Showing posts with label alexis tsipras. Show all posts
Showing posts with label alexis tsipras. Show all posts

Saturday, November 07, 2015

Woes of the EU

The European Union is facing a crisis of governance. Two bad policies on major issues are creating a climate that is making a process of further unity difficult. Maybe, in practice, impossible. Those are the now-chronic euro crisis and the refugee crisis.

In the end, the EU is a crisis of democracy. Because the policies Germany is imposed on fellow eurozone members in order to have the euro currency work for Germany's narrow national benefit is more and more directly interfering with democratic processes. This year, we've seen that big-time in Greece. And we're seeing it right now in Portugal.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard gave a good description of the early days of the current political crisis in Portugal: Eurozone crosses Rubicon as Portugal's anti-euro Left banned from power Telegraph 10/23/2015.

The President and head of state, Anibal Cavaco Silva, appointed a minority government after October's elections. A left-leaning coalition with a majority in Parliament is trying to get the pro-austerity minority government removed. Cavaco Silva said the majority coalition was too "anti-European," which in EU-speak means they want to pull out of the EU. In reality, they are anti-austerity and that's the real problem. They are committed to getting Portugal and its people out from under the ruinous austerity program on which Germany and Angela Merkel insist.

But the majority Left Bloc coalition is still striving to take power (Portugal left closer to government deal, still no majority Reuters 11/06/2015). Two of the three left parties, the social-democratic Socialist Party and the Left Bloc have agreed formally on a coalition program:

The [coalition] talks that began soon after the election have raised fears over the prospects for Portugal's timid economic recovery, because of the instability and the fact that the potential partners reject some reforms imposed to escape a debt crisis.

A group of over 100 entrepreneurs representing firms from cork-makers to motorways and construction, signed a manifesto arguing that uncertainty was already compromising investment, balance sheets and jobs, while a leftist government would only exacerbate the situation due to the far left's opposition to private business.

The centre-left Socialists have argued that they can form a government backed by a leftist majority that would respect European budget rules.

But the far left, especially the Communists, reject Brussels-imposed budget limits and have various other significant ideological divergences making a binding deal between them hard to achieve. Some Socialists also favour a centrist coalition rather than a deal with the radical left.

The Socialists plan more talks with the Communists before next week's vote to see if they can bring them on board.
Despite the propaganda slogans of the minority government's supporters quoted there, a left coalition is not going to demand an exit from NATO and the EU, as Cavaco Silva implied when he made his statement about deciding to install a minority government. They won't even try to exit the euro. But they do say they want to fight the austerity policies.

Paul Krugman in his column for today, Austerity’s Grim Legacy New York Times 11/06/2015, emphasizes that austerity policies can have very serious long-term problem that will continue to hurt people for years even if the economy starts growing at a healthy rate:

The idea that policies that depress the economy in the short run also inflict lasting damage is generally referred to as “hysteresis.” It’s an idea with an impressive pedigree: The case for hysteresis was made in a well-known 1986 paper by Olivier Blanchard, who later became the chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, and Lawrence Summers, who served as a top official in both the Clinton and the Obama administrations. But I think everyone was hesitant to apply the idea to the Great Recession, for fear of seeming excessively alarmist.

At this point, however, the evidence practically screams hysteresis. Even countries that seem to have largely recovered from the crisis, like the United States, are far poorer than precrisis projections suggested they would be at this point. ...

What this suggests is that the turn to austerity had truly catastrophic effects, going far beyond the jobs and income lost in the first few years. In fact, the long-run damage suggested by the Fatás-Summers estimates is easily big enough to make austerity a self-defeating policy even in purely fiscal terms: Governments that slashed spending in the face of depression hurt their economies, and hence their future tax receipts, so much that even their debt will end up higher than it would have been without the cuts.
But when the public votes in democratic elections against these destructive austerity policies, Merkel brings tremendous pressure to nullify that anti-austerity result, no matter how much contempt for democracy she shows in the process.

The Economist profiles Merekel as The indispensable European 11/07/2015. They note that Angie is "a scorpion who quietly eliminates potential rivals." That's even of her conservative sponsors in the CDU, most notably Helmut Kohl and Wolfgang Schäuble. And, if anything, it's more true of politicians in other countries of the eurozone, like Alexis Tsipras, Yanis Varoufakis and their Syriza party in Greece. Now the anti-austerity politicians in Portugal are in line for her wrath.

Caroline Copley reports on recent developments in the refugee crisis, which has been going on for years but recently reached a new acute stage, in German coalition agrees to speed up asylum process as influx hits record Reuters 11/06/2015:

The leaders of Germany's ruling coalition parties, struggling with the biggest influx of migrants in decades, clinched an agreement on Thursday on how to speed up the asylum process for those with little chance of being allowed to stay.

The agreement followed weeks of infighting and came as official figures showed the number of new arrivals in Germany this year had hit almost 800,000 by the end of October - the total number the government had expected for all 2015.

The crisis has opened a rift in Chancellor Angela Merkel's coalition. The Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party of Merkel's conservatives, have demanded tougher action, while the Social Democrats (SPD) favor a gentler stance.

After failing to fully resolve their differences on Sunday, Merkel said she and the leaders of the CSU and SPD had now agreed to set up special centers for migrants with no solid claim to asylum in Germany.
But Merkel's Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière of her own CDU party has thrown a brand-new wrinkle in the internal political arguments in Germany by suggesting Germany should set up some modification of Germany's right to asylum that would put new restrictions on the asylum recipient bringing in family members. (De Maizière will Familiennachzug für Syrer untersagen Deutschlandfunk 06.11.2015; Roland Preuß, Umgang mit Syrern: De Maizière löst neuen Koalitionsstreit aus Süddeutsche Zeitung 06.11.2015) This raises the prospects of still more conflict in Merkel's coalition over the refugee crisis, because that proposal wasn't part of the current governing coalition's refugee policy. It's always possible, though, that this was a coordinated "trial balloon" to test public reaction to such proposals.

The Economist article also reports the emergence of a new German verb, "merkeln," meaning to put off big decisions. That extend-and-pretend approach has been characteristic of her decision-making in the euro crisis and the refugee crisis. It involves short-term fixes that easy the acute phases of the crisis but avoid setting up substantial long-term solutions to the problems. But as the chronic problems drag on, they increase nationalist attitudes within EU and eurozone members countries, undermines the ability to further European unity, and, most seriously, undermines democracy within the whole of the EU.

Saturday, September 26, 2015

The real existing EU: Germany and Greece under the Compassionate Pastor's Daughter

The fight of Alexis Tsipras' government earlier this year against the harsh austerity measures imposed by the German government of the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter Angela Merkel via the Troika of the EU, the ECB and the IMF has highlighted for the world Greece's need for debt structuring.

So it's not at all surprising to see that need articulated by Richard Portes, who "argues that Greece is fundamentally insolvent and that the EU and its attendant institutions should recognize that fact and work immediately toward some form of sovereign debt restructuring." (Fiscal Austerity & Greece New Economic Thinking 09/26/2015)

He has the following to say about those famous "structural reforms" we hear so much about from the advocates of neoliberalism:

Portes also suggests that Greece is a special case, a country that does not lend itself readily to easy reform. There is an ongoing banking crisis, unsustainable debt levels ..., and institutions by and large remain malfunctioning. So whilst Portes agrees with much of the prevailing sentiment that further fiscal austerity will be counterproductive, he also argues that Greece must relent as well: it must signal its commitment to deep structural reform, particularly in regard to the endemic corruption in public administration, tax evasion, and the complex oligarchic system that links political parties to the media and administration. For Portes, no further fiscal austerity makes sense, but he suggests that Greece could aid its cause by reforming product markets and services that are still oligopolistic, with numerous barriers to entry and, hence competition. A second priority is to modernize the legal framework of property rights, investor protection and corporate governance, as well as a massive reorganization and restructuring of the public administration. These, rather than further wage cuts, are the only way to raise the competitiveness of the Greek economy. [my emphasis]
This is one way that the Greek fight this year has helped turn neoliberal rhetoric against itself.

The standard neoliberal recipe for "structural reforms" includes those obvious-sounding elements he mentions: fight corruption, crack down on tax evasion, even reduce the power of "oligarchy." Oligarchy in the neoliberal vocabulary refers to the capitalist class in countries considered in disfavor by whoever is using the term. In favored countries, they are economic elites ("job creators" for US Republicans) who are eager to show their public spirit by engaging in business-government cooperation and public-private partnerships, aka, PPP for the Kool Kids. In disfavored countries, they are oligarchs practicing crony capitalism.

In the Europe of the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter, Greece is the model of a corrupt, oligarchical, inefficient southern European country full of lazy and irresponsible people, needing the tutelage of a superior country with honest business practices and a good work ethic, i.e., Germany.

The dishonest and lawless practices of a great German company like Volkswagen are certainly no sign of deficiency in the superior economic and moral standards of Germany and the EU operating under the direction of the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter! Oh, no, that was just a couple of bad apples, or something. Why, it would be frivolous to even suggest that this was a symptom of a corrupt, oligarchical political system practicing crony capitalism. (Timeline: Is Volkswagen’s ‘Bug’ an EU Feature? Emptywheel 09/25/2015)

Brendan Greeley writing for the well-known radical-left Bloomberg Businessweek (note for Republicans: that's supposed to be obvious irony) asks, Did Privilege Enable Volkswagen’s Diesel Deception? 09/24/2015:

In Italy, the privilege is called potere speciale; in France, action spécifique; in the U.K., it’s a “golden share.” Those are all different names for an ownership stake that gives a government — be it national or local — special powers above any other shareholder. That makes a crucial difference in running a business. Governments, for example, have good reason to prevent jobs from moving to more competitive labor markets. A golden share can help with that.
But for countries practicing the neoliberal dogma in ways other than the ones discussed here so far, this is not crony capitalism or corruption, you see. Not at all. It's responsible gubment support for the Job Creators through public-private partnership. Or something.

In Europe, most golden shares are held in utilities and telecoms, companies that were state monopolies before being privatized. For more than a decade, the European Union, as it expanded and liberalized its common open market, has been trying to undo the persistence of state control. But there is one golden share that has endured, a German law so breathtakingly exceptional it can only be called what it is in fact called—“das VW-Gesetz,” the Volkswagen Law. It is explicitly designed for a single company. Germany has managed to defend its golden share against the EU because VW had built a reputation as a force for good: responsible corporate citizen, pioneer in environmental progess [sic]. [my emphasis]
Fortunately for the EU, Germany staunchly defends the rules for everybody. Well, with the occasional exception:

[Germany's "Volkswagen Law"] eventually brought Germany into conflict with the EU. In 2000 the European Commission — the EU’s executive body—began enforcement actions against the golden shares that remained in the newly privatized utilities in several countries. It acted against Italy for its shares in Eni, the former state oil company; against France, for its holdings in Elf Aquitaine, another oil company; and against the U.K. and its British Airports Authority. Several countries responded by defining their golden shares more narrowly, exercised only to defend a compelling national interest.

“The case of Volkswagen is peculiar because we are not dealing with public services,” says Daniele Gallo of Luiss Guido Carli University in Rome. “We are dealing with a company that sells cars.” In 2007 the commission won a judgment in the European Court of Justice against the Volkswagen Law. Germany, which usually follows the court’s judgments, responded instead with improvisation and duct tape: It struck some of the law’s provisions, which Volkswagen immediately added to its own bylaws. Lower Saxony retained its de facto veto over major decisions. The EC challenged, but the Court of Justice upheld the rejiggered law in 2013.
But this is consistent with the actual priorities of the neoliberal agenda and the actual application of it under the leadership of the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter. Germany gets to angle narrow nationalistic advantages out the EU and especially eurozone structures and processes. And those reforms emphasized by Portes - enforcing tax laws, reducing corruption, limiting the power of the oligarchy - are not the highest priorities.

Portes also notes "that the German government in particular (which consistently insists on 'following the rules') has been a serial violator of the Stability and Growth Pact, and conveniently forgets its own history when it comes to issues of debt forgiveness." The hardline "ordoliberalism" to which the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter adheres does seems to take deficits seriously, though exceptions can be made for the convenience of model country Germany, of course.

The "structural reforms" on which the Troika under the direction of the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter has been very intent on enforcing, most cruelly in Greece's case, are those calling for privatization of public property, deregulation of private business, elimination of capital controls, weakening of labor unions, reductions of wages and salaries and protective legislation for workers (aka, "liberalization of labor markets"), reductions of social services, raising the retirement age and reducing old-age pensions.

Alexis Tsipras' government shows every sign of being serious about improving tax collection and fighting corruption. His former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis expects that in his new government, Tsipras is "going to make a big deal out of how uniquely positioned he is to take on the oligarchy and tax evaders because Syriza has no strings attached." (Quoted in David Patrikarakos, Varoufakis told you so Politico EU 09/23/15)

But the Troika has actually impeded them in those efforts in various ways. As Varoufakis puts it, the Troika "is in cahoots with the oligarchs. Since 2010 the oligarchs have been the greatest supporters of the Troika and the Troika has been sheltering them." And presumably will continue to do so. As long as the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter has her way. As Varoufakis says, the July MOU the Troika imposed on Greece has deprived the country of "all the instruments the state has to fight a war against them."

Varoufakis refers to some of the ways in which the Troika, in cooperation with the Greek oligarchy, is impeding one of the very reforms, combating tax evasion, that Portes considers most urgent and emphasizing others (The lenders are the real winners in Greece – Alexis Tsipras has been set up to fail The Guardian 09/21/2015):

Tsipras must now implement a fiscal consolidation and reform programme that was designed to fail. Illiquid small businesses, with no access to capital markets, have to now pre-pay next year’s tax on their projected 2016 profits. Households will need to fork out outrageous property taxes on non-performing apartments and shops, which they can’t even sell. VAT [value-added taxes] rate hikes will boost VAT evasion. Week in week out, the troika will be demanding more recessionary, antisocial policies: pension cuts, lower child benefits, more foreclosures. [my emphasis]
And it's always important to remember the cost to Europe's fundamental democratic system from the midconduct of the Troika and the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter. Varoufakis in The Guardian: "Of course, to get to this point Greek democracy has had to be deeply wounded (1.6 million Greeks who voted in the July referendum did not bother to turn up at the polling stations on Sunday) – no great loss to bureaucrats in Brussels, Frankfurt and Washington DC for whom democracy appears, in any case, to be a nuisance."

The is the real existing EU, currently under management of the Mitfühlende Pastorentochter.

Thursday, September 24, 2015

The Greek "Troika" program continues

Alexis Tsipras just formed a new government in Greece after last Sunday's elections. (Helena Smith, New Alexis Tsipras-led Greek government takes power The Guardian 09/23/2015)

Despite a significant split-off from his own Syriza party, he was able to gain enough votes that he could form a new coalition with his previous small partner party Anel (Independent Greeks). Anel is typically described as a rightwing populist party. But their basic economic program, an end to austerity but keeping Greece in the eurozone, is compatible with Syriza's.

The new government has a narrower majority than his previous one. But at the moment, Tsipras is backing the latest brutal Troika program forced onto his last government, so he will get solid support for other non-coalition parties on votes in accord with the Troika's directions. Which means, above all, the directions from the Compassionate Pastor's Daughter Angela Merkel.

Former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis comments on the challenges for Tsipras in The lenders are the real winners in Greece – Alexis Tsipras has been set up to fail The Guardian 09/23/2015:

The third promise is key to Tsipras’s success. Having accepted a new extend-and-pretend loan that limits the government’s capacity to reduce austerity and look after the weak, the surviving raison d’être of a leftwing administration is to tackle noxious vested interests. However, the troika is the oligarchs’ best friend, and vice versa. During the first six months of 2015, when we were challenging the troika’s monopoly over policy-making powers in Greece, its greatest domestic supporters were the oligarch-owned media and their political agents. The same people and interests who have now embraced Tsipras. Can he turn against them? I think he wants to, but the troika has already disabled his main weapons (for example by forcing the disbandment of the economic crime fighting unit, SDOE).

In 2014 the conservative prime minister Antonis Samaras found himself in a similar conundrum, having to implement a failed troika programme. He resorted to feigning allegiance to the troika while stonewalling and petitioning it for laxity, lest Syriza win.

Will Tsipras have more success in faking commitment to another failed troika programme? The prospects are not bright, but we should not write him off. His fate depends on whether his new government remains connected to the victims of its troika agreement, implements genuine reforms to give bona fide business some confidence to invest, and uses the intensification of the crisis to demand real concessions from Brussels. It is a tall order. But then victory, however sweet, is not the point. The point is to make a difference.
Varoufakis has not aligned himself with the dissenting split from Syriza. But he declined to stand for his parliamentary seat in last Sunday's election because of his disagreement with Tsipras' acceptance of the Compassionate Pastor's Daughter's brutal austerity program.

Tuesday, August 25, 2015

Varoufakis paraphrases a classic

Yanis Varoufakis gave a speech on August 23; actually he says "Sunday August 25" but the 25th was a Tuesday and the related YouTube video is dated August 23. (The Athens Spring lives on! Speech at Frangy-en-Bresse, with Arnaud Montebourg 08/25/2015)

From the full text:

Let me tell you why I am here with words I have borrowed from a famous old manifesto. I am here because:

A spectre is haunting Europe — the spectre of democracy. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: The state-sponsored bankers and the Eurogroup, the Troika and Dr Schäuble, Spain’s heirs of Franco’s political legacy and the SPD’s Berlin leadership, Baltic governments that subjected their populations to terrible, unnecessary recession and Greece’s resurgent oligarchy.

Wednesday, August 12, 2015

Is the euro responsible for the eurozone's problems?

"Wir sind gefangen im Euro und müssen das Beste daraus machen." ("We are trapped in the euro and we have to make the best of it.")

So declares Mark Schieritz in Der Euro – eine Antwort auf Gustav Horn und Martin Höpner Die Zeit 11.08.2015. This is a follow-up to a set of articles:

Mark Schieritz, Friedman hatte recht Die Zeit 30.07.2015

Gustav Horn, Es ist der Neoliberalismus, stupid! Die Zeit 31.07.2015

Martin Höpner, Man hätte den Euro niemals einführen dürfen Die Zeit 10.07.2015

Gustav Horn, Der Euro als Sündenbock Über gesamtwirtschaftliches Denken und Handeln 10.08.2015

Schieritz in the earlier article notes that economists, including the monetarist conservative Milton Friedman, had warned that the design of the euro was deficient. They were basing their cautions on "optimal currency area" (OCA) theory.

Robert Mundell defined a currency as "a domain within which exchange rates are fixed." ("A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas" American Economic Review 51:4 Sept 1961)

The dollar is the currency for the entire US, neither Mississippi nor California nor Indiana or any other state has its own separate currency. A dollar from Mississippi is valued at exactly one dollar in one state as another. Prior to the crisis of 2001, Argentina had its currency pegged to the dollar, i.e., a fixed exchange rate. This arrangement functions in the same way as a single currency within a country, except it's easier to withdraw from, as Argentina did in 2001.

Schieritz passes this judgment on the euro after Germany's humiliation of Greece in this year's negotiations:

Die vergangenen Wochen haben gezeigt: Friedman hatte recht. Der Euro ist vielleicht eine der größten wirtschaftspolitischen Fehlentscheidungen des vergangenen Jahrhunderts – und wenn nicht schnell etwas passiert, wird er Europa zerstören.

[The past weeks have shown: Friedman was right {about the dangers of the euro currency zone}. The euro is perhaps the biggest mistaken economic-political decision of the past century - and if something doesn't happen soon, it will destroy Europe {i.e., European unity}.]
And he describes some of the deficiencies of the real existing eurozone:

Seit die Menschen von Helsinki bis Lissabon mit dem Euro bezahlen, schwanken in Europa zwar keine Währungen mehr, dafür schwanken jetzt ganze Länder.

Das liegt auch daran, dass die Währungsunion für die meisten ihrer Mitgliedsstaaten eine ökonomische Zwangsjacke ist. Sie schränkt – die Griechen erfahren es gerade – die nationalen wirtschaftspolitischen Reaktionsmöglichkeiten ein, weil die eigene Währung nicht mehr abgewertet werden kann, um die Wirtschaft wieder auszubalancieren. Auf der supranationalen Ebene wiederum fehlen die Instrumente, um dieses Defizit auszugleichen. Es gibt eben kein gemeinsames Budget, aus dem sich Krisenstaaten bedienen könnten, um einen Konjunkturabschwung durch Mehrausgaben abzufedern. Die europäischen Haushaltsregeln mit ihren Schuldengrenzen legen der Finanzpolitik in den Mitgliedsländern stattdessen sogar noch zusätzliche Fesseln an. Die Währungsunion, so formuliert es der dänische Wirtschaftswissenschaftler Lars Christensen, sei ein monetärer Strangulationsmechanismus".

[Since people from Helsinki to Lisbon have been paying with the euro, no European currencies have wabbled, but instead now whole countries wobble.

It also has to do with the fact that for most of the member states, the currrency union is an economic straightjacket. It shrinks the possible national economic policy reactions - the Greeks are already experiencing that - because their own currency can no longer be devalued in order to rebalance the economy. And there is no common budget from which the crisis states can be served in order to smooth out conjunctural downswings by higher outlays. On the contrary, the European budget regulations with their debt limits even put additional constraints on the member states. As the Danish economist Lars Christensen puts it, the currency union is a monetary strangulation machine.]

Schieritz sees the collapse of the eurozone as a world-historical magnitude catastrophe. Because he assume it would cause the collapse of the European Union.

But the solution he proposes is, as he admits, a fairly modest step in comparison to the diagnosis. Which I suppose is part of the point. He stresses the importance of a full banking union, which is certainly a necessary action. But he also doesn't seem to fully appreciate the disaster of austerity policies during a depression.

Gustav Horn in the later piece cited above tries to put Schieritz' position in the same category of that the euroskeptic conservative economist Hans-Werner Sinn. And Horn seems to think that the effects of a currency zone on forcing real deflation via reduction of wages, salaries and living standards in the lower-productive parts of a currency zone just don't exist.

In the earlier article, Horn argues that neoliberal policies are the problem, not the euro itself. But without realizing the problematic aspects of the current euro structure such as those Schieritz identifies as quoted above, growth policies won't in themselves solve the chronic problems in the longer run. And in the later article, even his argument about neoliberal policies being to blame seems hardly to figure.

Martin Höpner rather nonchalantly suggests that the current eurozone members should go back to the pre-euro adjustable exchange-rate system without addressing what a potentially disruptive step that could be.

Schieritz rightly criticizes him on that point. But he also uses the dramatic quote that opens this post, "We are trapped in the euro and we have to make the best of it," as part of making that point. I'm leery of this argument, just as I'm leery of minimizing the potential disruption of ending the currency zone. That's a nice Mugmump position that doesn't in itself say much. But I have the Greek experience in mind. To make their negotiating strategy of earlier this year work - achieving an end to austerity while staying in the eurozone - could only have been achieved if they were ready to actually leave the eurozone. Alexis Tsipras' government, rightly or wrongly, considered that it would be worse to leave the eurozone than to accept the drastic austerity measures that they actually did. They had a tough call to make. But at best, it's a questionable assumption to assume that leaving the eurozone would be more catastrophic than an interminable depression.

Schieritz understandably dismisses Horn's position that whatever currency stability the euro gave to the eurozone was more constructive overall than whatever would have happened if each country had still had its own currency whose exchange rates could have been adjusted.

Paul Krugman just did a post that brings into question Horn's argument in particular about the superiority of the euro to separate national currencies, although that's not specifically what Krugman is addressing here. He is looking at the growth rates of France, Japan and the United States for 1990-2014. And he uses the comparison to raise questions about a central tenet of the neoliberal gospel, the critical importance of international competitiveness:

What this tells you, I think, isn’t just that international competition is far less important than legend has it. It also suggests that economic growth is pretty insensitive to policy: France and the US are at the extremes of advanced-country regimes, yet there’s not much difference in their long-term performance.

But does this say that policy doesn’t matter? Not at all. For while there is not, repeat not, anything like the zero-sum competition among nations so beloved of business types, there really is the question of who gets the gains. U.S. economic growth has been OK these past 25 years; US family incomes, not so much, because such a large share of growth goes to the very top.
And he follows up with this striking closing sentence, "International competition is a mostly bogus notion; class warfare is very, very real."

Monday, August 10, 2015

The austerity madness and Greece

Brad DeLong expresses his dismay over the eurozone's abandonment of basic macroeconomics for the neoliberal, Herbert Hoover/Heinrich Brüning politicies that Germany has imposed on the eurozone. Those were bad enough before the 2008 crisis. In a depression situation, they are disastrous (Another Disaster at Political-Economic Policy Analysis by Brad DeLong! Equitable Growth 08/07/2015):

When the Greek crisis hit in 2010, my reaction was that this could well be a great blessing in disguise: Greece was so small that only trivial commitments at the scale of the eurozone in terms of real money would be necessary to resolve its entire debt, and hold the Greek economy harmless – relative to any alternative policy–while adjustment took place.

The obvious alternative was the standard IMF package: A mix of restructuring and write down coupled with substantial depreciation and a loan to keep imports flowing as long as policy reform was taking place successfully.

The absence of exchange rate depreciation was going to make adjustment very hard for the Greek economy. That absence of depreciation was something Greece was giving up in return for the bargain that was the euro. In return, if the euro bargain was to survive, Brussels and Frankfurt had to be willing to offer things of equivalent value. And it seemed very clear in 2010 what those things of equivalent value were: extra transfers over and above those that would follow from a normal IMF program, in order to to offset the extra harm from the lack of depreciation; and extra help in terms of expanding demand for Greek products from northern Europe. That meant that Brussels and Frankford [sic] would push the envelope on eurozone inflation, and within the eurozone the bulk of that inflation would be concentrated in northern Europe, where the fundamental cost disequilibrium vis-à-vis Greece was greatest ...
Heiner Flassbeck and his associates at flassbeck-economics pass the following harsh judgment on the Merkel government's position on Greece (Dear readers, 08/02/2015:

Unfortunately, the political situation in Germany and Europe gives little reason for optimism in the upcoming autumn season. Dogmatism and bigotry continues to threaten the public sphere, social cohesion and peaceful cooperation between nations. During the last couple of months, one small country [Greece] became the target of resentment and contempt in Germany. A smearing campaign, of an extremely repugnant nature, was set up against it. Almost incredibly, it laid bare emotions and mechanisms that most of us thought were left behind once and for all. The nationalistic arrogance and the search for enemies are a reminiscence of the collective madness that occurred during the middle of the last century. It seems that petty nationalism, nationalist arrogance, intolerance and the unwillingness to grapple with alternative views have not been decisively overcome. On the contrary, the storms caused by the financial crisis seem to have brought some of the old ghosts back to the surface again.

However, there are flickers of hope. The shocking and senseless German Diktat to Greece has alarmed many enlightened people worldwide and continues to inspire many people to act against it. In Germany, those who do not agree with the lopsided policies of the federal government have to raise their voices and form a broad front of opposition. Only then would we be able to prevent the intellectual isolation in economic matters that propagates the myth that “the rest of the world is challenging Germany because they are not as efficient as we are.“ [my emphasis in bold]
Stephan Schulmeister has a good piece on the eurozone, Europa auf die Couch! Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 8/2015. He provides suggestions using the metaphor of marriage counseling on how the two sides of the Greek negotiation - the Troika and the Greek government - could manage to improve the diplomatic climate. It seems to have been completed in July after the Greek government capitulated to the bad austerity deal on which Angela Merkel insisted.

The article has a bit of an odd sound. Because it talks about how both sides need to move toward each other. Yet the facts Schulmeister cites makes it very clear that the problem is very lopsided: the German side causing it, the Greek side incurring the most damage. He refers to the other eurozone besides Greece as "18 partners under German leadership." (All translations from the German here are mine.)

And he says of the July 13 agreement, "That is no reconciliation, and also no ceasefire, but rather a capitulation."

He points out the culpability of the lenders, German and French banks in particular, in the building up of Greek sovereign debt that became unsustainable during the crisis. Or, more precisely, after the Troika required Greece to take on large amounts of new debt in the 2010 arrangement, whose main purpose was to prevent German and French banks from incurring major losses on Greek securities. And he recalls that, as we now know, even in 2010 the IMF determined that Greece couldn't carry the debt burden it had. "But politics nevertheless decided for 'their' banks: They were paid off, while Greece's debt grew with the IMF, ECB and the euro rescue fund."

He even calls the Troika's program for Greece "the most radical austerity program in history."

And he takes note of the political and media campaign in Germany to promote contempt and hatred against the Greeks. But he also brings up a point quite embarrassing for such claims of German superiority: "From 1950 to 2008, Greece raised its total production/GDP more strongly than even Germany."

And although he argues that a Grexit is a doomsday scenario, he also makes the point strongly that the Greeks' referendum vote of July 5 was a strong public statement of support for an end to austerity while staying in the common currency. Syriza was elected on a program of just that in January. In the July 13 concession, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras wound up excepting more severe austerity while staying in the eurozone.

Sunday, August 02, 2015

Yanis Varoufakis: "In 1967 there were the tanks and in 2015 there were the banks"

"Europe is in the process of turning from a realm of shared prosperity, which is how we imagined it, into an iron cage for our peoples. I hope that Mrs Merkel decides that this is not a legacy she wants to leave behind."

That's from Yanis Varoufakis has been spreading the word about Greece's dire situation and the ills of the eurozone. Including In conversation with El Pais (Claudi Pérez), the complete (long) transcript 08/02/2015:

Didn’t you kill the troika?

Well, we got rid of them here in Athens. Now they are back: the troika is back. They could have acted as legitimate institutions. But they seem to have a clear preference to act as the troika of lenders. It’s their choice.

But they’ll be here until 2050, when your grandchildren will be adults.

No, they won’t. Because this agreement doesn’t have a future. It is continuing the extending and pretending charade: extending the crisis with new unsustainable loans, and pretending that this solves the problem… It can’t go on forever. You can fool the people and the markets for a short period of time, but in the end you can’t fool them for fifty years. Either Europe changes, and this process is replaced by something more democratic, and durable, manageable, humanistic. Or Europe will no longer exist as a Monetary Union.
Mr V gives France a central role in the politics of the eurozone as the Merkel government's primary target:

But which is your central scenario? Is [German Finance Minister Wolfgang] Schauble condemning Greece to go out?

You can see that there is a plan being implemented and which is in progress. Today we have read that Schauble wants to sideline the Commission and to create something like a Budget commissioner who oversees the ‘rules’ that strike down national budgets, even if a country is not under a program. In other words: to turn every country into a program country! One of the great successes of Spain in the middle of the crisis was that you avoided a full MoU (and only had a limited one stemming from the bank recapitalization program). Schauble’s plan is to put the troika everywhere, in Madrid too, but especially in ... Paris!

So Paris is the final game.

Paris is the larger prize. It’s the final destination of the troika. Grexit is used to create the fear necessary to force Paris, Rome and Madrid to acquiesce. ...

Why don’t you have allies in the Eurogroup? I mean, nor France, nor Italy, Spain, Ireland… Countries that at the beginning, with Syriza, had positive thinkings and at the end there were 18 against 1.

What you have to understand is that this 18-1 balance in the Eurogroup is an illusion. The 18 are divided very significantly in three groups. The very tiny, tiny minority who believe in austerity. The largest group of countries don’t believe in austerity but imposed austerity on their own people. And then there is another group of countries that neither believe in austerity nor practise it – e.g. France. But they fear that if they support us openly then austerity and the troika will come their way. [my emphasis]
He says of the forced agreement of July: "What happened in Greece was definitely a coup. The asphyxiation of the Government through the liquidity squeeze, a series of denials of any serious debt restructuring ... Then they gave us an ultimatum under the further threat of bank closure. This was nothing but a coup. In 1967 there were the tanks and in 2015 there were the banks." The 1967 reference is to the military coup that year.

Varoufakis even invokes Hegel: "Nobody can be free even if one person is a slave. That is Hegel’s well known master-slave paradox. Europe has to pay serious attention to it. Spain cannot prosper, or be free, or sovereign or democratic if its prosperity hinges on another member state being denied growth, prosperity or democracy."

He is right about the change in the public framing of Merkel's austericide policies:

I think that is a [sic] uncontroversial: your ideas about austerity and debt relief, everybody says you are right.

If you were talking to me in January it would not have been so. The only reason why now this is not controversial anymore is because we struggled for six months. For those who say to me we failed, these six months were in vain, I say “No we did not fail”. Now we have a debate in Europe which it’s not just about Greece, it’s about the continent. A debate we would have not had otherwise. A debate which is worth Greece’s, our continent’s, weight in gold.

But politics is about results. You called the first and second bailout like the Versailles Treaty. How would you define the third?

The Eurozone began life in 2000. It was badly designed and we realized that, or we should have realized that, in 2008 when Lehman Brothers collapsed. From 2009-2010 we have been in complete denial as official Europe has been doing precisely the wrong thing. This is a European phenomenon, it is an Europe-wide problem. Little Greece, 2% of Eurozone’s GDP, elected a government that raised issues crucial for all of Europe. After 6 months of struggles we had a major setback, we lost the battle. But we won the war of changing the debate. And this is a result!

The debate is the result?

Certainly! I cannot quantify this result for you. I cannot tell you how many billons [sic] it is worth. But some things are not measured in terms of prices but in terms of their value.

Friday, July 31, 2015

More on the frivolous accusations against Yanis Varoufakis

I'd much rather talk about Yanis Varoufakis and Angela Merkel than about Donald Trump. So I will.

In The Defeat of Europe (07/30/2015) at his blog and in Le Monde Diplomatique (dated 08/02/2015), Mr. V tells the story of the Greek negotiations this year. It's interesting to see that he thinks there is a real difference in approach between Merkel and her Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble: "Even worse, we had to deal with our creditors ‘vertical disintegration’, as the bosses of the IMF and the Commission had a different agenda to their minions or as the German and Austrian finance ministers had an agenda totally at odds to that of their Chancellors."

Presumably, this means he thinks Merkel prefers to keep Greece in the eurozone, while Schäuble wants to kick them out.

The title echoes this line in the article, "Greece capitulated but it is Europe that was defeated."

The Greek opposition attempt to accuse Varoufakis of high treason for doing his job as Finance Minister and doing contingency planning for a Grexit isn't looking so good. For the opposition. The accusation is hot air, as explained by Giorgos Christides in Strafanzeigen gegen griechischen Ex-Finanzminister: Varoufakis kann ganz cool bleiben Spiegel Online 30.07.2015.

Mohamed A. El-Erian writes In Defense of Varoufakis Project Syndicate 07/29/2015:

It ... would have been irresponsible for Varoufakis not to work behind closed doors on a Plan B. After all, Greece’s eurozone destiny largely was – and remains – in the hands of others (particularly Germany, the ECB, and the IMF). And it is yet to be established whether Varoufakis broke any laws in the way he and his colleagues worked on their contingency plan.

When push came to shove, Varoufakis faced the difficult choice of going along with more of the same, despite knowing that it would fail, or trying to pivot to a new approach. He bravely opted for the latter. While his brash style undermined outcomes, it would be a real tragedy to lose sight of his arguments (which have been made by many others as well).

If Greece is to have any realistic chance of long-term economic recovery and meeting its citizens’ legitimate aspirations, policymakers must recast the country’s austerity program, couple pro-growth reforms with greater social justice, and secure additional debt relief. And if Greece is to remain in the eurozone (still a big if, even after the latest agreement), it must not only earn its peers’ respect; it must be treated with greater respect by them as well.
Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is also having none of the frivolous treason accusations against his former Finance Minister (Greek PM Tsipras defends Varoufakis over 'Grexit' row BBC News 07/31/2015)

Mr Tsipras said on Friday that he had ordered the plan, adding it would have been "irresponsible" not to do so.

"Of course I issued personal instructions to the finance minister to create a team that would work on a plan of defence in the event of a national emergency," Mr Tsipras told parliament, according to AP.

"It would have been politically naive ... not to do so. Does that mean... that I was seeking an emergency?" he asked. [my emphasis]
Keep Talking Greece reports it this way (PM Tsipras: I ordered Varoufakis to prepare a contingency plan 07/31/2015):

Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras gave full coverage to former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis and said that he ordered the ex FinMin to work out an emergency contingency plan but not a Grexit plan.

Speaking to the Greek Parliament after a question posed by PASOK leader Fofi Gennimatas, Tsipras said among others:

“Of course I instructed the Minister of Finance to set up a team to prepare a defense plan in case of emergency” and stressed that “the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition had no plans to exit the Eurozone but a crisis management plan.” ...

In the Parliament, the Prime Minister defended Varoufakis even though he criticized some of his policies.

“Instead of looking for responsibilities about the Grexit, you would better contact those who cultivated the Grexit. Haven’t you heard anything about the Plan B of Brussels with 1,000 pages?” Tsipras asked the opposition adding, “For the first time we heard that the European Commission was preparing such a plan in 2012. This plan has been continuously updated. The partners and lenders had a ready Grexit plan. Shouldn’t we asa government design our defenses? We had an obligation to the citizens to be prepare against such a possibility.”

Tsiporas [sic] vehemently denied that the government was preparing a Grexit Plan.

“You accuse us that we had a secret plan for the country’s exit from the eurozone. so, why didn’t we implement it? If our goal was to get the country out of the euro, why didn’t we do it when the referendum result was 62%?”

Tsipras defended Varoufakis plan to get access to taxpayers’ registration numbers saying that “this data base was useful for the euro” and said that Varoufakis made mistakes as Finance Minister. [my emphasis]
Varoufakis is also under fire for, uh, wearing an orange shirt? (Renee Malezou, Alexis Tsipras on Yanis Varoufakis: You can question his taste in shirts, but not his honesty The Independent 07/31/2015; Stefan Kuzmany, Das Hemd: Varoufarben? Rosafakis? Spiegel Online 31.07.2015)

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

Perry Anderson's sneering take on the Greek government's handling of the Troika negotiations

Jacobin has been publishing a number of articles recently on the Greek crisis. Unfortunately, the first one I read was The Greek Debacle by Perry Anderson 07/23/2015.

Perry Anderson is one of the best-known Marxists of the Western academic world, a long-time editor of the New Left Review. That was a relatively lonely position after the fall of the Soviet Union. But after the crash of 2008, even financial magazines were starting to worry if Marx was more right than their writers would prefer to think. Which got some more respectable attention for Anderson, who in any case is a respected academic. In this piece, he dismisses Syriza's months-long fight over austerity policies against Germany and the Troika as more-or-less contemptible:

Five years of mass unemployment and welfare cuts later, Greek debt had merely soared still higher. Syriza won office because it promised, with much fiery rhetoric, to put an end to the submission of Greece to the rule of the troika. It would “renegotiate” the terms of the country’s wardship in Europe. How did it hope to do so? Simply by pleading for kinder treatment, and cursing when it was not forthcoming - pleas and curses alike appealing to the loftier values of Europe, to which the European Council could surely not remain deaf.

Incompatible with these outpourings, mingling supplication and imprecation, was, all too plainly from the start, any thought of desisting from the euro. There were two reasons for that. Provincial in outlook, the Syriza leadership found it difficult to make any mental distinction between membership of the EU and of the eurozone, treating exit from the one as if it were virtual expulsion from the other: the ultimate nightmare for any good European, as they held themselves to be.

They were also conscious of the fact that Greek standards of living — lubricated by low interest rates brought on by the convergence of spreads across Europe; topped up with Structural Funds — had indeed increased in the Potemkin years of Simitis, leaving warm popular memories of the euro, which did not connect subsequent miseries with it. Syriza made no attempt to explain the connection. Tspiras and his colleagues assured all who could listen that, on the contrary, there could be no question of abandoning the euro.

With this, they gave up any serious hope of bargaining with the real — not their dreamland — Europe. By 2015, the threat of a Grexit was economically much weaker than it would have been in 2010, because by now the German and French banks had been paid off with the bailout nominally going to Greece. Despite residual alarmist talk elsewhere, the German finance ministry has for some time, and with good reason, dismissed any dramatic material consequences from a Greek default. [my emphasis]
This is so superficial and ill-informed, it amazes me.

  • The German Finance Ministry has been spectacularly wrong on its projected benefits of austerity in Greece, so it's not clear why Anderson takes them as an obviously qualified authority on this question
  • Almost all the economists and economic analysts I've seen commenting on this assume, based on past experience with the break-up of currency zones and of ending currency pegs, that leaving the euro would be significantly disruptive in the short run in Greece and would greatly increase the likelihood of increasing pressure on other periphery countries to leave the eurozone
  • Christos Laskos and current Greek Finance Minister Euclid Tsakalotos describe the discussions within Syriza that led to adopting their position of negotiating a non-austerity position within the eurozone in Crucible of Resistance: Greece, the Eurozone and the World Economic Crisis (2013); one can argue it was an inadequate position, but it was certainly not due to frivolity of the part of Tsipras and the rest of the Syriza leadership
  • Varoufakis' Finance Ministry actually did make preparations for a Grexit. In fact, he's being accused by some of the opposition of "high treason" for having done so! After the referendum on the Troika's demands, Tsipras made a decision not to press on with those preparations. But it was not the brainless neglect that Anderson seems to want his readers to think it was.

Tsipras and Varoufakis did not based their negotiating strategy on simply "appealing to the loftier values of Europe." The knew very well that other eurozone countries were very concerned about the broader consequences of a Grexit and wanted to avoid that. They hoped the fear of those consequences would persuade them to agree to ease up on the austerity policies and get realistic about debt reduction.

I've said in earlier posts that based on what we know now, the negotiating strategy the Greek government pursued of getting a better deal within the eurozone could only have worked if they really had been willing to take the option of Grexit if they didn't get a non-austerity deal. But Tsipras as Prime Minister had to make a call as the head of government on whether the risk was worth it. And he decided that at that moment in July 2015, it was not. Anderson's description gives no good idea of what the actual decision factors were.

Anderson even resorts to polemics like this, which in this case are just dumb: "Syriza has turned its coat with a speed not seen since war credits were supported by European social democracy in 1914, even if this time a minority of the party has saved its honor."

If there's a difference between Anderson's piece and run-of-the-mill Internet trolling, it hard to discern what that is.

Edward Skidelsky described him back in 1999 this way: (The New Statesman Profile - Perry Anderson 03/19/2015): "Perry Anderson exemplifies a type that has almost vanished: the unaffiliated intellectual. The leading British Trotskyite, he has never belonged to a political party."

The best definition of a Trotskyist I ever heard was: A Trotskyist is someone who support revolution everywhere except where there's one actually going on.

In other words, "Trots" are known for being so pure that any actual political movement that's having an effect on real-world politics and government policy is by definition soiled with impurities and is Betraying The Revolution. Anderson's polemic against Tsipras and Syriza falls into that definition nicely.

Tuesday, July 28, 2015

Yanis Varoufakis: "traitor" to Greece?

This is awesome! Some of the pro-austerity opposition parties are trying to get up a "high treason" charge against Yanis Varoufakis for having made emergency preparations for a new Greek currency during the negotiations with Germany/The Troika in order to prepare for a temporary parallel currency if Tsipras' govenrment decided to exit the euro, or was pushed out by the Troika. (El Parlamento griego estudia una demanda contra Varoufakis por un delito de "alta traición" Público/EFE 28.07.2015)

Why hack your own government's computers? Because the Greek revenue office (their IRS) was under the control of the Troika, i.e., foreign creditors. They didn't proceed with the hack in any case, because Tsipras decided not to go to the wall on a Grexit at that time.

Is the Greek opposition using Newt Gingrich as a political adviser? Right, the opposition is going to try to kick Varoufakis out of Parliament and even charge him with high treason? Because he made preparations to keep the national economy going if foreign creditors tried to shut down the financial system (which they basically did)? And he went so far as to *talk* about hacking the computers of a Greek government agency *controlled by the foreign creditors and foreign governments* in order to defend Greece against against a hostile attempt to crash Greece's financial system and economy? Syriza must be praying for them to try it.

Syriza could wind up at 75% popularity after that fight. And they could permanently label the pro-austerity New Democracy, PASOK and To Potami parties as The Enemies Of Greek Sovereignty. Who are taking orders from Angela Merkel and Wolfgang Schäuble. Yeah, that's a brilliant plan!

Monday, July 27, 2015

More Varoufakis: "Plan B"

Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis is still causing consternation in the eurozone a Member of the Greek Parliament.

There was some melodramatic rending of garments and gnashing of teeth over a recording of Varoufakis on July 16 (Peter Spiegel, Varoufakis unplugged: the London call transcript FT Brussels Blog 07/27/2015; emphasis in FT transcript):

That would have created a parallel banking system while the banks were shut as a result of the ECB’s aggressive action, to give us some breathing space. This was very well developed and I think it would have made a very big difference, because very soon we could have extended it using apps on smart phones. It would become a functioning and functional parallel system. Then of course this would be euro denominated, but at a drop of a hat, it could be converted to a new drachma.

Now let me tell you, and I thank this is a quite fascinating story, what difficulties I faced. The general secretariat of public revenues, within my ministry, is controlled fully and directly by the troika. It was not under control of my ministry, of [unclear] ministry, it was controlled by Brussels. The general secretary is appointed, effectively, through a process that troika-controlled and the whole mechanism within. It’s like Inland Revenue in the United Kingdom being controlled by Brussels. I am sure as you’re hearing these words, your hair is standing up. Ok. So problem number one.

The general secretariat of information systems, on the other hand, was controlled by me as minister. I appointed a good friend of mine, a childhood friend of mine, who had become a professor of IT at Columbia University in the States, and so on, I put him there because I trusted him to develop the system. At some point, a week or so after we moved into the ministry, he calls me up and says to me: “You know what, I control the machines, I control the hardware. I don’t control the software.” The software belongs to the troika-controlled general secretariat for public revenues.

What do we do? So we had a meeting, just the two of us, nobody else knew. He said: “Listen, if I ask for permission from them to start implementing this programme then the troika will immediately know we are designing a parallel system.” Well, I said, “That won’t do, we don’t want to reveal our hand at this stage.” So I authorised him, and you can’t tell anyone that, this is totally between us, to hack ...
Despite the fainting-couch routine from Varoufakis' critics, this is pretty straightforward. (Peter Spiegel and Kerin Hope, Yanis Varoufakis defends ‘Plan B’ tax hack Financial Times 07/27/2015) There is no reason I can see to think the hack was actually done, since Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras didn't give Varoufakis the go-ahead for the additional preparations for a new national currency that would have required the hack:

So, we decided to hack into my minister’s own software programme in order to be able to bring it all, to just copy, just copy the codes of the tax systems’ website onto a large computer in his office, so he can work out how to design and implement this parallel payment system. We were ready to get the green light from the prime minister when the banks closed in order to move into the general secretariat of public revenues, which was not controlled by us but is controlled by Brussels, and to plug this laptop in and to energise the system.

I’m trying to convey to you the kind of institutional problems that we had, and institutional impediments to carrying out an independent policy for ameliorating the affects of having our banks being closed down by the ECB. [emphasis in FT transcript]
And even if they had done the hack, if it was a necessary move to set up a new currency in the face of ECB strangling their national financial system to force them into compliance with Angela Merkel's draconian austerity program, what's the problem?

And from what Varoufakis says, maybe François Hollande has been putting up more resistance to Merkel behind the scenes than I was aware of:

The French are terrified. They’re terrified because they know if they’re going to shrink their budget deficit to the levels that Berlin demands the Parisian government will certainly fall. There is no way that they can politically handle the kinds of austerity which is demanded of them by Berlin. And when I say by Berlin, I mean by Berlin, I don’t mean Brussels. I mean Berlin.

So they are trying to buy time. This is what they’ve been doing now, as you know, for a couple of years. They’ve been trying to buy time in terms of an extension of the time period during which they will have to reduce their deficit to below 3.5 per cent, 3 per cent, the Maastricht criteria in the Stability and Growth Pact.

At the very same time, Wolfgang Schäuble has a plan .... This is one of the very sweet moments in one’s life when one does not have to theorise, because all I did was to convey the plan as Dr Schäuble described it to me. The way he described it to me is very simple. He believes the eurozone is not sustainable as it is. He believes there has to be some fiscal transfers, some degree of political union. He believes for that political union to work without federation, without the legitimacy that a properly-elected federal parliament can render, can bestow upon an executive, it will have to be done in a very disciplinarian way. He said explicitly to me that a Grexit, a Greek exit, is going to equip him with sufficient bargaining power, with sufficient terrorising power in order to impose upon the French that which Paris is resisting. What is that? A degree of transfer of budget-making powers from Paris to Brussels. [emphasis in FT transcript]
Varoufakis' parliamentary office put out this statement, which he put on his blog (07/27/2015):

During the Greek government’s negotiations with the Eurogroup, Minister Varoufakis oversaw a Working Group with a remit to prepare contingency plans against the creditors’ efforts to undermine the Greek government and in view of forces at work within the Eurozone to have Greece expelled from the euro. The Working Group was convened by the Minister, at the behest of the Prime Minister, and was coordinated by Professor James K. Galbraith. (Click here for a statement on the matter by Professor Galbraith).

It is worth noting that, prior to Mr Varoufakis’ comfirmation of the existence of the said Working Group, the Minister was criticized widely for having neglected to make such contingency plans. The Bank of Greece, the ECB, treasuries of EU member-states, banks, international organisations etc. had all drawn up such plans since 2012. Greece’s Ministry of Finance would have been remiss had it made no attempt to draw up contingency plans.

Ever since Mr Varoufakis announced the existence of the Working Group, the media have indulged in far-fetched articles that damage the quality of public debate. The Ministry of Finance’s Working Group worked exclusively within the framework of government policy and its recommendations were always aimed at serving the public interest, at respecting the laws of the land, and at keeping the country in the Eurozone.

Regarding the recent article by “Kathimerini” newspaper entitled “Plan B involving highjacking and hacking”, Kathimerini’s failure to contact Mr Varoufakis for comment and its reporter’s erroneous references to “highjacking tax file numbers of all taxpayers” sowed confusion and contributed to the media-induced disinformation. The article refers to the Ministry’s project as described by Minister Varoufakis in his 6th July farewell speech during the handover ceremony in the Ministry of Finance. In that speech Mr Varoufakis clearly stated: “The General Secretariat of Information Systems had begun investigating means by which Taxisnet (Nb. the Ministry’s Tax Web Interface) could become something more than it currently is, to become a payments system for third parties, a system that improves efficiency and minimises the arrears of the state to citizens and vice versa.” That project was not part of the Working Group’s remit, was presented in full by Minister Varoufakis to Cabinet, and should, in Minister Varoufakis’ view, be implemented independently of the negotiations with Greece’s creditors, as it will contribute considerable efficiency gains in transactions between the state and taxpayers as well as between taxpayers.

In conclusion, during the five months of negotiations that gripped Europe and changed the debate throughout the Continent, the Ministry of Finance did everything possible to serve the public interest against many odds. The current media campaign to besmirch these efforts will fail to dent the legacy of a crucial five month struggle for democracy and common sense. [emphasis in original]
The Jamie Galbraith statement to which he links is also at Varoufakis' blog (07/27/2015):

I spent five months from early February through early July in close association with the Greek Finance Minister, Yanis Varoufakis, and was part of the Working Group that did contingency planning for potential attempts to asphyxiate the Greek government, including aggressive moves to force the country out of the euro. Since a great deal of public confusion has now arisen over this effort, the following should be stated:(1) At no time was the Working Group engaged in advocating exit or any policy choice. The job was strictly to study the operational issues that would arise if Greece were forced to issue scrip or if it were forced out of the euro.

(2) The group operated under the axiom that the government was fully committed to negotiating within the euro, and took extreme precautions not to jeopardize that commitment by allowing any hint of our work to reach the outside world. There were no leaks whatever, until the existence of the group was disclosed by the former Finance Minister himself, in response to criticism that his ministry had made no contingency plans when it was known that forces within the Eurozone were planning the forced exit of Greece.

(3) The existence of preliminary plans could not play any role in the Greek negotiating position, since their circulation (before there was a need to implement them) would have destabilized government policy.

(4) Apart from one late, inconclusive telephone conversation between MP Costas Lapavitsas and myself, we had no coordination with the Left Platform and our Working Group’s ideas had little in common with theirs.

(5) Our work ended for practical purposes in early May, with a long memorandum outlining major issues and scenaria that we studied.

(6) My work in this area was unpaid and unofficial, based on my friendship with Yanis Varoufakis and on my respect for the cause of the Greek people. [my emphasis]

Monday, July 13, 2015

Naming Merkelnomics #ThisIsACoup

Krugman has a new name for Angela Merkel's Herbert Hoover/Heinrich Brüning policies that are now wholeheartedly supported by the eurozone's conservative and social-democratic policies, Roach Motel Economics 07/13/2015: "Europe has created a system that treats surplus and deficit countries asymmetrically, even more than the classical gold standard, and leads to a severe deflationary bias."

And here he describes in economists' terms what is a very real problem in the eurozone:

This is true both for fiscal issues and for balance of payments issues. Debtors are forced into draconian austerity, while creditors face no pressure to reflate; economic crisis, which should be met with expansionary policy, instead leads to contraction because of this asymmetry. Meanwhile, countries that find themselves overvalued are forced to deflate in an effort to regain competitiveness, while undervalued counties face no pressure to help out with a higher inflation rate — so at times of major misalignment, when moderate inflation can help, the overall effect is declining inflation and maybe even deflation.

Arthur Goldhammer addresses the political implication of this latest turn in Endgame in Europe The American Prospect 07/13/2015:

Germany’s implacable finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, saw weakness in his opponent and went for the jugular. He insisted on “guarantees” that Greece would keep its word, including sequestration of Greek assets in a fund under his control. No such guarantees had been demanded previously, but now Chancellor Angela Merkel, who had previously seemed less exigent than Schäuble, declared that Greece had forfeited the “trust” of its European partners. In the end she proved to be a good German but not a good European.

France and Italy envisioned the euro originally as a way of restraining a reunified Germany. But instead of limiting German power, the euro has multiplied it. Currency union has deprived member states of budgetary autonomy. The European Union was conceived after World War II to moderate nationalist tensions and animosities, but the German insistence on austerity has exacerbated them instead. Resistance to this loss of sovereignty has triggered nationalist and populist reactions across the continent, and the remarkable intransigence that Germany displayed this weekend will do nothing to quell fears of its renewed assertiveness. The gloves have come off. Even within Germany there has been shock at the absence of compassion. Sigmar Gabriel, the leader of the social-democratic opposition party SPD, fully embraced the line of his coalition partners Schäuble and Merkel, triggering a reaction by his own party’s left wing that the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung described as a “shitstorm against ‘dear Sigmar.’” [my emphasis in bold]
Goldhammer notes of the last few days, "France and Italy at long last found the courage to put up mild resistance."

But the leaders of both countries have made such noises before. So far, it hasn't come to any "resistance" really worth the name.

Goldhammer's piece links to this article: Christian Salmon, 'We underestimated their power': Greek government insider lifts the lid on five months of 'humiliation' and 'blackmail' Mediapart 07/08/2015.

The New York Times' Roger Cohen is also writing about the political implications of the latest deal and what it revealed about the ugly nature of Merkel's "roach motel economics." (The German Question Redux 07/13/2015) But he has a lazy version that relies on dumb ethnic stereotypes that Merkel and her party have encouraged:

... the euro was a poisoned chalice. Conceived to bind Germany to Europe, it instead bound far-weaker European countries to Germany, in what for some, notably Greece, proved an unsustainable straitjacket. It turbo-charged German economic dominance as Berlin’s export machine went to work. It wed countries of far laxer and more flexible Mediterranean culture to German diktats of discipline, predictability and austerity. It produced growing pressure to surrender sovereignty — for a currency union without political union is problematic — and this yielding was inevitably to German power. [my emphasis]

The Greek deal: documenting the atrocities #ThisIsACoup

Für die Demokratie in Europa und in Deutschland war es ein trauriges Wochenende. ("For democracy in Europe and in Germany, it was a sad weekend.") - Wolfgang Múnchau, Schäubles Griechenland-Diplomatie: Europas Rückfall Spiegel Online 13.07.2015

Cartoonist Klaus Stuttmann illustrated the results of the new eurozone deal with Greece this way:


Harry Lambert has an interview with former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis (Yanis Varoufakis full transcript: our battle to save Greece New Statesman 07/13/2015) in which Mr. V gives us one reason Tsipras wound up capitualting: he had decided against making real contingency plans for introducing an alternative currency in case Angela Merkel remained as intransigent as she actually did:

HL: You must have been thinking about a Grexit from day one...

YV: Yes, absolutely.

HL: ...have preparations been made?

YV: The answer is yes and no. We had a small group, a ‘war cabinet’ within the ministry, of about five people that were doing this: so we worked out in theory, on paper, everything that had to be done [to prepare for/in the event of a Grexit]. But it’s one thing to do that at the level of 4-5 people, it’s quite another to prepare the country for it. To prepare the country an executive decision had to be taken, and that decision was never taken.

HL: And in the past week, was that a decision you felt you were leaning towards [preparing for Grexit]?

YV: My view was, we should be very careful not to activate it. I didn’t want this to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. I didn’t want this to be like Nietzsche’s famous dictum that if you stare into the abyss long enough, the abyss will stare back at you. But I also believed that at the moment the Eurogroup shut out banks down, we should energise this process.

HL: Right. So there were two options as far as I can see – an immediate Grexit, or printing IOUs and taking bank control of the Bank of Greece [potentially but not necessarily precipitating a Grexit]?

YV: Sure, sure. I never believed we should go straight to a new currency. My view was – and I put this to the government – that if they dared shut our banks down, which I considered to be an aggressive move of incredible potency, we should respond aggressively but without crossing the point of no return.

We should issue our own IOUs, or even at least announce that we’re going to issue our own euro-denominated liquidity; we should haircut the Greek 2012 bonds that the ECB held, or announce we were going to do it; and we should take control of the Bank of Greece. This was the triptych, the three things, which I thought we should respond with if the ECB shut down our banks.

... I was warning the Cabinet this was going to happen [the ECB shut our banks] for a month, in order to drag us into a humiliating agreement. When it happened – and many of my colleagues couldn’t believe it happened – my recommendation for responding “energetically”, let’s say, was voted down.

HL: And how close was it to happening?

YV: Well let me say that out of six people we were in a minority of two. … Once it didn’t happen I got my orders to close down the banks consensually with the ECB and the Bank of Greece, which I was against, but I did because I’m a team player, I believe in collective responsibility.

And then the referendum happened, and the referendum gave us an amazing boost, one that would have justified this type of energetic response [his plan] against the ECB, but then that very night the government decided that the will of the people, this resounding ‘No’, should not be what energised the energetic approach [his plan].

Instead it should lead to major concessions to the other side: the meeting of the council of political leaders, with our Prime Minister accepting the premise that whatever happens, whatever the other side does, we will never respond in any way that challenges them. And essentially that means folding. … You cease to negotiate.
So now there's a deal. The Troika returns to Athens. They will discuss debt relief only after the neoliberal reforms demanded are enacted. And those have to be enacted by Wednesday. (Griechenland-Kompromiss: Was beschlossen wurde APA/Salzburger Nachrichten 13.07.2015)

This Reuters article summarizes the major features of the deal (Paul Taylor and Renee Maltezou, Greek PM Tspiras faces party revolt over bailout deal 07/13/2015):

Just hours after a deal that saw Greece surrender much of its sovereignty to outside supervision in return for agreeing to talks on an 86 billion euro ($95 billion) bailout, doubts were already emerging about whether [Greek Prime Minister Alexis] Tsipras would be able to hold his government together.

The terms imposed by international lenders led by Germany in all-night talks at an emergency summit obliged Tsipras to abandon promises of ending austerity.

Instead he must pass legislation to cut pensions, increase value added tax, clamp down on collective bargaining agreements and put in place quasi-automatic spending constraints. In addition, he must set 50 billion euros of public sector assets aside to be sold off under the supervision of foreign lenders and get the whole package through parliament by Wednesday.

Tsipras himself, elected five months ago to end five years of suffocating austerity, said he had "fought a tough battle" and "averted the plan for financial strangulation". [my emphasis]
See also Euro Zone Leaders Reach Agreement To Rescue Greece Reuters/The World Post 07/13/2015 by the same authors.

Wolfgang Lieb, Griechenland: „Fiskalisches Waterboarding“ NachDenkSeiten 13.07.2015:

Deutschland wird von Sparkassenangestellten mit beschränkter Ein- und Weitsicht regiert, die sich allerdings für globale Fiskalgenies halten und auch Europa ihre intellektuelle fiskalische Beschränktheit oktroyieren. Zum absoluten Höhepunkt dieser politischen Verbohrt- und Kleinkariertheit wird nun der “griechische Treuhandfonds”, der in ähnlicher Weise als „Treuhandanstalt“ schon zum Desaster bei der Privatisierung der DDR-Wirtschaft zu Riesenverlusten, zu Korruption und einer beispiellosen Verschiebung gemeinnütziger Güter in Privathand geführt hat.

[Germany is governed by savings bank employees with little insight and limited long-distance vision, who nevertheless hold themselves to be global fiscal geniuses and also impose their intellectual fiscal obtuseness onto Europe. The absolute high point of this political pigheadedness and pettiness, the "Greek Treuhandfonds {fiduciary funds} which have already in the same way as Treuhandanstalt {fiduciary agency, the privatization agency for selling off East German public property} in the disaster of the privatizing of the GDR economy to led to gigantic losses, to corruption and an unexampled shift of non-profit goods into private hands.]
This also is food for my idea that the unification of Germany is Merkel's most important model for managing the EU. Although I can't quite give up my sneaking suspicion that she actually sees herself in the role of Brezhnev running the Warsaw Pact.

Wolfgang Múnchau writes in the Financial Times, Greece’s brutal creditors have demolished the eurozone project 07/13/2015:

By forcing Alexis Tsipras into a humiliating defeat, Greece’s creditors have done a lot more than bring about regime change in Greece or endanger its relations with the eurozone. They have destroyed the eurozone as we know it and demolished the idea of a monetary union as a step towards a democratic political union. ...

The fact that a formal Grexit may have been avoided for the moment is immaterial. Grexit will be back on the table when you have the slightest political accident — and there are still many things that could go wrong, both in Greece and in other eurozone parliaments. Any other country that in future might challenge German economic orthodoxy will face similar problems.
John Psaropoulos looks at some of the positive and the detrimental features of the latest agreement in Greece is thrown a life jacket containing significant amounts of lead shot The New Athenian 07/13/2015. He includes in the advantages, "The European Commission will disburse a €35bn development fund to Greece." But such an amount is already available to Greece if the government ponies up 15% of the costs of the projects, which it can't afford. Unless the new deal eliminates those requirements, that is effectively an empty propaganda offer.

But I am particular interested in what he says about the privatization trust sales that Tsipras has agreed to:

Immediately after the deal is sealed, Greece must “scale up” its privatisation programme from the current €11bn to €50bn euros. This is a massive undertaking, and both politically and practically difficult, and its success is highly doubtful.

Greece’s first bailout loan, in 2010, contained such a provision. The government was careful to keep it under wraps, rightly fearing outrage. When creditors made it public in a press conference in early 2011, then-finance minister Yiorgos Papakonstantinou was so outraged that he forbade them from ever holding another press conference on Greek soil again.

The objections came from both voters and politicians. Either the state would be denuded of regulatory bodies and infrastructure taxpayers had funded over decades, they opined, or such massive amounts of public land would have to be bundled, securitised and sold in the plan’s two-year period, that the sales would depress real estate prices and destroy the value of the collateral held by banks against mortgages. The banks had just suffered a collapse of the value of Greek government bonds they held at the time, and had required recapitalisation. The land selloff would repeat that trauma.
Angie was the darling of the boulevard press Bild-Zeitung on Monday: Wie hält Angela Merkel das bloß durch? 13.07.2015

Other reports and analysis of the deal:

Grexit avoided as Greece reaches "humiliating" bailout deal with Eurozone creditors New Statesman 07/13/2015

Estas son las nuevas condiciones que la troika impone a Grecia Público 13.07.2015

#ThisIsACoup - Euroländer einigen sich mit Griechenland: Die Reaktionen im Netz Profil 13.07.2015)

Karl Stagno, et al, Tsipras Moves From Predator to Prey at Euro 'Torture' Summit Bloomberg Business 07/13/2015

Paul Mason, Greece wins euro debt deal – but democracy is the loser 4 News 07/13/2015

Stephan Schulmeister's Profil column of 04.07.2015 was from the weekend before the deal, but it gives an account of the stages that eurozone policy developed into what Greece encountered in a very ugly way this past weekend, Der Weg in die Depression.

Mohamed El-Erian, Hard-Won Greek Deal Was the Easy Part Bloomberg View 07/13/2015

And, in a wonkier vein: Silvia Merler, Preserving the Greek financial sector: options for recap and assistance 07/13/2015.

Sunday, July 12, 2015

The Merkel method #ThisIsACoup

This tweet from The Economist's Jeremy Cliffe passing on a statement from some anonymous German official strikes me as only half the profile.


When it comes to her dedication to Herbert Hoover/Heinrich Brüning economics, though, she has shown she is more concerned with imposing her will than in awaiting a consensus to emerge.

Krugman harshes on Angela Merkel and the Troika and their latest ultimatum to Greece to forget democracy (Killing the European Project 07/12/2015):

... this Eurogroup list of demands is madness. The trending hashtag ThisIsACoup is exactly right. This goes beyond harsh into pure vindictiveness, complete destruction of national sovereignty, and no hope of relief. It is, presumably, meant to be an offer Greece can’t accept; but even so, it’s a grotesque betrayal of everything the European project was supposed to stand for.

Can anything pull Europe back from the brink? Word is that Mario Draghi is trying to reintroduce some sanity, that Hollande is finally showing a bit of the pushback against German morality-play economics that he so signally failed to supply in the past. But much of the damage has already been done. Who will ever trust Germany’s good intentions after this? [my emphasis]
Joe Stiglitz is pretty much on the same page (Germany showing 'lack of solidarity' over Greece: Stiglitz Dunya News 07/12/2015):

"What has been demonstrated is a lack of solidarity by Germany. You cannot run a eurozone without a basic modicum of solidarity. It is really undermining the common sense of vision, the sense of common solidarity in Europe," the Colombia University professor and former World Bank chief economist told AFP.

"I think it s been a disaster. Clearly Germany has done a serious blow, undermining Europe," he said.

"Asking even more from Greece would be unconscionable. If the ECB allows Greek banks to open up and they renegotiate whatever agreement, then wounds can heal. But if they succeed in using this as a trick to get Greece out, I think the damage is going to be very very deep."

TeleSur TV reports on the hashtag Krugman mentions (Greeks Face 'Humiliating' Demands As Twitter Says #ThisIsACoup 07/12/2015):

To meet the conditions for fresh aid packages and a third bailout that Greece needs to avoid bankruptcy, European finance ministers want Greece to pass a series of austerity measures--including tax and pension reforms-- through Parliament and put them into law by Wednesday.

Greece will also have to lose fiscal sovereignty as part of the austerity measures, implying that the troika- the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank- would be in charge of all legislation relevant to austerity. This also includes changes to legislation already passed by the Syriza government since it took power this year.

Ian Traynor et al report in Greek crisis: surrender fiscal sovereignty in return for bailout, Merkel tells Tsipras The Guardian 07/12/2015:

A weekend of high tension that threatened to break Europe in two climaxed on Sunday night at a summit of eurozone leaders in Brussels where the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and President François Hollande of France presented Greece’s radical prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, with an ultimatum.

In what a senior EU official described as an “exercise in extensive mental waterboarding” to secure Greek acquiescence to talks on a third bailout in five years worth up to €86bn (£62bn), the two leaders pressed for absolute certainty from Tsipras that he would honour what was on offer. ...

Under the terms set before Tsipras on Sunday night, the Greek parliament has to endorse the entire package on Monday and then pass several pieces of legislation by Wednesday, including on pensions reform and a new VAT regime, before the eurozone will agree to negotiate a new three-year rescue package.

The terms are much stiffer than those imposed by the creditors over the past five years. This, said the senior official, was payback for the emphatic no to the creditors’ terms delivered by the snap referendum that Tsipras staged a week ago.

“He was warned a yes vote would get better terms, that a no vote would be much harder,” said the senior official.