Showing posts with label SYRIZA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SYRIZA. Show all posts

Saturday, November 07, 2015

Woes of the EU

The European Union is facing a crisis of governance. Two bad policies on major issues are creating a climate that is making a process of further unity difficult. Maybe, in practice, impossible. Those are the now-chronic euro crisis and the refugee crisis.

In the end, the EU is a crisis of democracy. Because the policies Germany is imposed on fellow eurozone members in order to have the euro currency work for Germany's narrow national benefit is more and more directly interfering with democratic processes. This year, we've seen that big-time in Greece. And we're seeing it right now in Portugal.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard gave a good description of the early days of the current political crisis in Portugal: Eurozone crosses Rubicon as Portugal's anti-euro Left banned from power Telegraph 10/23/2015.

The President and head of state, Anibal Cavaco Silva, appointed a minority government after October's elections. A left-leaning coalition with a majority in Parliament is trying to get the pro-austerity minority government removed. Cavaco Silva said the majority coalition was too "anti-European," which in EU-speak means they want to pull out of the EU. In reality, they are anti-austerity and that's the real problem. They are committed to getting Portugal and its people out from under the ruinous austerity program on which Germany and Angela Merkel insist.

But the majority Left Bloc coalition is still striving to take power (Portugal left closer to government deal, still no majority Reuters 11/06/2015). Two of the three left parties, the social-democratic Socialist Party and the Left Bloc have agreed formally on a coalition program:

The [coalition] talks that began soon after the election have raised fears over the prospects for Portugal's timid economic recovery, because of the instability and the fact that the potential partners reject some reforms imposed to escape a debt crisis.

A group of over 100 entrepreneurs representing firms from cork-makers to motorways and construction, signed a manifesto arguing that uncertainty was already compromising investment, balance sheets and jobs, while a leftist government would only exacerbate the situation due to the far left's opposition to private business.

The centre-left Socialists have argued that they can form a government backed by a leftist majority that would respect European budget rules.

But the far left, especially the Communists, reject Brussels-imposed budget limits and have various other significant ideological divergences making a binding deal between them hard to achieve. Some Socialists also favour a centrist coalition rather than a deal with the radical left.

The Socialists plan more talks with the Communists before next week's vote to see if they can bring them on board.
Despite the propaganda slogans of the minority government's supporters quoted there, a left coalition is not going to demand an exit from NATO and the EU, as Cavaco Silva implied when he made his statement about deciding to install a minority government. They won't even try to exit the euro. But they do say they want to fight the austerity policies.

Paul Krugman in his column for today, Austerity’s Grim Legacy New York Times 11/06/2015, emphasizes that austerity policies can have very serious long-term problem that will continue to hurt people for years even if the economy starts growing at a healthy rate:

The idea that policies that depress the economy in the short run also inflict lasting damage is generally referred to as “hysteresis.” It’s an idea with an impressive pedigree: The case for hysteresis was made in a well-known 1986 paper by Olivier Blanchard, who later became the chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, and Lawrence Summers, who served as a top official in both the Clinton and the Obama administrations. But I think everyone was hesitant to apply the idea to the Great Recession, for fear of seeming excessively alarmist.

At this point, however, the evidence practically screams hysteresis. Even countries that seem to have largely recovered from the crisis, like the United States, are far poorer than precrisis projections suggested they would be at this point. ...

What this suggests is that the turn to austerity had truly catastrophic effects, going far beyond the jobs and income lost in the first few years. In fact, the long-run damage suggested by the Fatás-Summers estimates is easily big enough to make austerity a self-defeating policy even in purely fiscal terms: Governments that slashed spending in the face of depression hurt their economies, and hence their future tax receipts, so much that even their debt will end up higher than it would have been without the cuts.
But when the public votes in democratic elections against these destructive austerity policies, Merkel brings tremendous pressure to nullify that anti-austerity result, no matter how much contempt for democracy she shows in the process.

The Economist profiles Merekel as The indispensable European 11/07/2015. They note that Angie is "a scorpion who quietly eliminates potential rivals." That's even of her conservative sponsors in the CDU, most notably Helmut Kohl and Wolfgang Schäuble. And, if anything, it's more true of politicians in other countries of the eurozone, like Alexis Tsipras, Yanis Varoufakis and their Syriza party in Greece. Now the anti-austerity politicians in Portugal are in line for her wrath.

Caroline Copley reports on recent developments in the refugee crisis, which has been going on for years but recently reached a new acute stage, in German coalition agrees to speed up asylum process as influx hits record Reuters 11/06/2015:

The leaders of Germany's ruling coalition parties, struggling with the biggest influx of migrants in decades, clinched an agreement on Thursday on how to speed up the asylum process for those with little chance of being allowed to stay.

The agreement followed weeks of infighting and came as official figures showed the number of new arrivals in Germany this year had hit almost 800,000 by the end of October - the total number the government had expected for all 2015.

The crisis has opened a rift in Chancellor Angela Merkel's coalition. The Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party of Merkel's conservatives, have demanded tougher action, while the Social Democrats (SPD) favor a gentler stance.

After failing to fully resolve their differences on Sunday, Merkel said she and the leaders of the CSU and SPD had now agreed to set up special centers for migrants with no solid claim to asylum in Germany.
But Merkel's Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière of her own CDU party has thrown a brand-new wrinkle in the internal political arguments in Germany by suggesting Germany should set up some modification of Germany's right to asylum that would put new restrictions on the asylum recipient bringing in family members. (De Maizière will Familiennachzug für Syrer untersagen Deutschlandfunk 06.11.2015; Roland Preuß, Umgang mit Syrern: De Maizière löst neuen Koalitionsstreit aus Süddeutsche Zeitung 06.11.2015) This raises the prospects of still more conflict in Merkel's coalition over the refugee crisis, because that proposal wasn't part of the current governing coalition's refugee policy. It's always possible, though, that this was a coordinated "trial balloon" to test public reaction to such proposals.

The Economist article also reports the emergence of a new German verb, "merkeln," meaning to put off big decisions. That extend-and-pretend approach has been characteristic of her decision-making in the euro crisis and the refugee crisis. It involves short-term fixes that easy the acute phases of the crisis but avoid setting up substantial long-term solutions to the problems. But as the chronic problems drag on, they increase nationalist attitudes within EU and eurozone members countries, undermines the ability to further European unity, and, most seriously, undermines democracy within the whole of the EU.

Monday, October 26, 2015

Sad state of the EU

Wolfgang Münchau warns, "The eurozone is once again in a position where economic recovery is weakening before it really started, where the global risks are rising, and where inflation remains way off target." (Draghi must be more unconventional Financial Times 10/25/2015)

Yanis Varoufakis says, "Europe’s crisis is poised to enter its most dangerous phase." (Schäuble’s Gathering Storm Project Syndicate 10/23/2015)

Münchau there is writing more narrowly about the course of the eurozone economy. But Varoufakis is writing about that, too, as well as the political dimensions of the crisis. But in his FT piece, he notes of the Italian situation, "Matteo Renzi, the Italian prime minister, is currently using every trick in the book to circumvent European budget rules. His previously planned spending cuts are lower; the tax cuts are bigger — and of the wrong kind; and against the advice of the European Commission, he is now cutting unpopular property tariffs instead of labour taxes."

Varoufakis also discusses Italy's bucking of Germany's domination of the eurozone economy:

Renzi has come close to demolishing, at least rhetorically, the fiscal rules that Germany has defended for so long. In a remarkable act of defiance, he threatened that if the European Commission rejected Italy’s national budget, he would re-submit it without change.

This was not the first time Renzi had alienated Germany’s leaders. And it was no accident that his statement followed a months-long effort by his own finance minister, Pier Carlo Padoan, to demonstrate Italy’s commitment to the eurozone’s German-backed “rules.” Renzi understands that adherence to German-inspired parsimony is leading Italy’s economy and public finances into deeper stagnation, accompanied by further deterioration of the debt-to-GDP ratio. A consummate politician, Renzi knows that this is a short path to electoral disaster.
He also discusses the increasingly public dissent by the Socialist government of France to German misrule in the eurozone.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard reports France signals EU treaty change to avert Brexit, warns on euro survival Telegraph 09/24/2015:

Mr Macron had even tougher words for Germany, warning that the eurozone will disintegrate in a storm of populist revolt unless Berlin drops its vehement opposition to fiscal union and large transfers to the poorer regions.

The former Rothschild banker said the currency bloc is fundamentally unworkable without a joint budget to back it up and will leave debt-stricken countries on the periphery in permanent trouble.

“If we don’t move forward, we are deciding the dismantling of the eurozone. We have to choose: is it a fixed exchange system or a monetary union?” he said.

He called the struggle over the euro a new Thirty Years war in Europe between Calvinists and Catholics. "The Calvinists want to make others pay until the end of their life. They want reforms or no contributions toward any solidarity. On the other side are the Catholics, largely on the periphery,” he said.

"At every eurozone summit, at every Eurogroup, we have this same dilemma between member states. We have to exit this religious war," he said. [my emphasis]
Varoufakis seems to approve Macron's use of "Calvinists" to describe the supporters of Angela Merkel's ruinous austerity economics.

Neither France nor Italy is mounting the kind of challenge that Greece did earlier this year. But their situations are also not nearly as desperate as Greece's is. But Münchau in Spiegel Online recommends Renzi's example along with that of the Canadian Liberal Party's leader Justin Trudeau as potential models for the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) as to how they might revive their steadily declining political prospects: by offering meaningful alternatives to austerity policies. (So könnte die SPD zum Erfolg zurückkehren 23.10.2015)

Michael Krätke writes (Das Problem ist Deutschland Der Freitag 14.12.014), "Die Euro-Krise signalisiert seit mehr als fünf Jahren, dass die Währungsunion umgebaut werden muss, um zu überleben." ("The euro crisis signaled more than five years ago that the currency union had to be reconstructed to survive.")

He's right. But Angela Merkel continues to milk the eurozone arrangements for the narrow benefit they can provide for Germany. And the walls between EU members continue to go up.

Meanwhile, a majority left bloc in the Portuguese Parliament is now confronting President Aníbal Cavaco Silva over his attempt to keep a pro-austerity government in power after the recent elections there. When it comes to enforcing austerity, Merkel and her allies aren't terribly scrupulous about this whole democracy business.

Saturday, September 26, 2015

The real existing EU: Germany and Greece under the Compassionate Pastor's Daughter

The fight of Alexis Tsipras' government earlier this year against the harsh austerity measures imposed by the German government of the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter Angela Merkel via the Troika of the EU, the ECB and the IMF has highlighted for the world Greece's need for debt structuring.

So it's not at all surprising to see that need articulated by Richard Portes, who "argues that Greece is fundamentally insolvent and that the EU and its attendant institutions should recognize that fact and work immediately toward some form of sovereign debt restructuring." (Fiscal Austerity & Greece New Economic Thinking 09/26/2015)

He has the following to say about those famous "structural reforms" we hear so much about from the advocates of neoliberalism:

Portes also suggests that Greece is a special case, a country that does not lend itself readily to easy reform. There is an ongoing banking crisis, unsustainable debt levels ..., and institutions by and large remain malfunctioning. So whilst Portes agrees with much of the prevailing sentiment that further fiscal austerity will be counterproductive, he also argues that Greece must relent as well: it must signal its commitment to deep structural reform, particularly in regard to the endemic corruption in public administration, tax evasion, and the complex oligarchic system that links political parties to the media and administration. For Portes, no further fiscal austerity makes sense, but he suggests that Greece could aid its cause by reforming product markets and services that are still oligopolistic, with numerous barriers to entry and, hence competition. A second priority is to modernize the legal framework of property rights, investor protection and corporate governance, as well as a massive reorganization and restructuring of the public administration. These, rather than further wage cuts, are the only way to raise the competitiveness of the Greek economy. [my emphasis]
This is one way that the Greek fight this year has helped turn neoliberal rhetoric against itself.

The standard neoliberal recipe for "structural reforms" includes those obvious-sounding elements he mentions: fight corruption, crack down on tax evasion, even reduce the power of "oligarchy." Oligarchy in the neoliberal vocabulary refers to the capitalist class in countries considered in disfavor by whoever is using the term. In favored countries, they are economic elites ("job creators" for US Republicans) who are eager to show their public spirit by engaging in business-government cooperation and public-private partnerships, aka, PPP for the Kool Kids. In disfavored countries, they are oligarchs practicing crony capitalism.

In the Europe of the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter, Greece is the model of a corrupt, oligarchical, inefficient southern European country full of lazy and irresponsible people, needing the tutelage of a superior country with honest business practices and a good work ethic, i.e., Germany.

The dishonest and lawless practices of a great German company like Volkswagen are certainly no sign of deficiency in the superior economic and moral standards of Germany and the EU operating under the direction of the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter! Oh, no, that was just a couple of bad apples, or something. Why, it would be frivolous to even suggest that this was a symptom of a corrupt, oligarchical political system practicing crony capitalism. (Timeline: Is Volkswagen’s ‘Bug’ an EU Feature? Emptywheel 09/25/2015)

Brendan Greeley writing for the well-known radical-left Bloomberg Businessweek (note for Republicans: that's supposed to be obvious irony) asks, Did Privilege Enable Volkswagen’s Diesel Deception? 09/24/2015:

In Italy, the privilege is called potere speciale; in France, action spécifique; in the U.K., it’s a “golden share.” Those are all different names for an ownership stake that gives a government — be it national or local — special powers above any other shareholder. That makes a crucial difference in running a business. Governments, for example, have good reason to prevent jobs from moving to more competitive labor markets. A golden share can help with that.
But for countries practicing the neoliberal dogma in ways other than the ones discussed here so far, this is not crony capitalism or corruption, you see. Not at all. It's responsible gubment support for the Job Creators through public-private partnership. Or something.

In Europe, most golden shares are held in utilities and telecoms, companies that were state monopolies before being privatized. For more than a decade, the European Union, as it expanded and liberalized its common open market, has been trying to undo the persistence of state control. But there is one golden share that has endured, a German law so breathtakingly exceptional it can only be called what it is in fact called—“das VW-Gesetz,” the Volkswagen Law. It is explicitly designed for a single company. Germany has managed to defend its golden share against the EU because VW had built a reputation as a force for good: responsible corporate citizen, pioneer in environmental progess [sic]. [my emphasis]
Fortunately for the EU, Germany staunchly defends the rules for everybody. Well, with the occasional exception:

[Germany's "Volkswagen Law"] eventually brought Germany into conflict with the EU. In 2000 the European Commission — the EU’s executive body—began enforcement actions against the golden shares that remained in the newly privatized utilities in several countries. It acted against Italy for its shares in Eni, the former state oil company; against France, for its holdings in Elf Aquitaine, another oil company; and against the U.K. and its British Airports Authority. Several countries responded by defining their golden shares more narrowly, exercised only to defend a compelling national interest.

“The case of Volkswagen is peculiar because we are not dealing with public services,” says Daniele Gallo of Luiss Guido Carli University in Rome. “We are dealing with a company that sells cars.” In 2007 the commission won a judgment in the European Court of Justice against the Volkswagen Law. Germany, which usually follows the court’s judgments, responded instead with improvisation and duct tape: It struck some of the law’s provisions, which Volkswagen immediately added to its own bylaws. Lower Saxony retained its de facto veto over major decisions. The EC challenged, but the Court of Justice upheld the rejiggered law in 2013.
But this is consistent with the actual priorities of the neoliberal agenda and the actual application of it under the leadership of the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter. Germany gets to angle narrow nationalistic advantages out the EU and especially eurozone structures and processes. And those reforms emphasized by Portes - enforcing tax laws, reducing corruption, limiting the power of the oligarchy - are not the highest priorities.

Portes also notes "that the German government in particular (which consistently insists on 'following the rules') has been a serial violator of the Stability and Growth Pact, and conveniently forgets its own history when it comes to issues of debt forgiveness." The hardline "ordoliberalism" to which the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter adheres does seems to take deficits seriously, though exceptions can be made for the convenience of model country Germany, of course.

The "structural reforms" on which the Troika under the direction of the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter has been very intent on enforcing, most cruelly in Greece's case, are those calling for privatization of public property, deregulation of private business, elimination of capital controls, weakening of labor unions, reductions of wages and salaries and protective legislation for workers (aka, "liberalization of labor markets"), reductions of social services, raising the retirement age and reducing old-age pensions.

Alexis Tsipras' government shows every sign of being serious about improving tax collection and fighting corruption. His former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis expects that in his new government, Tsipras is "going to make a big deal out of how uniquely positioned he is to take on the oligarchy and tax evaders because Syriza has no strings attached." (Quoted in David Patrikarakos, Varoufakis told you so Politico EU 09/23/15)

But the Troika has actually impeded them in those efforts in various ways. As Varoufakis puts it, the Troika "is in cahoots with the oligarchs. Since 2010 the oligarchs have been the greatest supporters of the Troika and the Troika has been sheltering them." And presumably will continue to do so. As long as the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter has her way. As Varoufakis says, the July MOU the Troika imposed on Greece has deprived the country of "all the instruments the state has to fight a war against them."

Varoufakis refers to some of the ways in which the Troika, in cooperation with the Greek oligarchy, is impeding one of the very reforms, combating tax evasion, that Portes considers most urgent and emphasizing others (The lenders are the real winners in Greece – Alexis Tsipras has been set up to fail The Guardian 09/21/2015):

Tsipras must now implement a fiscal consolidation and reform programme that was designed to fail. Illiquid small businesses, with no access to capital markets, have to now pre-pay next year’s tax on their projected 2016 profits. Households will need to fork out outrageous property taxes on non-performing apartments and shops, which they can’t even sell. VAT [value-added taxes] rate hikes will boost VAT evasion. Week in week out, the troika will be demanding more recessionary, antisocial policies: pension cuts, lower child benefits, more foreclosures. [my emphasis]
And it's always important to remember the cost to Europe's fundamental democratic system from the midconduct of the Troika and the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter. Varoufakis in The Guardian: "Of course, to get to this point Greek democracy has had to be deeply wounded (1.6 million Greeks who voted in the July referendum did not bother to turn up at the polling stations on Sunday) – no great loss to bureaucrats in Brussels, Frankfurt and Washington DC for whom democracy appears, in any case, to be a nuisance."

The is the real existing EU, currently under management of the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter.

Thursday, September 24, 2015

The Greek "Troika" program continues

Alexis Tsipras just formed a new government in Greece after last Sunday's elections. (Helena Smith, New Alexis Tsipras-led Greek government takes power The Guardian 09/23/2015)

Despite a significant split-off from his own Syriza party, he was able to gain enough votes that he could form a new coalition with his previous small partner party Anel (Independent Greeks). Anel is typically described as a rightwing populist party. But their basic economic program, an end to austerity but keeping Greece in the eurozone, is compatible with Syriza's.

The new government has a narrower majority than his previous one. But at the moment, Tsipras is backing the latest brutal Troika program forced onto his last government, so he will get solid support for other non-coalition parties on votes in accord with the Troika's directions. Which means, above all, the directions from the Compassionate Pastor's Daughter Angela Merkel.

Former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis comments on the challenges for Tsipras in The lenders are the real winners in Greece – Alexis Tsipras has been set up to fail The Guardian 09/23/2015:

The third promise is key to Tsipras’s success. Having accepted a new extend-and-pretend loan that limits the government’s capacity to reduce austerity and look after the weak, the surviving raison d’être of a leftwing administration is to tackle noxious vested interests. However, the troika is the oligarchs’ best friend, and vice versa. During the first six months of 2015, when we were challenging the troika’s monopoly over policy-making powers in Greece, its greatest domestic supporters were the oligarch-owned media and their political agents. The same people and interests who have now embraced Tsipras. Can he turn against them? I think he wants to, but the troika has already disabled his main weapons (for example by forcing the disbandment of the economic crime fighting unit, SDOE).

In 2014 the conservative prime minister Antonis Samaras found himself in a similar conundrum, having to implement a failed troika programme. He resorted to feigning allegiance to the troika while stonewalling and petitioning it for laxity, lest Syriza win.

Will Tsipras have more success in faking commitment to another failed troika programme? The prospects are not bright, but we should not write him off. His fate depends on whether his new government remains connected to the victims of its troika agreement, implements genuine reforms to give bona fide business some confidence to invest, and uses the intensification of the crisis to demand real concessions from Brussels. It is a tall order. But then victory, however sweet, is not the point. The point is to make a difference.
Varoufakis has not aligned himself with the dissenting split from Syriza. But he declined to stand for his parliamentary seat in last Sunday's election because of his disagreement with Tsipras' acceptance of the Compassionate Pastor's Daughter's brutal austerity program.

Friday, September 18, 2015

"Mama Merkel", the EU and the refugees

Roland Nelles has a kiss-up-to-Merkel column, Unapologetic, Unequivocal: The Real Merkel Finally Stands up Spiegel International 09/16/2015. (German original: Kanzlerin in der Flüchtlingskrise: Die wahre Angela M. Spiegel Online 16.09.2015) He plays up the "Mama Merkel" image that Chancellor Angela Merkel has projected by unilaterally declaring Germany will accept hundreds of thousands of refugees while the European Union fails to come to agreement.

This reads like a press release from Merkel's political handlers:

The next crisis is now underway, and she has reacted indignantly to the criticism that Germany is allowing in too many refugees. "If we now have to start apologizing for showing a friendly face in response to emergency situations, then that's not my country," she said on Tuesday. Although delivered in her usual sober way, it was an unexpectedly heartfelt comment that will be remembered for a long time to come.

It wasn't a political tactician speaking this time, but a compassionate pastor's daughter from the eastern state of Brandenburg -- a politician who remains acutely aware of the Christian element in her party's agenda. In this respect she provides a welcome contrast to Horst Seehofer, leader of the Christian Democrats' Bavarian sister party, the CSU. In his book, charity more or less stops at the garden fence.

But Angela Merkel has not necessarily turned her back on realpolitik completely. As the refugee crisis unfolds, she too will inevitably make compromises and alter direction. Among these compromises are the newly instated border controls. Germany cannot take in all the world's refugees, as Merkel well knows.

But she has now made it obvious that she won't be deviating from her basic course. She is sending a message against knee-jerk xenophobia. That the conservatism of Bavaria's lederhosen brigade and some of her own party colleagues has always remained a foreign concept to Angela Merkel has never been more apparent than it is now. Ten years in office have clearly changed Merkel. She now has the strength and independence to state her opinion more stridently, even if it earns her the opprobrium of her allies. [my emphasis]
Political leaders, like everyone else, have seemingly contradictory or inconsistent feelings and priorities. I wouldn't question whether Merkel may feel genuine compassion for refugees.

But the "compassionate pastor's daughter" (mitfühlende Pastorentochter) has ruled the eurozone with thoroughly un-compassionate that have cruelly impoverished millions in Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and particularly Greece. She has successfully transformed the climate within the EU and especially the eurozone into one of competing nationalism. She largely ignored the antidemocratic, authoritarian turn in Viktor Orbán's Hungary while she dictated governments in Greece and Italy and, in 2015, ran a blatant "regime change" operation against the Syriza government in Greece, all the while encouraging the most hateful nationalist sentiments among Germans against the Greek people.

So is Merkel's unquestionably generous gesture toward the refugees an effort to change the nationalistic turn in Germany policy under her Chacellorship?

I doubt it.

Philippe Legrain is on point when he points out Merkel's latest refugee move is actually a sign of her continuing failure as the chief leader of the EU, and a continuation of her nationalistic bullying against other EU nations: "Above all, Germany is trying to strong-arm its neighbors into taking more refugees. Berlin has long insisted that passport-free travel across the Schengen Area could not survive without a common European asylum policy. Now Merkel is unilaterally forcing the issue." (Schengen in Shambles Foreign Policy 09/16/2015)

He also describes Mama Merkel's style of European leadership well:

Angela Merkel’s management of the crisis in the eurozone has been disastrous, her treatment of Greece unforgivable. But the German chancellor has played a much more positive role in Europe’s other crisis: the hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming into the continent from the Middle East and Africa. By throwing open the doors to Syrians fleeing a terrible civil war, she has showed up more mean-spirited governments and given Germans pride in themselves. While Merkel was largely following German public opinion, not leading it, she still ended up doing the right thing.

Until now. Over the weekend, Germany closed its border with Austria and then imposed emergency border controls, prompting its neighbors to do likewise. While the European Commission has rubber-stamped the decision — when does it ever hold Berlin’s feet to the fire? — the Schengen Agreement, which is meant to guarantee open borders among its 26 member countries, is now in tatters. At a time when barriers are going up across Europe — Hungary’s authoritarian ultranationalist government is completing a razor-wire fence on its border with non-Schengen Serbia, the main transit route from the Balkans to Germany — this sends a terrible signal. [my emphasis]
The Economist reports, "Europe will soon have more physical barriers on its national borders than it did during the Cold War." (More neighbours make more fences 09/15/2015) If St. Reagan were around today, in order to please conservatives in the US and Europe he would have to say, "Mr. Gorbachev, build up this wall!"

The German ARD channel also reports in (Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung: Radikale Leistungskürzungen für Tausende Flüchtlinge 17.09.2015) that Merkel's government is simultaneously proposing " die Leistungen für Tausende Flüchtlinge radikal zu kürzen" ("to radically cut the support for thousands of refugees").

George Soros summarizes the current problems of the EU, in an article primarily devoted to hawkish advocacy over the conflict between Ukraine and Russia (Ukraine & Europe: What Should Be Done? New York Review of Books 10/08/2015 issue, accessed 09/18/2015):

Because of the structural defects of the euro, the European authorities have had to become masters of the art of muddling through one crisis after another. This practice is popularly known as kicking the can down the road although it would be more accurate to describe it as kicking the can uphill so that it keeps coming back. But Europe now faces at least five crises at the same time: four internal ones — the euro, Greece, migration, and the British referendum on whether to remain in the EU—and an external one, Russian aggression against Ukraine. The various crises tend to reinforce one another. Both the public and the authorities are overwhelmed.
(I'm surprised that the Hungarian-born Soros didn't mention the authoritarianism of that country's current government in such a list.)

Talif Deen reports (U.N. to Host Meeting of World Leaders on Refugee Crisis Inter Press Service 09/15/2015):

The 28-member European Union (EU), which was sharply divided over the Greek bailout financial crisis last year, is facing its biggest test of unity over the growing refugee crisis unfolding in European borders.

At an emergency meeting in Brussels Monday, the EU hesitantly agreed to share some 40,000 refugees – mostly fleeing from war zones in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya – but only on a voluntary basis, even as Germany, Austria, Slovakia and the Netherlands imposed new border control measures to ward off the tidal wave of hundreds and thousands of displaced people flowing into Europe.

The restrictive measures include razor wire fences across land borders and pronouncements by some Eastern and Central European countries that only Christians will be welcomed, triggering strong condemnations by the United Nations.
Joachim Jahnke in Das Desaster der Angela Merkel Infoportal 17.09.2015) also discusses some of the very real practical problems with Merkel's approach: failure to adequately support refugee camps much closer to the Syrian border; continuing problems with ongoing immigrant integration in German society (which are primarily due to xenophobia encouraged by the Compassionate Pastor's Daughter's own CDU/CSU party); over-optimistic estimation of the size and timing of the refugee inflows into Germany; and, of course, failure to establish an effective EU system to handle refugee inflows.

It's not that the influx of refugees/migrants into the EU is a new problem. As just one example, here is a Catholic News Services report from 2011 (Bishops ask Germany to support migrants National Catholic Reporter):

Africa's bishops have asked German President Christian Wulff to support them in their efforts to develop their continent as one way of slowing the flow of migrants into Europe.

Cardinal Polycarp Pengo of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, president of the Symposium of Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar, asked Wulff to urge European governments "not to see the African migrant ... as a stranger or a threat, but rather as a fellow human being who indeed is an asset and not a liability when given the opportunity."

Cardinal Pengo addressed Wulff during SECAM's March 28-April 2 meeting with the German bishops' conference in Berlin. The meeting focused on migration, especially from Africa to Europe, and the church's responsibility for refugees and migrants.

Africa's bishops "also appeal to you to support us and our governments in our quest to provide the necessary conditions for the development of Africa as one of the ways to mitigate the challenges of migration," Cardinal Pengo said, noting recent violence in North Africa and Ivory Coast.
But, as Soros noted, the Compassionate Pastor's Daughter and the rest of the EU leaders kicked the can up the hill on this issue for years. And it keeps rolling back down.

Monday, August 17, 2015

Political trends imaginary and real

E.J. Dionne provides a classic piece of High Broderism in his column of yesterday, When Yeats comes knocking Washington Post 08/16/2015. He wrings his hands about the supposed decline of the center-left and the center-right. Because the American Republican Party is attracted to a blowhard like Trump and has become a party of multi-billionaire kingmakers, religious loons and white supremacist gun fetishists, the faith of High Broderism dictates that this must be balanced equally by faults on the other side. And trying to generalize this to the whole Western world, oy vey!

The closest he comes to mentioning an actual policy issue is this Mugwump observation: "widespread immigration can weaken social solidarity by complicating national identity and setting off new debates over what the word 'us' means." I guess this is a Pod Pundit version of "Trump has touched a nerve with some of the things he's been saying ..."

Dionne's generalization is true in some countries in Europe. In Greece, it took a government headed by the "Party of the Radical Left" (Syriza) to insist - unsuccessfully - on anti-depression economic policies that would have looked tame to Richard Nixon. (Tricky Dicky actually imposed wage and price controls!) In Germany, the "center-left" Christian Democrats and the "center-right" SPD have embraced hardline Herbert Hoover economics. But it actually hasn't created a crisis yet, except that the SPD is slowly dwindling away, to the point that they are floating the idea of not even running a Chancellor candidate against Angela Merkel in 2017. (!?!?) When both "center-left" and "center-right" parties argue for deregulation, privatization, lower wages and weaker unions, massive tax transfers to the One Percent, fewer public services, cutting pensions and health insurance - then the biggest problem is not a public desire for "authenticity." Which Dionne uses like it wasn't the Beltway Village media that turned it into a magical conjuring word so they could imagine John McCain as a "straight-talker" and Shrub Bush as "the kind of guy you'd like to have a beer with."

Jamie Galbraith gives a more realistic view of the state of politics in the eurozone in The Future of Europe The American Prospect 08/14/2015. He focuses on what EU critics (not to be confused with rightwing-nationalist "EU skeptics") have called the democratic deficit in the EU. He recaps the way the creditor nations forced the elected Greek government into surrender:

The European creditors and the IMF met the Greek proposals with hostility, obstruction and refusal. The governments of Finland, the Baltic states and Slovakia rejected them on ideological grounds. Those of Spain, Portugal, and Ireland rejected them from fear of the effect on their own politics. Italy, France, and the Commission expressed sympathy but did little. [German Finance] Minister [Wolfgang] Schäuble spelled out the choice: Greece could either adhere to the previous program, in full, or else leave the euro and perhaps also the European Union.

From the beginning, this position was backed by threats. In late January, Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem, visiting in Athens, threatened Greece with the destruction of its banking system. On February 4th, the ECB revoked a waiver permitting Greek banks to discount government debt, and so provoked a slow run that culminated in late June, meanwhile Greece made 3.5 billion euros in payments as a sign of good faith. When the Greek government, frustrated and broke, turned to a referendum, the creditors retaliated by closing the banks and imposing capital controls. When the Greek people stood up and said “No,” the retaliation deepened and in July the government was forced to its knees.
And Galbraith points out the high risk that a badly flawed euro currency zone poses to the entire European project, i.e., the EU:

The hope for negotiated change within the euro has been tested [by Greece], with brutal results. The fact of technocratic dictatorship within the euro is plain to everybody. Voters in the next country to rebel against the stranglehold of Eurozone policies will take note. That Greece was forced to explore the means of exit will also bear on future experience, as with improved knowledge and contingency planning—planning that will now become habitual and more-or-less open for every opposition movement faced with the possibility of power—the cost of making that transition, seemingly prohibitive to the Greeks this past spring, will decline. ...

These political consequences will keep the euro under strain, deepened by the ongoing failure of the neoliberal [austerity] economic regime. It therefore seems likely that the Euro will, at some point, in some country, crack. The decision to initiate a breakup could come from the left or the right. In any case such a decision will destroy, as events in Greece have destroyed, the previous political structures. A breakup, if it goes badly, could make things worse. What will happen to the European Union after that, is anyone's guess.

Monday, August 10, 2015

The austerity madness and Greece

Brad DeLong expresses his dismay over the eurozone's abandonment of basic macroeconomics for the neoliberal, Herbert Hoover/Heinrich Brüning politicies that Germany has imposed on the eurozone. Those were bad enough before the 2008 crisis. In a depression situation, they are disastrous (Another Disaster at Political-Economic Policy Analysis by Brad DeLong! Equitable Growth 08/07/2015):

When the Greek crisis hit in 2010, my reaction was that this could well be a great blessing in disguise: Greece was so small that only trivial commitments at the scale of the eurozone in terms of real money would be necessary to resolve its entire debt, and hold the Greek economy harmless – relative to any alternative policy–while adjustment took place.

The obvious alternative was the standard IMF package: A mix of restructuring and write down coupled with substantial depreciation and a loan to keep imports flowing as long as policy reform was taking place successfully.

The absence of exchange rate depreciation was going to make adjustment very hard for the Greek economy. That absence of depreciation was something Greece was giving up in return for the bargain that was the euro. In return, if the euro bargain was to survive, Brussels and Frankfurt had to be willing to offer things of equivalent value. And it seemed very clear in 2010 what those things of equivalent value were: extra transfers over and above those that would follow from a normal IMF program, in order to to offset the extra harm from the lack of depreciation; and extra help in terms of expanding demand for Greek products from northern Europe. That meant that Brussels and Frankford [sic] would push the envelope on eurozone inflation, and within the eurozone the bulk of that inflation would be concentrated in northern Europe, where the fundamental cost disequilibrium vis-à-vis Greece was greatest ...
Heiner Flassbeck and his associates at flassbeck-economics pass the following harsh judgment on the Merkel government's position on Greece (Dear readers, 08/02/2015:

Unfortunately, the political situation in Germany and Europe gives little reason for optimism in the upcoming autumn season. Dogmatism and bigotry continues to threaten the public sphere, social cohesion and peaceful cooperation between nations. During the last couple of months, one small country [Greece] became the target of resentment and contempt in Germany. A smearing campaign, of an extremely repugnant nature, was set up against it. Almost incredibly, it laid bare emotions and mechanisms that most of us thought were left behind once and for all. The nationalistic arrogance and the search for enemies are a reminiscence of the collective madness that occurred during the middle of the last century. It seems that petty nationalism, nationalist arrogance, intolerance and the unwillingness to grapple with alternative views have not been decisively overcome. On the contrary, the storms caused by the financial crisis seem to have brought some of the old ghosts back to the surface again.

However, there are flickers of hope. The shocking and senseless German Diktat to Greece has alarmed many enlightened people worldwide and continues to inspire many people to act against it. In Germany, those who do not agree with the lopsided policies of the federal government have to raise their voices and form a broad front of opposition. Only then would we be able to prevent the intellectual isolation in economic matters that propagates the myth that “the rest of the world is challenging Germany because they are not as efficient as we are.“ [my emphasis in bold]
Stephan Schulmeister has a good piece on the eurozone, Europa auf die Couch! Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 8/2015. He provides suggestions using the metaphor of marriage counseling on how the two sides of the Greek negotiation - the Troika and the Greek government - could manage to improve the diplomatic climate. It seems to have been completed in July after the Greek government capitulated to the bad austerity deal on which Angela Merkel insisted.

The article has a bit of an odd sound. Because it talks about how both sides need to move toward each other. Yet the facts Schulmeister cites makes it very clear that the problem is very lopsided: the German side causing it, the Greek side incurring the most damage. He refers to the other eurozone besides Greece as "18 partners under German leadership." (All translations from the German here are mine.)

And he says of the July 13 agreement, "That is no reconciliation, and also no ceasefire, but rather a capitulation."

He points out the culpability of the lenders, German and French banks in particular, in the building up of Greek sovereign debt that became unsustainable during the crisis. Or, more precisely, after the Troika required Greece to take on large amounts of new debt in the 2010 arrangement, whose main purpose was to prevent German and French banks from incurring major losses on Greek securities. And he recalls that, as we now know, even in 2010 the IMF determined that Greece couldn't carry the debt burden it had. "But politics nevertheless decided for 'their' banks: They were paid off, while Greece's debt grew with the IMF, ECB and the euro rescue fund."

He even calls the Troika's program for Greece "the most radical austerity program in history."

And he takes note of the political and media campaign in Germany to promote contempt and hatred against the Greeks. But he also brings up a point quite embarrassing for such claims of German superiority: "From 1950 to 2008, Greece raised its total production/GDP more strongly than even Germany."

And although he argues that a Grexit is a doomsday scenario, he also makes the point strongly that the Greeks' referendum vote of July 5 was a strong public statement of support for an end to austerity while staying in the common currency. Syriza was elected on a program of just that in January. In the July 13 concession, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras wound up excepting more severe austerity while staying in the eurozone.

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

Perry Anderson's sneering take on the Greek government's handling of the Troika negotiations

Jacobin has been publishing a number of articles recently on the Greek crisis. Unfortunately, the first one I read was The Greek Debacle by Perry Anderson 07/23/2015.

Perry Anderson is one of the best-known Marxists of the Western academic world, a long-time editor of the New Left Review. That was a relatively lonely position after the fall of the Soviet Union. But after the crash of 2008, even financial magazines were starting to worry if Marx was more right than their writers would prefer to think. Which got some more respectable attention for Anderson, who in any case is a respected academic. In this piece, he dismisses Syriza's months-long fight over austerity policies against Germany and the Troika as more-or-less contemptible:

Five years of mass unemployment and welfare cuts later, Greek debt had merely soared still higher. Syriza won office because it promised, with much fiery rhetoric, to put an end to the submission of Greece to the rule of the troika. It would “renegotiate” the terms of the country’s wardship in Europe. How did it hope to do so? Simply by pleading for kinder treatment, and cursing when it was not forthcoming - pleas and curses alike appealing to the loftier values of Europe, to which the European Council could surely not remain deaf.

Incompatible with these outpourings, mingling supplication and imprecation, was, all too plainly from the start, any thought of desisting from the euro. There were two reasons for that. Provincial in outlook, the Syriza leadership found it difficult to make any mental distinction between membership of the EU and of the eurozone, treating exit from the one as if it were virtual expulsion from the other: the ultimate nightmare for any good European, as they held themselves to be.

They were also conscious of the fact that Greek standards of living — lubricated by low interest rates brought on by the convergence of spreads across Europe; topped up with Structural Funds — had indeed increased in the Potemkin years of Simitis, leaving warm popular memories of the euro, which did not connect subsequent miseries with it. Syriza made no attempt to explain the connection. Tspiras and his colleagues assured all who could listen that, on the contrary, there could be no question of abandoning the euro.

With this, they gave up any serious hope of bargaining with the real — not their dreamland — Europe. By 2015, the threat of a Grexit was economically much weaker than it would have been in 2010, because by now the German and French banks had been paid off with the bailout nominally going to Greece. Despite residual alarmist talk elsewhere, the German finance ministry has for some time, and with good reason, dismissed any dramatic material consequences from a Greek default. [my emphasis]
This is so superficial and ill-informed, it amazes me.

  • The German Finance Ministry has been spectacularly wrong on its projected benefits of austerity in Greece, so it's not clear why Anderson takes them as an obviously qualified authority on this question
  • Almost all the economists and economic analysts I've seen commenting on this assume, based on past experience with the break-up of currency zones and of ending currency pegs, that leaving the euro would be significantly disruptive in the short run in Greece and would greatly increase the likelihood of increasing pressure on other periphery countries to leave the eurozone
  • Christos Laskos and current Greek Finance Minister Euclid Tsakalotos describe the discussions within Syriza that led to adopting their position of negotiating a non-austerity position within the eurozone in Crucible of Resistance: Greece, the Eurozone and the World Economic Crisis (2013); one can argue it was an inadequate position, but it was certainly not due to frivolity of the part of Tsipras and the rest of the Syriza leadership
  • Varoufakis' Finance Ministry actually did make preparations for a Grexit. In fact, he's being accused by some of the opposition of "high treason" for having done so! After the referendum on the Troika's demands, Tsipras made a decision not to press on with those preparations. But it was not the brainless neglect that Anderson seems to want his readers to think it was.

Tsipras and Varoufakis did not based their negotiating strategy on simply "appealing to the loftier values of Europe." The knew very well that other eurozone countries were very concerned about the broader consequences of a Grexit and wanted to avoid that. They hoped the fear of those consequences would persuade them to agree to ease up on the austerity policies and get realistic about debt reduction.

I've said in earlier posts that based on what we know now, the negotiating strategy the Greek government pursued of getting a better deal within the eurozone could only have worked if they really had been willing to take the option of Grexit if they didn't get a non-austerity deal. But Tsipras as Prime Minister had to make a call as the head of government on whether the risk was worth it. And he decided that at that moment in July 2015, it was not. Anderson's description gives no good idea of what the actual decision factors were.

Anderson even resorts to polemics like this, which in this case are just dumb: "Syriza has turned its coat with a speed not seen since war credits were supported by European social democracy in 1914, even if this time a minority of the party has saved its honor."

If there's a difference between Anderson's piece and run-of-the-mill Internet trolling, it hard to discern what that is.

Edward Skidelsky described him back in 1999 this way: (The New Statesman Profile - Perry Anderson 03/19/2015): "Perry Anderson exemplifies a type that has almost vanished: the unaffiliated intellectual. The leading British Trotskyite, he has never belonged to a political party."

The best definition of a Trotskyist I ever heard was: A Trotskyist is someone who support revolution everywhere except where there's one actually going on.

In other words, "Trots" are known for being so pure that any actual political movement that's having an effect on real-world politics and government policy is by definition soiled with impurities and is Betraying The Revolution. Anderson's polemic against Tsipras and Syriza falls into that definition nicely.

Frivolous recriminations against Yanis Varoufakis

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard had an article Sunday in which he asks Yanis Varoufakis for responses to the scurrilous accusations of treason made against him by opposition politicians in Greece, Varoufakis reveals cloak and dagger 'Plan B' for Greece, awaits treason charges The Telegraph 07/26/2015:

Mr Varoufakis recruited a technology specialist from Columbia University to help handle the logistics. Faced with a wall of obstacles, the expert broke into the software systems of the tax office - then under the control of the EU-IMF 'Troika' - in order to obtain the reserve accounts and file numbers of every taxpayer. "We decided to hack into my ministry’s own software programme," he said.

The revelations were made to a group of sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and life insurers - many from Asia - hosted as part of a "Greek day" on July 16 by the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF).

Mr Varoufakis told the Telegraph that the quotes were accurate but some reports in the Greek press had been twisted, making it look as if he had been plotting a return to the drachma from the start.

"The context of all this is that they want to present me as a rogue finance minister, and have me indicted for treason. It is all part of an attempt to annul the first five months of this government and put it in the dustbin of history," he said.

"It totally distorts my purpose for wanting parallel liquidity. I have always been completely against dismantling the euro because we never know what dark forces that might unleash in Europe," he said.
Jens Berger (Hinweise des Tages/Grexit-Pläne Nachdenkseiten 29.07.2015) comments on what he presumes Varoufakis meant by the Troika controlling the revenue office:

Dies sollte man wohl nicht all zu wörtlich nehmen. Die zuständige Abteilungsleiterin verfügte vielmehr – nach Aussagen eines EZB-Mitarbeiters – über „gute Kontakte nach Brüssel“ und hätte der Troika womöglich Details zu den griechischen Planungen gesteckt. Und hier sind dann auch beim Kern des Problems von Syriza: Die griechische Linkspartei arbeitet nicht nur gegen die Troika, sondern auch gegen einen unüberschaubaren Block aus politischen Beamten, die noch von den Vorgängerregierungen eingesetzt wurden und offenbar nicht loyal gegenüber der griechischen Regierung sind. In diesem Kontext einen überzeugenden „Plan B“ zu entwickeln, dürfte unmöglich sein. Dies wird dann wohl auch der Grund sein, warum das Team um Varoufakis nie einen echten „Plan B“ entwickelt hat. Aber das kann man ihm wohl kaum zum Vorwurf machen.

[One shouldn't take that all too literally. It's much more that the responsible division head - according to statement of an ECB employee - had "good contacts in Brussels" and would, if possible, have sent the Troika details to the Greek planning. And also here we are at the core of Syriza's problem: The Greek left party is working not only against the Troika, but also against an incalculable block of political bureaucrats that had already been put in place by the preceding regime and clearly are not loyal to the Greek government. In this context, to develop a convincing "Plan B," would be impossible. This would clearly also be the reason why the team around Varoufakis never developed a true "Plan B." But one can hardly blame him for that.]
The internal link in that quote about the "ECB employee" is to Andreas Petzold, Ein "Putsch"-Plan so realitätsfern wie Varoufakis selbst Stern 28.07.2015. But his reference is more vague that to a specific ECB employee. I'm not sure it matters much in practice. But it's not clear from these reports that the Troika control to which Varoufakis referred in his now-famous conference call was a such an informal nature or more official.

I would add that I'm not sure anyone is blaming Varofakis for not developing a more complete Plan B. Rather, the pro-austerity Troika allies in the Greek opposition is criticizing him for trying to prepare for that contingency.

Germany's economic problems and the eurozone

Philippe Legrain (The Eurozone’s German Problem Social Europe/Project Syndicate 07/27/2015) writes about how Germany's own short-sighted economic policies for itself damage the eurozone even beyond the fanaticism of the Merkel/Schäuble austericide program for Greece:

Germany’s immense current-account surplus – the excess savings generated by suppressing wages to subsidize exports – has been both a cause of the eurozone crisis and an obstacle to resolving it. Before the crisis, it fueled German banks’ bad lending to southern Europe and Ireland. Now that Germany’s annual surplus – which has grown to €233 billion ($255 billion), approaching 8% of GDP – is no longer being recycled in southern Europe, the country’s depressed domestic demand is exporting deflation, deepening the eurozone’s debt woes.

Germany’s external surplus clearly falls afoul of eurozone rules on dangerous imbalances. But, by leaning on the European Commission, Merkel’s government has obtained a free pass. This makes a mockery of its claim to champion the eurozone as a rules-based club. In fact, Germany breaks rules with impunity, changes them to suit its needs, or even invents them at will. [my emphasis]
And he reminds us of how much German so-called assistance to Greece has been shaped by calculations of narrowly-conceived German national interests:

Beyond refusing to adjust its economy, Germany has pushed the costs of the crisis onto others. In order to rescue the country’s banks from their bad lending decisions, Merkel breached the Maastricht Treaty’s “no-bailout” rule, which bans member governments from financing their peers, and forced European taxpayers to lend to an insolvent Greece. Likewise, loans by eurozone governments to Ireland, Portugal, and Spain primarily bailed out insolvent local banks – and thus their German creditors.

To make matters worse, in exchange for these loans, Merkel obtained much greater control over all eurozone governments’ budgets through a demand-sapping, democracy-constraining fiscal straitjacket: tougher eurozone rules and a fiscal compact. [my emphasis]
Dieter Wermuth notes in Warum die deutsche Wirtschaft nicht in Fahrt kommt Die Zeit 28.07.2015 notes that despite obviously good conditions for economic growth, such as very cheap credit, German GDP growth for 2015 is expected to be in a modest 1.5-2.0% growth range.

Higher German growth would be good for Germany and good for the eurozone. But Angela Merkel's economic dogma doesn't allow it.

Tuesday, July 28, 2015

Yanis Varoufakis: "traitor" to Greece?

This is awesome! Some of the pro-austerity opposition parties are trying to get up a "high treason" charge against Yanis Varoufakis for having made emergency preparations for a new Greek currency during the negotiations with Germany/The Troika in order to prepare for a temporary parallel currency if Tsipras' govenrment decided to exit the euro, or was pushed out by the Troika. (El Parlamento griego estudia una demanda contra Varoufakis por un delito de "alta traición" Público/EFE 28.07.2015)

Why hack your own government's computers? Because the Greek revenue office (their IRS) was under the control of the Troika, i.e., foreign creditors. They didn't proceed with the hack in any case, because Tsipras decided not to go to the wall on a Grexit at that time.

Is the Greek opposition using Newt Gingrich as a political adviser? Right, the opposition is going to try to kick Varoufakis out of Parliament and even charge him with high treason? Because he made preparations to keep the national economy going if foreign creditors tried to shut down the financial system (which they basically did)? And he went so far as to *talk* about hacking the computers of a Greek government agency *controlled by the foreign creditors and foreign governments* in order to defend Greece against against a hostile attempt to crash Greece's financial system and economy? Syriza must be praying for them to try it.

Syriza could wind up at 75% popularity after that fight. And they could permanently label the pro-austerity New Democracy, PASOK and To Potami parties as The Enemies Of Greek Sovereignty. Who are taking orders from Angela Merkel and Wolfgang Schäuble. Yeah, that's a brilliant plan!

Jeffrey Sachs on Germany and the Greek crisis

Jeffrey Sachs was an adviser to the Greek government and Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis during the Greek negotiations with Germany/The Troika this year, along with Jamie Galbraith.

While Sachs expresses himself more sympathetically toward neoliberal "structural reforms" than Galbraith or Varoufakis, he's highly critical of German Chancelor Angela Merkel's austerity economics in Greece. In Germany, Greece, and the Future of Europe Huffington Post 07/28/2015, he writes:

Creditors are sometimes wise and sometimes incredibly stupid. America, Britain, and France were incredibly stupid in the 1920s to impose excessive reparations payments on Germany after World War I. In the 1940s and 1950s, the United States was a wise creditor, giving Germany new funds under the Marshall Plan, followed by debt relief in 1953.

In the 1980s, the U.S. was a bad creditor when it demanded excessive debt payments from Latin America and Africa; in the 1990s and later, it smartened up, putting debt relief on the table. In 1989, the U.S. was smart to give Poland debt relief (and Germany went along, albeit grudgingly). In 1992, its stupid insistence on strict Russian debt servicing of Soviet-era debts sowed the seeds for today's bitter relations. [my emphasis]
Here is part of his criticism of Merkel's policies:

In my view, the policy response by Greece's partners, led by Germany, has been unwise and highly unprofessional. Their approach has been to extend new loans so that Greece can service its existing debts, without restoring Greece's banking system or promoting its export competitiveness. Greece's initial €110 billion bailout package, in 2010, went to pay government debts to German and French banks. As a result, Greece owes an ever-larger share of its debt to official creditors: the International Monetary Fund, the European Financial Stability Fund, and, increasingly, the European Central Bank. While Greece's debts to private creditors have been partly cut, this was too little too late, because it cannot even service its debts to official creditors.

Year after year, Greece's creditors have promised that the bailout packages would bring about a meaningful rebound in output, employment, and exports. Instead, the country has experienced a depression comparable to the decline in output and employment that Germany suffered from 1930 to 1932, the years that preceded Hitler's rise. Many Germans may despise Greece's current Syriza government, which pledged to end the policy of creditor-imposed austerity; but four consecutive governments -- center-left, technocratic, center-right, and left -- have implemented it.

All of these governments have failed. Perhaps Antonis Samaras's center-right government from 2012 to 2015 came closest to succeeding, but it could not survive, politically, the severe austerity that it was being forced to impose. Nor did Greece's creditors do anything to help Samaras's government out of its political bind, even though it was a government they liked. [my emphasis]

Monday, July 27, 2015

More Varoufakis: "Plan B"

Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis is still causing consternation in the eurozone a Member of the Greek Parliament.

There was some melodramatic rending of garments and gnashing of teeth over a recording of Varoufakis on July 16 (Peter Spiegel, Varoufakis unplugged: the London call transcript FT Brussels Blog 07/27/2015; emphasis in FT transcript):

That would have created a parallel banking system while the banks were shut as a result of the ECB’s aggressive action, to give us some breathing space. This was very well developed and I think it would have made a very big difference, because very soon we could have extended it using apps on smart phones. It would become a functioning and functional parallel system. Then of course this would be euro denominated, but at a drop of a hat, it could be converted to a new drachma.

Now let me tell you, and I thank this is a quite fascinating story, what difficulties I faced. The general secretariat of public revenues, within my ministry, is controlled fully and directly by the troika. It was not under control of my ministry, of [unclear] ministry, it was controlled by Brussels. The general secretary is appointed, effectively, through a process that troika-controlled and the whole mechanism within. It’s like Inland Revenue in the United Kingdom being controlled by Brussels. I am sure as you’re hearing these words, your hair is standing up. Ok. So problem number one.

The general secretariat of information systems, on the other hand, was controlled by me as minister. I appointed a good friend of mine, a childhood friend of mine, who had become a professor of IT at Columbia University in the States, and so on, I put him there because I trusted him to develop the system. At some point, a week or so after we moved into the ministry, he calls me up and says to me: “You know what, I control the machines, I control the hardware. I don’t control the software.” The software belongs to the troika-controlled general secretariat for public revenues.

What do we do? So we had a meeting, just the two of us, nobody else knew. He said: “Listen, if I ask for permission from them to start implementing this programme then the troika will immediately know we are designing a parallel system.” Well, I said, “That won’t do, we don’t want to reveal our hand at this stage.” So I authorised him, and you can’t tell anyone that, this is totally between us, to hack ...
Despite the fainting-couch routine from Varoufakis' critics, this is pretty straightforward. (Peter Spiegel and Kerin Hope, Yanis Varoufakis defends ‘Plan B’ tax hack Financial Times 07/27/2015) There is no reason I can see to think the hack was actually done, since Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras didn't give Varoufakis the go-ahead for the additional preparations for a new national currency that would have required the hack:

So, we decided to hack into my minister’s own software programme in order to be able to bring it all, to just copy, just copy the codes of the tax systems’ website onto a large computer in his office, so he can work out how to design and implement this parallel payment system. We were ready to get the green light from the prime minister when the banks closed in order to move into the general secretariat of public revenues, which was not controlled by us but is controlled by Brussels, and to plug this laptop in and to energise the system.

I’m trying to convey to you the kind of institutional problems that we had, and institutional impediments to carrying out an independent policy for ameliorating the affects of having our banks being closed down by the ECB. [emphasis in FT transcript]
And even if they had done the hack, if it was a necessary move to set up a new currency in the face of ECB strangling their national financial system to force them into compliance with Angela Merkel's draconian austerity program, what's the problem?

And from what Varoufakis says, maybe François Hollande has been putting up more resistance to Merkel behind the scenes than I was aware of:

The French are terrified. They’re terrified because they know if they’re going to shrink their budget deficit to the levels that Berlin demands the Parisian government will certainly fall. There is no way that they can politically handle the kinds of austerity which is demanded of them by Berlin. And when I say by Berlin, I mean by Berlin, I don’t mean Brussels. I mean Berlin.

So they are trying to buy time. This is what they’ve been doing now, as you know, for a couple of years. They’ve been trying to buy time in terms of an extension of the time period during which they will have to reduce their deficit to below 3.5 per cent, 3 per cent, the Maastricht criteria in the Stability and Growth Pact.

At the very same time, Wolfgang Schäuble has a plan .... This is one of the very sweet moments in one’s life when one does not have to theorise, because all I did was to convey the plan as Dr Schäuble described it to me. The way he described it to me is very simple. He believes the eurozone is not sustainable as it is. He believes there has to be some fiscal transfers, some degree of political union. He believes for that political union to work without federation, without the legitimacy that a properly-elected federal parliament can render, can bestow upon an executive, it will have to be done in a very disciplinarian way. He said explicitly to me that a Grexit, a Greek exit, is going to equip him with sufficient bargaining power, with sufficient terrorising power in order to impose upon the French that which Paris is resisting. What is that? A degree of transfer of budget-making powers from Paris to Brussels. [emphasis in FT transcript]
Varoufakis' parliamentary office put out this statement, which he put on his blog (07/27/2015):

During the Greek government’s negotiations with the Eurogroup, Minister Varoufakis oversaw a Working Group with a remit to prepare contingency plans against the creditors’ efforts to undermine the Greek government and in view of forces at work within the Eurozone to have Greece expelled from the euro. The Working Group was convened by the Minister, at the behest of the Prime Minister, and was coordinated by Professor James K. Galbraith. (Click here for a statement on the matter by Professor Galbraith).

It is worth noting that, prior to Mr Varoufakis’ comfirmation of the existence of the said Working Group, the Minister was criticized widely for having neglected to make such contingency plans. The Bank of Greece, the ECB, treasuries of EU member-states, banks, international organisations etc. had all drawn up such plans since 2012. Greece’s Ministry of Finance would have been remiss had it made no attempt to draw up contingency plans.

Ever since Mr Varoufakis announced the existence of the Working Group, the media have indulged in far-fetched articles that damage the quality of public debate. The Ministry of Finance’s Working Group worked exclusively within the framework of government policy and its recommendations were always aimed at serving the public interest, at respecting the laws of the land, and at keeping the country in the Eurozone.

Regarding the recent article by “Kathimerini” newspaper entitled “Plan B involving highjacking and hacking”, Kathimerini’s failure to contact Mr Varoufakis for comment and its reporter’s erroneous references to “highjacking tax file numbers of all taxpayers” sowed confusion and contributed to the media-induced disinformation. The article refers to the Ministry’s project as described by Minister Varoufakis in his 6th July farewell speech during the handover ceremony in the Ministry of Finance. In that speech Mr Varoufakis clearly stated: “The General Secretariat of Information Systems had begun investigating means by which Taxisnet (Nb. the Ministry’s Tax Web Interface) could become something more than it currently is, to become a payments system for third parties, a system that improves efficiency and minimises the arrears of the state to citizens and vice versa.” That project was not part of the Working Group’s remit, was presented in full by Minister Varoufakis to Cabinet, and should, in Minister Varoufakis’ view, be implemented independently of the negotiations with Greece’s creditors, as it will contribute considerable efficiency gains in transactions between the state and taxpayers as well as between taxpayers.

In conclusion, during the five months of negotiations that gripped Europe and changed the debate throughout the Continent, the Ministry of Finance did everything possible to serve the public interest against many odds. The current media campaign to besmirch these efforts will fail to dent the legacy of a crucial five month struggle for democracy and common sense. [emphasis in original]
The Jamie Galbraith statement to which he links is also at Varoufakis' blog (07/27/2015):

I spent five months from early February through early July in close association with the Greek Finance Minister, Yanis Varoufakis, and was part of the Working Group that did contingency planning for potential attempts to asphyxiate the Greek government, including aggressive moves to force the country out of the euro. Since a great deal of public confusion has now arisen over this effort, the following should be stated:(1) At no time was the Working Group engaged in advocating exit or any policy choice. The job was strictly to study the operational issues that would arise if Greece were forced to issue scrip or if it were forced out of the euro.

(2) The group operated under the axiom that the government was fully committed to negotiating within the euro, and took extreme precautions not to jeopardize that commitment by allowing any hint of our work to reach the outside world. There were no leaks whatever, until the existence of the group was disclosed by the former Finance Minister himself, in response to criticism that his ministry had made no contingency plans when it was known that forces within the Eurozone were planning the forced exit of Greece.

(3) The existence of preliminary plans could not play any role in the Greek negotiating position, since their circulation (before there was a need to implement them) would have destabilized government policy.

(4) Apart from one late, inconclusive telephone conversation between MP Costas Lapavitsas and myself, we had no coordination with the Left Platform and our Working Group’s ideas had little in common with theirs.

(5) Our work ended for practical purposes in early May, with a long memorandum outlining major issues and scenaria that we studied.

(6) My work in this area was unpaid and unofficial, based on my friendship with Yanis Varoufakis and on my respect for the cause of the Greek people. [my emphasis]

New Varoufakis profile with additional information on the Greek/Troika negotiations

A new, long article in The New Yorker based heavily on on-the-record comments from Yanis Varoufakis gives more details on the Greek negotiations with the Troika: Ian Parker, The Greek Warrior 08/03/2015 issue; accessed 07/27/2015.

Varoufakis tells about the call he received a couple of days after he had taken office from Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Finance Minister of the Netherlands and the head of the Eurogroup, composed of the finance ministers of the 19 eurozone countries:

On the phone, Varoufakis recalled, Dijsselbloem “was perfectly pleasant,” asking, “What do you want to do?” Promising to negotiate in good faith, Varoufakis requested the bridge. According to Varoufakis, Dijsselbloem said, “Sounds reasonable. I’ll fly in in a couple of days.”

“It was downhill from that moment,” Varoufakis said.

Arriving in Athens, Dijsselbloem asked the same question, and Varoufakis gave the same answer. This time, Dijsselbloem replied, “That will not do.” (“I have no doubt that he was pulled into line between the telephone conversation and the visit,” Varoufakis told me. He declined to name Germany explicitly, but added, “You can imagine.”) Varoufakis asked Dijsselbloem, “Are you threatening me, on Day One, with Grexit?” Dijsselbloem said that a crashed program wouldn’t necessitate Greece’s exit from the euro.

“But the banks will shut down,” Varoufakis said.

“Yes, sure,” Dijsselbloem replied. (Last week, a spokesperson for the Dutch finance ministry said, “We never comment on reports of discussions held behind closed doors. Mr. Dijsselbloem is trying to enjoy a government summer recess. I would advise Mr. Varoufakis to do the same.”)
There are also some memorable quotes from Mr. V, including, "Honey, I shut the banks."

Also, this indirect quote: "sharks are not placated by a little blood."

Sunday, July 26, 2015

Greek crisis: Tsipras' mistake in negotiations with the Troika

Georg Diaz in a thought-provoking column, Glossar zur Krise: Der Wandel in den Worten Spiegel Online 24.07.2015, talks about how the euro "crisis" has morphed into a permanent condition, a kind of state of emergency as normalcy.

So there will continue to be new chapters of the Greek crisis. Here I want to comment on what I understand to be the fault of Alexis Tsipras' government in the recent negotiations.

My perspective is very different from the disputes within his Syriza Party. One of Tsipras' responses to his internal Syriza critics is provided by The Greek Analyst, Tsipras’s nonpaper slamming SYRIZA dissenters 07/21/2015.

Tsipras made a very practical call taking into account the risks and opportunities within the very narrow range of options that German Chancellor Angela Merkel had successfully established as the dominant leader in the EU. Syriza had a clear policy of solving their debt crisis within the eurozone. It was the program on which they were elected. It was established in internal discussions and disputes within Syriza. It was a clear distinction from the explicit goal of leaving the eurozone and establishing a separate currency, which everyone seems to assume would be called the drachma, like the last separate Greek currency.

That goal was advocated by the Communist Party and the far-right Golden Dawn, as well as by some members of Syriza. But that approach was rejected by Syriza. Part of Syriza's hope, which presumably persists, is that hopefully sooner than later, they will gain effective allies in other eurozone countries. Upcoming Portuguese and Spanish elections could provide some of that support. In fact, Merkel's hardline opposition to any departure from the draconian austerity program in Greece is due to her determination to scare Portuguese and Spanish voters from elected anti-austerity governments.

How realistic Syriza's hope in that regard is, is another question. Recent public grumbling by the social-democratic governments of France and Italy have provided some encouragement on that front. On the other hand, France's President François Hollande was elected in 2012 promising to oppose Merkel's austerity program. Once elected, he hardly made any pretence of resistance to it. Maybe one of these days, he will actually get around to it.

Prime Minister Matteo Renzi of the Democratic Party in Italy has even more rational reasons than the government of France to oppose austerity measures. But since taken office in early 2014, he has been singing from the neoliberal hymnbook pretty faithfully. And the language of faith is appropriate here. Austericide economics is very much a faith-based devotion, not evidence-based economics. Susanna Böhme-Kuby in Bulldozer Renzi Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 07/2015 describes his demonstrated commitment to deflationary, neoliberal policies.

The one big miscalculation that I can see in the Tsipras government's approach to the negotiations is that, given the enormous determination by Merkel and her Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble to crush Greece's political resistance to their austerity program was that to attain meaningful concessions within the eurozone, he had to be prepared to actually exit the eurozone. And that Tsipras wasn't willing to do.

Wolfgang Münchau describes this correctly, if in a way somewhat less sympathetic to Tsipras' dilemma than I would be, in Grexit remains the likely outcome of this sorry process Financial Times 07/19/2015

Alexis Tsipras should never have hired Yanis Varoufakis as his finance minister. Or he should have listened to him, and kept him on. But instead the Greek prime minister chose the worst of all options. He followed Mr Varoufakis’ advice of rejecting the offer of the creditors - until last week. But having done this, Mr Tsipras committed a critical error by rejecting Mr Varoufakis’ plan B for the moment when the country’s banks closed down: the immediate introduction of a parallel currency - IOUs issues by the Greek state but denominated in euros. A parallel currency would have allowed the Greeks to pay for their daily transactions when cash withdrawals were limited to €60 a day. A total economic collapse would have been avoided.
In Wie Deutschland den Euro sprengt Spiegel Online 20.07.2015, he emphasizes how shortsighted a self-destructive Germany's behavior in those negotiations really were. The short-term destruction, of course, hits Greece. The longer-term destruction will eventually wreck Germany's leadership in the EU if it is not corrected by future, post-Merkel governments. There he writes:

Die Griechenlandkrise hat uns gezeigt, dass eine ökonomisch nicht nachhaltige Situation in kürzester Zeit alle politischen Tabus sprengt. Das Primat der Politik kann sich langfristig nicht über ökonomische Logik hinwegsetzen.

Aus ökonomischer Sicht ist Griechenland im Euroraum nicht mehr lebensfähig. In diesem Punkt hat Wolfgang Schäuble recht. Aus griechischer Sicht wäre ein Austritt besser.

[The Greece crisis has shown us that an economically unsustainable situation can int the shortest time blow up all political taboos. The primacy of politics cannot in the long run prevail over economic logic.

From an economic point of view, Greece is no longer viable in the euro area. On this point, Wolfgang Schäuble is correct. From the Greek point of view, an exit would be better.]

Christiane Amanpour interviewed Varoufakis for CNN International ( Mick Krever, Varoufakis: 'We made mistakes' 07/20/2015):

Varoufakis said he had sympathy for his former boss [Tsipras].

"He was faced with a choice: Commit suicide or be executed."

"Alexis Tsipras decided that it [would] be best for the Greek people for this government to stay put and to implement a program which the very same government disagrees with."

"People like me thought that it would be more honorable, and in the long term more appropriate, for us to resign. This is why I resigned. But I recognize his arguments as being equally powerful as mine."
The video is here, Varoufakis: 'We made mistakes' 07/20/2015:



Why debt sustains corruption in Greece and vice versa

Christos Koulovatianos, John Tsoukalas Vox 20 July 2015

Olaf Boehnke (Greece and Germany's game of chicken European Council on Foreign Relations 07/17/2015) holds out optimism that Merkel may come to her senses:

Although many observers expected that Angela Merkel and Wolfgang Schäuble would have been feted for their victory upon their return to Berlin, the exact opposite has been the case. The tersest reaction came from Thomas Strobl, vice chairman of the Christian Democrats (CDU) and Schäuble’s son-in-law. Prior to the CDU’s steering committee meeting after the euro summit last Monday he said: "The Greek has now annoyed long enough." While Strobl has since been heavily criticised for this remark, this chauvinistic attitude does reflect strongly the sentiment of many people in Germany and in Strobl’s party in particular. ...

These elements - plus the broadening criticism of German hegemony in Europe- may well bring her to the point where she has to demonstrate political leadership in a way Mario Draghi did when he announced that the ECB will “do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”. Once all Eurozone member states have agreed to the new negotiations it would be wise for Merkel to demonstrate her political commitment to the Greek people with a speech in front of the Greek parliament or a public place in Greece in order to reinforce what she has been best at: getting conflicting parties back to the table and finding a compromise. In her speech today, she paid special attention to the importance of the French-German cooperation. If she is really interested in achieving a reliable solution for the current crisis, she and Francois Hollande must include Alexis Tsipras in finding a political agreement which gives him and the Greek people real, not forced, ownership of such a deal.
I don't think Merkel sees the world that way. She the leader of the economically most powerful country in the eurozone and she's done very well from her German point of view with her strategy of domination. One of the greatest risks for political and business leaders is there is an inevitable tendency to continue doing what has been successful in the past. Unfortunately for the eurozone and for the periphery countries especially, what has been successful for Merkel and her hardline neoliberal outlook is horribly destructive for the countries practicing her austerity policies, especially for Greece.

Friday, July 17, 2015

Greek strategy reflections and recriminations

Gérard Roland describes the basic point of weakness in Greece's negotiating strategy that resulted in Monday's humiliating surrender by Alexis Tsirpas to Merkel's brutal austerity program (The humiliation of Greece and Tsipras’s fatal mistake The Berkeley Blog 07/15/2015):

What went wrong? Tsipras’s fatal mistake is that no preparations had been made for Grexit. The reason was that this is not an option that was ever desired by the Tsipras government. They thought that since Grexit would be catastrophic for everybody inside the Eurozone, it was not credible. The support in the referendum should show the support of Greek voters and help increase the bargaining position of Greece.

This lack of preparation is the weakness that was exploited by Schaüble. Once it was clear, that Germany and most of the partisans of austerity were ready to exclude Greece from the Euro, basically by getting the ECB to cut funding to Greek banks, it would have been a catastrophe of major proportions for the Greek economy. Truly, there was a large risk for the Euro, but by showing readiness to exclude Greece from the Eurozone, Tsipras literally had a gun to his head, and had no other choice but to capitulate.

The credible threat of Grexit is what did him in. If Greece had made serious preparations and was ready to weather a Grexit, things would have been completely different. The threat of exclusion would not seem that terrible to the Greeks, whereas the risk of Grexit to the Eurozone would seem much more serious. The threat of Grexit would then have seemed less credible. To me, this is the fatal mistake that Tsipras made. Overall, he was still able to push the bad agreement through the Greek Parliament. Germany now looks very bad to the outside world and Greeks look like victims, but are likely to go through a terrible time as their economy is further strangled. [my emphasis]
Somewhat paradoxically, if the Greek goal was to avoid "Grexit" from the euro, they had to prepare to be leave the eurozone and set up their own new currency, at least to the extent that the other euzozone governments could believe they were willing to do it.

Niels Kadritzke in Was nun Alexis Tsipras? takes a careful look at the outcome of the Greek negotiations and their immediate aftermath in Was nun Alexis Tsipras? Nachdenkseiten 17.07.2015. He deals with the question of whether Tsipras "betrayed" his program or the Greek people, and rejects that position. He notes correctly that Tsipras and Syriza were consistent in their goal of keeping Greece in the eurozone.

And he brings up the point that wasn't publicly clear a week ago but is now much more so, which is that the Merkel government's goal now appears to be to push Greece out of the eurozone. So Tsipras threatening to take that path would have played into that position.

This reminds me of an interesting historical parallel that I'm very hesitant to even mention. Because it has to do with possibly the most ill-used and damaging historical analogy ever used, the infamous "Munich analogy," the one that Republican warmongers use pretty much daily against whoever they want to bomb that day.

One fact about the Munich Agreement of 1938 is that Hitler was actually furious that Britain and France had agreed to let Germany annex the Bohemian and Moravian provinces of Czechoslovakia without coming to Czechoslovakia's defense. He wanted to take the territory by force without Anglo-French agreement.

Without worrying why he was taking that perspective or how well it might have served his objectives, that raises the obvious question, would it have been worse for Britain and France to not agree? After all, if that had been their decision, they would have been doing what Hitler expected and preferred! Isn't Hitler's outrage at their agreement to allow him to take Bohemia and Moravia a sign that Chamberlain and Deladier were taking the better position in doing so?

The answer is no, because whatever Hitler's was thinking, it was a dangerous disadvantage to Britain, France and their later wartime ally the Soviet Union for Hitler to seize those territories and to do it with the West's explicit agreement. It gave Germany access to the vast Skoda arms works which qualitatively increased their military potential. It convinced Soviet leaders that Britain and France were unwilling to resist German aggression and that it was in the Soviet interest to cut a deal with Hitler if they could to buy time for their own armament program. And while Britain and France weren't prepared for the kind of military action that could have stopped the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, an alliance with the USSR in 1938 would have at least given them a greater chance to do so.

I bring that up here no because I see any exact analogy, but because doing what the other side doesn't want isn't in itself a sign of a good or bad position in a negotiation. Merkel and Schäuble may well have preferred for Greece to leave the eurozone right now. But the fact that Tsipras avoided that immediate result doesn't in itself mean that was the optimal position for him to take.

I agree with Kadritzke that Tsipras' surrender, grim as it is, didn't constitute a political betrayal of his party or constituents.

But Kadritzke also seems to share Tsipras' apparent conviction that Grexit is effectively impossible or, at best, far worse than the gruesome alternative which they have now accepted at Germany's insistence and enormous pressure that constituted the opposite of "solidarity" on the Merkel government's part. He writes that in the case of Grexit:

... der würde in Wahrheit die Kapitulation vor der „Souveränität“ der realen Finanzmärkte bedeuten. Und die würden dem Land einen noch brutaleren Sparkurs diktieren als derjenige, den die meisten Griechen zurecht als Erpressung empfinden.

[... that would mean a capitulation before the "sovereignty" of the real finance markets. And they would dictate to the country an even more brutal austerity course than the one that most Greeks rightly perceive as blackmail.]
On this issue, I would ask the same question I previously quoted Paul Krugman as asking (History Lessons for Euro Debtors 07/15/2015):

If Greece still had its own currency, the case for devaluation would be completely overwhelming at this point. What this means, in turn, is that everything — the ongoing economic disaster in Greece, the bitter divisions within the euro area, the perplexity of even the best intentioned policymakers — flows from the supposedly insuperable technical difficulties of going off the euro.

Can this possibly make sense given the extremity of the situation?
Grexit would mean taking a path similar to that Argentina took in 2001-3. It would be tough in the short run. But the current program imposed on Greece looks like nothing but the German plan to push Greece out of the euro while doing an enormous amount of damage to their economy at the same time. And this program really gives them no hope of getting their economy out of a seriously depressed state.

In another post (Bernanke Isn’t Serious 07/15/2015), the Shrill One quotes from Greece and Europe: Is Europe holding up its end of the bargain? by former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke at his Brookings blog, where Bernenke writes:

The risks for the European project posed by these economic developments are real, no matter what the reasons for them may be. In fact, the reasons are not so difficult to identify. The slow recovery from the crisis of the euro zone as a whole is the result, among other factors, of (1) political resistance that delayed by many years the implementation of sufficiently aggressive monetary policies by the European Central Bank; (2) excessively tight fiscal policies, especially in countries like Germany that have some amount of "fiscal space" and thus no immediate need to tighten their belts; and (3) delays in taking the necessary steps, analogous to the banking "stress tests" in the United States in the spring of 2009, to restore confidence in the banking system. I would not, by the way, put "structural rigidities" very high on this list. Structural reforms are important for long-run growth, but cost-saving measures are less relevant when many workers are already idle; moreover, structural problems have existed in Europe for a long time and so can't explain recent declines in performance.

What about the strength of the German economy (and a few others) relative to the rest of the euro zone, as illustrated by Figure 2? As I discussed in an earlier post, Germany has benefited from having a currency, the euro, with an international value that is significantly weaker than a hypothetical German-only currency would be. Germany's membership in the euro area has thus proved a major boost to German exports, relative to what they would be with an independent currency.

Nobody is suggesting that the well-known efficiency and quality of German production are anything other than good things, or that German firms should not strive to compete in export markets. What is a problem, however, is that Germany has effectively chosen to rely on foreign rather than domestic demand to ensure full employment at home, as shown in its extraordinarily large and persistent trade surplus, currently almost 7.5 percent of the country's GDP. [my emphasis]
Commenting on the first paragraph just quoted from Bernanke, Krugman asks:

Does all this sound sort of ... familiar? Kind of like what other bearded Anglo-Saxon economists have been saying? As I’ve tried to point out for a long time, in this policy debate the supposedly radical types are the ones doing standard, more or less textbook economics, while the respectable voices have subscribed to fantasies ungrounded in either history or theory.

You might think that having one of history’s most celebrated central bankers weigh in on the anti-austerity side of the issue would change perceptions about what’s serious as opposed to Serious. But don’t bet on it.
I quote that here because the idea of Grexit as an alternative to crackpot austerian economic policies isn't radical or kooky. Whether it's desirable or not is a difficult call that Tsipras in the past week made according to his consistent policy and positions.

But at this point, it's clear that any successful resistance in the immediate future against Germany's draconian austerian policies for the eurozone periphery will have to be willing to risk going back to their own currency. Tsipras tried bluffing. Merkel and Schäuble called his bluff.

The next country that tries it has to be willing to take the real risk of leaving. And prepare for it. Only then can they assume they will have even the possibility of getting other eurozone countries like France or Italy to pressure Germany for a reasonable, non-austerian solution within the eurozone.

And speaking of France and Italy, I'm taking a show-me attitude toward the supposed opposition they are said to be showing against Merkel.

Kim Willsher and Philip Oltermann report in A 'marriage' in crisis: Greek bailout row puts strain on Franco-German alliance Guardian 07/17/2015:

Disagreements over how to handle the Greek debt crisis have led to a major falling out between Paris and Berlin, the “couple” at the heart of the European project. ...

To the north, Germans are grumbling that they were stitched up to avoid Greece leaving the eurozone at all costs. To the south, a hard-hitting missive by the leader of the governing French Socialist party accused Berlin of forgetting the “atrocious crimes” committed in its name.

“Germany must pull itself together, and quickly,” Jean-Christophe Cambadélis wrote in an open letter addressed to “mein lieber Freund” – my dear friend.

In Berlin, officials accused Paris of operating behind other member states’ backs and deliberately playing a game of chicken with the German delegation to force through a deal.
Yeah, get back to me when there's more than superficial diplomatic kabuki to talk about.