Showing posts with label deutschland. Show all posts
Showing posts with label deutschland. Show all posts

Sunday, June 19, 2011

German Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière rejects German participation in Libya War

Libyen-Krieg: De Maizière wirft Nato Kurzsichtigkeit vor Spiegel Online 18.06.2011 reports more pragmatically on the Libya War than we normally see in our American press:

Die Nato war mit ihrer Intervention zuletzt kaum vorangekommen. Seit gut drei Monaten bombardieren westliche Truppen nun schon die Stützpunkte des Gaddafi-Regimes. Dennoch kommen die Rebellen, denen die Nato den Rücken stärkt, mit ihrem Versuch, den Machthaber zu stürzen, kaum voran.

Hinzu kommen heftige Streits in der Nato. Europäische Alliierte warnten zuletzt vor Munitionsknappheit. US-Verteidigungsminister Robert Gates kritisierte, dass Amerika einspringen musste. Im eigenen Land steht die US-Regierung wegen hoher Militärausgaben unter Druck.

[NATO hasn't gotten very far with its intervention so far. Western forces have been bombarding key points of the Qaddafi regime for three months now. But then the rebels that NATO is supporting are also not getting very far with their efforts.

Besides that, there are serious conflicts within NATO. European allies warned recently about a shortage of munitions. US Defense Minister Robert Gates complained that America had to step up to provide them. In its own country, the US government is under pressure because of high military outlays.]
The article is mainly about an interview with German Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière, in which he criticized the Libya intervention on the record. He criticizes NATO for poorly planning the intervention. He says that NATO requested additional German help in June, and Germany turned it down. He even throws cold water on speculation that Germany might provide peacekeeping forces after the war. The way he phrased that point is almost certainly a dig at the vague nature of NATO's goals and the uncertainties about the intentions of the so-called Free Libya rebels:

"Eine internationale Friedenstruppe ist doch eine hypothetische Sache, die nur nötig ist, wenn Libyen zerfällt und man Streitparteien trennen muss", sagte er. "In einem sich hoffentlich demokratisch entwickelnden Land wäre das weder nötig noch wünschenswert." Er "hoffe, dass es zu einem solchen militärischen Einsatz gar nicht kommt. Weil Libyen hoffentlich vereint bleibt und sich in Richtung Demokratie entwickelt".

["But an international peacekeeping force is just a hypothetical thing that would only be necessary if Libya falls apart and contending parties have to be separated," he said. "In a country that will hopefully develop democratically that would be neither necessary nor desirable." He hopes "that it will just not come to such a military mission. Because Libya will hopefully stay united and develop in the direction of democracy."]
Mark Shields on the PBS Newshour Political Wrap segment for 06/1/2011 also commented in a somewhat broken way, during an otherwise lazy discussion about the Libya War:

JIM LEHRER: Why do you think they made it? Why -- why -- what -- do you have any -- any idea why they didn't just go to Congress before they did this? Or was there -- was it -- it couldn't have been an oversight.

MARK SHIELDS: No, no, it wasn't an oversight.

But I do think that the administration -- I think one thing, that they thought it was going to be -- it was going to be a lot easier going in. I mean, like, I think they thought Libya was going to be an awful lot easier than it has been. They thought it would topple. I mean, this is, what -- now we're up to almost approaching three months, aren't we, on it. [my emphasis]
For good measure, De Maizière also rejected the idea of Germany participating in any military intervention in Syria.

De Maizière's statements are particularly notable because they come after President Obama's very friendly reception of Chancellor Angela Merkel in Washington, despite Washington's unhappiness over Germany's reluctance to endorse or participate in the Libya War. There was speculation Obama had gotten agreement from Merkel to provide more assistance of some kind. But it may be that Wall Street's worries about the consequences of sovereign debt defaults in the EU has the Administration mainly looking to Germany to prevent that. The current German-French-IMF policies are scarcely optimal for that purpose, but they look good to German banks and probably to Wall Street observers, as well.

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Wednesday, June 08, 2011

German-American relations and Chancellor Merkel's visit to Washington

President Obama had German Chancellor Angela Merkel as a visitor in Washington this week. And they got along well so far as we saw in public, even though Washington is unhappy that Berlin hasn't been more supportive on the Libya War. (Jeff Mason and Steve Holland, Obama presses Europe, pledges help for Greek crisis Reuters 06/07/2011; Germany’s Angela Merkel and President Obama on friendly terms during state visit Washington Post 06/07/2011; Roland Nelles, Angela Merkel bei Barack Obama: Die Chemie stimmt - ein bisschen Der Spiegel Online 07/06/2011) The Washington Post story cited there is a good example of how sad much of US foreign affairs reporting has become. The fifth and sixth paragraphs of that story read:

Why the big show of friendliness?

In other words, how’d the chancellor and the president become Angela and Barack?
I was surprised to see that Obama pledged US help for bailing out Greece. The Reuters story says, "Obama, whose political prospects have suffered from persistently high unemployment and ballooning U.S. debt, has pinpointed the euro zone crisis as one foreign "headwind" hitting the U.S. economy." In general, I think the US gives way too little foreign aid. What aid we do give is far too heavily weighted toward military aid. And a huge percentage of our aid goes to just two countries, Israel and Egypt. But Germany and France certainly have the resources to bail out Greece. And the private entities most likely to be compromised by a Greek default on its sovereign debt are German banks.

Obama endorsed the current German and French play-acting that Greece, Portugal and Ireland are going to all be able to meet their debt obligations without their debtors taking a "haircut," i.e., a writeoff of part of the debt, especially from Greece:

"I'm confident that Germany's leadership, along with other key actors in Europe, will help us arrive at a path for Greece to return to growth, for this debt to become more manageable," Obama said.

"But it's going to require some patience and some time. And we have pledged to cooperate fully in working through these issues, both on a bilateral basis but also through international and financial institutions like the IMF."
Although he hedged the public message a bit:

But his main message was aimed at EU countries -- and, by default, wealthy Germany -- to step up to help Athens.

"Other countries in the euro zone are going to have to provide them a backstop and support," he said. "And frankly, people who are holding Greek debt are going to have to make some decisions, working with the European countries in the euro zone, about how that debt is managed."
Merkel, for her part, play-acted that Germany was living up to its leadership obligations as a leading country in the EU:

"We've seen that the stability of the euro as a whole will also be influenced if one country is in trouble," she said. "So we do see clearly our European responsibility and we're shouldering that responsibility, together with the IMF."
Since it doesn't make obvious sense to me from the standpoint of immediate American interests, I assume it's some kind of payoff for Germany to do something else the Obama Administration wants them to do.

Or maybe it's the price of a political alibi for his failed gamble on the economy picking up if we just bailed Wall Street out of its immediate crisis in 2009: "With U.S. unemployment at 9.1 percent, Obama has blamed outside forces for impeding the economy, including high fuel prices, the earthquake in Japan and the euro zone crisis."

Greece's reckless borrowing and the bond speculation targeting it, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are causing high US unemployment? That's quite a stretch. And as a political slogan, a very long way from "Morning in America."

Reymer Klüver in Mehr deutsches Engagement, bitte! Süddeutsche Zeitung 08.06.2011 suggest that Obama was bargaining for more German troops in what the US considers international crisis zones and more financial aid to emerging Arab democracies. Obama has talked about the latter before, although it's not clear to me why the EU would be doing that when they aren't willing yet to do what needs to be done for the weaker EU countries under pressure from the bond speculators. Maybe this whole notion of the US giving money to Greece (for the benefit of German banks) and Germany giving more money to Arab countries is somehow more politically palatable for somebody?

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Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Historical analogies and Kaiser Bill


Kaiser Bill

Historian Fritz Stern wrote a helpful essay dealing with historical analogies, Imperial Hubris: A German Tale Lapham's Quarterly Winter 2008:

The great French historian and resistance martyr, Marc Bloch, is supposed to have said that history was like a knife: You can cut bread with it, but you could also kill. This is even more true of historical derivatives like analogies; they can provide either illumination or poisonous polemic. The first requirement for an acceptable historical analogy is plausibility; the two situations compared must have striking similarities, and the image of the historic antecedent must be as clearly understood as possible. This becomes an unlikely presupposition when the analogy is proposed by partisans working in an age of stunning historical ignorance. Nowadays, politicians and partisans use analogies instead of arguments, convenient shorthand for their defenses of dubious policies.
And he reminds us of the most overused analogy in foreign policy:

Perhaps no single analogy has been so often and so perniciously invoked as “Munich.” (How many remember what actually happened?) The Munich Conference of September 1938 was the culmination of Anglo-French attempts to anticipate or accept Hitler's demands, to recognize the "injustices" visited upon Germany at Versailles, and to make efforts above all to avoid another war. Some proponents of appeasement — members of the ruling classes, ill-guided conservatives who hoped to preserve their own power—may have had a sneaking admiration for the decisive leader as the great anti-Bolshevik shield. Meanwhile, the European left and a few realistic conservatives (Winston Churchill is the heroic example) insisted that Hitler aimed for European hegemony and that only resolute will and the threat of force could stop him. To label American critics of an escalating involvement in Vietnam or Iraq as “appeasers” or proponents of "Munich" is dangerous nonsense, all the more so because the analogy may obscure the actual dangers that confront the United States.
The bulk of the essay is a discussion of German Emperor Wilhelm II ("Kaiser Bill") and his leadership in the First World War and the runup to it. As he points out, Kaiser Bill's effective power decreased greatly during the war:

After three years of unimaginable carnage, Wilhelm had been reduced to an instrument of a military dictatorship run by Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff, whom he had been forced to appoint and whose virtually unlimited power rested on their ever present threats of resignation. They enjoyed the confidence of Germany’s ruling classes and were determined to reject all compromise, always putting their faith in one more push that would deliver the ever elusive goal of total victory.
Abdicating his throne at the insistence of Ludendorff in November 1918, he continued to be a destructive (if then minor) figure in German history:

The Kaiser finally went into exile in the Netherlands — not by his will, but because the army leaders insisted that he go. As he left, he blamed "Ludendorff, Bethmann, and Tirpitz for having lost the war," a triumvirate itself consumed by hatred of one another. Until his death in exile in 1941, the Kaiser spread venomous poison where he could: The Jews were to blame, as were the socialists—he alone was right. Reflecting and encouraging the sentiments of all too many Germans, he saw in Hitler the new man chosen by providence, a savior after the treachery that had caused Germany’s defeat.
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Monday, May 31, 2010

German President Horst Köhler resigns


German President Horst Köhler, 2007

German President Horst Köhler just resigned from office, a first in the history of the German Federal Republic: Controversy Over Afghanistan Remarks: German President Horst Köhler Resigns Spiegel International 05/31/2010.

For an American, it's hard to know what to make of this. The reason for his resignation? He was perceived as having justified German intervention in Afghanistan on a basis (defense of German commercial interests) that would make it illegal under the German constitution. The German President is head of state but not head of government, while the US President is both. Our previous President claimed the right to disregard both the law and the Constitution if he himself decided on his own that it was necessary for National Security. Our current President has, very sad to say, defended many of those specific claims in court and in action.

The notion of a President resigning because he suggested that the country might be be able to do something illegal in relation to a war is almost beyond imagination in the US today. The controversial statement is quoted in the linked Spiegel International article:

A country of our size, with its focus on exports and thus reliance on foreign trade, must be aware that ... military deployments are necessary in an emergency to protect our interests -- for example when it comes to trade routes, for example when it comes to preventing regional instabilities that could negatively influence our trade, jobs and incomes.
Our politics have reached the state where if an American President said something like that, there would only be a controversy because his opponents would be saying it didn't sound tough enough.

Even though I'm aware that German democracy has some very different concepts about war, international law, and personal responsibility of senior officials than American politis does, I'm actually surprised at Köhler's resignation over the flap. I can see that it wasn't as diplomatically phrased as one might hope from the country's head of state. But from what I've read about it, it was part of a longer interview and basically in that section, he was sort of rambling a bit about the factors that drive foreign and military policy. In the same interview, he praised German soldiers serving in Afghanistan. He didn't seem at all to be denouncing the justification for German participation in the Afghanistan War, which takes place under the NATO treaty in response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

There are certainly very legitimate questions about whether Germany's continued participation in that war is good policy now. But the legal basis of it is sound.

Oddly, even though he was resigning over the controversy, in his resignation statement he rejected the substance of the criticism:

My comments about foreign missions by the Bundeswehr on May 22 this year met with heavy criticism. I regret that my comments led to misunderstandings in a question so important and difficult for our nation. But the criticism has gone as far as to accuse me of supporting Bundeswehr missions that are not covered by the constitution. This criticism is devoid of any justification. It lacks the necessary respect for my office.
Political junkie that I am, I can't help but wonder if there are other political calculations playing a major role in this resignation. The Spiegel International piece gives this background:

Köhler became president in 2004 and was elected for a second five-year term in 2009. The former head of the International Monetary Fund was the first non-politician to become German head of state. He is a member of Merkel's conservative Christian Democrats [CDU] and was nominated for the presidency by the CDU with the backing of their coalition partners, the pro-business Free Democrats.

Köhler won praise during his first term for making a series of strong speeches urging Germany to reform its economy, and his apparent independence from the government prompted mass circulation Bild newspaper to dub him "Super Horst." But he surprised commentators in recent months by appearing to stay on the sidelines in the euro crisis.

Finding a successor will pose a headache for Merkel, whose popularity has slumped in recent months. She has been hit by criticism of her handling of the euro crisis and by the loss of a center-right majority in the upper house following sharp declines for her CDU in a state election in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany's most populous state, on May 9.
Merkel is under heavy criticism both inside and outside Germany for her tepid initial response to the bond vigilantes attacks on the euro. Her popularity and that of her party have taken a major hit because of the euro crisis. It's hard not to wonder if some big part of Köhler's resignation isn't about letting him be the sacrificial lamb for his partisan home team, Merkel and the CDU, over Merkel's poor performance in the euro crisis.

Poli sci geek extra: Almost every German I've ever talked to about the topic is mystified by the American Electoral College, which is the official Constitution body that elects the President of the United States.

The German head of state, the Chancellor, is chosen according to parliamentary procedures, in which the Chancellor candidate of the lead party forming the government become Chancellor. After the experience of the Weimar Republic, the German President under their current constitution, known as the Basic Law, is a relatively weak head of state. But it is part of his responsibility as head of state to formally propose the Chancellor candidate to the lower house of Parliament, the Budestag.

The German President, though, is actually selected by a body that's very much like the American Electoral College, meaning that the President is chosen not directly by the voters but by the Bundesversammlung (Federal Convention), whose only purpose is to select the President. Their membership is chosen by a combination of the Budestag and the states.

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Thursday, September 10, 2009

Was war die DDR?


Rolf Hosfeld's Was war die DDR? Die Geschichte eines anderen Deutschland [What was the DDR? The history of another Germany] (2008) is a history of the German Democratic Republic (DDR, or Communist East Germany) from 1945 until 1989. The main focus is on the Walter Ulbricht years from 1945-73. He emphasizes the theme of relations with the Soviet Union.

Hosfeld spells out the fateful response of the Sozialischtische Einheitspartei (SED) - effectively the East German Communist Party - to the famous workers' revolt of July 1953, prompted by the increasing of work quotas which effectively meant a lowering of workers' salaries. That incident was actually far more widespread in the DDR than most observers and historians in the West realized until after the fall of the Wall. It wasn't limited to Berlin; cities all over the DDR were affected by it.

The SED had been trying to squeeze the workers' income to invest in industry and infrastructure. After the uprising, against which the SED found itself unable to proceed effectively was crushed by Soviet intervention, the Party decided that consumer needs must be subsidized sufficiently to prevent a recurrence. The subsidies on food supplies, rent and consumer goods weren't nearly enough to match the standard of living in the West, which was widely known in the DDR. But they were enough to chronically deprive East Germany of the investment that might have made their economy competitive over the long term. They were never able to do so. By 1989, when the Wall fell, the economic infrastructure was in far worse shape than even the most skeptical Western observers generally expected.

Hosfeld's book details various twists and turns in the economic and political changes of SED policy over the four decades of the DDR's existence. It gives a feel for how differences in opinion on economic, political and cultural matters expressed themselves within the limited confines of the SED dictatorship. Hosfeld also discusses the collaboration and disagreements between the SED and the Soviet leadership, which again took place with the confines of Soviet domination.

That is, until 1989 when the Michael Gorbachev basically cut the East German leaders loose. Then-Party-leader Erich Honecker and his supporters were so disturbed at the prospect of political liberalization in the DDR that they began banning Soviet articles on the changes taking place in the USSR.

Hosfeld's history of the democratic opposition in the 1980s is fairly cursory, almost like a postscript. This year marks the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall in November, 1989.

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Saturday, July 18, 2009

You say that means what?


I was curious when I saw a new book by an author named Helmut Schröcke, Die Vorgeschichte des deutschen Volkes: Indogermanen, Germanen, "Slawen" [Preshistory of the German People: Indogermanics, Germanics, "Slavs"] (2009). I was looking for information about a couple of historical points I had recently been discussing with someone. And this book had all the trappings of being a scholarly work. I hadn't planned to read all 700-plus pages of it. But I had hoped I could find some information that I was looking for in such an evidently thorough book on the subject.

I began to wonder about Schröcke's perspective when I read that that by 10,000 BCE "one of the greatest Darwinian selections" had taken place which transformed the people of part of the area that would later become Germany into the "blond, blue-eyed and white Mesolithic people." These genetic products were so smart and creative that until this day, according to Schröcke, they lead the world in IQ.

Uh-oh, I thought. This doesn't sound so good. But maybe he's swallowed some badly flawed conservative assumptions about IQ while still taking a sound scientific approach in other things.

Then he cites a dubious argument by the late Austrian scientist Konrad Lorenz, who German and Austrian rightwingers admire because of his pro-Nazi work during the Third Reich and later arguments that lend themselves to racial theories. The Lorenz citation was in support of Schröcke's argument that "the further evolutionary development of humanity is hindered" by the intercultural mixing. Definitely not sounding good - and this is just the second page of the chapter I started reading.

He continues immediately to say, "Die Herkunft dieser Zerstörungkräfte läßt sich heute lokalisieren. Ihre Diskussion liegt außerhalb der Aufgaben diese Buches." ("The origin of these destructive forces can be localized today. Discussion of them lies outside the scope of this book.") Uh-oh again. And double uh-oh. Anyone who's encountered much of this kind of thing would begin to wonder if there's a theory about Jews or Freemasons at work here.

A couple of pages later as he describes ancient times in middle Europe, claims that the Germanic peoples - "Germanic" comes from the Roman name for the tribes in northern Europe - maintained strict tribal laws against intermarrying with non-Germanic peoples and therefore had no mixing with the Celts who lived for centuries south of them. More uh-oh.

I skimmed through the following chapter, in which I found the kicker:

Dies ist eine aureichende Begründung für einen "deutschen Sonderweg", für das Dasein des letzten bis 1945 weitgehend unvermischt geliebenen größten Volkes der Indogermamanen, das jetzt in der multiethnischen und multikulturellen EU und ihrer geplanten Weiterentwicklung seine "Endlösung" finden soll.

[This is sufficient ground for a "German special way", for the existence until 1945 of the last widely unmixed remaining large people of the Indogermanics, which now in the multiethnic and multicultural EU [European Union] and its planned wider development will find its "Final Solution."]
"Endlösung" is exactly the word used for the infamous "Final Solution" of the Third Reich, the attempt to kill off all the Jews of Europe. This is undoubtedly the language of far-right crackpots. Which tells me that it would be risky to take anything in his book as established fact without responsible documentation.

Bringfriede Sas did a post about him, Post von Helmut Schröcke Endstation Rechts Sachsen 11.06.2008, that describes various far-right connections of Schröcke's. He has been part of the xenophobic Heidelberger Kreis (Heidelberg Circle). Eberhard Seidel wrote in Volksfront aus CDU und Skins 20.03.2001taz about how Schröcke and other leading lights of the Heidelberger Kreis helped legitimate to a degree racist and xenophobic attitudes within the Christian Democratic Union (CDU).

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Tuesday, June 23, 2009

Varieties of terrorist experience


Uwe Backes' Bleierne Jahre: Baader-Meinhof und danach [The Leaden Years: Baader-Meinhof and After] was published in 1991, near the end of the 23-year active career of the Baader-Meinhof Gang of the title (Rote Armee Fraktion, or RAF) and at a time when far-right terrorism was beginning to emerge as a more signficant problem for unifed Germany.

In light of recent polemics over domestic terrorism in the United States, it's useful to see the subject discussed in a different context, from a different time and at a point where both far-right and far-left terrorism were active problems of comparable significance. In a table displaying incidents of left- and rightwing terrorism in the German Federal Republic (BRD; West Germany) from 1968-1989, the left version exceeded the right version for each year in the comparison, with far-right terrorism becoming noticeably more active from 1980 on. Leftwing incidents also increased during that period.

But numerical comparisons can only tell us so much. The year during that period in which terrorism had the most significant political effect in the BRD was 1977, the year in which the RAF kidnapped and eventually "executed" Hanns Martin Schleyer, the head of the BRD's employers' association, which eventually involved the kidnapping of a Lufthansa flight by Palestinian terrorists acting in solidarity with the RAF, and the prison suicides of the RAF's two main leaders, Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ennslin. That year was the high-point of the terror that the RAF's actions were designed to inspire and the period in which the German government was under the greatest pressure to step outside its own legal bounds in the fight against the RAF.

So not all acts of terrorism are equal in their political impact. And not all terrorists are equal in terms of their motivations. Backes devotes his longest chapter to biographies of terrorists, including Baader and Ennslin, the other two main RAF founders Horst Mahler and Ulrike Meinhof, Bommi Baumann of a leftwing terrorist group Bewegung 2.Juni, Hans-Joachim Klein of the RAF, and neo-Nazi Odfried Hepp. He then summarizes his research on these and other "terrorist careers".

In the BRD during the period under study, the active terrorists had been most between roughly 20 and 40, with leftwing groups composed more of people near the same age and rightwing ones having a wider spread. Left groups had more female terrorists, right ones were almost exclusively male. Most were from prosperous families. Some kind of serious disruptions in their families' lives was a common factor, e.g., a missing father, divorce.

Among the three leading leftwing terrorist groups in the BRD - RAF, Bewegung 2.Juni and the Revolutionäre Zelle (RZ) - a disproportionate number came from Protestant families. Gudrun Ennslin's father was a Protestant minister. Backes speculates that a Protestant emphasis on the notion that correct belief will make everything right may have played a particular role.

Students composed a large portion of the left terrorists, and liberal arts studies like sociology, education and psychology were especially well represented. Members of far-right terrorist groups tended to have less than the average education compared to other Germans their age. For both groups, a period between completing their education and becoming established in a working career was the most likely period of recruitment.

Backes also describes the evolution of organizational forms of extremist groups involved in violence during the 1980s toward more "autonomous" forms, small groups working together in general but loose coordination with like-minded militants. As violent fringe groups in the US and other countries were discovering around the same time, a decentralized, loosely-knit form of organization is a different kind of challenge to the authorities than a centralized organization. Even in the RAF, the group evolved from a centrally-directed form under the original founding members to a more decentralized mode of operation over time. The "third generation" of the RAF active in the 1980s and 1990s were more successful in evading capture. And even now, their identities are less well known that those of the "first" and "second generations". And developing communications technology allows for even more diffuse methods of operation.

He uses a pyramid diagram of the type that management writers are so fond of employing to illustrate the political environment of the RAF, which could also be applied to other groups, as well. A circle diagram would probably be even more appropriate, particularly for the later, more decentralized forms of organization. There was at any given time a hard core of active, violent militants who were involved in actions against persons (kidnappings, assassinations, bank robberies). There was a larger group around the core who were also involved in violence but concetrated on violence against things, objects like buildings, in actions that were designed to have symbolic value rather than hurt people. These could be seen as two parts of the hard core group. In the first and second RAF "generations", the hard core was particularly isolated because they had given up their identities and had to concentrate most of their energy on securing money, weapons and identities papers of various kinds. The hard core of the "third generation" apparently mostly kept their own identities so they didn't have to rely on high-risk activities like robbery and kidnapping to finance their terrorism.

There was a militant group outside the illegals that would engage in smaller violent actions, like throwing rocks during demonstrations or more minor vandalism. This group weren't necessarily all living in the "underground". Then there was a larger group of active sympathizers who were engaged in agitation and propaganda.

These particular environments are vitally important to understanding not only these groups from 20 or 30 years ago but domestic terrorist groups today, as well. Even when the violent actions take the form of seeming "lone wolf" attacks, they are operating in a particular political and psychological environment. Including those who suffering from actual mental illness, which is the "lone nut" script into which the American press tries to squeeze any and all incidents of far-right terrorism. The path to violent action and the selection of targets operate within that larger framework. A leftwing terrorist is not likely to try to assassinate an abortion provider. A neo-Nazi is more likely to shoot up a crowd in a Holocaust museum than to attack a white racist TV commentator.

Recruitment into the hard core of violent militants also typically takes place from the related political circle of activists. That may seem obvious, but it's an important fact. If the broader context of sympathizers is reduced, then the potential for recruiting new violent activists is decreased. But that also means that neither authorities nor those in civil society concerned to reduce the domestic terrorist potential can simply ignore the terrorists' political goals and environment, any more than they can ignore their personal psychology, their choice of weaponry or their criminal modus operandi.

I'll quote Backes' concluding lines here, which focus on the role of fanaticism and the Good vs. Evil Manichean mindset in the phenomenon of terrorism:

Der Terrorismus belegt anschaulich die Macht extremistischer Ideologien. Marxismus, Anarchismus und Nationalismus heißen die intellektuellen Drogen, die das politische Wahrnehmungsvermögen trüben, scheinbar schlüssige Antworten auf alle Probleme bieten und das Verlangen nach „großen" Zielen befriedigen. Aus dem bedingungslosen Einsatz für die einzig „gerechte" Sache sind in der Vergangenheit die größten Verbrechen gegen die Menschheit begangen worden. Wo der Glaube an die absolute Richtigkeit der eigenen Überzeugungen Raum greift, gelten Toleranz und Liberalität als unverzeihliche Schwächen. Für die Erreichung höchster Ziele erscheint letzlich jedes Mittel geeignet. Hier tritt die totalitäre Wurzel des Terrorismus in demokratischen Verfassungsstaaten zutage.

[Terrorism graphically demonstrates the power of extremist ideologies. Marxism, anarchism and nationalism are the names of the intellectual drugs that dull the political perception, offer seemingly definitive answers to all problems and satisfy the longing for "great" objectives. From the unconditional commitment to the only "just" thing, the greatest crimes against humanity have been committed in the past. Where the belief on the absolute rightness of one's own conviction gains ground, tolerance and liberality are seen as unforgiveable weaknesses. For the achievement of the highest goals, any means appears appropriate. Here outcrop the totalitarian roots of terrorism in constitutional democratic states.]
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Sunday, June 07, 2009

EU elections in Germany and Austria

European Union Parliamentary elections were held Sunday throughout the EU. Based on the early results I've seen, here is status of the results in Germany and Austria.

Germany: Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) together with its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU) won the most votes with 38%. But that was a significant decline from the previous one in 2004. The Green Party and the Left Party together effectively matched the vote for the junior governing party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) with a combined 21%. In local elections that also took place the same day, the Greens for the first time came out as the leading party in Stuttgart. The Greens also won 22% in Mainz, a record for them in that city, which put them just behind the votes for the CDU and the SPD.

This election continues a weakening of the SPD's support. It's still has the second largest representation in Parliament after the CDU/CSU. But it's not unthinkable that the Greens could overtake them soon, though they would have to double their vote to achieve that. It's hard to say how some kind of Green/Left Party merger would fare, because the "postcommunist" Left Party still leaves doubts about how far they've come from orthodox Communist ideas of 20 years ago.

Austria: The Christian Democratic ÖVP pulled 30% with the Social Democrats (SPÖ) winning a disappointing 24%, down from their 33% in 2004; the ÖVP was also at 33% in 2004. The far-right FPÖ won 13%, which they considered a disappointment, and the Greens won just under 10%. An electoral headed by a former journalist, Hans Peter Martin, was the biggest surprise, pulling almost 18%, higher than the established parties the Greens and the FPÖ.

As usual, the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ) won under 1%. The KPÖ's main historical distinction was their business acumen at laundering money from the East German Communist Party back in the day.

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Wednesday, May 27, 2009

Bettina Röhl on Karl-Heinz Kurras and the Stasi revelations


Der Tod des Demonstranten (Death of the Demonstrator)- a memorial to Benno Ohnesorg by Alfred Hrdlicka, 1971: photo in Berlin 1990

I posted earlier about the story that came out in the German press last week about how Karl-Heinz Kurras, the West Berlin policeman who shot and killed Benno Ohnesorg on June 2, 1967, had been an East German spy and an illegal member of the East German Communist Party (SED) since 1967. Ohnesorg’s death is generally understood as having been a decisive event in spreading the militant German student movement throughout West Germany, when it had been primarily a West Berlin phenomenon prior to that. And the movement in response became even more militant and, in part, violent.

In her blog post Tod von Benno Ohnesorg: Staatsmord aus Ostberlin?, journalist Bettina Röhl Die Welt 22.05.2009 gives some quirky interpretations of the history of that event and its aftermath. I’ve laid out my understanding of the Ohnesorg killing and its repercussions in my earlier post, so I won’t do another overall recap here. She argues that the biggest impetus to the spread and increased militance of the student movement after June 2 was due to the resignations of West Berlin's Mayor and Police President, which signalled to the extra-parliamentary opposition (APO), i.e., the militant left opposition, that state authorities were weak. In other words, she argues that insufficient authoritarianism by West German officials let the student movement flourish that otherwise could have been restricted.

In doing so, she makes contradictory arguments about the power of the student movement, which she heavily implies was essentially a creation of East Germany. In one place, she argues that the movement would have developed pretty much the way it did, violence and all, without Ohnesorg’s killing. Yet she also argues that if the public had just known then about Kurras' Stasi (East German Security) ties, that the movement couldn’t have gotten any traction from the killing.

But the West German state hardly showed itself to be weak in dealing with protesters, then or later. On the contrary, their training in crowd control was based on a scenario of crowd actions in support of an act of Soviet/East German military aggression against West Berlin. In the situation of the late 1960s, the overly aggressive police tactics had the effect of polarizing the situation in university cities all over West Germany, including conservative Bavaria. The Ohnesorg killing became a symbol of that, but it became a symbol because police excesses were real.

"Enteignet Springer" (Expropriate Springer) became a popular slogan of the student movement shortly after Benno Ohnesorg's death

Her self-contradicatory argument that the APO would have been undercut by the immediate knowledge that Kurras was a Stasi agent is essentially based on the notion that the APO admired the East German version of socialism, which for the most part wasn’t really the case. APO activists expressed solidarity with protest movements in Poland and Czechoslovakia and were generally critical of East German "Stalinism“. She also ignores the ham-handed pugnacity of Social Democratic Mayor Heinrich Albertz in the immediate wake of the killing, as well as the hysteria of the Springer press. On the latter, she is explicitly in denial, writing that they were "die einzige, die damals einen kühlen Kopf bewahrte" (the only ones who kept a cool head back then). That’s imaginative, for sure, but it‘s astonishing revisionism that could only be defended by defining "cool head“ as something like "recklessly irresponsible“. (Die Welt was then and is now a Springer paper.)

Her post also carries a tone of what we in America would call "culture war" polemics, i.e., she still wants to discredit the DHF's (darn frigging hippies, in the nice version) of those days while imagining that their malign influence is present all over the place in present-day German culture. She talks, for instance, about the "die 68er-Ideologen und auch das gigantische Millionenheer der Mitläufer von 68" (the Sixties ideologues and also the gigantic army of millions of fellow-travelers of the Sixties) who are supposedly resistent to facts about that period. DFH's, in other words. And historians of the period who don't share her dismissive atitude toward the DFH's are acting as "security guards" to protect some DFH conventional wisdom about the 1960s.

Having fairly recently read a number of accounts of the period - not least of them Röhl's own highly informative book on the subject, which shows a level of care in narrative and analysis that is missing in her blog post - I don't know who she may be talking about there. I've reviewed here two 2008 books on "1968" by leading German historians Norbert Frei and Götz Aly. Neither strikes me as some DFH ideological position paper. On the contrary, most of the analysis I've seen from German writers on that period seem to take a critical view of events, especially on the ideology and practice of violence.

Röhl also paints with a very broad brush in her post when she writes:

Indes war die Propaganda der APO eine ganz durchsichtige Angelegenheit: Die 68er-Bewegung, die damals noch APO-Bewegung hieß, baute auf dem Tod von Ohnesorg ihre Legende auf, dass der Staat derjenige war, der zuerst Gewalt angewendet hätte, auf die die friedliche Massenbewegung nur reagiert habe.

[In this way, [Ohnesorg's shooting] was a very obvious opportunity for the propaganda of the APO. The Sixties Movement, when then was still called the APO Movement, built up on the death of Ohnesorg their legend that it was the state that first introduced violence, to which the peaceful mass movement only reacted.]
Here she seems to be so intent on denigrating the APO that she manages to simultaneously exaggerate and minimize the significance of the Benno Ohnesorg shooting. Sure, his death became an element of the APO's propaganda. Just as the events of that day became an element of the Springer press' hysterical campaign against the student movement - a cool-headed hysterical campaign, according to Röhl. But it became a widespread symbol for the APO because the image and the context resonated strongly with so many young people given how they saw the police acting.

And I'm not sure what it means to say that the APO "built up on the death of Ohnesorg their legend that it was the state that first introduced violence". However emotional a turning point the Ohnesorg may have been for many APO activists, for those among them who advocated some form of political violence, I don't get the impression that "who shot first" was a particularly important question.

A video accompanying the following article addresses some of these issues: Stasi-Fall Kurras: Birthler weist "rätselhafte" Vorwürfe zurück Die Welt 26.05.2009

Other related links:

Dutschke-Sohn fordert neue Suche in den Stasi-Akten von Einar Koch Bild-Zeitung 26.05.2009

Der Fall Benno Ohnesorg: Jetzt spricht die Frau des Todes-Schützen Bild-Zeitung 26.05.2009

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Monday, May 25, 2009

Other links on Benno Ohnesorg's murder by Stasi agent Karl-Heinz Kurras

These are a variety of links with mostly no commentary by me on the Curious Case of Benno Ohnesorg and His Killer Karl-Heinz Kurras, Stasi Agent:

Stasi-Debatte: Vorwürfe gegen die Birthler-Behörde Frankfurter Rundschau 25.05.2009

Given the notorious role the Springer press in general and the Bild-Zeitung in particular played in inciting fear and hatred against young political activists in the 1960s, there something weirdly ironic about citing Bild's articles on the revelations that Benno Ohnesorg's killer, Karl-Heinz Kurras, was a Stasi agent. But here's one link, Der Ex-Innenminister zum Fall Benno Ohnesorg: War es ein Auftragsmord, Herr Schily? 24.05.2009.

Bild's Web site has an aggregator page of at least some of its articles on the Ohnesorg case: Alle Infos zum Fall Benno Ohnesorg.

Der Fall Karl-Heinz Kurras: "Soll ich mich deshalb schämen?" von S. Höll Süddeutsche Zeitung 24.05.2009

The current issue of Der Spiegel makes the story its cover feature:


Fall Kurras: Ohnesorgs Todesschütze gesteht SED-Mitgliedschaft Die Zeit 24.05.2009

Ohnesorg-Todesschütze: "Mein Fall ist längst verjährt" Frankfurter Rundschau 24.05.2009

Benno Ohnesorg: Mit einem Schuss in die Geschichte von Uwe Schlicht Die Zeit24.05.2009

Fall Kurras: Neue Details: "Ich komme wegen der Schießabteilung" Süddeutsche Zeitung 23.05.2009

Birthler-Behörde: Stasi-Spitzel erschoss Ohnesorg Die Zeit23.05.2009

Studentenbewegung 1967: Zu Besuch bei Ohnesorgs Todesschützen von Uwe Soukup Die Zeit23.05.2009

Stasi-Spitzel: Schuss mit Fragezeichen von Steffen Hebestreit Frankfurter Rundschau 22.05.2009

Stasi-Vergangenheit: Erneut Strafanzeige gegen Kurras gestellt Die Zeit22.05.2009

Taumeln von einer Lüge zur anderen: Ohnesorg und die DDR von Willi Winkler Süddeutsche Zeitung 22.05.2009

Vielleicht war es nicht die NS-Vergangenheit von Wolfgang Kraushaar Frankfurter Rundschau 22.05.2009

Der Stasi-Kurras: Ohnesorg, die DDR und die 68er von Heribert Prantl Süddeutsche Zeitung 22.05.2009

Oskar Negt über Karl-Heinz Kurras: "Eine gespenstische Wende" Süddeutsche Zeitung 22.05.2009

Karl-Heinz Kurras: Stasi-Agent tötete Ohnesorg Süddeutsche Zeitung 22.05.2009

Karl-Heinz Kurras: Strafanzeige gegen Ohnesorg-Todesschützen Süddeutsche Zeitung 22.05.2009

Benno Ohnesorg: Die Geburt der 68er von Michael König Süddeutsche Zeitung 22.05.2009

Kurras: "Können die uns nicht endlich in Ruhe lassen?" Süddeutsche Zeitung 22.05.2009

Neue Berichte: Ohnesorg von Stasi-Spitzel erschossen" Süddeutsche Zeitung 21.05.2009

Tod Benno Ohnesorgs: "Die Polizisten haben geprügelt wie blöd" Süddeutsche Zeitung 30.05.2007 (Interview mit Friederike Hausmann)

Benno Ohnesorg: Der Tod des Träumers von Willi Winkler Süddeutsche Zeitung 30.05.2007

Der 2. Juni 1967 und Ohnesorgs Tod: "Zynischer ging's nicht" Süddeutsche Zeitung 02.06.2007

Spätes Bedauern in Berlin: Polizeipräsident legt Kranz für Ohnesorg nieder von Oliver Das Gupta Süddeutsche Zeitung 02.06.2007

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Wow! And, wow! New wrinkle on a notorious event in recent German history


Friederike Dollinger (now Friederike Hausmann) with the dying Benno Ohnesorg, who had just been shot in the head by a West Berlin policeman who was secretly a Stasi agent (June 2, 1967)

I'm really surprised at this one. The West Berlin policeman Karl-Heinz Kurras set off a long wave of violence when he murdered a 26-year-old student named Benno Ohnesorg on June 2, 1967. A photo of Ohnesorg bleeding out from his head wound is one of the most famous images of recent German history. It was a crucial turning point in the student movement in West Germany.

Now the 81-year-old Kurras is admitting that he was a secret member of the East German Communist Communist Party (SED) and spied for East Germany!

Der Fall Karl-Heinz Kurras: "Soll ich mich deshalb schämen?" von S. Höll Süddeutsche Zeitung 24.05.2009 reports that Kurras initially denied it last week when documents from the archives of the Stasi (East Germany secret police) were published showing his role. But now he admits it straightforwardly. He denies getting paid for his spying, though. Höll reports that a new charge against Kurras over the shooting of Ohnesorg is unlikely, since he was acquitted in two trials related to the killing already. He also reports that there is no indication that the Ohnesorg shooting was somehow ordered by East Germany.

Whether or not those trials were genuinely fair ones from the victim's viewpoint, it's clear that there was no good reason for Kurras to shoot Ohnesorg to death. The incident took place after the second of two demonstrations against the Shah of Iran, who was paying a state visit to Germany. There was a politically active community of pro-democracy Iranian dissidents in West Germany who were highlighting the human rights abuses of the Iranian regime. One of them was a young intellectual named Bahman Nirumand who had fled Iran in 1965 and had published a book in 1967 called Persien: Modell eines Entwicklungslandes oder Die Diktatur der freien Welt [Persia [Iran]: Model of a developing country or the Dictatorship of the Free World]. Nirumand criticized the support of the Western democracies for the Shah's brutal government, and his book was one of the most influential books for the activist German students of the 1960s.

Stasi expert Helmut Müller-Enbergs on discovering the Kurras Stasi files: "Ich bin vom Stuhl gefallen." ("I fell out of my chair.")

The German authorities had made a spectacularly ill-advised decision to allow a group of thugs run by the Iranian secret service, the SAVAK, to act as guards to the Shah. During a peaceful demonstration during the daytime of June 2, the SAVAK thugs had attacked a few hundred anti-Shah demonstrators while the Berlin police looked passively on and let it happen. Then the police moved in themselves against the student demonstrators, arresting some of them but none of the SAVAK attackers.

This raised the emotional temperature for a second demonstration already planned that evening outside the Deutsche Oper, where the Shah and his wife were attending a performance of Mozart's opera, The Magic Flute. The demonstrators were more militant, and a few tomatoes and paint balloons flew, injuring no one but embarassing the Berlin officials. Erich Duensing, the chief police official (president), had directed the police to proceed aggressively against the demonstrators, beating them with clubs (men and women alike) and firing water cannons at them, like in the infamous photos from Birmingham, Alabama, of a few years before. The demonstrators were in full flight when Kurras shot Benno Ohnesorg in the back of the head in a parking garage.

Ohnesorg was a 26-year-old literature student who apparently wasn't taking part in the demonstration at all. Nor was he armed or threatening the police in any way. The reaction was intense. Part of the problem, aside from the bad judgments of the moment by German officials and police, was that the Berlin police weren't really trained to deal with street demonstrations at that time. Their training for emergency situations was predicated opposing street actions coordinated with a Soviet invasion of the city. Which also meant that city officials were also pretty clueless about how to respond to such an event as the Ohnesorg shooting. So the Social Democratic Mayor of West Berlin, Heinrich Albertz, said the demonstrators were to blame for the death, adding, "Die Geduld der Stadt ist am Ende." (The patience of the city is at an end.") Not especially diplomatic in a situation where a cop has just made a very questionable fatal shooting, in a situation that was already tense because of blatant police misconduct.

This video shows the report on the German channel ZDF about the Kurras revelations, including footage of the fatally wounded Benno Ohnesorg with Friederike Hausmann:



The Springer press empire, which included the sensation-oriented Bild-Zeitung, accused the demonstrators of acting like Hitler's SA Brownshirts back in the day. Bild on the day after the Ohnesorg murder declared, "In Berlin gab es bisher Terror nur östlich der Mauer. Gestern haben bösartige und dumme Wirrköpfe zum erstenmal versucht, den Terror in den freien Teil der Stadt zu tragen." ("In Berlin up until now, there was Terror only east of the Wall. Yesterday, malicious and dumb crazies attempted for the first time to bring Terror into the free part of the city.") Again, it was the demonstrators they were accusing of Terror, not the police and the SAVAK thugs. A particularly awkward comparison to place against state terror in Communist East Berlin. And even more ironic in retrospect, knowing now that the killer was an East German agent.

Protests grew against the police and the Springer press, as well. Within a few weeks, the slogan "Enteignet Springer!" (Expropriate Springer!) became popular among left-leaning student demonstrators. It's generally assumed among German historians that the killing of Benno Ohnesorg touched off "1968" or "the Sixties" in West Germany, insofar as that meant a mass political movement among the young (though it was not only young Germans who were outraged by the Ohnesorg shooting). As historian Norbert Frei describes it in 1968: Jugendrevolte und globaler Protest (2008), the fate of Benno Ohnesorg, shot down by a cop because he looked like a student who was in the wrong place at the wrong time, was one in which it was easy for many students to imagine themselves.

The shooting didn't create the student or youth movements, they were already under way. But, referring to the SDS, the leading militant political group among German university students (not to be confused with the American SDS of the same time), Frei writes that at their national conference in Frankfurt a few weeks later, "nobody was talking about tomatoes any more." The Ohnesorg shooting marked a militant and violent turn in the student movement.

Wolfgang Kraushaar writes in Vielleicht war es nicht die NS-Vergangenheit von Frankfurter Rundschau 22.05.2009 that Ohnesorg's death was "the spark that ignited the student revolt". There had been something like a student revolt at the Freie Universität in West Berlin before that, he writes, but the Ohnesorg killing and the general official misconduct around the demonstrations on June 2 created such a shock and outrage among univerisity students and other young people that activism took off among them all over West Germany.

Karl-Heinz Kurras, Stasi agent and killer of Benno Ohnesorg, in 1967

When Karl-Heinz Kurras was acquitted on November 21, 1967 of murder in the Ohnesorg case, the chief judge in the case indicated that he was unhappy with the outcome of the case in words that retroactively take on a new meaning in light of the revelations that Kurras as an East German spy: "Kurras weiss mehr, als er sagt, und er macht den Endruck, als wenn er in vielen Dingen die Unwahrheit sagt." ("Kurras knows more than he's saying, and he gives the impression that he is speaking falsehood in many things.") The judge was more perceptive than he knew.

Despite Kurras' acquital, both police president Erich Duensing and Mayor Heinrich Albertz wound up resigning their posts after the details of the Ohnesorg killing became public.

According to Höll's report, Kurras provided intelligence reports to East Germany on the West German police and the West German Verfassungsschutz, an internal security agency. The Stasi reduced their contacts with him after the Ohnesorg murder. But the files show a Stasi contact as late as 1976. He provided information to the Stasi about East German refugees and planted microphones in offices. He wasn't just passing on office gossip.

I hate to speculate. But who can resist speculating about a spy story? One obvious speculation is that the East Germans could have put him up to shooting somebody at that demonstration to cause trouble. Or, he could have seen himself as a convinced Communist - which he presumably did if he wasn't taking money for his information - a made a similar calculation on his own, although that seems more far-fetched. But there's apparently no evidence of either, so far.

Then it's always possible that the West German authorities somehow greased the skids for Kurras' acquitals on charges related to the Ohnesorg murder because he was working as a double agent, or because they were secretly aware of his spying activities and were using him to feed misinforation to the Stasi. But there is no evidence in the public record of that either, so far as I know.

Still, it is a remarkable coincidence that a policeman whose shooting of student played such a key role in the politics of West Germany in the 1960s turns out to have been a secret Communist and a spy for East Germany!

Kraushaar recalls something I don't recall seeing described before. Benno Ohnesorg's funeral procession of over 100 cars had to pass through East German territory to get from West Berlin to Hannover, where he was buried. Normally, the East German officials required cars to wait for hours to pass. The funeral convoy was waved through. Along the way, young people greeted the convoy along the highway, and East German soldiers along the route even paid honor to the deceased. As Kraushaar says, these unusual occurences looked like an act of state by the East Germans. At a minimum, it meant that East Germany wanted to make the incident as much of a pain as they could for the West German government. Kraushaar cautions that this is not to say that it was some kind of genuine act of solidarity by the East Germans. The leaders of the East German SED regime generally weren't interested in the "anti-authoritarian" goals of the western student movement except as it further their own state goals. Some twenty years later, they were rejecting Michael Gorbachev's brand of reform Communism as way too liberal for their liking.

But he also cautions that there is no evidence of an East German order to Kurras to shoot somebody. And he warns that we may never know. Since Kurras is still alive and apparently lucid, he himself could reveal for the first time what his motive in the killing was. But, as Kraushaar notes, there is no statute of limitations on murder, so by talking openly about his motives, Kurras could open himself to another prosecution on the Kurras killing. So it's unlikely to happen.

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Saturday, January 03, 2009

Terrorism then and now

Astrid Proll in custody, 1973

I came across a useful comparison between the jihadist terrorism we associate with Al Qa'ida and the kind of domestic terrorism a number of countries experienced in the 1970s, including Germany, Japan, the US, Italy, Spain and Argentina. It comes from a book by Astrid Proll, Hans und Grete: Bilder der RAF 1967-1977 (2004 edition). The author has some experience in the subject. She was one of the original members of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), aka, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, who managed to spread considerable terror in Germany during the 1970s, although remnants of the group remained into the 1990s.

The formation of the RAF can be dated to May 14, 1970, when Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ennslin and others, including Proll, sprang Andreas Baader from police custody. Baader, Gudrun, Astrid's brother Thorwald, and Horst Söhnlein firebombed a department store in Frankfurt in 1968 as a political protest. The bombs went off at night; no one was injured though the store burned down. Baader was in custody in 1970 in relation to that bombing.

One official was severely wounded in freeing Baader, Astrid says by a hired gun the group brought along with them. She herself was arrested on May 6, 1971, which effectively ended her participation in the group's actions, before most of their more notorious and deadly actions began, although she considered herself part of the group for another couple of years.

Her comparison of the RAF's brand of terrorism to the kind the word invokes today, as in the Oklahoma City bombing or the 9/11 attacks, is as follows. The text of this edition of the book is a parallel text in German and English:

To me, the production of this book was a way of getting close to my own history as well as the history of the RAF, which has been distorted by myths. And yet, appraising this type of 1970s terrorism in West Germany has become much more difficult since Al Quaida showed their murderous contempt for human life on 11 September 2001. Compared with the commandos who flew jet planes into the World Trade Center in New York, we were troubled amateurs, tormented by moral scruples. While Islamic assassins not only accept the death of civilians but attempt to kill as many as possible, we had long discussions about the issue of legitimate goals. When 17 workers were unintentionally hurt in a bomb attack on the headquarters of the Springer media corporation in Hamburg in May 1972, there was serious criticism about it and heavy tension within the group.

In making this comparison I do not want to, nor can I, deny our responsibility, but I wish to point out nevertheless that the term terrorism has undergone a change of meaning and is now understood in a different context than it was in the seventies. The media revolution through the Internet, satellite TV and 24-hour news channels around the world, creating the possibility of messages from all corners of the world, give the terrorists of today a power and visual impact which we never had.

Today, the propaganda methods we used seem completely antiquated. Andreas Baader did not pose for a video camera like Osama Bin Laden, Kalashnikov in hand, to recruit new comrades. In Ulrike Meinhof we had an excellent, professional journalist, but our press releases were always reduced to brief, formulaic commando-like declarations. We never really tried to use the power of pictures. [my emphasis]
Not that the RAF's history is without violence against people and deliberate killings, quite the contrary. Actions like bombing American bases in Germany were intended to kill people, and did.

And when fanaticism takes hold, whether it comes in a religious or secular cast, the definition of who are innocents can become very broad. Bodyguards? The RAF killed them. Civilian prosecutors? Targeted for assassination. And so on.

In the case of Salafi Sunni extremists like Osama bin Laden, they typically embraced something like the theory of Sayyid Qutb, who classified not just non-Muslims or even non-Sunnis as infidels, but included anyone who was not an adherent of true Islam as defined by those of like mind to himself. In Qutb's case, that would have been the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Astrid Proll circa 2008

But Astrid Proll is right to distinguish between different types of terrorism. Bush's favorite formula that terrorists are the embodiment of evil who kill because "they hate our values" makes them sound like near-mindless nihilists. But it hinders rather than helps trying to actually understand what those groups do. And some level of understanding is obviously required to protect innocent people against them. One of the most bizarre things about today's Republican ideology is that they take the notion of trying to understand what terrorists are doing as the equivalent of sympathy. Truly weird.

Terrorism is a technique of warfare, not an ideology. But it's also important to distinguish between the types of groups using it. Pro-Allied partisans in France, Yugoslavia and Russia during the Second World War practiced bombings, sabotage and assassination. But they didn't simply try to kill large numbers of civilians. They certainly wanted to terrorize the German occupiers and any local sympathizers. But they wanted the support of the local population, not their hostility.

Deliberate mass killing of civilians is typically not practiced against a group's own population base of support, although I'm sure there are exceptions. The Irish Republican Army were willing to indulge in random killing of English civilians. Leaving aside the morality of it for a moment, that at least makes more sense than, say, Timmy McVeigh blowing up the federal building in Oklahoma City and killing hundreds of people, including white people who theoretically should have been potential participants in the theocratic-Christian White Power revolution McVeigh imagined.

But morality is part of war, however much today's Republicans may despite the very notion of law or morality in war, except to assume that Our Side is justified in doing whatever Dear Leader tells us - as long as Dear Leader is a Republican, of course. And deliberate killing of civilians, or even careless disregard for the safety of civilian noncombatants, is wrong. Whether its a terrorist group or a government on Our Side doing it.

She also offers these descriptions of the thinking of RAF members in the 1970s:

We wanted to be part of the world-wide youth revolt in the late 190s, and we wanted to be its vanguard. We were shocked and enraged by the images of the war in Vietnam, such as the photograph of the Saigon Head of Police who killed a captured Vietcong on a open road by shooting him in the head. Most Germans accepted the Vietnam War without taking action - we, by contrast, identified with Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara and the liberation movements in the Third World. In Nazi Germany our parents had been stranded in an ugly, despicable place in history. We wanted to escape their guilt and their nightmare, as well as their continuing love of law and order.
So far as I'm aware, the RAF didn't promote any Jewish conspiracy theories or anything like that. But their revolutionary purity from the sins of their parents' generation didn't stop them from going for military training to a Al Fatah Palestinian guerrilla camp in Jordan. (This was long before Al Fatah became a sometime ally of Israel as it is in the Gaza attack going on now.) And they certainly considered Israel as an enemy of the world revolution of which they wanted to be a part.

We wanted to be radical, courageous, pioneers, we considered ourselves to be a vanguard. We overestimated ourselves excessively, indulging in the illusion that revolution was possible in the prosperous German Federal Republic [West Germany]. In this light we were self-timers [i.e., self-justifying] who acted cut off from reality in a void. We lived a kind of armed existentialism. The men were ready to get going. While they were busy affectionately cleaning their guns, the women did the major part of organising and thinking. The women did bank raids, too, but more carefully and reluctantly. I also carried a gun, though I would have tried everything else to defend myself before using it. The weapon was the membership card of the RAF which we, in accordance with the [American] Black Panthers, would only use in self-defence, if it was really necessary.
While this may relate her own experience accurately, it could also be misleading in another sense. The RAF from the start aimed at a violent revolution in West Germany and was certainly willing to take actions that could hardly be called self-defence. (The Black Panthers would be a different story, though in practice they didn't see armed action as strictly a matter of self-defence, either.)

It's also worth noting that women later were not only active but in leadership positions in the RAF. As one commenter said, the men of the RAF were very macho. But the women were more macho than the men.

After her arrest in 1971, Astrid was brought to prison in Cologne-Ossendorf. She was kept for a time in extreme isolation, something that has been a part of the torture techniques of the Cheney-Bush administration. She describes her experience as follows:

At first in Cologne I was kept isolated in a normal prison block. Then I was taken to an empty wing, a dead wing, where I was the only prisoner. Ulrike Meinhof later called it the "Silent Wing". The shocking experience was that I could not hear any noises apart from the ones that I generated myself. Nothing. Absolute silence. I went through states of excitement and was haunted by visual and acoustic hallucinations, extreme concentration disturbances, horrible weakness and fatigue. I had no idea how long this would go on for. I had a terrible fear of going mad.
The history of the RAF is an important part of recent German history in itself. And it does have some similarities to more recent terrorist events.

But differences do matter between the various groups. A Marxist-Leninist group like the RAF does not have the same goals or worldview as a white supremacist like Tim McVeigh, heavily influenced by Christian Identity religious doctrine. And violent Sunni Salafi extremists are different still. To pretend that they are all just some nihilist killers with no goals other than to kill people, destroy property and make life difficult for Americans is absurd.

Astrid Proll, by the way, after being released from jail went underground again in England for several years. She was eventually re-arrested and served part of her sentence. She was released early, though she doesn't detail the particular terms of her release. She went back to school and became a professional photographer, working for major publications including Der Spiegel and the London Independent, and even for Time magazine. So far as I'm aware, she has not been noted for having an urge to commit nihilistic violence.

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Thursday, January 01, 2009

"1968" in Germany


Rudi Dutschke, the most famous leader of the German student movement in 1968

Der diskrete Charme der Rebellion: Ein Leben mit den 68ern (2008) von Reinhard Mohr

Unser Kampf: 1968 - ein irritierter Blick zurück (2008) von Götz Aly

The now-departed year 2008 was the fortieth anniversary of the legendary "1968", which has become a symbol for the political and cultural upheavals that affected much of the world during that time. I've made a few "anniversary" type posts myself, including a review of German historian Norbert Frei's book 1968 (2008), which gives special attention to the German experience but also explains those events in the larger world context of "the 1960s".

Both books discussed here focus more particularly on events in Germany. And both involve some autobiography. Reinhard Mohr's book title, The Discrete Charm of the Rebellion in English, captures the perspective of his book well. Mohr relates some his experiences in the alternative scene in Frankfurt in the 1970s, where he knew some stars of the "68ers" like Daniel Cohn-Bendit, aka, Dany the Red, and Joschka Fischer. From Mohr's perspective as a young man in the Frankfurt scene, the experiences of what in America we call "the Sixties" were already something of a mythical past. His book doesn't sentimentalize that period. But his focus is on showing to readers of today why so many people found the experiences of that time charming and appealing to their sentiments and passions. That part of the story can get lost.

Götz Aly is one of Germany's leading historians, known in particular for his histories of the Third Reich and the Holocaust. His book focuses on both the key events that were most politically significant in that period and also is a kind of personal reckoning. Aly relates having been a leftwing activist of college age during that time. At times his book almost sounds like an American neoconservative villifying "the Sixties" while trying not to sound like a Christian fundamentalist or holy-roller. But that's not what he's doing.

Still, Aly's account does have some of the feel of a "god that failed" story. And self-analysis is certainly not a bad thing. As another one-time leftwing activist, Spain's Javier Solano, once put it, only idiots never change their minds. Yet it does seems to me at places in the book that Aly is a bit too hard on himself for once having been young.

The events that have come to symbolize "1968" in Germany are generally agreed upon: the anti-Shah protests of 1967 that included the police murder of a young protester named Benno Ohnesorg; the political role of groups like the German student organization SDS and its most famous leader Rudi Dutschke; the attempted assassination of Dutschke in 1968 by a young nationalist fanatic; the Grand Coalition (SPD and CDU/CSU) government of 1966-69; the Notstandsgesetz (emergency law) and the protests against it; the outrage of the now-adult children of those who were adults during the Nazi period at the failures of their parents and their parents' generation; the 1968 bombing of a department store in Frankfurt that first made two young revolutionaries named Andreas Baader and Gundrin Ensslin famous, the pair who along with Ulrike Meinhof and a few others would found the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), aka, the Baader-Meinhof Gang; the practice of terrorism in various forms mostly notoriously that of the RAF but also others like the Tupamaros Westberlin and the Bewegung 2.Juni; protests nonviolent and otherwise against the Axel Springer press empire; the sexual revolution and the appearance of alternative lifestyles scenes, such as the legendary Kommune 1 in Berlin.

Shocking the comfortable: the most popular German SDS poster, showing Marx, Engels and Lenin with the slogan, "Everybody talks about the weather. Not us."

It strikes me from today's perspective that one advantage that the 68er movement bequeathed to later decades was the fact that directly protesting against the press, particularly the Axel Springer papers of which the Bild-Zeitung was the most significant. The Bild-Zeitung was and is more of a sensational tabloid than part of the "quality press".

But while there was certainly a fourishing "underground" press in the United States, there was not the broad perception in America that there was among the German movement that the press itself was seriously flawed in a way that was a menace to freedom. Southern segregationists' railed against the alleged failure of the Yankee press to report how well the whites and the "nigras" got along with each other in the segregated South. The Republican Party under Nixon and Spiro Agnew picked up that theme and broaden it to accuse the press of being unpatriotic in its reporting on the Vietnam War and domestic protests, to the point where complaining about the Liberal Press! Liberal Press! Liberal Press! has beome part of the Party's DNA. With Nixon and Agnew on the warpath against the press, and with a mainstream press that still practiced actual journalism as with the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case and the Washington Post with the Watergate scandal, leftwing dissident groups were more likely to look on the Establishment press as at least a sometime ally.

Sexual revolution in Germany

That experience partially explains the fact that so many Democrats, both former "68ers" as well as others, failed to recognize for years how badly the national political press had begun to malfunction by 1992 with the Whitewater pseudo-scandals. Even today, it can be like pulling teeth to get liberal Dems to acknowledge that the national press is a serious, big-time mess.

Part of the challenge for anyone writing about a series of events as vaguely defined as "1968" or "the Sixties" is determining a focus. When people talk about "1968" in Germany, it's largely events and trends like those described above that come to mind. But one could make an argument that the birth control pill, the widespread diffusion of television sets, and the "economic miracle" in western Germany in the 1950s were more important in determining the direction of German society. Even more strictly in the realm of politics, it can certainly be plausibly argued that the beginning of Willi Brandt's Ostpolitik to ease tensions with the eastern European Communist bloc and the SPD leading a government under Brandt's Chancellorship were more significant events.

And the latter was not a direct result of the activism of the "68ers", though most of them presumably marginally preferred an SPD government to a hidebound conservative one. But the Social Democrats were attacked by many New Left activists as no longer being a revolutionary party, something which the SPD hadn't much pretended to be since 1918, at the latest.

But the activists of the 1960s challenged aspects of German society - such as authoritarian university practices, the excessive influence of ex-Nazi jurists in the judicial system, sexual practices, gender roles, reflexive support of American policies like the Vietnam War, passive attitudes toward politics, the ham-handed brutality that municipal police often displayed - that needed to be challenged. Ther ewas no New Left party at the time that was able to take any kind of direct political power, by electoral means or otherwise. But it can scarcely be said that the protests had no effect on the mainstream parties, on lifestyles, and even churches.

One characteristic of the youth movements of the German New Left and alternative-lifestyle movements was that they were largely youth movements. Certainly there were older people like the Frankfurt School philosopher Herbert Marcuse who were well-regarded by the movement. But even so, the influence of older and more experienced politicians on the Movement of the late 1960s was very limited. The German SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentendbund) was orginally the student group of the SDS. It eventually broke with the SPD altogether because the SDS assumed a more militant ideology and was highly critical of the political course the SPD had assumed with the Godesburg Program of 1959. Even Marcuse's Frankfurt School collaborator Max Horkheimer became a bogey-man of the young militants for his criticism of their dogmatic revolutionary rhetoric.

There were several effects of this youth focus. One is that they often placed too high a value on the essentially adolescent joys of shocking the stereotypical good solid citizens for the sake of shocking them. Now, protest movements are, well, protest movements. It's almost by definition their role to shock or at least annoy people into thinking differently about the aim of the protest. But when protesters adopted popular slogans like "Frei sein, high sein, Terror muss dabei sein" (be free, get high, and you have to have terrorism along with it"; it rhymes in German and doesn't sound so clunky), it mostly sounded charmingly shocking only to those using it. To others it was more likely just disgusting.

"Gewalt gegen Sachen" (Violence Against Things) by Kai Uwe Niephaus

And terrorism is inevitably part of the story. It would be false to see the terrorism of the RAF, which created a genuine political crisis in Germany in 1977, as some inevitable, teleological product of the protest movements of the 1960s. But it's also a fact that the terrorist groups did emerge from the "68er" scene. It's part of the story. And both Aly and Mohr include that aspect in their accounts. Mohr provides a bit more insight into the tragic aspects of it, Aly focuses more on the grim aspects of it. But with a fairly narrow definition of who the "68ers" were, any meaningful look at the terrorist phenomenon in Germany in the 1970s would have to recognize that it drew sympathy only from a limited segment of even those who considered themselves radical, although the RAF in particular has to be counted as group that made a significant mark on German history.

Aly focuses more on some of the questions that would particularly concern professional historians. And he makes some very thought-provoking observations about the 68er movement and its notions about existing Marxist governments, the Prague Spring of 1968, and the continuing historical burden of the Third Reich and the Holocaust. On these subjects, he sometimes sounds like a grumpy neoconservative wagging his finger at the alleged shameful hypocrisy of the Left. But, for the most part, he raises some valid issues, though his particular analysis isn't always convincing.

For instance, he takes himself and other young "rebels" to tasks for being naive about the Great Chinese Culture Revolution. As presented by Chinese propaganda, the Cultural Revolution was a process by which the Chinese Revolution was breaking new ground, fighting against the kind of bureacratic socialism which the Western New Left tended to see in the Soviet Union. In reality, it was a mass movement that Mao promoted to tighten his control over the Chinese Communist Party. And there's the body count, which Aly puts at a minimum of three million people dying between 1966 and 1976 as a result of the Cultural Revolution. And Aly argues that based on reliable information available in Germany at the time, the young German radicals could have known this.

There are a couple of problems, though, with his argument as presented in Unser Kampf. One is that it's not at all clear just how widespread this alleged admiration for the Chinese Cultural Revolution was among German activists. He cites some who were. And here's where the vagueness of an historical concept like "the Sixties" becomes an issue. If you define the 68ers as those who adhered to some full-blown revolutionary ideology, it's easy to imagine (though even then he doesn't really demonstrate) that admiration for the Cultural Revolution was typical. If you define the Movement in broader terms, it becomes more doubtful.

And he also plays a bit of a rhetorical trick here. It's one thing to criticize someone who's writing history for failing to appreciate the significance of the best German sources on the Cultural Revolution. It's another to look at what the Cultural Revolution symbolized in the minds of those German activists who did find it attractive in some way. Very few of the young people today who wear some kind of Che Guevara logo are likely to be able to give you an exposition of Marxist dialectical materialism, if they even know that Che was some kind of Marxist. His iconic image is a symbol of rebellion. And for the German 68ers who actually did find the Cultural Revolution symbolically appealing, it was very likely more as a symbol of rebellion, with the added shock value of it being something happening in the Communist world. China was an exotic, far-away place to most Germans. And with both the US and the Soviet Union carrying on propaganda wars against China in the 1960s, anyone who didn't have a healthy dose of skepticism about claims of the horrors of Communism in China probably wasn't thinking very hard about the subject.

Yes, those youthful admirers of Mao's Cultural Revolution were often wrong about it. And they were committing the sin of being young. But it hardly represents some kind of widespread callousness toward mass murder, which conclusion a reader might easily choose to draw from Aly's account.

Aly is on stronger ground when he argues that in terms of long-term historical signficance, the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a more consequential historical event than the protests in Germany or even the May-June revolt in Paris that same year. But his account also does carry the weight of the impression he leaves that most West German activists were indifferent to it or unsympathetic to it. In fact, the New Left in Europe and America was not generally attracted to the Soviet model of society, nor especially sympathetic to the Soviet Union. For adherents of the Soviet line, the New Left was largely "anti-Communist".

But what the New Left had to deal with, as did any mainstream critics of particular Cold War policies, was the fact that all sorts of military and political policies were justified by the US and its allies as necessary to combat Communism. Anyone serious about bringing about drastic changes in Western foreign policies would need to be very hesitant about helping promote attitudes and analyses that would reinforce their governments' Cold War positions. That context doesn't really come through in Aly's arguments along those lines. Here, I get the impression that his own need to renounce the less edifying aspects of his own youthful ideas gets in the way of his historical account.

Free speech poster by Ina Weiss

I find his thoughts on the relationship of the radicals of "1968" to the memory of the Third Reich far more valuable. The memory of the Third Reich and the Holocaust is a subject on which Aly is an actual expert. From Aly's as well as other accounts, it's clear that the skepticism of the younger generation about their elders' role during the Third Reich provided an important background to the events of the Sixties in Germany.

But the actual issues the movement raised from 1967 on had very little to do with the working out of remaining issues of the Nazi past. He argues that some of the revolutionary purism of the militants was in part a way of declaring themselves innocent of the sins of their parents' generation during the Third Reich. And he has a good case in noting that reflexive embrace of the Palestinian cause by many militants after the Six-Day War of 1967 was often taken with little thought of the complex relation of Germany to Middle Eastern affairs as a result of the Holocaust.

He cites a couple of actions by leftist activists that showed a particularly bone-headed attitude toward the anti-Semitism of the Nazi period. Activists associated with the Tupamaros West-Berlin group planted a firebomb in 1969 in Jewish Community House in West Berlin. It was meant to explode on November 9, the anniversary of the Kristallnacht pogrom action of 1938. Fortunately, it failed to explode.

In June of 1969, Israel had sent its first Ambassador to the Federal Republic (West Berlin), Asher Ben-Natan. Soon after his posting, he was invited to speak on June 9 at Frankfurt University on the topic, "Peace in the Near East". Leftist demonstrators protested his appearance with chants of "Ha, ha, ha - Al Fatah ist da" (Ha, ha, ah, Al Fatah is there) and "Zionisten raus aus Deutschland" (Zionists out of Germany).

Again, it's important to be careful about overly-broad generalizations about a vaguely-defined movement. But occurrences like this do give some reason to think that young German activists sometimes assumed a revolutionary purity without much thought of the extent to which they were affected by old-fashioned anti-Semitism or much reflection on the responsibilities of contemporary Germany in relation to the crimes of the Third Reich.

The fascination of the events of the Sixties is still with us. Maybe it's more of a Baby Boomer phenomenon than anything else. But there's no question that the events of the Sixties shook up most Western societies to one degree or another. For all the movement's faults, not least of them the terrorist offshoots, it did represent what Jerry Brown calls a "democratic moment" for Germany, in which citizen activism asserted itself without the initiative of the political elites.

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