Showing posts with label maría eugenia vidal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label maría eugenia vidal. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 13, 2016

Buenos Aires provincial police chief accused of narco-trafficking

Felipe Solá, former Governor of Buenos Aires province 2002-2007 and currently a Congressional Deputy for the conservative-Peronist Frente Renovador, is claiming that Pablo Bressi was named as the current police chief of the province at the request of the US Embassy and the DEA.

Bressi was appointed last year by María Eugenia Vidal after she was elected Governor of Buenos Aires. She is part of Argentine President Mauricio Macri's electoral coalition Cambiemos. Elisa "Lilita" Carrió, head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, has accused Bressi of being involved in drug-trafficking. Carrió is part of Cambiemos, as well, and Solá's Frente Renovador supported Macri in last year's Presidential election. So it's not a purely opposition partisan play, whatever else is involved.

The Buenos Aires Herald reports (Pressure mounts on BA province’s police chief 07/13/2016):

Solá’s claim reflected the deepening political crisis in the BA province administration surrounding Bressi, further exacerbated when [left Peronist] Victory Front (FpV) provincial lawmaker Rodolfo Iriart claimed yesterday that Vidal’s Security Minister Cristian Ritondo was likely to investigate the accusations.

“I warned them about Bressi but I was told he had been asked for personally by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA),” Solá told Radio Del Plata.

He added that ahead of Bressi’s appointment to Vidal’s provincial administration he had been asked of his opinion of the policeman’s record and stated that there were serious concerns about his background.

“Last November, Cristian Ritondo asked my opinion about the time I spent with Bressi and I told him that I remembered ... we had a great deal of suspicions of his involvement in a bribery issue,” he said.

Last week, Carrió sent an open letter to Vidal saying Bressi had demonstrable links to organized drug-trafficking — a key priority of Vidal’s government — and vowing to support her claims with “evidence.”
It's Sola's request that the United States pressed for Pablo Bressi's appointment. If only because it sounds like a typical twist in a narco-novela. It also makes you wonder just what kind of official friends the US government seeks out in Argentina!

Solá claims that he heard the claim that the US wanted Bressi in that position from the above-mentioned Cristian Ritondo. (“Lo pidieron la embajada y la DEA” Página/12 13.07.2016)

“Me asustó mucho cuando me contestó que lo pide la Embajada, la DEA”, reveló Solá sobre la conversación con Ritondo, a quien se encargó de desacreditar en combo con Vidal. “Si vos querés combatir el narcotráfico en los barrios del Gran Buenos Aires y pensás que los objetivos de un gobernador de Buenos Aires son los mismos que los de la DEA, o no entendiste nunca nada o sos un zonzo, elegí”, disparó.

“A la DEA no le importa el paco en los barrios”, siguió, porque “está enfocada en otras cosas más grandes”. Solá explicó que la DEA “se vale de infiltrarse” entre los jefes narcos, entre quienes recluta “buchones” que luego gozan de impunidad. Bressi, que se desempeñó como Superintendente de Investigaciones sobre el Tráfico de Drogas Ilícitas durante la gobernación de Daniel Scioli, siguió un curso de negociador en toma de rehenes con el Departamento de Estado.

["It bothered me a lot when he responded that the Embassy, the DEA, had requested him," he Solá revealed about the conversation with Ritondo, who he took it upon himself to discredit along with Vidal. "I you want to combat narco-trafficking in the barrios of Greater Buenos Aires and think that the objectives of a Governor of Buenos Aires are the same as those of the DEA, either you don't understand anything, or you're an idiot, you choose," he declared.

The DEA doesn't care about the pacas in the barrios," he continued, because "it's focused on other, much grander things." Solá explained that the DEA "considers it important to infiltrate themselves" among the narco bosses, among whom they recruit "stool pigeons" who later enjoy immunity. Bressi, who functcioned as Superintendent of Investigations for the Traffic in Illegal Drugs during the governorship of Daniel Scioli [Peronist Governor of Buenos Aires province 2007-2015], took a course for negotiating in {cases of} the taking of hostages with the State Department.]
No major international intrigue in evidence in this one so far. But an intriguing story nevertheless.

Thursday, December 31, 2015

New York Times explains Argentine President Macri's radical free-market policies

President Mauricio Macri won the Argentine Presidency earlier this month. He certainly cannot be accused of compromising his goals in an Obama-like desire for bipartisan harmony with the now-opposition Peronists. The party of the latter is the Partido Justicialista (PJ) and their Congressional bloc is called the Frente para la Victoria (FpV).

Macri is basically an Argentine version of Mitt Romney, born on third base and thinks he hit a triple. And he's fully committed to One Percenter economics, aka, predator state policies (Jamie Galbraith's phrase), Herbert Hoover economics, the Washington Consensus, neoliberalism, Merkelnomics.

He hasn't yet been in office a month and he's moved ahead rapidly with his radical economic program in good "shock doctrine" fashion. Jonathan Gibert gives an account of the initial measures in Argentina’s New President Moves Swiftly to Shake Up the Economy New York Times 12/27/2015. Complete with a photo of Macri looking very like Count Dracula.

A key part of the beginning was a drastic devaluation of the Argentine peso by letting it float freely against the dollar. At the same time, he dropped export controls that had been part of the previous government's strategy to promote domestic development. And as Gilbert reports, it was the traditional oligarchy based on agribusiness that got a windfall benefit from Macri's currency move:

The devaluation and a slashing of export taxes favored influential farmers on Argentina’s Pampas lowlands who had speculated about such moves by hoarding their grain harvests. They struck an agreement with Mr. Macri’s government to immediately sell billions of dollars of grain stocks, like soy, to ease the shortage of funds at the Central Bank.

But while these agricultural exports are now more profitable for the farmers, for people like Mr. Raspa, the devaluation is eroding their salaries and fueling price increases as imports become more expensive.
Gilbert's short piece relies heavily on the classic person-on-the-street interviews, many of which in the United States at least are actually practiced informal spokespeople referred to the reporter by interest groups to repeat their positions as though they were random citizens.

But Gilbert's description is generally pretty good. The immediate effect of the devaluation was a burst of inflation without corresponding adjustments to wages and salaries, immediately lowering the real incomes of millions of workers. In the neoliberal view, this is a good thing.

Gilbert also explains other drastic - and constitutionally questionable - actions of Macri:

Mr. Macri must also tread carefully, analysts said, because of his small margin of victory in the election. A decision to temporarily appoint Supreme Court judges by decree, bypassing Congress during its summer recess, was criticized as an overreach of executive power. This, together with moves viewed as steps toward the dismantling of a media law that is strongly endorsed by Mrs. Kirchner’s supporters, has left him less room for unpopular measures.

Mr. Macri has already moved to cool the simmering economic tensions, keeping Mrs. Kirchner’s [Cristina Fernández de Kircher, Macri's predecessor] price control programs in place for now and offering a small one-time payment to around eight million recipients of state pensions or child benefits.

Still, repercussions are already being felt. “It’s the workers who always pay for these crises,” said Raúl Lemos, 54, who manages a downtown paint store, as he clicked through an online price list showing that the price of some products had risen by 25 percent overnight. “Sales are going to drop.” Similarly, Sergio Camerucci, 52, who manufactures trophies and sells them to sports leagues, said the price of the plastic he needed to make the trophy bases rose by 20 percent after the devaluation. [my emphasis]
The comment that price controls were retained is very misleading. In fact, there was a massive increase in prices after Macri's election even before his inauguration and the devaluation in anticipation of Macri's action.

The "dismantling of a media law" to which Gilbert refers is the Ley de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual. Macri's intention to undermine it has both economic and political imperatives. The law basically inhibits further monopoly concentration of news media, which is dominated today by two major media groups, that of La Nación and that of Clarín, both known by the names of their flagship newspaper properties. The Nación group is the traditional media advocates for the oligarchy, agricultural and otherwise. Clarín is almost as bad. Clarín gave Néstor Kirchner favorable coverage during his Presidency (2003-2007), because he didn't try to interfere with their media acquisition activity. But one of the differences between Cristina and her husband was her hostility to Clarín because of their generally conservative tilt. So when she was elected President in 2007, she moved ahead with the media law limiting media monopoly and Clarín became her bitter opponent.

Since Gilbert's article, Macri has gone further and is attempting to reorganize the media regulatory agencies by executive decree and change the law itself by the same means. (Werner Pertot, La victoria de la terapia de shock Página/12 31.12.2015) This seems especially high-handed since his supporters have a majority in Congress.

Cristina Fernández now has a Facebook account called "Casa Rosada Argentina 2003-2015," in which she has been actively pointing out problems with Macri's new policies and administration. The inflation. Reduction of energy subsidies on homes. The attempt to govern by decree. (Marcela Valente, Macri desmantela la Argentina de Cristina Kirchner a golpe de decreto La Voz de Galicia 26.12.2015) Macri's Shrub-Bush-like indifference over recent massive flooding in Argentina. Nepotistic appointments. (Agustín Ceruse, Los ministros de Macri que le dieron cargos a familiares Big Bang! News 30.12.2015) Harsh measures against protesting workers.

In one weird twist that could easily have happened in some corrupt Republican state in the US like Texas or Wisconsin, three prisoners doing time for murder escaped from a high-security prison in Buenos Aires Province. Se fugaron de la cárcel Martín y Cristian Lanatta, los condenados por el Triple Crimen La Nación 27.12.2015; Manhunt begins after Lanatta brothers, Schillaci make dramatic getaway Buenos Aires Herald 12/28/2015)

What makes this more than a crime story is that two of the prisoners played a role in the election campaign, in which Macri ally María Eugenia Vidal won the governorship of Buenos Aires Province, the country's most populous, in a contest against Cristina's candidate Aníbal Fernández:

The prison break by 40-year-old Martín Lanatta, his 41-year-old brother Cristian Lanatta and Víctor Schillaci, 33, shocked the nation in the midst of the Christmas holidays, as the brothers had made the headlines earlier this year by accusing ex-president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s cabinet chief Aníbal Fernández of being the alleged mastermind of the murders of Sebastián Forza, Damián Ferrón and Leopoldo Bina, three businessmen who were kidnapped and killed in a case linked to ephedrine and drug trafficking. [my emphasis]
Quite a coincidence, as various Peronistas were quick to point out. (Triple fuga de la cárcel con un arma de juguete Página/12 28.12.2015) That fit with the law-and-order theme of Vidal's campaign and, despite the lack of any credible evidence at all to back up the unlikely charge, played a notable role in the campaign. One of the escaped murderers, Martín Lanatta, was interviewed on TV in August.

Aníbal Fernández isn't worrying too much about bipartisan harmony at the moment, either. He said, “Estos tipos ‘fugados’ son asesinos, que formaron parte de la campaña, junto con el actual gobierno” ["These "escaped" guys are murderers who took part in the {election} campaign together with the current government"]. (“Algo iban a cobrar” Página/12 28.12.2015)

The Governor's excuse is pretty inspired, in a bluff-your-way-through kind of way. She says they broke out because she's gotten a lot tougher on crime in the last month! Seriously: "What happened was the result of decisions we made, of clear messages, of our ‘no” to corruption, of the fight against drug trafficking. That message and the actions we have carried out since day one have had costs." You have to admire her chutzpah on this one! (BA governor reports “penitentiary service complicity’ in jail breakout Buenos Aires Herald 12/28/2015)

Supposedly, the two used a plastic pistol to escape and steal a police car. As the article just linked notes, there are, uh, questions about the validity of the official story. The two brothers among the three had tried to escape in 2013, unsuccessfully. (El ensayo de 2013 Página/12 28.12.2015)

Sunday, November 08, 2015

Argentina's elections

Javier Lewkowicz reports on the current Argentine Presidential election in Argentina’s runoff to be determined by a penalty shoot-out democraciaAbierta 10/27/2015.

Left-Peronist incumbent President Cristina Fernández is termed out after two consecutive terms, though she could run against in 2019. And she has said she plans to stay active in the politics of the Partido Justicialista (PJ), the main Peronist party.

The big contest in the current election is between Argentina's current version of Mitt Romney, Mauricio Macri, and the PJ candidate, Daniel Scioli. The final round of the election comes in two weeks, November 22.

There was a preliminary round on October 25. Argentina now has a law that forces a runoff in the Presidential election so that a candidate has to get a majority to be elected. National campaigns in Argentina tend to run as part of coalition parties. Scioli's alliance is the Frente para la Victoria (FPV).

Macri previously served as the Governor of Buenos Aires City, where he headed his own party, the PRO (Propuesta Republicana). The main opposition party, called the party of the oligarchy by the Peronists, is the Union Civica Radical (UCR). The Radicals are backing Macri under the electoral alliance called Cambiemos. Consistent with the name of Macri's party, anti-Peronists are starting to identify themselves as "republicans." The association with the US party of the same name is not lost on the Peronists. The UCR is an official party of the Socialist International. So is the smaller Partido Socialist (PS), currently headed by Hermes Binner. Since the days of Juan Perón's first Presidency, the PS has largely acted as an ally of UCR in national politics, including supporting the 1955 coup against Perón's elected government. The supporters of that so-called "Revolution Libertadora" in 1955 also identified themselves as "republicans," though their political practice was very different that what most people think of as a representative republican form of government.

For the November 22 election, the PS is officially neutral between Macri and Scioli. (Ni Macri ni Scioli para el socialismo) Página/12 29.10.2015. They backed a minor candidate, Margarita Stolbizer, in the October 25 round. Her electoral alliance is called Frente Amplio Progresista (FAP), of which the PS is a part. But since the PS largely supports the neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus, as does Macri but not the PJ, it's unlikely that their voters would necessarily support Scioli over Macri in the final round. Their not a major force nationally. Their electoral alliance received on 3% of the votes on October 25. But in a very close race, those votes could be decisive. Stolbizer has also taken a neutral position for November 22 while making it clear that she's closer to Macri's pro-oligarchy positions than to Scioli's more genuinely social-democratic ones.

To further illustrate the complexity of the partisan and ideological alignments, there is a group of Congressional deputies who call themselves Unidad Socialista para la Victoria (USpV) and are aligned with the Peronist-led FpV currently headed by Scioli. (En búsqueda de coincidencias Página/12 31.10.2015) The USpV includes the deputies Jorge Rivas y Oscar González.

In the October 25 round, Scioli came out with 36%, Macri with 35%. Sergio Massa came in third with 21%. Massa had split from the PJ and was basically running as a conservative Peronist with an electoral alliance called Unidos por una Nueva Alternativa (UNA). Massa's own party is called the Frente Renovador. Massa opposed the main PJ and the left Peronists. But the Frente Renovador is still part of the larger Peronist movement. (Peronism as a political concept is exceptionally complicated!) So it's uncertain where his October 25 voters are likely go on November 22. But it's reasonable to expect that more would go to Scioli than to Macri, whatever Massa's personal leanings. He's been publicly neutral on the November 22 runoff, though some of his prominent allies have indicated a lean to Macri. (Miguel Jorquera, Massa, sin definición para el ballottage Página/12 26.10.2015; Fernando Cibeira, Scioli ganó por poco y va al ballottage con Macri Página/12 26.10.2015; Argentina Presidential Challenger Mauricio Macri Seeks Common Ground With Sergio Massa NDTVReuters 10/28/2015; Richard Lough and Maximilian Heath, Massa allies lean toward opposition challenger in presidential run-off Reuters 10/208/2015)

One of the wild cards is the Province of Buenos Aires, where Scioli has been the Governor since 2007. Macri beat him there in the October 25 round. Buenos Aires province, even with the City of Buenos Aires which is its own separate province, has around 40% of the Argentine population. That's why the affairs of the capital city and Buenos Aires Province figure so very prominently in national politics. Peter Prengaman and Almudena Calatrava report that various issues are important in the province, with crime being particularly prominent at the moment. (Sprawling BA province key to runoff AP/Buenos Aires Herald 11/08/2015) It can sometimes be a challenge for non-Argentines to keep up with what is meant exactly by "Buenos Aires," i.e., Buenos Aires City, Greater Buenos Aires (the city plus the suburbs in the province), and Buenos Aires Province.

It's also a bad sign that the pro-Macri opposition won the Governorship in Buenos Aires Province. "El impactante triunfo de María Eugenia Vidal en Buenos Aires marca el fin de la hegemonía del peronismo en el distrito más importante del país desde hace 28 años" ["The impressive victory " of María Eugenia Vidal in Buenos Aires {Province} marks and end to the hegemony of Peronism {that has held} for 28 years in the most important district of the country."] (Página/12 26.10.2015) But Scioli's Presidential ticket won significantly more votes than the provincial ticket of the FpV headed by Anibal Fernández.

Javier Lewkowicz characterizes the situation as follows. I wouldn't characterize the differences between the political groupings exactly the way he does. But this gives a good general idea of the situation:

But he did not pronounce them on Monday October 26, 2015, after his huge electoral performance the day before. Macri was evaluating his electoral victory on December 5, 1995, his first step into politics. At that moment, the runoff, Daniel Scioli, the alliance with the Unión Cívica Radical, his three successive victories as Buenos Aires City mayor, and the constitution of his own political party, the Republican Proposal (PRO), all belonged to an unpredictable future. By the end of 1995, Macri also won the elections to become president of the Boca Juniors football club. Popular sport magazines ran front page headlines saying: “Argentina’s Berlusconi”.

Last Sunday, the Macri-led Cambiemos (Lets’ change) alliance achieved what not even the most optimist militants would have dared to imagine. He got himself into the second round of the presidential election with a close-to-technical draw with Daniel Scioli, the candidate for the Front for Victory, the party in power in Argentina since 2003. Macri even managed to defeat Peronism in the elections for governor of the Buenos Aires Province, something that had not happened since 1983. The size of the electoral results, whatever happens in the second round, is gigantic. Kirchnerism’s political hegemony since the country’s way out of the 2000/2012 crisis is now hampered, and a bipolar scheme emerges.

Macri can be located in what is now called the new right, economically liberal but not fully anti-popular, democratic and sensible to changes in the public mood. Henrique Capriles, Aecio Neves and Sebastián Piñera, in Venezuela, Brasil and Chile respectively, also belong to this category. Scioli and Peronism, on their side, represent a relatively light version of Kirchnerism [Cristina Fernández' policies], with no great expectations and willing to mend broken bounds, from the IMF to the local corporate media.