Showing posts with label peronismo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label peronismo. Show all posts

Thursday, June 15, 2017

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner to run for Argentine Senate

Argentina has legislative elections this coming October. The last Presidential election was in 2015, when the current President Mauricio Macri was elected. Macri's party is called the PRO (Propuesta Republicana), originally set up as a vehicle for Macri himself to be elected as the head of government for the City of Buenos Aires (Jefe de Gobierno de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires), an office he held 2007-2015.

Former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner is now positioning herself for a possible 2020 Presidential run. The step in that that direction she took this week was to announce her candidacy for the Argentine national Senate from Buenos Aires province. [Update: Actually she didn't announce her candidacy directly; a close political ally announced that she would be, but she didn't publicly confirm it.] Her electoral coalition just formally constituted itself as the Unidad Ciudadana, which the Télam agency in this report translates into English as Citizen Unity, Cristina Kirchner announces "citizen unity" will be the name of the front with which Kirchnerism will compete in primaries, outside PJ Télam/Yahoo! Noticias 06/14/2017. For Americans, that sounds awfully close to Citizens United, a name that has a bad odor in the United States because of the 2010 Supreme Court decision of that name. Cristina's politics are definitely not like those of the Citizen's United group in the US that brought that case!

Argentine politics is not a two-party affair like we have in the US. But it is a presidential system. The head of government is elected directly and is not a prime minister in the sense of parliamentary systems. And the political alignments at the national level do tend to align on a two-camp basis. One major camp is that of the Peronists, of which Cristina Fernández is very much a part. Peronism is both a party and a movement. The party is the Partido Justicialista (PJ).

The other major alignment since 1946 has been the Radical Civic Union (UCR), which is typically referred to "the radicals" or radicalism (radicalismo), even though they have long since become conservative. The UCR is being absorbed to some extent by the PRO. There is a small Socialist Party, which essentially lines up with the conservatives in the PRO and UCR.

The various parties and splinter groups on both sides ran in 2015 on umbrella tickets. The Peronist ticket headed by Daniel Scioli was called Frente Para la Victoria (FpV). Macri's group was Cambiemos. Macri was also backed by a significant Peronist splinter group called Frente Renovadora, headed by Sergio Massa.

Cristina has now signed a common platform with other left-Peronist (kirchnerista) leaders to create the Unidad Ciudadana electoral front in Buenos Aires province for 2018. And more conservative faction in the PJ headed by Florencio Randazzo will complete in the provincial election as part of the Frente Justicialista, though he will likely have to win an internal primary for the right to head the ticket.

Elecciones 2017: Cristina Kirchner lanzó el frente "Unidad Ciudadana" C5N 06/15/2017:



The Argentine economy has been in decline pretty much since taking office in December 2015. And that's a feature, not a bug for the Macri government. They have applied Herbert Hoover "Washington Consensus" economic policies from the start, including big budget cuts, deregulation of business, raising utility and public transit prices, all accompanied by major inflation and rising unemployment.

The inflation is very much related to economic policies of Macri's government. The prior government had used a system of capital controls and price regulations to maintain economic stability, promote the growth of domestic industry and maintain necessary dollar reserves. Macri's government pretty much dumped that whole menu of policies very quickly. High inflation and growing unemployment followed.

Debt for developing countries is different for that of the more developed countries. Because it becomes a tool that foreign governments and corporations can use to keep the debtor country in a state of dependency. The Kirchner governments of 2003-2008 had drastically reduced the debt, which had previously led to the severe financial crisis of 2001. Now Macri has put that course into full reverse: Argentina becomes largest debtor among emerging markets Buenos Aires Herald 06/14/2017.

There are plenty of political issues to fight about over the next 2 1/2 years.

Wednesday, May 24, 2017

El retorno de Cristina?

Cristina Fernández, that is, the President of Argentina 2007-2015.

Not that's she really been absent from the political scene since leaving office in 2015. Her successor Maricio Macri campaigned on a moderate program, or at least a moderate-sounding one. Since assuming office in December 2015, he has instead instituted a standard neoliberal/IMF/Washington Consensus economic menu. And the results are what should have been expected: falling real wages, higher unemployment, cutbacks of essential government services, a cave-in to the blackmail from vulture funds that had bought up defaulted Argentine debt, and taking on new debt, some of which reportedly uses Argentine state property as security. Dropping capital controls has contributed to a high inflation rate, even by Argentine standards. (It's not the kind of triple-digit hyperinflation that Argentina experienced in the late 1980s, at least.)

Cristina has been a regular, public critic of Macri's government. And she still has strong support within the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ) and the broader electoral coalition of the Frente para la Victoria, (FpV). This photo and slogan has been popping up in hard copies and online.


The slogan says, "The sun of the 25th is appearing." Or, "Sunrise of the 25th is coming" probably works, too. That's a reference to the 25th of May, a national holiday celebrating the official proclamation of a new national government on that date in 1810, displacing the Spanish Viceroy Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros (1756–1829). It's known as May Revolution Day, a key event in the establishment of Argentina as an independent nation. Argentine Independence Day is celebrated on July 9, commemorating the formal declaration of independence of 1816.

May 25 took on a particular political and patriotic significance for the kichneristas. Cristina's late husband Néstor Kirchner became President on May 25, 2003, the beginning of a dramatically new reformist direction for Argentina in which neoliberal political prescriptions were largely rejected in favor of a more activist government aggressively promoting Keynesian policies and recovering the language and spirit of left Peronist populism. (Martín Granovsky, “Llegamos sin rencores y con memoria” Página/12 06.05.2003) The 25th of May was treated as a major day of celebration of what they called the "national and popular" tradition of Argentina, i.e., left-nationalist, democratic and militant social-democratic ones.

Cristina took part in a meeting with other political leaders this week working to form an effective political coalition in Buenos Aires Province for the 2017 legislative elections. (Sin definiciones, pero con afiches Página/12 24.05.2017)

Former Finance Minister and current Deputy in the lower House of the Argentine Congress Axel Kiciloff considers Cristina to be the leader of the movement (kircherista/peronista/FpV), 22/05/17 - Kicillof: "Cristina es la jefa del movimiento y yo soy parte de él":



Saturday, November 19, 2016

The opposition to Perón and Peronism in Argentine politics, 1943-1951

Marcia García Sebastiani in her book Los antiperonistas en la Argentina peronista (2005) looks at the formation of the opposition to Juan Perón and Peronism in the years 1943-1951. A consolidation of the opposition to Peronism congealed behind the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). And that two-party alignment largely prevails in Argentine politics today. Of course, with many changes along the way.


The landmarks of the the period in which this oppositional alignment emerged include the following:
  • 1943: the military coup which made Gen. Pedro Ramírez head of government. From 1941, Col. Juan Perón had led the secret GOU group (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos) of military officers who were responsible for the 1943 coup.
  • 1945: October 17 and Perón's dramatic release from detention as the result of dramatic and massive popular demand
  • February 1946: a few days before the national elections, the US releases its Blue Book against Perón as part of a scarcely concealed US regime-change effort spearheaded by Spruille Braden, US Ambassador to Argentina and later a member of the National Council of the early John Birch Society, the longtime mother ship of far-right conspiracy theories. (Braden Discloses He Quit Birch Post New York Times 03/19/2016)

  • The US interference in Argentine politics had been so blatant that Perón made his central campaign theme "Perón o Braden" ("Perón or Braden"). After his election victory, Perón told a Brazilian paper, "I'm grateful to Braden for the votes he has given me... If I win two thirds of the electorate, a third would be due to the propaganda Braden made against me."
  • The national elections of February 1946 were marred by violence and some dubious actions by the military government that interfered with the campaign activities of the opposition. But it was a free and competitive election and far cleaner than any since before the coup of September 1930, which had removed the elected President Hipólito Yrigoyen (UCR) and installed José Félix Uriburu as head of a provisional government.
  • 1947: Women's suffrage approved by Congress. The UCR had long advocated it but opposed the law that actually enacted it when it was up for a vote in Congress.
  • 1948: The police claim in September they have uncovered a plot to assassinate Perón
  • 1949 - Constitution of 1949 approved, replacing that of 1853. The new Constitution allows Perón to run for re-election and reduces some of the features of Congress that the UCR had used to impede Peronist legislation
  • 1951-As the parties prepare for a new Presidential election for 1952, Gen. Benjamin Menéndez leads a new coup attempt, which fails. Filipe Pigna writes that the intent of Menéndez in the coup was that he "wanted to disarm the Peronist state completely and take away from the worker all their social conquests, returning them to the regime of semi-slavery that rules before 1943." (Los mitos de la historia argentina 4. La Argentina peronista (1943-1955); translations from Pigna here are mine)
1951 ends the period on which Sebastiani's book concentrates.

In 1955, Gen. Eduardo Lonardi mounted a successful coup attempt in September that styled itself the Revolución Libertadora. Perón fled the country to asylum in Paraguay. In March 1956, the military government banned the Peronist Party and all explicitly Peronist political activity. The coup and the new military government and the ban on Peronism was supported by the UCR and the Socialists. Perón himself was unable to return to Argentina and stand for election again until 1973, when he was elected by a 62% majority.

Sebastiani provides a table (p. 90) showing the vote percentages of the various parties in the elections of 1946, 1948 (non-Presidential) and 1952. For the UCR and the Peronists, it shows the following.

1946: Peronista 50%, UCR 28%
1948: Peronista 61%, UCR 27%
1952: Peronista 62%, UCR 32%

The broad opposition front formed by the opposition leading up to the 1946 elections, bringing together the Radicals (UCR), the Socialists, the Communists, conservatives (Partido Demócrata Nacional/PDN) and center-right (Partido Demócrata Progresista/PDP), was called the Unión Democrática. They constructed their political identity are the rhetoric of democracy and political liberalism. They opposition under the military regime characterized the government as "fascist" and "Nazi." That characterization was encouraged by the United Nations powers in the Second World War because Argentina remained neutral in the Second World War until 1945, when the outcome of the war was all but certain. And when Perón had become Vice President and Minister of War.

There is an ongoing discussion on whether Perón's government should be classified as "fascist." I won't try to recapitulate it here. But I find that case unsustainable. Whatever authoritarian aspects his governments may have had, his goal from 1945 to his death in 1974 as President for a second time, his goal was to democratize the Argentine government. I would argue that the question of authoritarianism is more relevant to his brief 1973-4 government than to that of 1945-55. It was under his government that Argentine women won the vote. His policies strengthened the labor unions, mobilized a large number of people into an active involvement in politics and pursued economic policies that greatly increased the well-being of millions.

During the 1946-51 period, Peronist government and political movement took measures that restricted the opposition's freedom in various ways. It restricted the publication of opposition newspapers by limiting the amount of paper deliver to them for the publications and shutting some of the down or taking over publication. A few opposition leaders wer expelled from Congress. Ricardo Balbín, a key UCR leader, was jailed in 1950 for a five-year term. But the Perón government pardoned and released him in 1951 and he became the UCR's Presidential candidate that year. Pigna notes dryly of the expulsions and Balbín's imprisonment, "The governmental response to the Radicals' chicanery wasn't exactly democratic." (Los mitos de la historia argentina 4. La Argentina peronista (1943-1955))

Still, this was neither a dictatorship nor were the elections shams. Comparing the votes above in the Presidential and congressional elections of 1946, 1948 and 1952 don't give any obvious indication that the opposition was being suppressed. And, in fact, despite the restrictions mentioned, those elections were competitive and both sides were able to make their positions to the public. For better or worse, Perón understood his movement as revolutionary. And always would. But it was a revolutionary movement that was more committed to democratic processes than the governments of 1930-1943 had been.

The opposition was also willing to support the self-described Revolución Libertadora in 1955,aka, Lonardi's military coup. During Perón's elected governments, there was nothing approaching the complete ban of the Peronist party and even the use of Peronist slogans like the Revolución Libertadora initiated in 1956. Even tango dancing was discouraged because the new rulers identified it with the common people who supported Perón. As the election results above show, Peronism was a kind of politics with which a majority identified. So from 1955-1973, Argentina suffered a chronic crisis of governance because the party and movement speaking for the majority was suppressed. And no government in Argentine history was so brutal a dictatorship as the military government that was in power 1973-83.

Pigna mentions the following senior oppsotion politicians who had not only guilty knowledge and at least passively collaborated in the coup attempt of 1951 led by Menéndez: Arturo Frondizi (UCR), Américo Ghioldi (Socialists), Reynaldo Pastor (conservatives) and Horacio Thedy (center-right). Basically the entire opposition spectrum, in other words, except the Communist Party, which would join in with the opposition in supporting the 1955 coup.

Perón had very legitimate reason to fear violent, anti-democracy conspiracies against him. That is not a justification for bad acts. It's a description of a central political fact of that period. Sebastiani provides a useful account of the development of the anti-Peronist opposition and the ideological narratives they shaped for themselves. But that process and those ideologies are difficult to evaluate meaningfully if not understood in the context of the interests at work and the actors supporting them.

The narrative of Perón as a Nazi obscured much more than it clarified. Framing your opponent as Hitler can result in drastic threat.inflation. Or, rather, it almost always is threat inflation. (Which is why it's such a bad thing in US foreign policy that we try to make every adversary from Ho Chi Minh to Muammar Qaddafi the New Hitler.) Ironically, the cover features of photograph of a rally for the Unión Demócratica umbrella opposition group. I say it's ironic because it's from August 12, 1946 in the Plaza del Congreso in Buenos Aires. It features a sign saying "Contra el nazismo" (Against the Nazis).


That was three days after the bombing of Nagasaki. so the Second World War was still officially going on and Argentina was formally a belligerent on the United Nations' side. Germany had surrendered in May, so if the reference was meant to be a patriotic wartime one, the reference was already a bit anachronistic. It was actually directed at the military government, in which Perón as Vice President was the most popular leader at that point. But it was before the President, Gen. Edelmiro Farrell, ousted Perón and imprisoned him in early October. Popular pressure forced Perón's release and he returned in triumph to address the throng on October 17 in the famous Plaza de Mayo from the balcony of the Presidential palace, the Casa Rosada. October 17 is still celebrated today by the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ) as a major historical turning point they observe every year.

So under the military dictatorship, with no democratic elections scheduled, the umbrella opposition group Unión Demócratica was holding a rally in the federal capital in front of a major governmental building. In the actual Nazi regime of the Hitler government, such demonstrations in front of the Reichstag in Berlin were, it's safe to say, extremely rare. As in, non-existent after the imposition the Enabling Law in 1933 that established the dictatorship.

But the central opposition narrative was that they were standing for democracy against Perón's "Nazi-fascist" rule, even during his democratically elected governments. That same narrative continued to be used, including to justify the military coup of 1955. The UCR continued to describe their victory via military coup as having overthrown "Nazis."

Sunday, November 08, 2015

Argentina's elections

Javier Lewkowicz reports on the current Argentine Presidential election in Argentina’s runoff to be determined by a penalty shoot-out democraciaAbierta 10/27/2015.

Left-Peronist incumbent President Cristina Fernández is termed out after two consecutive terms, though she could run against in 2019. And she has said she plans to stay active in the politics of the Partido Justicialista (PJ), the main Peronist party.

The big contest in the current election is between Argentina's current version of Mitt Romney, Mauricio Macri, and the PJ candidate, Daniel Scioli. The final round of the election comes in two weeks, November 22.

There was a preliminary round on October 25. Argentina now has a law that forces a runoff in the Presidential election so that a candidate has to get a majority to be elected. National campaigns in Argentina tend to run as part of coalition parties. Scioli's alliance is the Frente para la Victoria (FPV).

Macri previously served as the Governor of Buenos Aires City, where he headed his own party, the PRO (Propuesta Republicana). The main opposition party, called the party of the oligarchy by the Peronists, is the Union Civica Radical (UCR). The Radicals are backing Macri under the electoral alliance called Cambiemos. Consistent with the name of Macri's party, anti-Peronists are starting to identify themselves as "republicans." The association with the US party of the same name is not lost on the Peronists. The UCR is an official party of the Socialist International. So is the smaller Partido Socialist (PS), currently headed by Hermes Binner. Since the days of Juan Perón's first Presidency, the PS has largely acted as an ally of UCR in national politics, including supporting the 1955 coup against Perón's elected government. The supporters of that so-called "Revolution Libertadora" in 1955 also identified themselves as "republicans," though their political practice was very different that what most people think of as a representative republican form of government.

For the November 22 election, the PS is officially neutral between Macri and Scioli. (Ni Macri ni Scioli para el socialismo) Página/12 29.10.2015. They backed a minor candidate, Margarita Stolbizer, in the October 25 round. Her electoral alliance is called Frente Amplio Progresista (FAP), of which the PS is a part. But since the PS largely supports the neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus, as does Macri but not the PJ, it's unlikely that their voters would necessarily support Scioli over Macri in the final round. Their not a major force nationally. Their electoral alliance received on 3% of the votes on October 25. But in a very close race, those votes could be decisive. Stolbizer has also taken a neutral position for November 22 while making it clear that she's closer to Macri's pro-oligarchy positions than to Scioli's more genuinely social-democratic ones.

To further illustrate the complexity of the partisan and ideological alignments, there is a group of Congressional deputies who call themselves Unidad Socialista para la Victoria (USpV) and are aligned with the Peronist-led FpV currently headed by Scioli. (En búsqueda de coincidencias Página/12 31.10.2015) The USpV includes the deputies Jorge Rivas y Oscar González.

In the October 25 round, Scioli came out with 36%, Macri with 35%. Sergio Massa came in third with 21%. Massa had split from the PJ and was basically running as a conservative Peronist with an electoral alliance called Unidos por una Nueva Alternativa (UNA). Massa's own party is called the Frente Renovador. Massa opposed the main PJ and the left Peronists. But the Frente Renovador is still part of the larger Peronist movement. (Peronism as a political concept is exceptionally complicated!) So it's uncertain where his October 25 voters are likely go on November 22. But it's reasonable to expect that more would go to Scioli than to Macri, whatever Massa's personal leanings. He's been publicly neutral on the November 22 runoff, though some of his prominent allies have indicated a lean to Macri. (Miguel Jorquera, Massa, sin definición para el ballottage Página/12 26.10.2015; Fernando Cibeira, Scioli ganó por poco y va al ballottage con Macri Página/12 26.10.2015; Argentina Presidential Challenger Mauricio Macri Seeks Common Ground With Sergio Massa NDTVReuters 10/28/2015; Richard Lough and Maximilian Heath, Massa allies lean toward opposition challenger in presidential run-off Reuters 10/208/2015)

One of the wild cards is the Province of Buenos Aires, where Scioli has been the Governor since 2007. Macri beat him there in the October 25 round. Buenos Aires province, even with the City of Buenos Aires which is its own separate province, has around 40% of the Argentine population. That's why the affairs of the capital city and Buenos Aires Province figure so very prominently in national politics. Peter Prengaman and Almudena Calatrava report that various issues are important in the province, with crime being particularly prominent at the moment. (Sprawling BA province key to runoff AP/Buenos Aires Herald 11/08/2015) It can sometimes be a challenge for non-Argentines to keep up with what is meant exactly by "Buenos Aires," i.e., Buenos Aires City, Greater Buenos Aires (the city plus the suburbs in the province), and Buenos Aires Province.

It's also a bad sign that the pro-Macri opposition won the Governorship in Buenos Aires Province. "El impactante triunfo de María Eugenia Vidal en Buenos Aires marca el fin de la hegemonía del peronismo en el distrito más importante del país desde hace 28 años" ["The impressive victory " of María Eugenia Vidal in Buenos Aires {Province} marks and end to the hegemony of Peronism {that has held} for 28 years in the most important district of the country."] (Página/12 26.10.2015) But Scioli's Presidential ticket won significantly more votes than the provincial ticket of the FpV headed by Anibal Fernández.

Javier Lewkowicz characterizes the situation as follows. I wouldn't characterize the differences between the political groupings exactly the way he does. But this gives a good general idea of the situation:

But he did not pronounce them on Monday October 26, 2015, after his huge electoral performance the day before. Macri was evaluating his electoral victory on December 5, 1995, his first step into politics. At that moment, the runoff, Daniel Scioli, the alliance with the Unión Cívica Radical, his three successive victories as Buenos Aires City mayor, and the constitution of his own political party, the Republican Proposal (PRO), all belonged to an unpredictable future. By the end of 1995, Macri also won the elections to become president of the Boca Juniors football club. Popular sport magazines ran front page headlines saying: “Argentina’s Berlusconi”.

Last Sunday, the Macri-led Cambiemos (Lets’ change) alliance achieved what not even the most optimist militants would have dared to imagine. He got himself into the second round of the presidential election with a close-to-technical draw with Daniel Scioli, the candidate for the Front for Victory, the party in power in Argentina since 2003. Macri even managed to defeat Peronism in the elections for governor of the Buenos Aires Province, something that had not happened since 1983. The size of the electoral results, whatever happens in the second round, is gigantic. Kirchnerism’s political hegemony since the country’s way out of the 2000/2012 crisis is now hampered, and a bipolar scheme emerges.

Macri can be located in what is now called the new right, economically liberal but not fully anti-popular, democratic and sensible to changes in the public mood. Henrique Capriles, Aecio Neves and Sebastián Piñera, in Venezuela, Brasil and Chile respectively, also belong to this category. Scioli and Peronism, on their side, represent a relatively light version of Kirchnerism [Cristina Fernández' policies], with no great expectations and willing to mend broken bounds, from the IMF to the local corporate media.

Sunday, November 23, 2014

Political fights in Argentina: Cristina vs. vulture funds and opposition political schenanigans

Floyd Norris in the New York Times, a somewhat poorly titled piece called Argentina’s Case Has No Victors, Many Losers 11/20/2014. As Norris explains, Argentina hasn't caved in to the predatory hedge funds (vulture funds) and their compliant Nixon-appointed zombie judge Thomas Griesa:

Five months later, Argentina has not paid any money to the hedge funds. The judge has succeeded in blocking it from paying any money to holders of other bonds, but that just increases the number of losers.

In a way, the current fight is reminiscent of the battles more than 300 years ago in the American colonies over debtor’s prisons, which were widespread. Such punishment might have made sense for deadbeats, and it presumably had a deterrent effect, but prisoners were unable to earn the money needed to pay their creditors even if they wished to do so. [my emphasis]
Norris explains some of why the Nixon zombie judge's decision in this case was such a radical one:

For international bonds issued under New York law, as many are, it used to be that a country that defaulted could be sued and the courts would order it to pay. But sovereign immunity meant that decision could not be enforced. So most bondholders would eventually agree to some sort of debt restructuring, often involving the International Monetary Fund.

The Argentine ruling has clearly given bondholders an incentive to hold out in future international restructurings. Under Judge Griesa’s ruling, holdouts could do much better than those who agreed to the restructuring, and could not do worse.

If, that is, the decision can be enforced.

The judge, aware of that problem, has barred banks and other financial firms from doing anything to help Argentina evade the ruling. That has meant extending the ruling to cover not only bonds issued under New York law but also those issued under English and Argentine laws.
This is a report from TV Pública argentina, Visión 7 - Fondos buitre: El New York Times habla de excesos de la Justicia de EEUU 11/21/2014:



The political maneuvering for the 2015 Presidential elections in Argentine is intensifying, not surprisingly. Aside from Peronism being an exceptionally challenging political movement to understand, Argentina's political system has confusing fluidities within continuities in other ways. Argentine President Cristina Fernández' Peronist Partida Justicialista (PJ) governs with a legislative coalition called the Frente para la Victoria (FpV). The main opposition party is the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). But the leading opposition figure right now is the governor of the City of Buenos Aires, Mauricio Macri. He has a separate political party called the PRO (Propuesta Republicana). But in a two-way match-up in a national campaign against a PJ candidate in 2015, he would very likely be supported by the national umbrella coalition called Frente Amplio UNEN, aka, FAUNEN. FAUNEN includes the UCR and the Argentine Socialist Party, both of which are formal members of the Socialist International. Both UCR and the Socialist Party are married to neoliberal economic ideology. UCR is the main political vehicle of the "oligarchy," the political villain that is perhaps the most significant constant in the political trend called Peronism. The Socialist Party is effectively their ally, promoting the same interests and policies with more left-sounding rhetoric. FAUNEN also includes several smaller parties.

In a national meeting this past week, the UCR decided that they would seek to put forward their own UCR candidate rather than seek a unified FAUNEN candidate. (A nivel nacional, en el FAUNEN Página/12 17.11.2014). This rules out an early formal alliance between Macri's PRO and the neoliberal-Peronist Sergio Massa, whose current political vehicle is called the Frente Renovador (FR). Massa's ideology is known as "federal" Peronism.

Also this past week, Jorge Capitanich, head of Cristina Fernanez' cabinet, attacked the opposition for "golpismo activo" (active coup activity [!]) in connection with allegations of corruption in connection with the Hotesur company. TV Pública argentina reports in Visión 7 - Capitanich denunció "golpismo activo" 11/21/2014:



The Buenos Aires Herald reports (Gov’t says Bonadío uses Hotesur raids to 'extort and play politics' 11/23/2014):

Justice Secretary Julián Álvarez has joined the group of government officials who have questioned recent judicial raids at the Hotesur company partly owned by President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Álvarez accused federal judge Claudio Bonadío – who ordered the raids - of “extortion” and a “clear institutional coup-mongering.”

“When we speak of Bonadío, we are not talking about a paladin of justice, we are talking of someone who uses cases to extort and to play politics,” Álvarez stated during an interview with Página/12 newspaper.

The official described the judge’s raids as “clear institutional coup-mongering” and said that they are the result of the magistrate’s reaction against the “nine motions for his impeachment he faces in the Magistrates Council.” [my emphasis]

Santiago Rodríguez interviews Álvarez for Página/12 in “Usa causas para extorsionar y hacer política” 17.11.2014. Rodriguez reports that Hotesur administers a hotel owned by Cristina, a somewhat different description than the Buenos Aires Herald piece just cited provides. Álvarez claims that Judge Bonadío is an "activist" (militante) of the FN and is in active discussions with Massa about posts he might get under a Massa Presidency. Citing Bonadío's history as a loyal supporter of neoliberal causes as a judge and a long history of association with the neoliberal strand of Peronism says, "Cuando hablamos de Bonadio no hablamos de un paladín de la justicia, sino de alguien que utiliza las causas para extorsionar y hacer política." ("When we're talking about Bonadio, we're not talking about a paladin of justice, but rather about someone who uses court cases to extort and to make policy.")

Monday, May 27, 2013

Cristina Fernández, the Kirchner brand of Peronism and "la década ganada"

This past weekend, May 25, Argentina celebrated the 203rd anniversary of the Revolución de Mayo (May Revolution). President Cristina Fernández gave a long speech at the Plaza de Mayo in front of the Presidential residence in Buenos Aires, the Casa Rosada. The occasion coincided with the beginning of kirchnerismo government, when Cristina late husband Néstor Kirchner became President on May 25, 2003.

Cristina's speech in notable for the way in which she positions her and Néstor's political project in the tradition of Argentine independence and of the Peronist movement. She looks with approval to the social achievements of the first Perón government, its defense of labor rights and income and the extension of the vote to women.

This is her speech (in Spanish), Cristina: "Es necesario empoderar a la sociedad de estas reformas y conquistas" TV Pública argentina 05/25/2013:



At around 50:00, she compares Argentina's economic progress since the crisis of 2001 to the current state of European countries like Italy, Spain and even Switzerland. in a play on the well-known phrase "the lost decade," which was famously applied to Japan and now looks more and more like an appropriate description of the post-2007 decade in the US and Europe, she described the kirchnerismo decade as "la década ganada," the decade won.

Página/12 reports on her speech here: Nicolás Lantos, "Quiero la unidad con memoria, verdad y justicia" 26.05.2013. He leads with this quote from her speech, "Yo quiero la unidad de todos los argentinos. Pero quiero la unidad con memoria, con verdad y con justicia, porque sin eso no hay unidad posible y la necesitamos." ("I want the unity of all Argentines. But I want unity with memory, with truth and with justice, because without that, unity isn't possible, and we need it".) Lantos explains that this was a response to a proposal by the governor of Córdoba province, José Manuel de la Sota (from Cristina's own Partido Justicialista), who recently suggested that the government stop prosecutions of criminals acting in service of the military dictatorship of 1976-83, in exchange for getting information about the fate of people kidnapped and disappeared, many of whose fates have not been definitively determined, though those still unaccounted for were essentially all murdered. Accountability, including legal accountability, for those crimes has been a signature cause of both Kirchers in their presidencies.

She says of the kirchnerismo project, "Que quede claro, éste no es un modelo económico. Este es un proyecto político con objetivos económicos, sociales y culturales." ("Let's be clear, this is not an economic model. It is a political project with economic, social and cultural objectives.")

And in a statement that Americans can pretty much only fantasize our politicians right now would even think of saying out loud, she said, "Dicen que la suba de salarios genera inflación, pero los precios no los ponen los trabajadores ni el Gobierno, sino los empresarios y los grandes monopolios." ("People say that the increase of salaries generates inflation, but the prices aren't set by the workers nor the government, but by the businesspeople and the big monopolies.") If Obama were to ever say anything like that, poor David Brooks would have a stroke.

Aljazeera English reports, Kirchners' 10-year rule stirs mixed feelings Aljazeera English 05/24/2013:



Other reports on the weekend anniversaries:

La militancia kirchnerista exhibió una capacidad de movilización sin precedentes Tiempo Argentino 26.05.2013

Década ganada: "Néstor Kirchner reafirmó la soberanía del país" Cronica 26.05.2013

La presidenta llamó a "empoderar" al pueblo para defender las conquistas Tiempo Argentino 26.05.2013

Guido Braslavsky, Cristina: "A la década ganada queremos que siga otra más" Clarín 26.05.2013. Clarín generally gave good treatment to Néstor Kirchner but has been hostile to Cristina, who has put up obstacles to the large Clarín media group's expansion plans.

Santiago Fioriti, La Cámpora, protagonista del plan K para recuperar la calle Clarín 26.05.2013

Cristina Kirchner habló de "otra década más" para el modelo y negó un "fin de ciclo" La Nación 26.05.2013. La Nación, part of another Argentine media conglomerate, is the traditional newspaper of "the oligarchy" and therefore hostile to the Peronist party and to Néstor and Cristina.

Luego del acto masivo, el FPV ratificó el camino transitado en la "década ganada" Tiempo Argentino 27.05.2013

Tags: , , ,

Saturday, January 26, 2013

Cristina Fernández and the reindustrialization of Argentina

In this speech, Argentine President Cristina Fernández discusses a new national program to construct or renovate around 17 thousan residential units, of which 13 thousand are to be new. It is expected to benefit 160 cities and generate 25 thousand jobs. She emphasized that this was part of the larger program that began with Néstor Kirchner's Presidency in 2003 of reindustrializing Argentina. 25 de ENE. Anuncio Plan "Más Cerca: Más municipio, Mejor país, Más patria". Casa Rosada 25.01.2012:



Página 12 reports on the speech in CFK: "Es básico seguir con el proceso de reindustrialización" 25.01.2013.

She calls the new residential construction plan, "Más Cerca: Más municipio, Mejor país, Más patria" ("Closer together: more city, more country, more homeland.")

The "kirchnerismo" policy pursued since 2003 involves promoting diverse economic development. This comes after a nearly 30-year period of neoliberal economic policies, first imposed by the military dictatorship of 1976-83 and continued through the Presidency of Eduardo Duhalde (Jan 2002-May 2003). Allowing the "free market" to operate according to the principles favored by the IMF that eventually came to be known as the "Washington Consensus," Argentina's export industries (agricultural exports, natural gas) and financial speculation prospered, at the cost of vastly increased financial instability, falling real wages, vastly increased public debt and a major loss of sovereignty to foreign capital and international agencies like the IMF following austerity policies like those currently doing such enormous damage in Europe.

Part of the challenge in maintaining the policy of balanced, diversified development has to do with the currency effects of exports at times when exports are doing particularly well. If the Great God Free Market is allowed to manage this process unguided by government, export items like energy-related resources will increase in price domestically because they are more in demand in the world market. This can create "imported inflation."

Rising prices for major exports is a good thing, up to a point. They can also become too much of a good thing, especially in a developing economy like Argentina's. Because as they become more profitable, they begin to attract more foreign capital, again something that can be a good thing in itself. This creates pressure for the currency to appreciate. But that first hits the newer, developing industrial exporters that the country is actually trying to develop for the good of long-run national performance and for the immediate employment opportunities they create.

So the Argentine government is attempting to optimize benefits from prosperous exporting industries while not sabotaging their own policy of balanced, diverse development and reindustrialization. That and their on-going disputes over Argentine debt held by vulture-capital funds also requires the national treasury maintaining a certain supply of dollars and placing limits of the amount of currency exchange into dollars, as well as other kinds of export controls.

One immediate result of that balancing act has been a significant amount of inflation the last few years. Inflation can be very damaging, and not just to the wealthy, as Argentina itself experienced under Duhalde when he drastically devalued the peso under conditions that maximized the inflationary impact. But where, say, 10% inflation sounds like the end of the world to many affluent Americans, it doesn't necessarily sound like such a catastrophe to people in a developing country like Argentina that has seen tangible benefits from steady, sustained economic development since 2003.

One tangible result that Cristina mentions in the video above that would also sound good to most Americans is a 233% increase in supermarket sales since 2003. Ordinary people being able to buy a lot more groceries sounds like a palpable increase in well-being for the country. Even though the Argentine oligarchs might have preferred greater opportunities for financial speculation for themselves over that benefit for the majority of the country.

Diego Rubinzal, citing earlier periods of sustained, relatively rapid development in Argentina, Brazil and South Korea, notes that significant inflation can be concurrent with strong growth of GDP. (Puja distributiva Página 12/Cash 13.02.2011) He notes that the conventional solution that orthodox economists would recommend to control inflation would be to put a damper on economic growth. But that solution also has very real downsides, although it should be noted that the inflation problem in Argentina is generally recognizing as being real, though there are ongoing disputes about its actual severity, which is likely worse than the official statistics indicate. It's not the situation we currently have in the US, where not only is inflation low but long-term indicators of future inflation like US Treasury bond rates show no immediate inflation danger, but conservatives have been issuing hug-inflation-is-just-around-the-corner jeremiads every since 2009.

But Cristina's government isn't adopting the austerity route, though Argentina's limits on access to credit markets does mean they have to pay particular attention to budget balancing. Though contrary to the austerians in Europe and America, that does not have to be done by measures that directly damage workers and the poor.

The text accompanying the video at the official Casa Rosada Presidential website is as follows:

Viernes 25 de Enero de 2013, Buenos Aires: La Presidenta Cristina Fer[n]ández de Kirchne[r], encabezó un acto en Casa Rosada, para anunciar la construcción de viviendas. Allí, llamó a "seguir avanzando en el proceso de reindustrialización del país". Además, vía teleconferencia, inauguró obras en Campana, Rosario y Mar del Plata.

Durante el acto, la jefa de Estado anunció el inicio de obras para la construcción de casi 17 mil soluciones habitacionales financiadas con fondos nacionales. Además, se firmó el convenio para la Comisión de Seguimiento del Plan Integral para la Promoción del Empleo.

Las obras de vivienda que anunció la mandataria se desarrollan en el marco del Plan "Más Cerca: Más municipio, Mejor país, Más patria" y abarca 160 municipios de 14 provincias, que implicarán más de 25.000 empleos. La mayoría serán casas nuevas, además de mejorar algunas ya existentes.

Al respecto, se firmó un convenio entre los actores sociales de la construcción (Uocra, Cámara de la Construcción, Estadística y Registro de la Construcción) el ministerio de Planificación Federal, ministerio de Trabajo y los distintos gobernadores de las provincias en donde se realizarán las obras de vivienda.
Tags: , , , , ,