German Communist Party) reflected both internal German conditions and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as filtered through the Comintern. But that division, mirrored in most other European countries, represented a major division in the political force of the working classes that were the base voters and supporters of both Social Democrats and Communists. It was a major departure from the unity of the prewar SPD, when it had been the largest German party in voting strength since 1877 and was the leading advocate of both democratic government and the abolition of capitalism as the economic organizations of society.

So, on the one hand, the rapid social and political changes at the end of the World War had confirmed in the minds of the Frankfurt School that a socialist transformation of society was a near-term possibility. But there had been major setbacks, with the rise of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany being the most alarming examples. In their perspective, these movements didn't just represent accidents of history in those particular countries. They were a more general development in which the capitalist rulers in those countries had abandoned democracy and political liberalism for a new form of totalitarian dictatorship. (Horkheimer uses the "totalitarian" formulation in this essay.)

At the same time, Horkheimer had been expecting that the Hitler dictatorship would be overthrown by revolution, a prospect which surely appeared far less likely to them as an immediate event in 1937 than it had in 1933. Because the Hitler regime seemed to have found ways to bind large portions of the public in at least passive loyalty to the government. The methods of doing so including massive and unprecedented use of the mass media of radio, film and television for political propaganda, suppression of overt challenges to the ruling ideology in word or deed, and by making mass institutions like unions, churches and sports clubs subservient to the Nazi Party ideology.

These were practical as well as theoretical problems for the Frankfurt School. And it's important to understand that, on the one hand, they made very clear distinctions between democratic regimes and dictatorships. But they also believed that Fascism and Nazism were extreme expressions of basic tendencies within capitalist societies. So some of their arguments were in defense of classical "bourgeois" (capitalist, classical liberal) ideology against dictatorship. Other arguments were focused particularly against the capitalist dictatorships in the first rank but also against governments and economic trends in democratic capitalist countries.

All of this is typically expressed in the Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung in intellectual, academic language. And therefore much of it assumes a solid grounding in the relevant history, economics and philosophy in question. It's not written to be campaign arguments for elections. And even allowing for that, it’s sometimes written in generalizations that can make the argument fairly obtuse if the reader doesn't recognize the references.

In Part 2 tomorrow, I'll discuss Horkheimer's "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie" in more detail.

Tags: critical theory, frankfurt school,, frankfurter schule, kritische theorie, max horkheimer, max horkheimer