Showing posts with label peronism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label peronism. Show all posts

Thursday, June 15, 2017

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner to run for Argentine Senate

Argentina has legislative elections this coming October. The last Presidential election was in 2015, when the current President Mauricio Macri was elected. Macri's party is called the PRO (Propuesta Republicana), originally set up as a vehicle for Macri himself to be elected as the head of government for the City of Buenos Aires (Jefe de Gobierno de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires), an office he held 2007-2015.

Former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner is now positioning herself for a possible 2020 Presidential run. The step in that that direction she took this week was to announce her candidacy for the Argentine national Senate from Buenos Aires province. [Update: Actually she didn't announce her candidacy directly; a close political ally announced that she would be, but she didn't publicly confirm it.] Her electoral coalition just formally constituted itself as the Unidad Ciudadana, which the Télam agency in this report translates into English as Citizen Unity, Cristina Kirchner announces "citizen unity" will be the name of the front with which Kirchnerism will compete in primaries, outside PJ Télam/Yahoo! Noticias 06/14/2017. For Americans, that sounds awfully close to Citizens United, a name that has a bad odor in the United States because of the 2010 Supreme Court decision of that name. Cristina's politics are definitely not like those of the Citizen's United group in the US that brought that case!

Argentine politics is not a two-party affair like we have in the US. But it is a presidential system. The head of government is elected directly and is not a prime minister in the sense of parliamentary systems. And the political alignments at the national level do tend to align on a two-camp basis. One major camp is that of the Peronists, of which Cristina Fernández is very much a part. Peronism is both a party and a movement. The party is the Partido Justicialista (PJ).

The other major alignment since 1946 has been the Radical Civic Union (UCR), which is typically referred to "the radicals" or radicalism (radicalismo), even though they have long since become conservative. The UCR is being absorbed to some extent by the PRO. There is a small Socialist Party, which essentially lines up with the conservatives in the PRO and UCR.

The various parties and splinter groups on both sides ran in 2015 on umbrella tickets. The Peronist ticket headed by Daniel Scioli was called Frente Para la Victoria (FpV). Macri's group was Cambiemos. Macri was also backed by a significant Peronist splinter group called Frente Renovadora, headed by Sergio Massa.

Cristina has now signed a common platform with other left-Peronist (kirchnerista) leaders to create the Unidad Ciudadana electoral front in Buenos Aires province for 2018. And more conservative faction in the PJ headed by Florencio Randazzo will complete in the provincial election as part of the Frente Justicialista, though he will likely have to win an internal primary for the right to head the ticket.

Elecciones 2017: Cristina Kirchner lanzó el frente "Unidad Ciudadana" C5N 06/15/2017:



The Argentine economy has been in decline pretty much since taking office in December 2015. And that's a feature, not a bug for the Macri government. They have applied Herbert Hoover "Washington Consensus" economic policies from the start, including big budget cuts, deregulation of business, raising utility and public transit prices, all accompanied by major inflation and rising unemployment.

The inflation is very much related to economic policies of Macri's government. The prior government had used a system of capital controls and price regulations to maintain economic stability, promote the growth of domestic industry and maintain necessary dollar reserves. Macri's government pretty much dumped that whole menu of policies very quickly. High inflation and growing unemployment followed.

Debt for developing countries is different for that of the more developed countries. Because it becomes a tool that foreign governments and corporations can use to keep the debtor country in a state of dependency. The Kirchner governments of 2003-2008 had drastically reduced the debt, which had previously led to the severe financial crisis of 2001. Now Macri has put that course into full reverse: Argentina becomes largest debtor among emerging markets Buenos Aires Herald 06/14/2017.

There are plenty of political issues to fight about over the next 2 1/2 years.

Wednesday, May 24, 2017

El retorno de Cristina?

Cristina Fernández, that is, the President of Argentina 2007-2015.

Not that's she really been absent from the political scene since leaving office in 2015. Her successor Maricio Macri campaigned on a moderate program, or at least a moderate-sounding one. Since assuming office in December 2015, he has instead instituted a standard neoliberal/IMF/Washington Consensus economic menu. And the results are what should have been expected: falling real wages, higher unemployment, cutbacks of essential government services, a cave-in to the blackmail from vulture funds that had bought up defaulted Argentine debt, and taking on new debt, some of which reportedly uses Argentine state property as security. Dropping capital controls has contributed to a high inflation rate, even by Argentine standards. (It's not the kind of triple-digit hyperinflation that Argentina experienced in the late 1980s, at least.)

Cristina has been a regular, public critic of Macri's government. And she still has strong support within the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ) and the broader electoral coalition of the Frente para la Victoria, (FpV). This photo and slogan has been popping up in hard copies and online.


The slogan says, "The sun of the 25th is appearing." Or, "Sunrise of the 25th is coming" probably works, too. That's a reference to the 25th of May, a national holiday celebrating the official proclamation of a new national government on that date in 1810, displacing the Spanish Viceroy Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros (1756–1829). It's known as May Revolution Day, a key event in the establishment of Argentina as an independent nation. Argentine Independence Day is celebrated on July 9, commemorating the formal declaration of independence of 1816.

May 25 took on a particular political and patriotic significance for the kichneristas. Cristina's late husband Néstor Kirchner became President on May 25, 2003, the beginning of a dramatically new reformist direction for Argentina in which neoliberal political prescriptions were largely rejected in favor of a more activist government aggressively promoting Keynesian policies and recovering the language and spirit of left Peronist populism. (Martín Granovsky, “Llegamos sin rencores y con memoria” Página/12 06.05.2003) The 25th of May was treated as a major day of celebration of what they called the "national and popular" tradition of Argentina, i.e., left-nationalist, democratic and militant social-democratic ones.

Cristina took part in a meeting with other political leaders this week working to form an effective political coalition in Buenos Aires Province for the 2017 legislative elections. (Sin definiciones, pero con afiches Página/12 24.05.2017)

Former Finance Minister and current Deputy in the lower House of the Argentine Congress Axel Kiciloff considers Cristina to be the leader of the movement (kircherista/peronista/FpV), 22/05/17 - Kicillof: "Cristina es la jefa del movimiento y yo soy parte de él":



Saturday, November 19, 2016

The opposition to Perón and Peronism in Argentine politics, 1943-1951

Marcia García Sebastiani in her book Los antiperonistas en la Argentina peronista (2005) looks at the formation of the opposition to Juan Perón and Peronism in the years 1943-1951. A consolidation of the opposition to Peronism congealed behind the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). And that two-party alignment largely prevails in Argentine politics today. Of course, with many changes along the way.


The landmarks of the the period in which this oppositional alignment emerged include the following:
  • 1943: the military coup which made Gen. Pedro Ramírez head of government. From 1941, Col. Juan Perón had led the secret GOU group (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos) of military officers who were responsible for the 1943 coup.
  • 1945: October 17 and Perón's dramatic release from detention as the result of dramatic and massive popular demand
  • February 1946: a few days before the national elections, the US releases its Blue Book against Perón as part of a scarcely concealed US regime-change effort spearheaded by Spruille Braden, US Ambassador to Argentina and later a member of the National Council of the early John Birch Society, the longtime mother ship of far-right conspiracy theories. (Braden Discloses He Quit Birch Post New York Times 03/19/2016)

  • The US interference in Argentine politics had been so blatant that Perón made his central campaign theme "Perón o Braden" ("Perón or Braden"). After his election victory, Perón told a Brazilian paper, "I'm grateful to Braden for the votes he has given me... If I win two thirds of the electorate, a third would be due to the propaganda Braden made against me."
  • The national elections of February 1946 were marred by violence and some dubious actions by the military government that interfered with the campaign activities of the opposition. But it was a free and competitive election and far cleaner than any since before the coup of September 1930, which had removed the elected President Hipólito Yrigoyen (UCR) and installed José Félix Uriburu as head of a provisional government.
  • 1947: Women's suffrage approved by Congress. The UCR had long advocated it but opposed the law that actually enacted it when it was up for a vote in Congress.
  • 1948: The police claim in September they have uncovered a plot to assassinate Perón
  • 1949 - Constitution of 1949 approved, replacing that of 1853. The new Constitution allows Perón to run for re-election and reduces some of the features of Congress that the UCR had used to impede Peronist legislation
  • 1951-As the parties prepare for a new Presidential election for 1952, Gen. Benjamin Menéndez leads a new coup attempt, which fails. Filipe Pigna writes that the intent of Menéndez in the coup was that he "wanted to disarm the Peronist state completely and take away from the worker all their social conquests, returning them to the regime of semi-slavery that rules before 1943." (Los mitos de la historia argentina 4. La Argentina peronista (1943-1955); translations from Pigna here are mine)
1951 ends the period on which Sebastiani's book concentrates.

In 1955, Gen. Eduardo Lonardi mounted a successful coup attempt in September that styled itself the Revolución Libertadora. Perón fled the country to asylum in Paraguay. In March 1956, the military government banned the Peronist Party and all explicitly Peronist political activity. The coup and the new military government and the ban on Peronism was supported by the UCR and the Socialists. Perón himself was unable to return to Argentina and stand for election again until 1973, when he was elected by a 62% majority.

Sebastiani provides a table (p. 90) showing the vote percentages of the various parties in the elections of 1946, 1948 (non-Presidential) and 1952. For the UCR and the Peronists, it shows the following.

1946: Peronista 50%, UCR 28%
1948: Peronista 61%, UCR 27%
1952: Peronista 62%, UCR 32%

The broad opposition front formed by the opposition leading up to the 1946 elections, bringing together the Radicals (UCR), the Socialists, the Communists, conservatives (Partido Demócrata Nacional/PDN) and center-right (Partido Demócrata Progresista/PDP), was called the Unión Democrática. They constructed their political identity are the rhetoric of democracy and political liberalism. They opposition under the military regime characterized the government as "fascist" and "Nazi." That characterization was encouraged by the United Nations powers in the Second World War because Argentina remained neutral in the Second World War until 1945, when the outcome of the war was all but certain. And when Perón had become Vice President and Minister of War.

There is an ongoing discussion on whether Perón's government should be classified as "fascist." I won't try to recapitulate it here. But I find that case unsustainable. Whatever authoritarian aspects his governments may have had, his goal from 1945 to his death in 1974 as President for a second time, his goal was to democratize the Argentine government. I would argue that the question of authoritarianism is more relevant to his brief 1973-4 government than to that of 1945-55. It was under his government that Argentine women won the vote. His policies strengthened the labor unions, mobilized a large number of people into an active involvement in politics and pursued economic policies that greatly increased the well-being of millions.

During the 1946-51 period, Peronist government and political movement took measures that restricted the opposition's freedom in various ways. It restricted the publication of opposition newspapers by limiting the amount of paper deliver to them for the publications and shutting some of the down or taking over publication. A few opposition leaders wer expelled from Congress. Ricardo Balbín, a key UCR leader, was jailed in 1950 for a five-year term. But the Perón government pardoned and released him in 1951 and he became the UCR's Presidential candidate that year. Pigna notes dryly of the expulsions and Balbín's imprisonment, "The governmental response to the Radicals' chicanery wasn't exactly democratic." (Los mitos de la historia argentina 4. La Argentina peronista (1943-1955))

Still, this was neither a dictatorship nor were the elections shams. Comparing the votes above in the Presidential and congressional elections of 1946, 1948 and 1952 don't give any obvious indication that the opposition was being suppressed. And, in fact, despite the restrictions mentioned, those elections were competitive and both sides were able to make their positions to the public. For better or worse, Perón understood his movement as revolutionary. And always would. But it was a revolutionary movement that was more committed to democratic processes than the governments of 1930-1943 had been.

The opposition was also willing to support the self-described Revolución Libertadora in 1955,aka, Lonardi's military coup. During Perón's elected governments, there was nothing approaching the complete ban of the Peronist party and even the use of Peronist slogans like the Revolución Libertadora initiated in 1956. Even tango dancing was discouraged because the new rulers identified it with the common people who supported Perón. As the election results above show, Peronism was a kind of politics with which a majority identified. So from 1955-1973, Argentina suffered a chronic crisis of governance because the party and movement speaking for the majority was suppressed. And no government in Argentine history was so brutal a dictatorship as the military government that was in power 1973-83.

Pigna mentions the following senior oppsotion politicians who had not only guilty knowledge and at least passively collaborated in the coup attempt of 1951 led by Menéndez: Arturo Frondizi (UCR), Américo Ghioldi (Socialists), Reynaldo Pastor (conservatives) and Horacio Thedy (center-right). Basically the entire opposition spectrum, in other words, except the Communist Party, which would join in with the opposition in supporting the 1955 coup.

Perón had very legitimate reason to fear violent, anti-democracy conspiracies against him. That is not a justification for bad acts. It's a description of a central political fact of that period. Sebastiani provides a useful account of the development of the anti-Peronist opposition and the ideological narratives they shaped for themselves. But that process and those ideologies are difficult to evaluate meaningfully if not understood in the context of the interests at work and the actors supporting them.

The narrative of Perón as a Nazi obscured much more than it clarified. Framing your opponent as Hitler can result in drastic threat.inflation. Or, rather, it almost always is threat inflation. (Which is why it's such a bad thing in US foreign policy that we try to make every adversary from Ho Chi Minh to Muammar Qaddafi the New Hitler.) Ironically, the cover features of photograph of a rally for the Unión Demócratica umbrella opposition group. I say it's ironic because it's from August 12, 1946 in the Plaza del Congreso in Buenos Aires. It features a sign saying "Contra el nazismo" (Against the Nazis).


That was three days after the bombing of Nagasaki. so the Second World War was still officially going on and Argentina was formally a belligerent on the United Nations' side. Germany had surrendered in May, so if the reference was meant to be a patriotic wartime one, the reference was already a bit anachronistic. It was actually directed at the military government, in which Perón as Vice President was the most popular leader at that point. But it was before the President, Gen. Edelmiro Farrell, ousted Perón and imprisoned him in early October. Popular pressure forced Perón's release and he returned in triumph to address the throng on October 17 in the famous Plaza de Mayo from the balcony of the Presidential palace, the Casa Rosada. October 17 is still celebrated today by the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ) as a major historical turning point they observe every year.

So under the military dictatorship, with no democratic elections scheduled, the umbrella opposition group Unión Demócratica was holding a rally in the federal capital in front of a major governmental building. In the actual Nazi regime of the Hitler government, such demonstrations in front of the Reichstag in Berlin were, it's safe to say, extremely rare. As in, non-existent after the imposition the Enabling Law in 1933 that established the dictatorship.

But the central opposition narrative was that they were standing for democracy against Perón's "Nazi-fascist" rule, even during his democratically elected governments. That same narrative continued to be used, including to justify the military coup of 1955. The UCR continued to describe their victory via military coup as having overthrown "Nazis."

Sunday, November 08, 2015

Argentina's elections

Javier Lewkowicz reports on the current Argentine Presidential election in Argentina’s runoff to be determined by a penalty shoot-out democraciaAbierta 10/27/2015.

Left-Peronist incumbent President Cristina Fernández is termed out after two consecutive terms, though she could run against in 2019. And she has said she plans to stay active in the politics of the Partido Justicialista (PJ), the main Peronist party.

The big contest in the current election is between Argentina's current version of Mitt Romney, Mauricio Macri, and the PJ candidate, Daniel Scioli. The final round of the election comes in two weeks, November 22.

There was a preliminary round on October 25. Argentina now has a law that forces a runoff in the Presidential election so that a candidate has to get a majority to be elected. National campaigns in Argentina tend to run as part of coalition parties. Scioli's alliance is the Frente para la Victoria (FPV).

Macri previously served as the Governor of Buenos Aires City, where he headed his own party, the PRO (Propuesta Republicana). The main opposition party, called the party of the oligarchy by the Peronists, is the Union Civica Radical (UCR). The Radicals are backing Macri under the electoral alliance called Cambiemos. Consistent with the name of Macri's party, anti-Peronists are starting to identify themselves as "republicans." The association with the US party of the same name is not lost on the Peronists. The UCR is an official party of the Socialist International. So is the smaller Partido Socialist (PS), currently headed by Hermes Binner. Since the days of Juan Perón's first Presidency, the PS has largely acted as an ally of UCR in national politics, including supporting the 1955 coup against Perón's elected government. The supporters of that so-called "Revolution Libertadora" in 1955 also identified themselves as "republicans," though their political practice was very different that what most people think of as a representative republican form of government.

For the November 22 election, the PS is officially neutral between Macri and Scioli. (Ni Macri ni Scioli para el socialismo) Página/12 29.10.2015. They backed a minor candidate, Margarita Stolbizer, in the October 25 round. Her electoral alliance is called Frente Amplio Progresista (FAP), of which the PS is a part. But since the PS largely supports the neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus, as does Macri but not the PJ, it's unlikely that their voters would necessarily support Scioli over Macri in the final round. Their not a major force nationally. Their electoral alliance received on 3% of the votes on October 25. But in a very close race, those votes could be decisive. Stolbizer has also taken a neutral position for November 22 while making it clear that she's closer to Macri's pro-oligarchy positions than to Scioli's more genuinely social-democratic ones.

To further illustrate the complexity of the partisan and ideological alignments, there is a group of Congressional deputies who call themselves Unidad Socialista para la Victoria (USpV) and are aligned with the Peronist-led FpV currently headed by Scioli. (En búsqueda de coincidencias Página/12 31.10.2015) The USpV includes the deputies Jorge Rivas y Oscar González.

In the October 25 round, Scioli came out with 36%, Macri with 35%. Sergio Massa came in third with 21%. Massa had split from the PJ and was basically running as a conservative Peronist with an electoral alliance called Unidos por una Nueva Alternativa (UNA). Massa's own party is called the Frente Renovador. Massa opposed the main PJ and the left Peronists. But the Frente Renovador is still part of the larger Peronist movement. (Peronism as a political concept is exceptionally complicated!) So it's uncertain where his October 25 voters are likely go on November 22. But it's reasonable to expect that more would go to Scioli than to Macri, whatever Massa's personal leanings. He's been publicly neutral on the November 22 runoff, though some of his prominent allies have indicated a lean to Macri. (Miguel Jorquera, Massa, sin definición para el ballottage Página/12 26.10.2015; Fernando Cibeira, Scioli ganó por poco y va al ballottage con Macri Página/12 26.10.2015; Argentina Presidential Challenger Mauricio Macri Seeks Common Ground With Sergio Massa NDTVReuters 10/28/2015; Richard Lough and Maximilian Heath, Massa allies lean toward opposition challenger in presidential run-off Reuters 10/208/2015)

One of the wild cards is the Province of Buenos Aires, where Scioli has been the Governor since 2007. Macri beat him there in the October 25 round. Buenos Aires province, even with the City of Buenos Aires which is its own separate province, has around 40% of the Argentine population. That's why the affairs of the capital city and Buenos Aires Province figure so very prominently in national politics. Peter Prengaman and Almudena Calatrava report that various issues are important in the province, with crime being particularly prominent at the moment. (Sprawling BA province key to runoff AP/Buenos Aires Herald 11/08/2015) It can sometimes be a challenge for non-Argentines to keep up with what is meant exactly by "Buenos Aires," i.e., Buenos Aires City, Greater Buenos Aires (the city plus the suburbs in the province), and Buenos Aires Province.

It's also a bad sign that the pro-Macri opposition won the Governorship in Buenos Aires Province. "El impactante triunfo de María Eugenia Vidal en Buenos Aires marca el fin de la hegemonía del peronismo en el distrito más importante del país desde hace 28 años" ["The impressive victory " of María Eugenia Vidal in Buenos Aires {Province} marks and end to the hegemony of Peronism {that has held} for 28 years in the most important district of the country."] (Página/12 26.10.2015) But Scioli's Presidential ticket won significantly more votes than the provincial ticket of the FpV headed by Anibal Fernández.

Javier Lewkowicz characterizes the situation as follows. I wouldn't characterize the differences between the political groupings exactly the way he does. But this gives a good general idea of the situation:

But he did not pronounce them on Monday October 26, 2015, after his huge electoral performance the day before. Macri was evaluating his electoral victory on December 5, 1995, his first step into politics. At that moment, the runoff, Daniel Scioli, the alliance with the Unión Cívica Radical, his three successive victories as Buenos Aires City mayor, and the constitution of his own political party, the Republican Proposal (PRO), all belonged to an unpredictable future. By the end of 1995, Macri also won the elections to become president of the Boca Juniors football club. Popular sport magazines ran front page headlines saying: “Argentina’s Berlusconi”.

Last Sunday, the Macri-led Cambiemos (Lets’ change) alliance achieved what not even the most optimist militants would have dared to imagine. He got himself into the second round of the presidential election with a close-to-technical draw with Daniel Scioli, the candidate for the Front for Victory, the party in power in Argentina since 2003. Macri even managed to defeat Peronism in the elections for governor of the Buenos Aires Province, something that had not happened since 1983. The size of the electoral results, whatever happens in the second round, is gigantic. Kirchnerism’s political hegemony since the country’s way out of the 2000/2012 crisis is now hampered, and a bipolar scheme emerges.

Macri can be located in what is now called the new right, economically liberal but not fully anti-popular, democratic and sensible to changes in the public mood. Henrique Capriles, Aecio Neves and Sebastián Piñera, in Venezuela, Brasil and Chile respectively, also belong to this category. Scioli and Peronism, on their side, represent a relatively light version of Kirchnerism [Cristina Fernández' policies], with no great expectations and willing to mend broken bounds, from the IMF to the local corporate media.

Sunday, November 23, 2014

Political fights in Argentina: Cristina vs. vulture funds and opposition political schenanigans

Floyd Norris in the New York Times, a somewhat poorly titled piece called Argentina’s Case Has No Victors, Many Losers 11/20/2014. As Norris explains, Argentina hasn't caved in to the predatory hedge funds (vulture funds) and their compliant Nixon-appointed zombie judge Thomas Griesa:

Five months later, Argentina has not paid any money to the hedge funds. The judge has succeeded in blocking it from paying any money to holders of other bonds, but that just increases the number of losers.

In a way, the current fight is reminiscent of the battles more than 300 years ago in the American colonies over debtor’s prisons, which were widespread. Such punishment might have made sense for deadbeats, and it presumably had a deterrent effect, but prisoners were unable to earn the money needed to pay their creditors even if they wished to do so. [my emphasis]
Norris explains some of why the Nixon zombie judge's decision in this case was such a radical one:

For international bonds issued under New York law, as many are, it used to be that a country that defaulted could be sued and the courts would order it to pay. But sovereign immunity meant that decision could not be enforced. So most bondholders would eventually agree to some sort of debt restructuring, often involving the International Monetary Fund.

The Argentine ruling has clearly given bondholders an incentive to hold out in future international restructurings. Under Judge Griesa’s ruling, holdouts could do much better than those who agreed to the restructuring, and could not do worse.

If, that is, the decision can be enforced.

The judge, aware of that problem, has barred banks and other financial firms from doing anything to help Argentina evade the ruling. That has meant extending the ruling to cover not only bonds issued under New York law but also those issued under English and Argentine laws.
This is a report from TV Pública argentina, Visión 7 - Fondos buitre: El New York Times habla de excesos de la Justicia de EEUU 11/21/2014:



The political maneuvering for the 2015 Presidential elections in Argentine is intensifying, not surprisingly. Aside from Peronism being an exceptionally challenging political movement to understand, Argentina's political system has confusing fluidities within continuities in other ways. Argentine President Cristina Fernández' Peronist Partida Justicialista (PJ) governs with a legislative coalition called the Frente para la Victoria (FpV). The main opposition party is the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). But the leading opposition figure right now is the governor of the City of Buenos Aires, Mauricio Macri. He has a separate political party called the PRO (Propuesta Republicana). But in a two-way match-up in a national campaign against a PJ candidate in 2015, he would very likely be supported by the national umbrella coalition called Frente Amplio UNEN, aka, FAUNEN. FAUNEN includes the UCR and the Argentine Socialist Party, both of which are formal members of the Socialist International. Both UCR and the Socialist Party are married to neoliberal economic ideology. UCR is the main political vehicle of the "oligarchy," the political villain that is perhaps the most significant constant in the political trend called Peronism. The Socialist Party is effectively their ally, promoting the same interests and policies with more left-sounding rhetoric. FAUNEN also includes several smaller parties.

In a national meeting this past week, the UCR decided that they would seek to put forward their own UCR candidate rather than seek a unified FAUNEN candidate. (A nivel nacional, en el FAUNEN Página/12 17.11.2014). This rules out an early formal alliance between Macri's PRO and the neoliberal-Peronist Sergio Massa, whose current political vehicle is called the Frente Renovador (FR). Massa's ideology is known as "federal" Peronism.

Also this past week, Jorge Capitanich, head of Cristina Fernanez' cabinet, attacked the opposition for "golpismo activo" (active coup activity [!]) in connection with allegations of corruption in connection with the Hotesur company. TV Pública argentina reports in Visión 7 - Capitanich denunció "golpismo activo" 11/21/2014:



The Buenos Aires Herald reports (Gov’t says Bonadío uses Hotesur raids to 'extort and play politics' 11/23/2014):

Justice Secretary Julián Álvarez has joined the group of government officials who have questioned recent judicial raids at the Hotesur company partly owned by President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Álvarez accused federal judge Claudio Bonadío – who ordered the raids - of “extortion” and a “clear institutional coup-mongering.”

“When we speak of Bonadío, we are not talking about a paladin of justice, we are talking of someone who uses cases to extort and to play politics,” Álvarez stated during an interview with Página/12 newspaper.

The official described the judge’s raids as “clear institutional coup-mongering” and said that they are the result of the magistrate’s reaction against the “nine motions for his impeachment he faces in the Magistrates Council.” [my emphasis]

Santiago Rodríguez interviews Álvarez for Página/12 in “Usa causas para extorsionar y hacer política” 17.11.2014. Rodriguez reports that Hotesur administers a hotel owned by Cristina, a somewhat different description than the Buenos Aires Herald piece just cited provides. Álvarez claims that Judge Bonadío is an "activist" (militante) of the FN and is in active discussions with Massa about posts he might get under a Massa Presidency. Citing Bonadío's history as a loyal supporter of neoliberal causes as a judge and a long history of association with the neoliberal strand of Peronism says, "Cuando hablamos de Bonadio no hablamos de un paladín de la justicia, sino de alguien que utiliza las causas para extorsionar y hacer política." ("When we're talking about Bonadio, we're not talking about a paladin of justice, but rather about someone who uses court cases to extort and to make policy.")

Saturday, January 26, 2013

Cristina Fernández and the reindustrialization of Argentina

In this speech, Argentine President Cristina Fernández discusses a new national program to construct or renovate around 17 thousan residential units, of which 13 thousand are to be new. It is expected to benefit 160 cities and generate 25 thousand jobs. She emphasized that this was part of the larger program that began with Néstor Kirchner's Presidency in 2003 of reindustrializing Argentina. 25 de ENE. Anuncio Plan "Más Cerca: Más municipio, Mejor país, Más patria". Casa Rosada 25.01.2012:



Página 12 reports on the speech in CFK: "Es básico seguir con el proceso de reindustrialización" 25.01.2013.

She calls the new residential construction plan, "Más Cerca: Más municipio, Mejor país, Más patria" ("Closer together: more city, more country, more homeland.")

The "kirchnerismo" policy pursued since 2003 involves promoting diverse economic development. This comes after a nearly 30-year period of neoliberal economic policies, first imposed by the military dictatorship of 1976-83 and continued through the Presidency of Eduardo Duhalde (Jan 2002-May 2003). Allowing the "free market" to operate according to the principles favored by the IMF that eventually came to be known as the "Washington Consensus," Argentina's export industries (agricultural exports, natural gas) and financial speculation prospered, at the cost of vastly increased financial instability, falling real wages, vastly increased public debt and a major loss of sovereignty to foreign capital and international agencies like the IMF following austerity policies like those currently doing such enormous damage in Europe.

Part of the challenge in maintaining the policy of balanced, diversified development has to do with the currency effects of exports at times when exports are doing particularly well. If the Great God Free Market is allowed to manage this process unguided by government, export items like energy-related resources will increase in price domestically because they are more in demand in the world market. This can create "imported inflation."

Rising prices for major exports is a good thing, up to a point. They can also become too much of a good thing, especially in a developing economy like Argentina's. Because as they become more profitable, they begin to attract more foreign capital, again something that can be a good thing in itself. This creates pressure for the currency to appreciate. But that first hits the newer, developing industrial exporters that the country is actually trying to develop for the good of long-run national performance and for the immediate employment opportunities they create.

So the Argentine government is attempting to optimize benefits from prosperous exporting industries while not sabotaging their own policy of balanced, diverse development and reindustrialization. That and their on-going disputes over Argentine debt held by vulture-capital funds also requires the national treasury maintaining a certain supply of dollars and placing limits of the amount of currency exchange into dollars, as well as other kinds of export controls.

One immediate result of that balancing act has been a significant amount of inflation the last few years. Inflation can be very damaging, and not just to the wealthy, as Argentina itself experienced under Duhalde when he drastically devalued the peso under conditions that maximized the inflationary impact. But where, say, 10% inflation sounds like the end of the world to many affluent Americans, it doesn't necessarily sound like such a catastrophe to people in a developing country like Argentina that has seen tangible benefits from steady, sustained economic development since 2003.

One tangible result that Cristina mentions in the video above that would also sound good to most Americans is a 233% increase in supermarket sales since 2003. Ordinary people being able to buy a lot more groceries sounds like a palpable increase in well-being for the country. Even though the Argentine oligarchs might have preferred greater opportunities for financial speculation for themselves over that benefit for the majority of the country.

Diego Rubinzal, citing earlier periods of sustained, relatively rapid development in Argentina, Brazil and South Korea, notes that significant inflation can be concurrent with strong growth of GDP. (Puja distributiva Página 12/Cash 13.02.2011) He notes that the conventional solution that orthodox economists would recommend to control inflation would be to put a damper on economic growth. But that solution also has very real downsides, although it should be noted that the inflation problem in Argentina is generally recognizing as being real, though there are ongoing disputes about its actual severity, which is likely worse than the official statistics indicate. It's not the situation we currently have in the US, where not only is inflation low but long-term indicators of future inflation like US Treasury bond rates show no immediate inflation danger, but conservatives have been issuing hug-inflation-is-just-around-the-corner jeremiads every since 2009.

But Cristina's government isn't adopting the austerity route, though Argentina's limits on access to credit markets does mean they have to pay particular attention to budget balancing. Though contrary to the austerians in Europe and America, that does not have to be done by measures that directly damage workers and the poor.

The text accompanying the video at the official Casa Rosada Presidential website is as follows:

Viernes 25 de Enero de 2013, Buenos Aires: La Presidenta Cristina Fer[n]ández de Kirchne[r], encabezó un acto en Casa Rosada, para anunciar la construcción de viviendas. Allí, llamó a "seguir avanzando en el proceso de reindustrialización del país". Además, vía teleconferencia, inauguró obras en Campana, Rosario y Mar del Plata.

Durante el acto, la jefa de Estado anunció el inicio de obras para la construcción de casi 17 mil soluciones habitacionales financiadas con fondos nacionales. Además, se firmó el convenio para la Comisión de Seguimiento del Plan Integral para la Promoción del Empleo.

Las obras de vivienda que anunció la mandataria se desarrollan en el marco del Plan "Más Cerca: Más municipio, Mejor país, Más patria" y abarca 160 municipios de 14 provincias, que implicarán más de 25.000 empleos. La mayoría serán casas nuevas, además de mejorar algunas ya existentes.

Al respecto, se firmó un convenio entre los actores sociales de la construcción (Uocra, Cámara de la Construcción, Estadística y Registro de la Construcción) el ministerio de Planificación Federal, ministerio de Trabajo y los distintos gobernadores de las provincias en donde se realizarán las obras de vivienda.
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Sunday, December 23, 2012

The Argentine oligarchy's latest tactic against Cristina Fernández' government: promote looting

"They play dirty in Argentina" ("En Argentina se juega sucio"), writes Jorge Muzam in a brief explanation of the latest tactic of the Argentine oligarchy against the Peronist government of President Cristina Fernández. (Saqueos organizados en Argentina Huffington Post 21.12.2012)

They are promoting gangs of looters in an effort to create a sense of chaos in hopes that the public will blame the President's government for it. It's not a new tactic for reactionaries: create disorder for the purpose of offering yourselves as the solution to that disorder. The opposition in Chile during the Allende government notoriously used such tactics to prepare the coup of 1973. (To be clear, there is no indication I've heard of that a military coup is in the works in Argentina, nor of any active American governmental involvement as their was in Chile.)

Looting in this case means groups of young people going into stores and simultaneously snatching a bunch of stuff off the shelves and running out of the store. There was also some amount of vandalism in the artsy/touristy Boca section of Buenos Aires. These kinds of incidents occurred in cities all over Argentina.

The last time Argentina experienced serious violent civil disorder was during the crisis in 2001, when the IMF was attempting to do to Argentina what the EU is doing right now to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain: force them into an protracted cycle of impoverishment via self-destructive austerity policies to satisfy their creditors.

As Mario Wainfeld explains in La chispa y las realidades Página 12 23.12.2012:

La situación socioeconómica actual de la Argentina es incomparable con la del año 2001. Inversión social desconocida desde las anteriores experiencias nacionales y populares del peronismo (el del ’45 al ’55, el de los ‘70), con consecuencias enormes y palpables. Muy otros indicadores de empleo, de distribución del ingreso, de amplitud de las coberturas sociales, del consumo, de la institucionalidad laboral. Mucha acción estatal hubo de por medio, potenciada por la enorme capacidad de adaptación y recuperación de los argentinos, en especial los laburantes. El hambre y el desempleo extendidos no son los primeros problemas de los estratos populares, ni de lejos. La comensalidad familiar se ha restaurado en gran proporción. Hay un gobierno legitimado y activo, que coexiste con organizaciones sociales vitales y empoderadas. Algunas lo apoyan y sacan ventaja de ello, otras se le oponen y saben exigir desde la vereda de enfrente.

[The current socioeconomic situation of Argentina cannot be compared to that of the year 2001. Social investment unknown since the previous national and popular experiences of Peronism (that of '45 to '55, that of the 70s), with consequences that are enormous and palpable. Many other indicators of employment, of the distribution of income, the amplitude of the social coverage, consumption, of unionization. Much state action done for the medium term, strengthened by the enormous capacity for adaptation and recuperation of the Argentines, especially the working people. Hunger and prolonged unemployment are not the primary problems of popular governments, not by a long shot. The quality of family life has been largely restored. There is an active and legitimate government that coexists with vital social organizations and powerful social groups. Some support it and take advantage of it, others oppose it and know how to make demands openly.]
Others, such as the ones inciting street gangs to go on looting sprees, exercise their opposition in less legitimate ways.

Part of the context here is that political parties and politicians in Argentina often have contact with street gangs and socially marginal types who can be mobilized when causing a physical ruckus is deemed to be in order. It's not like the Weimar Republic, where political parties had to have their own paramilitary organizations to survive. Nor do they have the general level of gun violence of say, Mexico or the United States. (I suppose in the latter case it goes without saying.)

These are not, notes attorney for juveniles Julián Axat (Saqueos y reclutamiento juvenil el niño rizoma 22.12.2012, highly organized gangs of youths like the infamous MS-13 and similar groups in Central America. He also writes, "En el 2008 un juez se atrevió a denunciar que en la Provincia de Buenos Aires los menores eran instrumento de organizaciones criminales, incluyendo a la policía bonaerense que los usaba como mano de obra barata, y después se descartaba de ellos." ("In 2008, a judge dared to denounce the fact that in the province of Buenos Aires, minors were an instrument of criminal organization, including the Buenos Aires provincial police, who used them to do dirty jobs, and later discard them.")

As Muzam describes it, saying of the opposition leaders:

"No cuentan con suficiente apoyo popular, pero tienen de su lado el actuar mafioso de sus dirigentes, el numeroso lumpen clientelista de cada ciudad, el narcotráfico, los principales medios de comunicación y la oligarquía resentida con este gobierno."

[The can't count on sufficient popular support, but they have at their side the Mafia-like actions of their leaders, the numerous lumpen clientelista {socially marginal thugs with connections to parties} of every city, the drug trafficers, the principal media of communication and the oligarchy that resent this government.]
The part about the media presumably refers mainly to the media empires of La Nación and Clarín, both of which currently take an intensely oppositional stance toward Cristina's government.

Sure enough, this Clarín article Saqueos: enojo de intendentes por la falta de refuerzo policial 23.12.2012 highlights the blame some merchants are laying on the national government at the Peronist provincial government of Buenos Aires Province, headed by Cristina ally Daniel Scioli for supposedly not responding quickly enough on Friday to the dramatic instances of looting. The responses included in that article are very consistent with that classic rightwing political strategy. Stir up violence during a government you don't like, then blame the government for not doing enough to stop it.

The two main opposition groups are the Radicals (Unión Civic Radical, UCR) and the Partido Socialista (PS), both members of the Socialist International, amazingly enough. The UCR is the traditional party of the oligarchy, whose consistent hatred over decades for the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ) is one of the defining characteristics of Peronism. The PS is often allied with the UCR in the anti-Peronist/oligarchical cause.

This piece from La Nación, the longtime mouthpiece of the oligarchy, Para Binner, los saqueos fueron "actos vandálicos no ligados a la pobreza" 23.12.2012, has PS leader Hermes Binner pooh-poohing the idea that the opposition had anything to do with the recent round of lootings and vandalism. Another reminder that just because a party has "socialist" in its name doesn't mean it can't be a willing ally of oligarchical groups.

Wainfeld presents a more complete picture of the groups involved in the incidents of looting and vandalism that have attracted considerable attention in recent days and resulted in at least two deaths. In the article linked above and in Los pibes to la esquina 23.12.2012, he looks at a variety of factors at work in the background these incidents. It's not the case, in other words, that the political opposition just hired a bunch of professional gangsters to do this.

The state Channel 7, TV Pública Argentina, ran an eight-part telenovela in 2012 centering around a gang of street kids, Los pibes del puente, which also shows in fictionalized form the kind of ties such marginal youth can develop with wealthy members of "respectable" society.

This is a report on the disorder in San Fernando, one of the municipalities that is part of the conurbana (Greater Buenos Aires) area and part of the Province of Buenos Aires, whose Peronist government is one of the targets of the oligarchy, Vuelve la calma a San Fernando TV Pública Argentina 12/21/2012:



This is a longer report on the action in San Fernando, Saqueos organizados: Vandalismo y destrozos en San Fernando TV Pública Argentina 12/21/2012:



This report shows Edgardo Depetri, a member of Cristina's Parliamentary coalition, the Frente para la Victoria (FpV), talking about the political aspects of the gang attacks, Depetri: "Se trata de grupos organizados que tratan de generar caos" TV Pública Argentina 12/21/2012:



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Thursday, July 26, 2012

Today is the anniversary of the death of Eva ("Evita") Perón

Argentina this week is observing the 60th anniversary of the death of Eva ("Evita") Perón, which was on July 26, 1952.

I recently saw this film, Eva Perón (1996), whose screenplay was written by José Pablo Feinmann, a philosopher who has written extensively on Argentine political history, including a multi-volume work on Peronism. It's not as entertaining as Evita, the musical by Andrew Lloyd Weber. But it's one of the better movies I've seen about a politician. It strikes a good balance in giving the audience some understanding of the very complex nature of Peronism. It also does a good job of showing the tragedy and passion as well as the fanaticism of Evita.


Following are Spanish-language reports fro TV Público Argentina on Evita.

Homenaje a Evita en la Legislatura porteña 07/24/2012:


Obra y legado de Eva Perón 07/25/2012


Evita, en las imágenes del fotógrafo Mazzarotolo 07/26/2012:


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Tuesday, May 29, 2012

José Pablo Feinmann's "La sombra de Heidegger"

Argentine philosopher and political theorist José Pablo Feinmann wrote a philosophical novel about the influential and controversial German philosopher Martin Heidegger. La sombra de Heidegger (The Shadow of Heidegger) (2005). The main narrator writes at one point of Sartre's novel Nausea, "it's hard to know where one discipline ends and the other begins. What was philosophy, what was literature." (my translation)


As the cover image with its young men marching in uniforms and carrying swastika flags suggests, the novel focuses heavily on the aspects of Heidegger's thought and personal career that connected him in sympathy with the National Socialist movement, including his own membership in the Nazi Party (NSDAP) until 1945.

The story is in the form of accounts written by a fictional student and disciple of Heidegger's, Dieter Müller, and a much shorter one by his son, Martin, who Dieter named after the philosopher. Dieter's account is an extended suicide note. The son's describes his visit to Martin Heidegger in Freiburg, Germany in 1968.

Dieter's note introduces us to critical issues about Heidegger's direct involvement with the NSDAP and the issues in his philosophy that may have been especially compatible with, or particular open to adaptation to, the Nazi worldview and political program. As the title implies, Heidegger hangs over the story more than participates in it, though he does appear in places as an active character. The philosophers Hannah Arendt and Jean-Paul Sartre also appear as characters in the narrative, Arendt as Heidegger's girlfriend (which she was in reality) and Sartre as also a shadowy kind of presence. The German philosopher Karl Löwith shows up in connection with his account of his 1936 meeting with Heidegger in Rome, an important document in understanding Heidegger's support of the NSDAP.

Dieter and young Martin introduce us to Heidegger's apparent relationship to the SA (Sturmabteilung), aka, Brownshirts, and his competition with Alfred Rosenberg and Alfred Bäumler to articulate an official philosophy for the Nazi movement. Heidegger largely abandoned this effort after the suppression of the SA in 1934, though he continued to insist on the greatness of the Nazi movement from the viewpoint of his philosophy.

A number of key philosophical issues in and around Heidegger's philosophy are touched upon: his concept of truth as aletheia (ἀλήθεια), which he understood as the un-forgetting of the experience of Being; the privileged position he assigned to the pre-Socratic philosophers; his notion of the history of metaphysics as a long-term decay from the pre-Socratics; his concept of the inauthenticity of the present human Dasein (mode of existence); Heidegger's relation to Hegel's philosophy; his notion of historicity; the role of intense experience of living in Heidegger's outlook; the concept of death in his thought; the (in Dieter's view) surprising adaptation of Heidegger's though in French philosophy not only in Sartre's existentialism but also by thinkers by Jacques Derrida and others in the deconstructionist school of literary criticism.

Dieter has Heidegger at one point explaining his support for Nazism as based on his sense that Germany had a particular mission to save Western culture from the threat of Bolshevism, i.e., Soviet Communism. A mission that was connected with Heidegger's sense of Germany as the nation of the most superior culture. The Germans were a "metaphysical people", as Dieter puts it interpreting Heidegger's view on this point. Dieter also notes that Heidegger distanced himself from the biological racism of Rosenberg and the official Nazi doctrine, though this didn't mean that he was free of anti-Semitism.

The novel doesn't have a lot of sex or romance. Most of what is there comes in the form of Dieter and his SA friends gossiping and fantasizing about what the Master and young Hannah Arendt might be doing during their romantic encounters. Probably the cheesiest part of the story comes early on, when Dieter and his SA friend Rainer Minder encounter the fictional characters Sally Bowles and Maximilien von Heune from the musical Cabaret.

The most interesting action sequences come after Dieter emigrates to Argentina in 1944 with his son, and there after the war encounters old Nazis who want to recruit him to a neo-Nazi Fourth Reich conspiracy. This provides some cloak-and-dagger time moments, though not a lot of them. Dieter, like his mentor Heidegger, had been and NSDAP member and believer in the cause, though the particular Party factions they would have preferred had not won out. Once Dieter allows himself years later to realize the magnitude and seriousness of what the Nazis had done, he commits suicide.

The timing of Dieter's arrival in Argentina allows him to convey us his own Heideggerian interpretation of the Peronist movement and the Revolución Liberatadora, the military coup that overthrew it in 1955. He connects the Peronist notion of the tercera posición that Juan Perón advocated, a "third poisition" that, in Dieter's description, "debe rechazar tanto el comunismo como el capitalismo" ("should reject Communism just as much as capitalism"), with Heiddeger's justification of Nazism as a middle road between Russia's "Bolshevism" and the "mercantilism" of American capitalism.

In the conclusion of the novel, Martin Müller confronts his namesake in 1968 in his study in Freiburg, a confrontation heavily burdened by his relationship to his father's, his father's inability to resolve his contradictory feelings and attitudes towards Heidegger and his philosophy, and Dieter's own suicide.

Not only is it a challenge in this book to know "what was philosophy, what was literature". It's also a challenge, as usual with fiction, to distinguish what the author may be trying to say by what he has the narrators say. The narrators do have their own story, and Dieter's viewpoint is that of a disciple of Heidegger's until the end.

But our author has given us a clue suggesting that when Dieter Müller accepts Heidegger's view of the Germans as a "metaphysical people" with a special role assigned to them by history - or as the agent of Being in history? - the character Dieter departs from the outlook of the author who created him. In his book La sangre derramada: Ensayo sobre la violencia política (1998/2006), he includes a chapter, "Digresión: Heidegger y el nazismo, ¿contingencia personal o necesariedad interna de su filosofar?", in which he identifies that concept as the central problem in Heidegger's philosophy and political outlook. He quotes from Heidegger's description of the historical mission of the Germany people in Introduction to Metaphysics (1935), and concludes (my translation):

Détras de estas líneas late el genocidio. Cuando un pueblo se adjudica un misión histórica, cuando esa misión consiste en rescatar a los otros pueblos de su decadencia espiritual y remitirlos a un centro originario y puro que él, ese pueblo, representa, aquí, exactamente aquí, se abre el horizont conceptual del genocidio.

[Behind these lines lies genocide. When a people assigns itself an historical mission, when this mission consists in rescuing other peoples from their spiritual decadence and sending them to an original and pure center {of existence} that they, this people, represent: here, precisely here, is where the conceptual horizon of genocide opens.] (italics in original)
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Sunday, May 13, 2012

Peronism: Los tres peronismos

The Argentine political current of Peronism is difficult to define, much less understand. Embodied in the current ruling Partido Justicialista (PJ) of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, in the last two decades it has been the party that led Argentina to radical privatization and deregulation and then back to a period of Keynesian stimulus and assertive government direction of the economy.


Ricardo Sidicaro in his book Los tres peronismos: Estado y poder económico 1946-55/1973-76/1989-99 (2002) breaks the history of Peronism up until that point into the three periods in the subtitle. More precisely, he discusses the three periods of Peronist government during those periods.

The first Peronist government in Sidicaro's scheme was the civilian government of 1946-55 headed by Juan Perón as President. It succeeded a military government that had taken power in 1942 and in which Perón had achieved a leading role. Perón's government of 1946-55 had definite authoritarian tendencies but was a democratically legitimated civilian government.

Argentina had been ruled by military governments from 1930 to 1938, then again in 1942-46. Perón's first government came to power in an election permitted by the military. But soon thereafter he suppressed activity by other parties than his own the PJ, to a significant extent. He was considered a "populist" because he made special appeals to workers in class-based terms, with effective public assistance from "Evita", who was especially popular among workers and unionists.

But he also ran his government on a corporatist basis, using large economic organizations both to direct the economy but they also functioned to give direction to the state. This first Peronist period was heavily influenced by Mussolini's corporate-state ideas and was regarded by the US at the time as a fascist regime. Which is probably largely correct, though Sidicaro doesn't go into the vexed questions of defining fascism and situating Perón's first government in relation to it.


Juan and Eva Perón.

In that first Peronist government, the main industrial representative group was the Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA), which was superceded by the Conferación Económica (CGE) in 1952. The Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires was also a key group. The institution which the government used to regulate agricultural prices was the Instituto Argentino de Promoción del Intercambion (IAPI), whose formation preceded Perón's government.

The rural capitalists, i.e., the large landowners and the meat-processing industry, were the chief opponents of Peronism. Perón called them "the oligarchy". The opposition of the rural "oligarchy" is one of the strongest continuities in Peronism from 1946 until today. The landowners' brand of conservatism was expressed from the 1930s through the fiasco of El Proceso of 1976-83 in support for military governments.

During this period, the Confederación General de Trabajo (CGT) was the umbrella labor organization, which was indirectly run by the Peronist state along corporatist lines..

The second Peronist period was 1973-76, under Presidents Héctor José Cámpora (1973), Perón himself (1973-74) and Perón's widow, María Estela Martínez de Perón aka, Isabelita. It also replaced a military government, and was overthrow by the brutal military junta which ruled from 1976-83, the members of which are still being prosecuted for the crimes they committed while in office.

The third Peronist period which Sidicaro discusses is that of the Presidency of Carlos Menem. With a brief interlude, the Peronist party, the Partido Justicialista (PJ), returned to power in early 2002. Fortunately, none of those changes of government since 1983 have involved military rule either before or after a new administration takes power.

President Cristina Fernández stands before a photo of Eva Perón with children
The post-2001 period of Peronism is qualitatively different enough from Menem's administration that it could probably be considered a "fourth Peronism" in Sidicaro's terms. Cristina Fernández' late husband Néstor Kirchner Presidency together with Cristina's have created a new variety of Peronism, which is commonly referred to as "kirchnerismo". The nature of kirchnerismo is the topic of some interesting analyses by Argentine political thinkers. Qué es el kirchnerismo: Escritos desde un época de cambio (2011) by Nicolás Freiburn et al is one of several examples of this, which I plan to discuss in later posts.

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Monday, March 19, 2012

Marysa Navarro's Evita

A review of Evita (edición corregida, 2005) by Marysa Navarro


Marysa Navarro’s biography of Eva "Evita" Perón was first published in 1982, and she published an updated edition in 2005. It's a careful work aimed at establishing the biographical facts about the woman who became a living legend and remained a powerful political myth long after her death, and at describing her political role during her lifetime in the context of Juan Peron's political leadership and the development of the Peronist movement in Argentine politics.

María Eva Duarte was born in 1919 into the second family of Juan Duarte, an official in the province (state) of Buenos Aires, not to be confused with the City of Buenos Aires, which is the province of the Federal District. Eva and her four siblings were the second family in the since that Duarte was married and had a family with his wife, and also a family with Eva’s mother, Juana. The circumstances of her family situation, and the family’s economic struggles after her father died when she was six no doubt contributed to her later passion for the poor and the working class, though many kids growing up in similar circumstances developed no comparable passion.

At age 15, Eva moved to the City of Buenos Aires to pursue a career as an actress. Navarro avoids much speculation about the many versions of Eva’s earlier years that circulated, some of them decidedly intended to detract from her later prestige and influence. But it’s clear from her account that Eva’s move to Buenos Aires was voluntary on her part and that it showed a considerable amount of drive, ambition and personal courage. In Buenos Aires, she struggled for years, living from various stage productions. She eventually made her way into film and into the field where she had her greatest success in acting, radio theater.

Eva met Juan Domingo Perón (1895-1974) in 1944 and became his girlfriend and partner, marrying him in 1945. The widowed Perón was the Minister of Labor, Minister of War and vicepresident under the military government of Edelmiro Julián Farrell, which had originally taken power in 1943 from a democratic but very corrupt government that held sham elections. Eva enjoyed an unusual role in that she was often present at meetings of government officials and politicians where wives were normally not present, much less girlfriends.

Perón was aggressive in promoting the rights and power of labor unions and in pressing for social legislations protecting workers and increasing their wages and salaries, which made him particularly popular among workers. Other members of the military junta were both dubious enough of his pro-labor positions and jealous enough of his mass popularity that he was placed under arrest on October 9, 1945, beginning a crisis that became a founding myth of the Peronist movement. The union movement mobilized on a massive scale on Perón’s behalf, persuading the junta to release him and return him to office. The newly-freed Perón appeared to a massive crowd of workers gathered in Buenos Aires on October 17, which thenceforth became an official date of celebration for the Peronist movement. He married Eva four days later.

Elected President in Feburary 1946 with 56% of the vote, he presided over a newly-installed democratic government. Re-elected in 1951, his new term began in 1952, which would also be the year that Eva died of cancer, he served until 1955, when a reactionary military coup removed him from power and he went into exile in Spain. It was during the 1945-52 period when Eva became “Evita”, the tribune of the workers, the “descamisados” as she called them (literally, “the shirtless”).

The actions that made Eva into “Evita” were primarily her European trip in …, her work at the Labor Ministry as Perón’s unofficial but genuinely influential representative, her founding and leadership of the Peronist women’s party Partido Peronista Feminino, her leadership of the charitable Fundación Eva Perón and her impassioned speeches in campaigns, the radio and many public appearances on behalf of Perón and his movement.

Some of Ronald Reagan’s critics to this day mock his background as an actor. But if they had paid more attention to Evita’s career, they might have reflected that an actor’s skills are exceptionally useful in mass politics. She knew how to stage herself, and that’s an important skill for anyone really, but especially for a politician who has to appeal to large numbers of people who he or she will never meet personally.

Navarro carefully recounts Evita’s meeting with descamisados who came to her at the Labor Ministry with appeals for help of various kinds. The Fundación Eva Perón was financed largely by contributions from individuals and businesses, though it had enough substantial support from the government that Navarro considers it as an quasi-official governmental institution. And it’s accomplishments in setting up nursing schools, clinics, residences for unmarried working women, and individual housing for poor families, among its many functions, is genuinely impressive.

Evita’s oratory on behalf of Perón, his Partido Justicialista (PJ), the Peronist movement, the unions and the descamisados was also extremely popular among those groups, and was a key aspect of his influence and fame. Peronism was and is a particularly complex political phenomenon, but it was very much part of Evita’s life story, just as she was of its. The Peronist movement during its formative years doesn’t fit easily into a left-right schema. (Nor in its later years, for that matter.) It combined authoritarian elements with genuine pro-labor and democratic elements.

Perón himself admired Benito Mussolini’s Fascist movement and government in Italy. And we see some similar elements in the aspects of Evita’s career that Navarro chronicles: the cult of the Leader around Perón; prolific demagoguery; press censorship; pronounced anti-Communism.

On the other hand, Perón was democratically elected in both 1946 and 1951 in competitive elections. When his government and the Argentine democracy was overthrown in 1955, it was by a military coup backed by opposition leaders who never tired of calling Perón a dictator and totalitarian. Labor unions were independent and a powerful force advocating for the rights of workers, despite Perón’s success at getting labor leaders installed friendly to Perón and his party – which they had good reason to be. Unlike in Fascist Italy, Perón’s policies were aimed at increasing the wages and improving the working conditions of the working class, not at subordinating them to whims of their bosses. One of Perón’s signature achievements was establishing the vote for women in Argentina.

Argentine political theorist José Pablo Feinmann has suggested that Peronism is easier to define by its opponents, the “anti-Peronistas”, than by its supporters. (That’s my reading here of his argument in his “Prólogo” to a history of Peronsim in Página 12 of 25.11.2007) Perón and Evita named that that opponent “the oligarchy”. Navorro quotes Evita’s definition from La razón de mi vida, an autobiography ghostwritten for Evita but one that Evita endorsed as her own and which Navarro accepts as Evita’s statement of her position, though not always accurate about the facts of her life. Evita’s book put it this way:

Y conste que cuando hablo de oligarquía me refiero a todos los que in 1946 se opusieron a Perón: conservadores, radicales, socialistas y comunistas. Todos votaron por la Argentina del viejo régimen oligárquico, entregador y vendepatria. De ese pecado no se redimirán jamás. (p. 357 of Navorro)

[My translation:] And always when I speak of the oligarchy, I refer to all those who in 1946 opposed Perón: conservatives, radicals [i.e., classical liberals ], socialists and communists. They all voted for the Argentina of the old oligarchic regime, submissive and selling out their country. For this sin there will never be redemption.

This is also an example of the passion and demagogic edge of Evita’s rhetoric. Evita typically blasted the oligarchy, for instance, as "traidora y vendepatria" (treacherous and selling out their country) and the like. And working-class voters who supported socialist or communist candidates scarcely fit any usual definition of “oligarchy”, although in that passage she was referring to supporters of the oligarchs as well as the main villains themselves. Oligarchs in the narrow sense referred to the provincial landowners who commanded great wealth from their ranching and agricultural operations, as well as the older established industrial branches of the Argentine urban areas. And, in reality, as Navorro notes, Perón’s support, especially in 1945, was broad-based, including conservatives, liberals, unionists and the occasional renegade socialist and communist. Perón had wealthy backers along with union support, though the workers were clearly his main and most loyal voting base.

Despite Perón’s support for workers and Evita’s fiery polemics against the oligarchy, Peronist ideology framed itself as an appeal above classes and rejected the socialist idea of class struggle as such. Also, Evita’s declaration that voting against Perón was a sin from which there was no redemption, Perón’s government wasn’t rounding up opponents and putting them in concentration camps. In fact, as Navarro makes clear, Evita’s charitable work and advocacy for individual petitioners for assistance was not conditioned on party membership or activity. A plausible case can be made that the violence of the rhetoric in Argentine politics at the time was a sign of the weakness of democratic culture. Still, from 1930 to 1983 the country alternated between democratic governments and military dictatorships of varying levels of brutuality

But in the 1943-55 period, Peronism’s nastier rhetorical barking was worse than its bite, even after a failed coup attempt against Perón in 1951. Nobody was executed as a result of that pathetic little coup attempt. If Perón was trying to mimic Mussolini and Italian Fascism, he only succeeded in establishing a very weak-tea version of it.

Navarro discusses the difficulties presented by the polemical nature of the sources on Evita. On the one hand was Peronist hagiography, on the other extremely hostile polemics for the left parties and the genuine adherents of the oligarchy. The latter contributed a lot of sensationalist gossip. The former mixed her genuine accomplishments with conscious myth-making. One Peronist legend was that Evita organized the massive labor resistance to Perón’s arrest, which culminated in the signature historical event of October 17. This was just not the case.

The real existing María Eva Duarte de Perón of history

One of Perón’s signature achievements for which Evita was also given a larger role in the hagiography than she actually played was the establishment of female suffrage for the first time in Argentina. Evita supported this change and campaigned for it, but she did not initiate it with the government or the Peronist movement as her adorers would claim.

One of the challenging and contradictory aspects of Evita as an historical figure is her pioneering role as a female political leader in Argentina. Not only did she break the mold of the “first lady” of Argentina by becoming a prominent leader and popular idol in her own right. Her role as a female political leader itself was path-breaking in Argentine history, and no doubt opened many minds – and panicked many others – about the capabilities of women as public figures.

And yet she did not consider herself a feminist. Indeed, she took a hostile attitude toward feminism, which she say as an ideology of affluent ladies aligned with the oligarchy. It doesn’t seem accurate to see her as an advocate of a strictly traditional role for other women. She wasn’t an Argentine Phyllis Schlafley or Michelle Bachmann. She did complain bitterly of the unjust wages and lack of opportunities for working men that forced women into the labor force. But she and the Peronist movement backed female suffrage and got it enacted, and they recognized the important part of working women in the labor movement – though the established leadership of the major unions did fully share Evita’s views on that subject. One of the notable functions of her foundation was to provide lodging facilities for single working women. So she played an important role not just as a model for broader possibilities for women but as a direct support for some of those roles. Her role as leader of the Partido Peronista Feminino can also be seen in that light. Though Navarro does relate that Evita failed to develop other leaders within the party, preferring female party officials with a disinclination to show independent leadership.

Kitsch Evita and happy dancing workers

Navarro provides some brief discussion at the end of Evita’s post-mortem role as a symbol for various sides in the Argentine political struggles, an inspiration to Guevarist Argentine guerillas in the 1970s, and eventually musical kitsch in the form of Evita by Andrew Lloyd Webber and Tim Rice.

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Saturday, March 10, 2012

Cristina Fernández in the Argentine political spectrum

Three months into her second term as President of Argentina, Cristina Fernández is doing well in a recent Equis public opinion poll, as Raúl Kollmann reports in Los números acompañan a la Presidenta Página 12 10.03.2012. The poll was done in metropolitan Buenos Aires, where around 40% of the Argentine population lives, with the telephone sample of 800 people used to project national results.


Current polls show her approval rating at 65.3% and 58.2% willing to vote for her again. Currently, the Argentine Constitution prevents her from seeking a third term, but her supporters are seriously considering trying to pass a constitutional amendment that would allow her to do so. She was re-elected in 2011 with 53% of the vote, the highest margin for a Presidential candidate since democracy was restored in Argentina in 1983.

Cristina is head of the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ). Her own political orientation is known as "kirchnerism", from the family name of her late husband and predecessor as President, Néstor Kirchner. Her married name is Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. She is typically referred to in the press by "Fernández", "CFK", or simply "Cristina", though "Kirchner" is also used. Her policies are often referred to in the press as simply the "K policies". Peronism is a particularly complicated historical and political phenomenon. But the K brand of Peronism could be reasonably described as a combative social-democracy. To add to the terminological complication, Cristina's electoral and parliamentary coalition is called the Frente para la Victoria (FpV), the coalition of the PJ with other small parties that support kirchnerism.

Her most prominent opposition is Mauricio Macri, the mayor/governor of the Federal District of Buenos Aires, which is a province in its own right, not to be confused with the province named Buenos Aires; put another way, the City of Buenos Aires is also the province Federal District; the province Buenos Aires does not include the City of Buenos Aires proper, though it does include the suburbs, aka, Greater Buenos Aires.  Macri's approval rating is 37.8% in the poll discussed in the linked article, and his willing-to-vote-for rating is 13.6%. His electoral coalition is known as the Propuesta Republicana (PRO).

The main opposition party to the PJ is the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) headed by Ricardo Alfonsín. It's probably not too far off to call it the conservative party, though the radical privitization of the 1990s was under the PJ government of Carlos Menem and kirchnerism is direct repudiation of Menemism, rather than of the UCR. The UCR is typically referred to as the "radicals" because of their historical party name. They actually were radicals, you know, 100 years ago. The UCR has been a badly weakened party over the last decade.

To muck things up ever further, both the UCR and the Partido Socialista (PS) are members of the Socialist International. Go figure. (And, no, it's not your imagination: trying to understand this with FOX News categories is literally impossible. You can't get here from there.) The PS is headed by Hermes Binner, and is part of a larger coalition known as the Frente Amplio Progresista (FAP).

Cristina is no Obama. She has no interest in pursuing some will-o-the-wisp of post-partisan harmony. She has confronted Britain diplomatically over their continued illegal occupation of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands. She is pushing the largest private oil company, YSP, to increase its domestic investment, even threatening to take a minority government stake in the company if that's what it takes to get them to do the right thing.

I would think that her status has probably been helped, and Macri's hurt, by a very recent controversy of the devolution of control of the Buenos Aires/Federal District subway system to the Federal District administration. The national government had been previously responsible for it. The devolution was something Macri wanted. And in line with his conservative orientation, he boosted the subway fares by over 100% earlier this year. Now he's balking at the hand-off of the subway responsibility which he formally agreed to. But the Equis report didn't show the effects of that controversy affecting the opinion ratings. The Equis head, Artemio López, speculates that the subway controversy was too specific to Buenos Aires proper to move the national or Greater Buenos Aires ratings.

The recent deadly rail crash in the Once district of Buenos Aires does not seemed to have affected Cristina's ratings one way or the other. So far, she has taken an aggressive public posture of taking responsibility for seeing that the causes of the crash are addressed and corrected.

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