Showing posts with label georgia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label georgia. Show all posts

Sunday, July 22, 2018

NATO and Europe after the latest Trump shenanigans

Raimund Löw gives this evaluation of the state of relations between the EU/NATO countries and Trump's USA in Wie Donald Trump Europa zerstören will Falter 18.07.2018
Trump hat in Brüssel die niedrigen Rüstungsausgaben der Nato-Partner angeprangert. Angesichts seiner Annäherung an Russland fehlt dem Vorwurf die politische Logik. Dazu kommt: Höhere nationale Rüstungsbudgets lösen nicht das Hauptproblem, dass in Europa alle Armeen das Gleiche tun. Sie unterhalten alle ihre Panzer, Flugzeuge und Geschütze. Die militärische Arbeitsteilung ist trotz Nato und EU minimal. Das nationalstaatliche Denken beim Militär erhöht die Kosten und senkt die Effizienz.

Kein europäischer Nationalstaat könnte gegenwärtig im Ernstfall ohne US-Hilfe bestehen.

Politische Freiheiten, Gewaltenteilung und Pressefreiheit, für die der Westen steht, sind es wert, verteidigt zu werden.

Gefährdet werden sie von den eigenen autoritären Nationalisten, von Donald Trumps Amerika und den von Washington gesponnenen merkwürdigen Allianzen.

[Trump in Brussels demounced the low armaments expenditures of the NATO partners. In light of his rapprochement with Russia, the accusation lacks political logic. On that matter: Higher national defense budgets will not solve the main problem, which is that in Europe all the armies do the same thing. They all maintain their tanks, planes, and guns. But the military division of labor is minimal, despite NATO and the EU. The national-state thinking in military affairs increases the costs and reduces the efficiency.

No European national state could presently last in case of emergency without US help.

Political liberties, separation of powers, and freedom of the press, for which the West stands, are worth defending.

They are being endagered by our own authoritarian nationalists, by Donald Trump's America and by the strange alliances that Washington has knitted together.]
It's unlikely that Russia, which is relatively weak in conventional military power, has any real intention of annexing former Soviet Republics like Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, or the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. But they actually did annex the Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. This kind of violation of legal national borders is a violation of international law. And the NATO countries have to take that seriously.

Then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer gave what is one of the the best descriptions I've ever heard of the danger of belligerent nationalism when he was arguing for the NATO intervention in Kosovo. I supported that intervention at the time but the postwar view of the results made me highly dubious of its necessity or desirability, as I explained in James Galbraith on lessons of the Kosovo War 05/13/2004. And my view since then has only gotten more critical. But what Fischer said then is still worth noting:

Fischer made these comments on the PBS Newshour of 05/25/99 (the given link is now dead):
If you were to ask me a half year ago whether we [the governing coalition in Germany] would politically survive a bombing campaign of 60 days, I would say "never." We are now very united not only in Germany, but also in the alliance. I think this is a very positive result. On the other side, I mentioned it before, you must understand that in Germany, there is a trauma of the two world wars and especially in the older generation. Germany, for example, accepted much more refugees than all other countries. Why? Because many of us, my family is for 200 years lived in Budapest. We are ethnic Germans from Budapest. After-- in 1946, we were sent back like hundreds of thousands of other Germans to Germany after 200 years. So the experience to be displaced persons or refugees is very substantial in our people. So I mention that, that I think tradition and historical experiences, historical fears are very important. ...

I was a peace activist against colonial wars. But this is not a colonial war I think. This is an aggressive confrontation against aggressive nationalism. In the 30's, Milosevic would fit -- would have fitted wonderful in the political landscape of a fascist Europe and fascist means not only the extreme -- most extreme form of fascism of the Nazis. Mussolini, Franco and all the others. It's an aggressive nationalism and is believing in the right of its own people to attack, to fight for territory for whatever and to suppress others, the Balkans is full of this heritage. They all have their maps in their pockets. And these maps mean bloodshed and means real disaster. And Milosevic is acting in that way. And we cannot accept it. This would mean that Europe, the principals of Europe, of unification would be, I think, attacked and if Milosevic will win, others will follow in the Balkans and then we will have a real security problem. Therefore, he must be stopped. [my emphasis]
That applies to the Russian annexation of Crimea, as well.

Democrats at the moment don't like to hear it, but NATO's action in Kosovo, including recognizing Kosovo as an independent country, was one factor shaping Russian policy in Crimea. That does not justify it. And the referendum conducted there also does not justify annexing part of another country without that's country's agreement. Americans even half-familiar with the history of our own Civil War shouldn't need a lot of explanation about the problem with that idea. It's also a ploy that Britain has used and still uses today to justify holding illegal colonial possessions, including the Malvinas/Falkland Islands (Argentina) and Gibralter (Spain).

The smaller portions of territory in Ukraine and Georgia that Russia also de facto controls are practical measures from a Russian point of view to prevent the incorporation of either country into NATO. But those are also a problem, based as they are in part on the presence of ethnic/linguistic Russian populations in those areas. As Fischer said in 1999, "They all have their maps in their pockets. And these maps mean bloodshed and means real disaster." It's not only in the Balkans where that is so.

But Russia is the single biggest military security worry for NATO countries. And especially for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which were part of the former Soviet Union like Georgia and Ukraine and therefore viewed by Putin's government as a legitimate Russian sphere of influence. As a practiacl matter, every step of the post-1990 NATO expansion was dubious and risky, each one more than the others. But with the Baltic countries, NATO accepted countries that were atually part of the old Soviet Union. And did so apparently thinking that it was not such a big deal at all.

But it is. Even if it was a bad idea to incorporate them into NATO, there are NATO allies now. And if the Russians were to take part of their territory and NATO does not respond militarily to push them out, that would call into question that value of the NATO alliance, to put it mildly. As Löw puts it, Trump's approach already means, "Europa ist dabei, seinen weltpolitischen Anker zu verlieren. Der amerikanische Schutzschild über der Nato, inklusive der ehemaligen Sowjetrepubliken im Baltikum, gilt nur mehr halb." ("Europe is already on the point of losing its world-political anchor. The American protective shield over NATO, including the former Soviet republics in the Baltics, now only half applies.")

Saturday, June 10, 2017

The stakes for the US and Europe in NATO

The national security expert and adviser to Presidents Zbigniew Brzezinski, who passed away just recently, was a devout Cold Warrior. But he also tended toward a realist perspective. That manifested itself in the run-up to the Iraq War, when he made his opposition to invading Iraq very clear and public.

In an article from 2003, Hegemonic Quicksand The National Interest Winter 2003/04, he looked at the role of the European Union in US foreign policy in Eurasia and the Middle East, particularly the Islamist challenge in its various forms.

The current anti-Europe policy of the Trump Family Business Administration has given the US/European divisions over the Iraq War renewed immediate relevance. Brzezinski's article was written at that now-almost-forgotten moment after the ousting of Saddam Hussein's government when it still seemed possible that violence was quickly winding down in Iraq. War opponent Brzezinski even writes in this article, "The decisive military victories in the 1991 and the 2003 campaigns against Iraq firmly established the United States as the sole external arbiter in the area." It's jarring now to read material from later 2003 which refer to US victory in Iraq as an accomplished reality.

NATO has never been free of conflict among its various partners. At some times, that conflict has been significant. NATO formally began with the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, constituted as a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union. For the first 52 years of its existence, until 1991, the Soviet Union also still existed. After the fall of the USSR, NATO became an alliance in search of a mission. Brzezinski's 2003 article focused on NATO as a force multiplier and essential partner for the United States. But partner for what?

At the beginning of the article, he forecasts, "For the next several decades, the most volatile and dangerous region of the world - with the explosive potential to plunge the world into chaos - will be the crucial swathe of Eurasia between Europe and the Far East." He describes that area as "the unstable region that currently extends from approximately the Suez Canal to Xinjiang, and from the Russo-Kazakh border to southern Afghanistan - almost like a triangle on the map. In the case of both areas, internal instability has served as a magnet for external major power intervention and rivalry." He also refers the triangle he describes as "the Global Balkans," a term that doesn't seem to have caught on.

And it's in managing the crises in that region in which he sees the mission of NATO consisting going forward from that point. He surveys other significant potential allies for that purpose, and explains why he sees them as less useful than NATO.

He writes that Israel and the United States have historically been close diplomatically and that it could "not only to be America's military base but also to make a significant contribution to any required U.S. military engagement." Israel does have the largest armed forces of any country in the region. And has nuclear weapons.

But, as he notes drily, "American and Israeli interests in the region are not entirely congruent." Brzezinski sees the US has having a strong long-term interest in decent relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), both of which Israel has no interest in strengthening. Although Israel can find common interest with the Kingdom and the UAE on issues like opposing the Alawite regime in Syria and regarding Iran as an adversary.

Brzezinski notes, though, that until there is a real settlement of the Palestinian issue, Israel's value as an active military ally to the US in the Middle East will be limited. Prospects for an Israel-Palestine peace agreement look considerably less optimistic in 2017 than they did in 2003.

He sees India's potential as a strategic ally limited by the intensification of both Hindu and Muslim sectarian politics. The increasing influence of Hindu nationalism in India since 2003 is part of this trend. He writes that "the more radical of the Hindu politicians tend to present" the "war on terrorism" as a war against Islam. This is problematic for reasons that should be obvious. But it does fit with the US Republican Party's understanding.

India also has long-standing tensions with its neighbors China and India. The conflict with Pakistan has the dispute over the Muslim-majority province of Kashmir, which is currently party of India at its center.

Brzezinski notes the trend, already strong in 2003, that "Russia has come to see its Muslim neighbors as the source of a potentially explosive political and demographic threat, and the Russian political elite are increasingly susceptible to anti-Islamic religious and racist appeals." Both of which are potentially factors that should theoretically facilitate an anti-Muslim-extremism alliance between the US and Russia. But Brzezinski also points to Russia's record in Afghanistan and Chechnya as a major factor in giving Muslim countries in the region a dim view of Russia. In addition, "the newly independent Central Asian states [which include many Muslims] increasingly define their modern history as a struggle for emancipation from Russian colonialism."

So Brzezinski saw the most promising ally of the US in promoting stability as being the nations of the European Union:

Only Europe, increasingly organized as the European Union and militarily integrated through NATO, has the potential capability in the political, military and economic realms to pursue jointly with America the task of engaging the various Eurasian peoples on a differentiated and flexible basis-in the promotion of regional stability and of progressively widening trans-Eurasian cooperation. And a supranational European Union linked to America would be less suspect in the region as a returning colonialist bent on consolidating or regaining its special economic interests.
And he states an essential condition for European-American cooperation:

European engagement will not occur, however, if it is expected to consist of simply following America's lead. The war on terrorism can be the opening wedge for engagement in the Global Balkans, bur it cannot be the definition of that engagement. This the Europeans, less traumatized by the September ll attacks, understand better than the Americans. It is also why any joint effort by the Atlantic community will have to be based on a broad strategic consensus regarding the longterm nature of the task at hand. [my emphasis]
The nuclear agreement with Iran is an example of what cooperation with the US and Russia can accomplish in that region. Brzezinski specifically cites the initiative taken by the EU at the time to get that process moving. It took over a decade to get it done. And it took a more cooperative arrangement between the US and Europe than the Cheney-Bush Administration practiced in 2003 and which the Trump Family Business Administration is clearly eager to jettison. Or, jettisoned: it may time to speak in the past tense about that.

But some of the issues on which he focuses are also reminders now of opportunities missed: promoting an Israel-Palestine peace agreement, stabilizing Iraq (a sadly forlorn hope in retrospect) and improving relations with Iran. The latter is something on which significant progress has been made. But Trump seems to be signaling - he sends so many confusing signals - that he's signing on to the Saudi and Israeli push for war with Iran. So it's not only on global climate change that the Trump Family Business Administration is veering away from common ground with the EU. "Active strategic partnership between the United States and the European Union would also make it more likely that Iran could eventually be transformed from a regional ogre into a regional stabilizer." But stabilization of Iran and the Middle East is the opposite of what Trump and his Defense Secretary "Mad Dog" Mattis want.

Brzezinski's article from 14 years ago is a reminder of the stakes involved in the US downgrading NATO and undermining partnership with the European allies. NATO since 1949 has been a power multiplier for the US and has generally supported US policy in the world. And, as Brzezinski points out, achieving a more stable and constructive situation in the "Global Balkans" triangle requires for now and the foreseeable future close cooperation between Europe and the US.

NATO survived the crisis provoked by the Iraq War, just as it survived the Suez Crisis of 1956 in the first decade of its existence. Part of the reason surely had to do with the Northern Atlantic economic crisis that started in 2007-8 and created serious problems for European unity, which obviously took a bit hit from the Brexit vote. The US and European partners also found a common interest in NATO Enlargement, as outlined on the official site (my emphasis in italics):

29 March 2004: Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

21 April 2005: Launch of the Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine’s aspirations to NATO membership and related reforms, at an informal meeting of foreign ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania.

21 September 2006: NATO foreign ministers in New York announce the decision to offer an Intensified Dialogue to Georgia.

28-29 November 2006: At the Riga Summit, Allied leaders state that invitations will be extended to MAP countries that fulfil [sic] certain conditions.

2-4 April 2008: At the Bucharest Summit, Allied leaders invite Albania and Croatia to start accession talks; assure the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that it will be invited once a solution to the issue of the country’s name has been reached with Greece; invite Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro to start Intensified Dialogues; and agree that Georgia and Ukraine will become members in future.

9 July 2008[-] December 2008: Accession Protocols for Albania and Croatia are signed. Allied foreign ministers agree that Georgia should develop an Annual National Programme under the auspices of the NATO-Georgia Commission.

1 April 2009: Accession of Albania and Croatia.

4 December 2009: NATO foreign ministers invite Montenegro to join the MAP.

22 April 2010: NATO foreign ministers invite Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the MAP, authorising the North Atlantic Council to accept the country’s first Annual National Programme only when the immovable property issue has been resolved.

2 December 2015: NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels invite Montenegro to start accession talks to join the Alliance, while encouraging further progress on reforms, especially in the area of rule of law. In a statement on NATO’s “open door” policy, ministers reiterate decisions made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit concerning the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and encourage Bosnia and Herzegovina to undertake the reforms necessary for the country to realise its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and to activate its participation in MAP. Ministers also reiterate their decisions at Bucharest and subsequent decisions concerning Georgia, welcoming the progress the country has made in coming closer to the Alliance and expressing their determination to intensify support for Georgia.

19 May 2016: Allied ministers sign the Accession Protocol, following which Montenegro has ‘Invitee’ status and starts attending North Atlantic Council and other NATO meetings.

5 June 2017: Accession of Montenegro

Ironically, NATO's "out of area" interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Middle East, especially Libya, not only served as a common mission that also brought NATO back from the kind of internal strife the Iraq War produced in the alliance. But those actions also helped to tarnish the image of Europe in the crisis area Brzezinski called the Global Balkans.

Even more ironically, the enlargement of NATO membership has brought NATO's value for the Europeans back towards its original purpose. The eastward expansion of membership met with serious resistance from Russia with Georgia in 2008 and then Ukraine in 2014. It's safe to say that the aspirations for NATO membership of Georgia and Ukraine are effectively on indefinite hold. The 2004 expansion included not only more countries from the former Warsaw Pact, but also the three Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Those three had previously been part of the Soviet Union itself, as had Georgia and Ukraine.

Foreign policy "realists," including the late George Kennan and Stephen Walt, warned that in the normal calculation of the Russian government, whether it was Putinist or liberal democratic or whatever else in its orientation, could be expected to treat the enlargement as a national security threat and start to push back against it. Remarkably, though, NATO leaders, including the Bush and Obama Administrations, seemed almost Pollyannish about that warning. In particular, adding Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania committed all other NATO countries to defend those countries in the case of any Russian aggression. But it has never been thought necessary to fortify those three countries as though a Russian invasion might be a likely event, much less an imminent one. And Western policymakers probably seriously underestimated what a dim view that Russian leaders took of NATO military intervention in the Balkans, especially in the Kosovo War.

And Russian strategists much surely be thinking out scenarios in which Russia seizes all or part of those three countries as a way to test the seriousness of NATO commitment to them. Are the US France, Britain, France and Germany prepared to go war with Russia over some occupied strips of land in the Baltic nations? What the Russians did in Georgia and Ukraine, which were aspiring NATO members but not yet part of the pact, were similar actions to that scenario.

Yet both Democrats and Republicans seemed to see NATO expansion as having political and military upsides with relatively small risks on the downside. Cold War triumphalism dulled the collective judgment of our policymakers in many ways.

In the 2002-3 crisis within NATO over Iraq, Russia was actually a political ally of the US in supporting the Iraq War. Vladimir Putin was already President of Russia. But Russia was cooperating with the on the war in Afghanistan, as well. (I've always wondered if there was an element of calculation there in which the Russians thought, yeah, let's allow the United States to learn what an intervention in Afghanistan can be like.) There was still serious tensions over issues like installation of "missile defense" in eastern Europe.

But there was no serious split between the US and the European allies over the need for solidarity in the face Russian aggression directly against NATO members. That was probably in significant part because the prospect of that kind of Russian military aggression wasn't considered a serious possibility.

After the Georgia crisis of 2008 and the Ukraine crisis, the latter including Russia's incorporating the Crimea as its own territory, have shifted those perceptions and calculations in significant ways. Now European leaders have to take into account that the Trump Family Business Administration with its dubious entanglements with Russian interests and its seeming hostility to European unity may not be as committed to supporting NATO allies against Russian pressure. And that's going to affect their willingness to cooperate with the US on "out of area" military and political actions.

This post is part of my efforts to understand the direction that US-European relations in the Trump Era. There are a lot of what-ifs that are difficult to ignore in thinking about NATO. In practical terms, trying to preserve NATO after the fall of the USSR and looking for a new mission for it was probably inevitable. But in retrospect, I have big doubts about the Kosovo War, which I supported at the time. And I think the NATO enlargement was probably not a good idea. Incorporating the Baltic countries directly into NATO and inviting Georgia and Ukraine to eventually join were mistakes, done with far too little realistic consideration of the consequences.

But kicking out the Baltics, for example, would be a dramatically different thing than not incorporating them in the first place. If the US government wants to drastically redefine its relationships to Russia and to oppose rather than support European unity, to do that while minimizing the downsize risks would be a very difficult political and diplomatic task. The Trump Family Business Administration is clearly not capable of pulling off something that complicated while minimizing dangerous disruptions. I'm particularly interested in how the European allies will attempt to minimize risk and damage to themselves while the current US administration attempts to do such a thing. And to do it in what would surely be a blundering way.

Tuesday, December 30, 2008

Georgia and US commitments

If this proposed agreement doesn't include specific defense commitments, it may not be a bad idea: U.S., Georgia to Sign Strategic Pact by Nathan Hodge, Danger Room 12/26/08. But I do wish our national reporters and Pod Pundits could stop themselves from talking about the non-scandal of Obama's non-involvement with Rod Blagojevich's apparently crooked schemes long enough to focus on stories like this. You know, because they have to do with war and peace and so on?

Ray McGovern talks about the Russia-Georgia summer war with Scott Horton of Antiwar Radio (11/17/08). He says straightforwardly, without explaining his sources, that Dick Cheney and McCain foreign policy advisor Randy Scheunemann were behind Georgia's attack on Russia. I don't buy that story without something more solid. But when you look at the well-established evidence that Nixon in 1968 delayed the Paris Peace talks when he first ran for President, and the circumstantial evidence of the Reagan campaign's dirty dealings with Iran in 1980, such a thing is not unthinkable. But, unlike the standards the press applied to non-scandals with Democratic Presidents or Presidents-elect are the ones that aren't involved but the press wants to insinuate they are, in my mind "not unthinkable" is a very different thing than "evidence".

Joe Galloway wrote about the brief Georgia-Russia war when it was happening in A sad week for Georgia, America and the world by McClatchy Newspapers 08/14/08. Being one of the real journalists left in America and working with what has become a quaint rarity in the US - a decent news service - he was able to state factual information clearly without the political hype distracting him:

Encouraged by their warm relations with George W. Bush's administration and the weapons and military training the U.S. has provided them in recent years, the Georgians pulled the Russian bear's tail in one of their own breakaway territories, South Ossetia, and promptly got pounded.

That was their bad.

The Russians invaded and expelled Georgian military forces from South Ossetia, and then invaded Georgia itself, rolling up the demoralized Georgian Army and sending it and a horde of frightened refugees falling back on the Georgian capital of Tblisi.
The fact that the Georgian leadership recklessly initiated that conflict was always an important and highly relevant fact. But most of our punditocracy seemed oblivious to it and its practical implications.

Michael Dobbs in'We Are All Georgians'? Not So Fast. Washington Post 08/17/08 was also sensibly cautious:

When it comes to apportioning blame for the latest flare-up in the Caucasus, there's plenty to go around. The Russians were clearly itching for a fight, but the behavior of Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili has been erratic and provocative. The United States may have stoked the conflict by encouraging Saakashvili to believe that he enjoyed American protection, when the West's ability to impose its will in this part of the world is actually quite limited.
This is why it would be good to know a more complete story of how Georgia came to their decision to launch the August attack. We know from what's in the public record that Georgia almost certainly assumed that they had a good chance of receiving American backing, although they apparently hoped for more than they got. That's why Congressional hearings on these agreements could serve a useful purpose.

Ian Trainor reported in real time on Six days that broke one country - and reshaped the world order by Guardian 08/16/08. He points out that the Russian response to the Georgian conflict was a reflection of a policy shift that Vladimir Putin had declared in a public way:

In a seminal speech in Munich last year, Putin confidently warned the west that he would not tolerate the age of American hyperpower. Seven years in office at the time and at the height of his powers, he delivered his most anti-western tirade[.]

To an audience that included John McCain, the White House contender, and Robert Gates, the US defence secretary and ex-Kremlinologist, he served notice: "What is a unipolar world? It refers to one type of situation, one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making. It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. This is pernicious ... unacceptable ... impossible."

This week, he turned those words into action, demonstrating the limits of US power with his rout of Georgia. His forces roamed at will along the roads of the Southern Caucasus, beyond Russia's borders for the first time since the disastrous Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.
And it's worth recalling that Russia had also declared the Georgian case to be a parallel to that of Kosovo, whose independence the US recognized over the opposition of Russia, a long-time ally of Serbia.

As former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer said at the time, NATO countries can't let Russian threats dictate their policies toward Georgia and Ukraine.

But they also have to be realistic about the power relations in the region and clear on the commitments they make and the real implications of those commitments.

Tags: ,

Monday, November 10, 2008

Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean the neocons aren't after you

Tom Hayden makes what I believe is his debut appearance at TPM Cafe asking Was Georgia a Neo-Con Conspiracy? A Lesson for Obama 11/10/08.

McCain's top foreign policy advisor in his blessedly unsuccessful Presidential campaign, Randy Scheunemann, is a leading figure in a set of circumstances that certainly deserves more investigation. Scheunemann in his role as a lobbyist was a registered foreign agent of the Georgian government from 2004-8. There's nothing wrong with being a "registered foreign agent". Lobbyists doing work for foreign government are required by law to make such a registration and it doesn't imply anything illegitimate.

Hayden looks at the circumstantial evidence suggesting that Scheunemann and McCain could have at least had some advance warning of Georgia's initiation of hostilities against Russian forces in South Ossetia, which started the August conflict:

Now that Georgia's August 7 operation appears to have been pre-planned and deliberate, is it possible to believe that Scheunemann was unaware of a scenario that closely matched the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident? Before this becomes yesterday's news, someone should ask what did he know and when did he know it? Did the US advisers to the Georgian military know and not report the facts? In the unlikely event that they were uninformed and uninvolved, the McCain team was quick to exploit the moment to attack Obama for inexperienced wobbling.
I do think this is worth further investigation by the press (if they can organize themselves for it), by Congress and/or by the incoming Obama administration.

But I would stress that looking for individual connections that may be tenuous or unprovable can easily distract from policy issues. And we can certainly conclude from what is already in the public record that the Cheney-Bush administration with its aggressive push to get Georgia into NATO, including the training of Georgian armed forces for that purpose, were at best careless in sending signals to Georgia that they could interpret as US backing for an attack.

Not unlike ambiguous US signals that the Old Man Bush administration sent to Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime before he attacked Kuwait in 1990. Back when Dick Cheney was Secretary of Defense. (I'm just saying!)

Hayden's observations about the hawkish reaction of the Obama campaign to the Georgia-Russia conflict are certainly worthwhile:

There followed a complete acquiescence by the Democrats, led by Obama's national security advisers, whose Cold War conditioning apparently trumped their own experience of being manipulated into the Iraq war. Or was a political decision made that Obama could not afford to appear weaker than McCain on Russia? A reignited Cold War would have been fused with the War on Terrorism in one dominant paradigm.
And Hayden is right to take the attitudes of McCain and the neocons toward Russia as a signal of what to expect in their upcoming efforts to start new wars, discredit the Obama administration and keep the defense budget at absurdly elevated levels:

Now that they are in opposition, there is little doubt that the neo-conservatives will continue their strategy of confrontation on the Russian border. These are people who deliberately exaggerated the Soviet military threat in the Reagan years, developed the Project for the New American Century [where Scheunemann was a director], fabricated evidence about Saddam's arsenal, and seemingly have never stopped. They could destroy an Obama presidency by demanding expenditures for multiple wars which America cannot win and cannot afford, or alternatively accusing him of weakening America in the world.

The important cautionary lesson for Obama is that his initial instincts favoring diplomacy were correct while his national security advisers failed him. ...

Vice president Joe Biden famously warned that Barack Obama would be tested over national security policy in the first months of his tenure. That the testing may come from within the national security establishment, not only from foreign sources, should give Obama pause as he contemplates the time ahead.[my emphasis]
Paranoid? As Hayden reminds us, the Bay of Pigs fiasco did happen back in John Kennedy's first weeks in office.

Tags: , ,

Friday, September 12, 2008

Georgia and NATO

I don't really mind seeing McCain and his White Princess get embarassed about her somewhat artless responses to Charlie Gibson's softball questions on Georgia. Press misunderstanding and affection for "gotcha" lines work so often again Democrats that it's hard not to enjoy seeing such things sting the Republicans every now and then.

But she was really just stating the policy shared by McCain, Obama and Biden, which is that the US wants Georgia added to NATO. As I said yesterday, a real journalist would have pressed her on the practical questions involved.

Monica Friedlander at the UC-Berkeley Web site reports on a Sept. 4 panel about the Georgia crisis in Berkeley Professors Weigh in on the Crisis in the Caucasus by (n.d., accessed 09/12/08) featuring Edward Walker, Yuri Slezkine, Steven Fish and Johanna Nichols.

They weren't in doubt about the practical upshot of recent events: "Meanwhile, the panelists said, Georgia’s prospects for NATO membership have collapsed and the fate of the people of South Caucasus remains dire for the foreseeable future."

That sums it up well. Diplomatically, the US will have to maintain a negotiating position insisting on Western freedom of action in leaving the prospect of Georgian NATO membership open and opposing the independence of the breakaway provinces South Ossetia and Abkhasia.

But Russia has killed any practical prospect of Georgian membership in NATO. And very likely the chances for such membership by Ukraine.

As Joschka Fischer and others have observed, Russia's power has been growing over the last couple of decades despite chronic economic problems. And in the Caucuses, they have a conventional military superiority that they showed in August they are willing to use in defense of their perceived national interests.

Friedlander reports:

“Russia drew a line in sand,” said Edward Walker, associate adjunct professor of political science and director of the Berkeley Program in Eurasian and East European Studies. “They said, ‘Do not recognize Kosovo and do not incorporate Georgia into NATO. We see this as a threat to our national security. If you do, bad things will happen.’ We ignored those warnings.”

What’s more, the panelists said, the war in the Caucasus strengthened Russia’s position in the region and embarrassed Washington, which has precious few cards to play in this conflict.

“The U.S. built an ally and abandoned it, or else tried to support it and failed. Regardless, it looks weak,” said Yuri Slezkine, a professor of history and director of the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies.
The US and NATO were essentially bluffing over Georgia and Ukraine, in other words. And the Russians successfully called the bluff.

Tags: , ,

Thursday, September 11, 2008

The White Warrior Princess speaks

The White Princess, being an expert on Russia and all because, you know, Alaska is kind of close to Russia, is talking tough on South Ossetia and Abkhasia. Not that she necessarily knows where either of those places are exactly. Because they're on the other side of Russia from where Alaska is.

But here what she told Charlie Gibson in their softball interview, from the partial transcript from David Kurtz at TPM in Palin Foreign Policy: War with Russia 09/11/08 (see below on why I think that is poorly headlined):

GIBSON: And under the NATO treaty, wouldn't we then have to go to war if Russia went into Georgia?

PALIN: Perhaps so. I mean, that is the agreement when you are a NATO ally, is if another country is attacked, you're going to be expected to be called upon and help.

But NATO, I think, should include Ukraine, definitely, at this point and I think that we need to -- especially with new leadership coming in on January 20, being sworn on, on either ticket, we have got to make sure that we strengthen our allies, our ties with each one of those NATO members.

We have got to make sure that that is the group that can be counted upon to defend one another in a very dangerous world today.

GIBSON: And you think it would be worth it to the United States, Georgia is worth it to the United States to go to war if Russia were to invade.

PALIN: What I think is that smaller democratic countries that are invaded by a larger power is something for us to be vigilant against. We have got to be cognizant of what the consequences are if a larger power is able to take over smaller democratic countries.

And we have got to be vigilant. We have got to show the support, in this case, for Georgia. The support that we can show is economic sanctions perhaps against Russia, if this is what it leads to.

It doesn't have to lead to war and it doesn't have to lead, as I said, to a Cold War, but economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, again, counting on our allies to help us do that in this mission of keeping our eye on Russia and Putin and some of his desire to control and to control much more than smaller democratic countries.

His mission, if it is to control energy supplies, also, coming from and through Russia, that's a dangerous position for our world to be in, if we were to allow that to happen. [my emphasis]
This is not a good sign in more ways than one. It's not at all clear that she understands jack about the situation with Russia and Georgia. But Gibson's questions quoted there were pretty softball, and focused on the kind of dumb "gotcha" approaches so beloved of our wealthy and soft-headed Big Pundits.

But whoever did the TPM headline was being sensationalist. I'm perfectly willing to believe that our Third Wave Pentecostalist Christian Zionist Republican Vice Presidential candidate adheres to a militarist way of thinking. I would be astonished, actually, if it were otherwise.

But that excerpted transcript doesn't say that she and her war-loving running mate are ready to immediately go to war with Russia. In fact, she easily side-stepped the lightweight questions there. It is American policy right now to put Georgia on a track to become a NATO member, a position which Obama and Biden also support.

The real question to be asked is about where the rubber meets the road with that policy (if the media and the Republicans haven't declared that metaphor to be Patriotically Incorrect in the last couple of hours). The question a real reporter would as is whether the United States should accept Georgia as a NATO member when it doesn't have actual control of the territory it claims as part of its country (South Ossetia and Abkhasia).

The Maverick and his White Princess might be goofy enough to be willing to sign up for that. But most of the NATO members are not going to be willing to. As a practical matter, it's darn near impossible.

But she seems to have stuck to the script in that excerpt.

Tags: , ,

Monday, September 08, 2008

Georgia-Russia conflict and the US

Dick Cheney is still working hard to build up military tensions and increase the danger of war, including in the Caucuses: Cheney backs membership in NATO for Georgia by Steven Lee Myers International Herald Tribune 09/05/08; Cheney visit: U.S. treads tightrope on Georgia aid by Howard LaFranchi Christian Science Monitor 09/05/08. Myers reports:

Cheney spent only four and a half hours in Georgia, but the visit included a strong rebuke to Russia's behavior and a highly symbolic visit to American troops unloading humanitarian supplies at the airport here within sight of an airplane factory that Russian bombs had damaged.

He arrived a day after the United States pledged $1 billion to help Georgia recover from its defeat by Russia's armed forces, which continue to control two breakaway regions, as well as buffer zones in Georgia.

Standing beside President Mikheil Saakashvili, Cheney said that the United States had strongly supported Georgia since protests in 2003 ushered a democratic government to power and that it would continue to do so despite Russia's proclamations that Saakashvili's government was illegitimate.
George Friedman of Stratfor.com gives his views on Georgia and the Balance of Power in the New York Review of Books 08/28/08 (09/25/08 issue). His analysis seems to implicitly assume that the differences between Russia and the West will be central to Russia's external challenges in the coming years. That contrasts with the explicit analysis of Joschka Fischer that China and Islamic nations and movements to the South of Russia will be considerably more important strategic challenges from Russia's point of view.

But Friedman provides a lot of useful information and background:

The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in Eurasia. It has simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted. The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing situation in Pakistan. It has no strategic ground forces in reserve and is in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery. This has opened an opportunity for the Russians to reassert their influence in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow did not have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States or Europe; hence, the balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when to make this public. They did that on August 8. [my emphasis]
One thing I don't understand about his analysis is his (qualified) argument that "Russia had laid a trap" for Georgia and their Western allies.

This may well be true. But I haven't seen anyone lay out the evidence for this specific claim, though the neocons and other advocates of a New Cold War have been repeating it. There is no real dispute that Russia was prepared to respond quickly to military action initiated by Georgia. And its certainly reasonable to assume that made the kind of calculations about the effect of such a response on Russia's larger foreign policy. But that's not really the same as saying the Russians "laid a trap". That only makes sense if Russia actually did something to trick them into attacking. Friedman doesn't describe any such action.

But he does make it clear that the Georgian leaders almost certainly had some indication that the US approved of their attack on Russian positions in South Ossetia:

It is difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against US wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first is a huge breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the deployments of Russian forces or knew of them but - along with the Georgians - miscalculated Russia's intentions. The second is that the United States, along with other countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when its military was in shambles and its government was paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 1970s and 1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for years. The United States had assumed that they would not risk the consequences of an invasion. [my emphasis]
Friedman also explains the various factors which, he argues, appear to the Russians as hostile moves by the US and NATO aimed against Russian vital interests. It's worth saying here that recognizing that the Russians have rational reasons to perceive such a threat is not the same as saying that Western leaders necessarily intend such a threat.

Two of the critical issues from Russia's viewpoint were the US/NATO support for the independence of Kosovo and the decision to put Ukraine on the track to NATO membership:

... the discussion of including Ukraine in NATO represented to them a fundamental threat to Russia's national security. It would, in their calculations, have rendered Russia indefensible and threatened to destabilize the Russian Federation itself. When the United States went so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO deeper into the Caucasus, the Russian conclusion - publicly stated - was that the United States in particular intended to encircle and break Russia.

The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the United States to back Kosovo's separation from Serbia. The Russians were friendly with Serbia, but the deeper issue for Russia was this: the principle accepted in Europe since World War II was that, to prevent conflict, national borders would not be changed. If that principle were violated in Kosovo, other border shifts—including demands by various regions for independence from Russia —might follow. The Russians publicly and privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but instead continue its informal autonomy, which was the same thing in practical terms. Russia's requests were ignored.

From the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined to respond in Kosovo, they decided to respond where they had all the cards: in South Ossetia. [my emphasis]
That last sentence could be read to imply that the Russians were somehow baiting Georgia into attacking them. As I say above, I haven't seent he evidence for that.

This could also be read that way:

Putin did not want to reestablish the Soviet Union, but he did want to re-establish the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet region. To accomplish that, he had to do two things. First, he had to reestablish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force, at least in its own region. Second, he had to establish that Western guarantees, including NATO membership, meant nothing in the face of Russian power. He did not want to confront NATO directly, but he did want to confront and defeat a power that was closely aligned with the United States, had US support, aid, and advisers, and was widely seen as being under American protection. Georgia was the perfect choice. [my emphasis]
Friedman also points out that current US policies in the GWOT (global war on terror) leave the US with very limited military options in the Caucuses (Georgia and Ukraine):

Therefore, the United States has a problem - either it must reorient its strategy away from the Middle East and toward the Caucasus, or it has to seriously limit its response to Georgia to avoid a Russian counter in Iran. Even if the United States had an appetite for war in Georgia at this time, it would have to calculate the Russian response in Iran - and possibly in Afghanistan (even though Moscow's interests there are currently aligned with those of Washington).[my emphasis]
On a related issue, see Israel of the Caucasus by Arnaud de Borchgrave (UPI/Middle East Times 09/02/08.

Tags: , ,

Friday, September 05, 2008

New Cold War?

Dick Cheney's foreign policy advisers arrive for consultation with his designated successor, White Princess Sarah Palin

Joschka Fischer has been writing about the Russia-Georgia conflict in his Monday column for Die Zeit. (See the end for links; all translations in this post are mine.) He views Russia's main goals and concerns as follows:

  • To revise the international situation in its "near abroad", including Georgia and Ukraine
  • Competing with the United States in which Fischer calls "the new great game", the struggle for control of Central Asian oil resources
  • Maintaining effective control of the oil pipelines that runs from Russia through Georgia (for more on this particular topic, see Steve LeVine, Georgia: A Blow to U.S. Energy Business Week 08/13/08, who writes that "in this part of the world, diplomacy and war are about oil and gas as much as they are about hegemony and the tragic loss of human life.")
  • To stop further westward expansion of NATO
  • To restore to the Russian elite a stronger feeling of having a great-power position
  • To maintain Russian security and interests in the face of long-term challenges from China and from Islamic state and movements; Fischer sees those as Russia's "decisive strategic threats".
Fischer argues that the challenges to Russia from China and Islamic states/entities make Russia's evident intent to act as a bullying great power with the neighboring states short-sighted. Yet he reminds us that such a policy is now reality, and the EU and US need to take seriously the fears of countries that feel themselves threatened by it.

He warns that both Russia and the West would pay a high prince for a renewed Cold War. He doesn't mention it specifically here, but such a new Cold War would benefit some players in the US military-industrial complex and the national security state bureaucracies. And in some of their Russia and EU counterparts, as well.

Fischer highlights some important considerations that call for a measured and rational reaction to the Russia-Georgia conflict. The US national security state is chronically inclined to inflate the foreign threats on which it focuses. That is all the more reason for citizens to look carefully at such assumptions.

For one thing, the current situation with Georgia, the breakaway dwarf republics, and the Russia is a "strategic cul-de-sac" for the US, Europe and Russia.

Fischer describes Saakashvili's decision to initiate military operations against Russian forces in South Ossetia as "catastrophic". He argues that the only remotely rational goal of Georgia's action was to create an international incident that would politically force the Americans to provide direct support to Georgia. Fischer writes, "But a direct confrontation between Russia and the USA over South Ossetia would be a nightmare scenario that hopefully will never occur!"

He calls Saakashvili's act that of "a political gambler". Because of the Georgia government's recklessness and because of the severe limit on the West's applying military force in the Caucuses (Georgia, Ukraine), NATO membership for Georgia is basically impossible to seriously contemplate, though Fischer himself doesn't put it quite so categorically.

The US has weakened itself badly, both physically and politically, by the Iraq War, Fischer writes. And the EU has declined to build up a common force and a united foreign policy that would allow them to provide a credible military deterrent in the caucuses. He does suggest that the EU undertake a project to strengthen Ukrainian independence outside the NATO framework, but doesn't really describe the form he thinks such assistance should take.

There's also that GWOT (global war on terror) that requires cooperation with Russia, as well as major issues like nuclear proliferation and global warming. As Fischer writes:

Russia today - differently than in the 1990s - is needed everywhere: In Iran, the Near East, in Afghanistan, on arms control, energy supplies, and climate policy. The USA cannot go it alone any longer on these challenges, and Europe has weakened itself. These realities also constitute Russia's new strength.
As I understand Fischer's Green outlook, his foreign policy views in American terms are closer to "liberal internationalism" than to "realism". But he certainly seems to base his analysis on a clear assessment of the realities of the world. Despite the American habit of threat inflation, reality-based strategists in Europe and American have failed to appreciate the relative rise in power of Russia and China, he argues. (Neocon Chicken Littles are not part of the reality-based community.)

So Fischer thinks the West in principle has to reject Russia's attempts to dismember Georgia. But he also warns that the West has to respect Russia's legitimate interests in the matter, as well.

But he also calls the clash over the Georgian provinces "the turning point ... at which Russia's renewed confrontation with the West begins: the new Europe is founded on the basis of inviolable borders". Breaking this principle as Russia is doing in Georgia is something "that Europe can never accept", in his view.

Yet Fischer cautions strongly against inflating the new challenges of Russia to the West. He expects Russia to concentrate on its new role as a major energy power. But outside energy, Russia's economy is weak and faces serious problems across the board. Their population is declining in numbers. The infrastructure is backward. Significant social conflicts create real problems. "Russia has not really over come its internal weaknesses; its strength cannot be compared with that of the former Soviet Union," Fischer writes.

He sees the real solution and hope for Western relations with Russia as being in strengthening cooperation with Russia in the many areas of common interest while building up Western strength in meaningful ways, such as politically and militarily strengthening the EU.

For the US, his hope is that the US will be able to minimize the disaster of the Iraq War, though he sees no net positives for Europe or America coming from that misbegotten war. "Bush's political legacy is a confrontation with the Islamic world whose end is not yet visible."

Interestingly enough, Fischer sees the greatest long-rang beneficiary of the Iraq War to be not Iran (which has clearly benefited enormously) but China:

While the leading Western power, the USA, blew its credibility and power in the so-called "war against terror" - that is, against broad parts of the Islamic world - China grew powerfully in the slipstream of this strategic foolishness.
Sources:

Großmacht und Hasardeur von Joschka Fischer Die Zeit 12.08.2008

Europas Schwäche und Russlands Stärke von Joschka Fischer Die Zeit 18.08.2008

Amerikas Schwäche von Joschka Fischer Die Zeit 25.08.2008

Warum Obama es schaffen wird von Joschka Fischer Die Zeit 01.9.2008

For more info on the Russia-Georgia conflict see Memeorandum.

Tags: , ,

Sunday, August 24, 2008

Randy Scheunemann


Tom Hayden and Bob Dreyfuss discuss McCain's top foreign policy adviser Randy Scheunemann in, respectively, The Neo-Cons Who Fabricated Evidence for the Iraq War Are Back Huffington Post 08/20/08 and Scheunemann, Iraq and Georgia The Nation 08/21/08.

Hayden comes to the more drastic judgment about Scheunemann's influence on the Georgia-Russia conflict this summer:

Barack Obama and the Democrats are heading towards trouble in November because of a new Cold War with the Russians triggered largely by a top John McCain adviser and the same neo-conservative clique who fabricated evidence to lobby for the Iraq War.

This is not a conspiracy theory but a conspiracy fact, stated as boldly as possible before it is too late.
Dreyfuss also discusses Schuenemann's career as a Georgia lobbyist and active advocate for the Iraq War. But he contents himself with the conclusion about Scheunemann's highly-profitable Georgia connection and his role as McCain's adviser: "It's a blindingly obvious conflict of interest, and frighteningly it's one that conceivably could drag the United States into yet another war in that unstable part of the world."

Hayden may well be correct, though he establishes a broad circumstantial case rather than anything so specific it could legitimately be called a conspiracy. His main point is that the neocons and other advocates of militarism see the Georgia-Russia conflict as the chance to open a New Cold War. And he believes that the peace movement needs to make its opposition to such policies clear, even though that involves criticizing Obama and Biden during the election campaign. The following sounds like good advice to me:

At the very least, Obama can stop going out of his way to celebrate McCain as a great American war hero, which only reinforces McCain's strongest rationale for victory. And Obama's surrogates might delicately suggest that McCain shoots before he thinks. McCain was the pointman pushing the neo-conservative war against "islamo-fascism", centered in Baghdad, months before the Bush Administration revealed its intentions. While Obama urged caution about a "dumb war", McCain was supporting Ahmad Chalabi's misleading assertions about weapons of mass destruction and Iraq-al-Qaeda ties that didn't exist.

The broad peace movement has to awaken a burning memory from below. Everyone recalls George Bush declaring "Mission Accomplished", but does anyone recall John McCain standing on another aircraft carrier on January 2, 2002, yelling to young Navy pilots like himself during Vietnam, "Next up, Baghdad!" (my emphasis)
Tags: , , , ,

Saturday, August 23, 2008

Georgia and the Malvinas/Falklands (Updated)


Leopoldo Galtieri: the Mikheil Saakashvili of 1982?

Oscar Raúl Cardoso makes an interesting comparison in Un paralelismo con Malvinas Clarín 12.08.2008 between the decision of the Argentine military junta in 1982 to seize the British Falkland Islands, called the Malvinas in Argentina. He asks if Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili may have made the same mistake in attacking Russian positions in South Ossetia that the junta made in attacking the Malvinas: thinking that the Americans would support them and have their back if they got in trouble.

Cordoso writes that the Georgia-Russia conflict "para los argentinos sugirió una melodía ya escuchada hace más de dos décadas, cuando todavía eran gobernados por una dictadura militar." (... for Argentines suggested a melody that they heard more than two decades ago, when they were still governed by a military dictatorship).

In the early 1980s, the newly elected President Ronald Reagan was in his more aggressively confident phase of his foreign policy. He basically turned over Central American policy to the neoconservatives. Their conduct of that policy was a template in a surprising number of ways for the worldwide disaster we know today as the Cheney-Bush foreign policy.

There was a civil war in El Salvador that the neocons imagined to be an effort by the Soviet Union to take over Central America. Reagan regarded the Sandinista government in Nicaragua as basically a Soviet satellite already. He was eager to finance the murderous terrorists brave freedom fighters known as the Contras, a reactionary group of former members of dictator Anastoza Somoza's hated National Guard.

The Argentine junta was a key player in supporting the Contras. They were the first government granted a formal visit to Reagan after his inauguration as President. Argentina's murderous junta, which killed tens of thousands (at least) of its own citizens' in its "dirty war" against rebels and dissidents, had been a target of criticism for the Carter administration human rights policy. Carter had cut off military aid to the junta over human rights concerns. Back in those days, the United States still had some credibility in the world on the subject of international law and human rights. [Clarification 08/28/08: Credible estimates of the number of "disappeared during the junta's rule range from around 11,000 to 30,000, the latter figure probably closer to accurate.]

Reagan had opposed that policy, determined to embrace rightwing dictatorships like Argentina's to fight Communism, revolution and generally any protest that might disturb the comfort of American multinational corporations. So he was making a show of welcoming the junta's representatives in Washington to signal pro-American dictators everywhere that torture and murder was okay by his administration. He resumed military aid. Though in those long-ago days the notion that the US government would be engaging directly and officially in sick, sadistic torture as a proud matter of national policy was a difficult one for most people to picture.

Argentina had claimed - still does - that the Malvinas are Argentine territory. Britain had seized the islands from Buenos Aires in 1833. But Britain occupied the small islands, and recovering them was and is a matter of national pride, though it's very unlikely that Cristina Fernández' administration will go to war over Britain about them.

(Not that she's ignoring them, either. Earlier this month, her government requested that the Vatican include the Malvinas in a diocese they were planning to set up in the province of Tierra del Fuego. Her government wanted the Vatican to include the Malvinas in the diocese. The province in the eyes of Argentina has jurisdiction over the islands, and the Vatican under its arrangements with Argentina requires the government's approval to establish a new diocese. The Vatican decided to drop the plan for the new diocese rather than get tangled in the Malvinas question. See Llega el canciller del Papa y se espera que destrabe la creación de una diócesis por Julio Algañaraz Clarín 02.08.2008 and El Vaticano no crea un obispado que iba a excluir a las Malvinas por Julio Algañaraz Clarín 07.08.2008.)

Argentine map of the Malvinas

The junta in 1982 likely saw the war as a way to rally the public around their government. They also thought the occupation of the Malvinas would help in wider territorial claims they were asserting over part of Antarctica. So far as I'm aware, there is no evidence that the Reagan administration explicitly gave them a green light for war, though the junta claimed they had received such assurances. More likely, they saw what they wanted to see in the improvement of relationships with the United States, and figured that their role in supporting Reagan's Central American policy gave them additional cause to expect American assistance with Britain.

In any case, they assumed that Britain would not be willing to undertake direct hostilities against Argentina over the issue. As José Luis Romerto writes in his Breve Historia de la Argentina (1997 edicion):

Los jefes militares concibieron el plan de ocupar militarmente las islas por sorpresa y forzar a los británicaos a una negociación, para lo cual Galtieri confiaba en el apoyo de los Estados Unidos, donde había establicido excelentes relaciones.

[The military leaders conceived the plan to militarily occupy the islands by surprise and force the British to a negotiation, for which Galtieri was confident of the support of the United States, where he had established excellent relations.]
They were wrong. Reagan's administration thought the support of Maggie Thatcher's Britain was more important than the dubious contributions of the Argenine junta. The US did initially try to persuade the junta to abandon the islands in favor of negotiations. But, as Romero writes, "los militares, apresados en su propia rhetórica, estaban imposibilitados de retroceder sin perder todo lo que habían ganado en el orden interno, y aún más." (... the generals, caught in their own rhetoric, found it impossible to retreat without losing everything that they had gained in internal order, and even more.)

Britain did go to war, which the junta had not expected. The US sided diplomatically with Britain, Britain won the war, and the loss of the war was basically the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back for the junta's rule.

Argentine news magazine, Apr 1982: "We saw the British surrendering"

Argentina was supported by most Latin American countries, though Chile provided logistical support to Britain. And the action itself seemed to meet with approval among the Argentine public. Losing the war wasn't nearly so popular. Romero argues that the junta did botch things militarily. And that they had launched the action in ignorance of their basic international position at that time.

In the aftermath, Galtieri turned the presidency over to General Reynaldo Bignone, and the junta scheduled democratic elections for October, 1983. The new civilian government under President Raúl Alfonsín began the "transition to democracy".

Cardoso also points to some of the obvious differences between the Georgia-Russia conflict in 2008 and the Falklands War of 1982:

Las situaciones de los 80 en el Atlántico Sur y el presente vuelven a encontrar puntos de contacto porque en ambos conflictos está en carne viva la cuestión de la soberanía territorial. Georgia considera que Osetia del Sur y Abjazia, en el Cáucaso - dos repúblicas rebeldes -, son parte de su territorio, y Saakashvili ha hecho de su recuperación el principal objetivo de su gobierno. Pero en el caso del Cáucaso está en juego la certeza con que Moscú ve a esa región como su muy propia área de hegemonía y está dispuesta a mantenerla a cualquier costo. La entonces Unión Soviética ocupó Georgia desde 1921 hasta los 90, resistiendo inclusive un alzamiento en 1924. La operación militar rusa que primero ocupó Osetia del Sur y ahora prosigue en territorio de Georgia parece, además de todo, un recordatorio ruso de la voluntad de Moscú de no ser desafiado en su rol de potencia militar.

[The situations of the 1980s in the South Atlantic and the present have similarities because in both conflicts the question of territorial sovereignty was an urgent passion. {The phrase "en carne viva" literally means "in living flesh".} Georgia considers South Osetia and Abkhasia, in the Caucuses - two rebellious republics - part of its territory, and Saakashvili has made their recovery the principle object of his government. But in the case of the Caucuses, part of the reality is that Moscow views this region as its own area of hegemony and is ready to maitain it at any price. The former Soviet Union occupied Georgia from 1921 to the 1990s, resisting even with a revolt in 1924. The Russian military operation that first occupied South Osetia and now is proceeding into the territory of Georgia appears, in addition to everthing, a reminder of Moscow's intention to not be challenged in its role as military power.]
But there is very likely to have been some similar miscalculation at work for Georgia now and Argentina then. Although Bush officials deny giving Georgia any green light to attack Russian forces in South Osetia, we also know from years of experience that this administration can be much less than candid about such matters. Also, given what we know already about Dick Cheney's rogue foreign policy operations, the influence and shady dealings of the neocons, and the prominence of Randy Scheunemann in McCain's campaign (Sheunemann was still being paid as a lobbyist for the Republic of Georgia when he was working for McCain campaign), it's entirely possible that Saakashvili was getting some explicit signals. We do know that the Cheney-Bush administration had embraced Georgia as a military partner, though the US has no defense treaty with Georgia, and that alone could have provided material for an ambitious nationalist politician to assume he would get more American support.

Tags: ,

Wednesday, August 20, 2008

Obama hopes and worries

I realize that Obama can push the envelope only so far past the conventional view of things during the Presidential campaign. Assuming he wants to push the envelope. But if he gets elected, withdraws from Iraq and gets some kind of practical comprehensive health insurance program passed, then he will have put the major building blocks in place for something we could call a conservative revival.

This is a preface to expressing concerns about the state of the Presidential fight. but I want to call attention to dday's post Obama's Big Bet - The Power Of The Ground Game Hullabaloo blog 08/20/08, which addresses Obama's "ground game", putting an elaborate get-out-the-vote operation in place. Obviously, his ground game in the caucuses was key to his success, a strong point that let him offset Clinton's advantage in the primary states. And I've seen his organizational approach mentioned before, described as putting a new grassroots party organization in place.

He quotes Dana Goldstein and Ezra Klein, "For all the talk of post-partisan 'unity,' Barack Obama has been proving himself the most party-focused presidential candidate in recent history - possibly ever." I want to believe that this will be very effective. And I think dday makes an important point. It's one that the trivia-and-sex-obsessed Establishment press largely ignores.

Now to my concerns. Obama's recent statements on Iraq sound pretty emphatic about getting all the troops out, though he's still fudging on trainers, aka, military advisers, and on soldiers to protect the embassy. The latter would sound unexceptional except that the mega-embassy Cheney and Bush are building there is meant to be much more than your average embassy building.

But seeing the text of the speech he just gave to the VFW makes it sound like he's determined to escalate the Afghanistan War. "This is a war we have to win," he says there. If he winds up just shifting troops from Iraq to Afghanistan, with the Republicans all the while blaming him for every single thing that goes wrong in either place (the Reps' starry-eyed view of all the "progress" will evaporate as soon as Obama is in charge), this will likely destroy his Presidency. It's not as much of a disaster as McCain would create by waging war on Iran. But too much disaster to build a dominant progressive coalition on.

He also said that he was "crystal clear" that "Georgia should be integrated into transatlantic institutions." I suppose we should be relieved that he didn't say "Georgia should be made a member of NATO", although I'm not sure what other meaning we can take from his statement. Does he really want to make a military alliance with a state like Georgia that doesn't physically control the borders it claims as its own?

There is money to be made in selling arms to Georgia. Legislation that Obama supported allows weapons to be sold to Georgia on pretty much the same terms as to NATO allies. (See Billmon's post from Monday.)

And there are many other ways in which massive military spending and the foreign policy fears that justify it are almost hard-wired into our political culture, if that metaphor makes any sense. Obama's willingness to challenge the whole assumption of the Iraq War is an important rejection of national-security-state thinking.

But his expressed positions on Afghanistan and Georgia are largely consistent with Establishment thinking on foreign and military policy. Which is still stuck to an amazing degree in the Cold War mold. In McCain's case, that's painfully obvious. He seems to think eternal Cold War and perpetual hot wars as a secondary aspect of it should be the normal state of affairs. Or at least the extreme Cheney-Bush version of it.

The other discouraging aspect of Obama's speech is that his objections to McCain's attacks on him played right into the Republican script and come off sounding whiny. It's silly to whine about how the Republicans are running a nasty campaign. They're Republicans, that's what they do! He needs to jam their attacks back into McCain's face, using either humor or direct attacks or allowing surrogates to do it. If he loses this thing, his refusal to defend Wesley Clark when he provoked media-Republican faux-outrage by saying McCain's military experience wasn't in itself directly relevant experience for the Presidency will be one of the worst wrong turns of his campaign.

I agree with Josh Marshall in Free Advice, Worth Every Penny TPM 08/20/08: "Don't ever demand someone stop attacking you. Doesn't work. Don't do it. Sounds weak. Sounds pathetic. And a lot else." Obama needs to hit back at McCain's supposed strengths and, yes, deflate his I'm-a-saint-because-I-was-a-POW schtick.

Tags: , , ,

Monday, August 18, 2008

Billmon on Georgia, the US and our dysfunctional foreign policy elite

The pioneering liberal blogger Billmon is back posting sporadically at his Daily Kos diary. His entry for 08/18/08, Anatomy of A(nother) Fiasco, is about the Georgia-Russia conflict and provides some useful background. He reminds us that a lot of the most questionable assumptions underpinning current US foreign policy are shared by most Republicans and many Democrats.

As Billmon notes, our European allies supported some expansions of NATO, e.g., Poland and the Czech Republic. But they didn't share the enthusiasm of Cheney and Bush for incorporating countries like Georgia and Ukraine into NATO. Plus, it would be highly problematic to make a formal defense alliance with Georgian at a time when it is not in undisputed control of territory it claims as its own, i.e., South Ossetia and Abkhasia.

Billmon also explains in 2007 that Congress passed the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act, which authorized treatment of Georgia and Ukraine as de facto allies of the United States, at least in terms of providing weapons sales and advisers on similar terms to those received by formal NATO allies. This reckless piece of legislation was sponsored by those famous "moderate" Republicans Dick Lugar and Chuck Hagel, along with Democrats Joe Biden and Chris Dodd and that famous Maverick McCain (who Billmon identifies as R-POW). And earlier this year, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden joined with John McCain and Joe Lieberman to sponsored another resolution "demanding that NATO open its doors to the Ukraine and Georgia". There was even a subsequent Congressional resolution passed supporting Georgia and blasting Russia. Both parties need to start being a lot more careful about sending signals to volatile regimes that can be easily misinterpreted, or create openings for lobbyists like Randy Schuenemann (now of the McCain campaign) to make mischief.

Tags: ,

Saturday, August 16, 2008

The American politics of the Georgia-Russia conflict

I stopped by our old friend Donald Douglas' blog, American Power, to see what he was up to these days.

Same as usual, it appears: typing up the latest neocon scripts. Georgia is the new "Czechoslovakia" (1968 version), vital strategic interests in Georgia, yadda, yadda, terrible Russian menance, blah, blah. And those horrible leftists and unpatriotic paleo-conservatives who don't cheer for war anywhere and everywhere are destroying our vital bodily fluids, etc.

I don't know how McCain's Cold War posturing around the Georgia-Russia conflict will play politically. A lot depends, of course, on how Obama handles the larger issues of war and peace. But if Obama can manage to ignore his conventional-minded advisers and hammer on the differences between his position and McCain's on the Iraq War, that is the most important way he can draw the contrast.

My worry politically about McCain's position on Iraq has not been that he would attract swing voters like flies to honey with his bonkers talk about staying in Iraq for 10,000 years. My concern has been more that he will blur the differences between his war-forever position and Obama's, and that he will manage to convince a critical number of swing voters that his Mean Mr. Mustard attitude will be just the thing to achieve peace in Iraq.

His blatantly aggressive posturing on Georgia is a big potential liability. The punditocracy has already decreed that since McCain is their favorite manly man, the Georgia issue is Good For The Republicans. But, in the real world, most ordinary voters just aren't terribly thrilled by the idea of perpetual war.

This is not 2002. As that year began, we had just faced the 9/11 attacks and the still-unsolved anthrax attacks. The administration was claiming with some apparent basis in fact that the Afghanistan War had gone brilliantly. The press was, as we know, groveling at Our Dear Leader's feet - although to give the press some credit, anyone following the reporting on the Afghanistan War closely and taking the time to think about it could see that event that Great Victory was less than it was being advertised.

But even then, it took Cheney and Bush over a year to get the country fired up for war, despite all the advantages of fear, forgeries and a zombified national press. And up almost until the eve of war, polls still showed a clear majority opposed to going to war with Iraq without United Nations authority. And there were demonstrations of unprecedented size against the war prior to the invasion.

Cheerleading for a new Cold War over Georgia's breakaway provinces turns on Republican war fans, of course. But think about the difference between this situation and the buildup to the Iraq War. We had the Gulf War of 1991, in which we had defeated Saddam Hitler. Throughout the 1990s, we maintained "no-fly" zones and directed repeated missile strikes against Iraq and Saddam Hitler, including the intensive strikes of the bizarrely-named Operation Desert Fox of December, 1998. We had military encounters of various kinds elsewhere, including the Bosnia intervention and the Kosovo War. The belief in American military omnipotence was at a high point. Then there were the 9/11 attacks and the unsolved anthrax attacks and the year-plus of intensive propaganda against Saddam Hitler and his terrible arsenal of super-duper-deadly "weapons of mass destruction".

Our press is still broken, and our Congress is still prostrate. But it will take a lot more than a few belligerent-old-man speeches from John McCain to convince most people who are not already drooling-at-the-mouth war fans that the fate of the United States and World Civilization rests on the outcome of the Georgia-Russia conflict. And McCain's posturing doesn't sound like the thoughts of someone who is determined to preserve peace and contain conflict. No matter how much his fan club in our "press corps" swoon over his manly manliness.

Calling for the Russians to withdraw from Georgia as Obama has done is fine. The government would basically have to take that position no matter how badly the preventive war against Iraq has undermined our actual credibility. But I'm guessing that since a week and a half ago most Americans would have been more able to identify Quemoy and Matsu than South Ossetia and Abkhasia, beating the drums for a new Cold War is not likely to be that appealing to most voters.

Besides, what does this mean for the "transcendental" struggle against
Islamofascistunism? Weren't McCain and his twin Joe Lieberman telling us just a few days ago that this was the greatest menace that the US had ever faced? And aren't the Russians also opposed to The Terrorists and Islamofascistunism, too? Starting a new Cold War over Georgia's right to militarily retake their breakaway provinces that most Americans don't know anything about and care even less just doesn't fit well into the framework of the Long War Against Islamofascistodefeatocratunism that the Republicans have worked so hard to build up the last seven years.

McCain's free-lancing on Georgia diplomacy worries me even apart from the politics. A large part of international relations consists of countries reacting to one another based on a poor understanding of each other producing poor interpretations of each other's actions.

Having the Presidential candidate of the ruling party calling the head of government of Georgia at a moment like this could easily be taken as an official channel by those on the other end. Especially since Georgia sees its interests benefiting from more American involvement, giving them an incentive to misunderstand it as such.

Georgian lobbyist Randy Scheunemann's prominent role in McCain's campaign makes McCain's involvement in this crisis reek even more. Presumably Scheunemann was legally required to register officially as a foreign agent of Georgia to do that work. I don't think it would be stooping to Republican levels at all for the Democrats to point out that one of McCain's top campaign people was a "registered foreign agent" of Georgia, if he actually was. I noticed that the otherwise hapless Ruth Marcus used that phrase about Sheunemann on the PBS Newshour of 08/15/08.

After seeing the circumstantial evidence amassed by Gary Sick and Robert Perry on the 1980 "October surprise", I don't consider it at all far-fetched that this Georgia crisis is in part an "August surprise" by McCain and the Republicans. I'd like to see a decent investigation that would put the facts in the public record. When you have a President and rogue Vice President arguing that they can do anything they choose as long as they say it's related to "national security", it's worth asking those questions.

McCain's free-lancing to me is also a sign of the enormous sense of entitlement the Republican Party has today. Most past Presidents would have been jealous enough of their own power to tell even members of their own Party to stop the personal diplomacy in a situation like this. And what McCain and Schuenemann are doing here has to be at least borderline illegal.

But to me this is a sign of how much today's Republicans see the Party as their supreme secular authority. The Party is entitled to conduct foreign relations how it chooses. And the state and law-enforcement are expected to conform to the Party's actions.

I don't see the downside of the Obama campaign calling the Reps on this, especially over Scheunemann's role. But ever since the Gulf War of 1991, the Dems have been shuddering in fear that they might come off looking less "hawkish" than the Republicans over this or that.

Tags: , ,

Wednesday, August 13, 2008

Georgia and NATO

Sarah Mendelson of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) makes some important observations in An August War in the Caucuses 08/11/08 about the Russia-Georgia War. She argues that the Russian action has effectively blocked the option of making Georgia a NATO member:

This conflict is a tragedy for the people of this region. Instead of negotiating over the hotels, golf courses, and resorts that ought to be built along Georgia's Black Sea coast, bringing tourists and needed revenue to the citizens of the region, Russia and Georgia have gone to war. At this moment, it is hard to see where or how the conflict will end. The Georgian government has called for a ceasefire. There are also fears that Russia might overrun Georgia, bringing down the government of Mikhail Sakashvili through the use of force. Whatever the outcome, Russia has all but obliterated Georgia’s possibility of joining NATO as it cannot belong to this alliance if it has unresolved border disputes. Russia has successfully burned Georgia’s NATO card. (my emphasis)
She also makes a point I haven't seen anywhere else, which is that Russian polemics against Georgia has set that country up as a serious foreign policy challenge:

The Russian authorities have run an anti-Georgian campaign inside Russia for several years. Boycotts of products followed periodic expulsions of diplomats. The threat factor seemed to be seeping into the public consciousness: in a CSIS survey in May 2007, we found that fully one-third of a nationally representative sample of 1,800 Russians aged 16 to 29 believed Georgia was Russia’s enemy. At the time, we focused on the fact that 22 percent regarded the United States that way. We should have zeroed in on the finding that over twice as many young Russians viewed Georgia as an enemy as viewed Iran that way—31 percent versus 14 percent. (We also found that only 6 percent viewed China as an enemy, and a tiny 3 percent and 2 percent respectively thought that about Belarus and Germany.) In other words, of all these countries, Russian respondents viewed Georgia, a NATO and EU aspirant, as enemy number one. If these findings are representative of how the population as a whole feels, Russians will believe that Vladimir Putin's war in Georgia is justified.
Which is another way of saying that for the Russians, what happens about Georgia is very important. Americans not only don't feel a similar stake in events there. There's no reason we should.

Janusz Bugajski also writes for CSIS on Georgia: Epicenter of Strategic Confrontation 08/12/08. His piece is pretty much just a statement of the neocon New Cold War position, i.e., Russia wants to take over the world, yadda, yadda.

Tags: ,

Monday, August 11, 2008

How bad a joke is this? And did you know that the Georgia/Russia conflict is Germany's fault (according to our greatest living saint)?

That bold Maverick McCain is shocked, shocked to see the Russians committing violent aggression against a sovereign country. Why, that's against international law, the Maverick says! Such a thing has no place in the 21st century! Actually, he said "21sth century Europe", so he qualified it a bit.

Still, having been one of the main cheerleaders for the Iraq War, you would think he might be embarrassed to say such a thing. But, apparently, you would be wrong.

But doesn't he realize at some level what a sad joke that is to most of the world? And to most Americans who stop to think about it? Zbigniew Brzezinski at least has some credibility from having opposed the Iraq War when he outlines a hawkish policy on Russia and Georgia, although he sounds way too willing to restart the Cold War for me.

Brzezinski hauls out the Hitler-and-Czechoslovakia analogy, of which we will apparently never be free. He at least prefers the USSR-Finland analogy, which may be largely irrelevant but is least not completely hackneyed. And he says Putin is the new Stalin rather than the new Hitler.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been de facto independent and actively cooperating with Russia since 1992. Before that, in the days of the Soviet Union, their areas had been recognized as being the terrain their respective ethnic groups formally controlled. (Overridden by central Soviet authority, of course.) The latest fighting probably establishes an independent existence for South Ossetia as an effectively permanent status, allied to the Russians. Maybe for Abkhazia, too.

McCain and the neocons are so stuck in their fantasies of the US as the world-dominating superpower facing Cold War-type enemies is so strong they can't see straight. But the truth is that any US national interest in Georgia is marginal. And in any case, the US has no practical military solution to the conflict. nor many recourses of other types, either.

Of course, the neocons and their favorite Maverick can always find a vital US interest anywhere, even if they have to forge the evidence to back it up. McCain's statement today claims:

Russia is using violence against Georgia, in part, to intimidate other neighbors such as Ukraine for choosing to associate with the West and adhering to Western political and economic values. As such, the fate of Georgia should be of grave concern to Americans and all people who welcomed the end of a divided of Europe, and the independence of former Soviet republics. The international response to this crisis will determine how Russia manages its relationships with other neighbors. We have other important strategic interests at stake in Georgia, especially the continued flow of oil through the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which Russia attempted to bomb in recent days; the operation of a critical communication and trade route from Georgia through Azerbaijan and Central Asia; and the integrity and influence of NATO, whose members reaffirmed last April the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Georgia.
Ah, more mavericky "straight talk". NATO has never made a commitment to defend Georgia militarily. Where NATO's credibility is really on the line, and the conflict that could wind up dissolving the alliance altogether, is in Afghanistan. "Integrity and influence" as McCain uses it here is a phrase similar to "credibility". If we assume that our influence should be decisive anywhere in the world, then anything that happens can be construed as a threat to our credibility/integrity/influence.

NATO expansion has gone far enough already. How could NATO admit a country like Georgia that doesn't control its own national territory, i.e., in South Ossetia and Abkhazia? But both McCain and Obama want to do it. Does that mean the day Georgia joins, NATO goes to war with the Russians over South Ossetia and Abkhazia? Will South Ossetia and Abkhazia be the Quemoy and Matsu and the next administration? (No, almost nobody remembers the Quemoy-and-Matsu issue which was a major theme in the 1960 Presidential election.)

While we're signing up for a new world war with Russia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, we might keep in mind that, justified or not, it was Georgia that initiated the current round of military confrontation. Georgia has 37,000 troops, Russia 1.1 million. I'm just saying.

It's worth noting that at this year's NATO summit in Bucharest, the main opposition to putting Georgia on the formal track to admission to the alliance was Bush's back-rub buddy, German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The Republicans expected Merkel's government to be far more supportive of their policies than the previous German government. Now, the bold Maverick says that this war is probably Germany's fault: "NATO's decision to withhold a Membership Action Plan for Georgia might have been viewed as a green light by Russia for its attacks on Georgia, and I urge the NATO allies to revisit the decision."

Oh, and he wants to commit US credibility/integrity/influence to some kind of support for Ukraine against Russia, too.

Unfortunately, Brzezinski's position seems almost as clueless when it comes to looking at the real limits of American power and the depths of the problems the Cheney-Bush foreign policy has created.

By the way, the initiation of conventional military hostilities by Georgia is very quickly morphing in the Establishment press and Republican rhetoric (what a coincidence!) into a sneaky invasion by Russia. Stalin attacks Finland! in Brzezinski's version. Now, there is a political and legal argument to be made that Georgia has every right to initiate military action on what is officially recognized by most of the world as their own territory. But with no apparent evidence, it's rapidly becoming in our media a carefully plotted Russian invasion.

Still, as a very practical matter of judging the good sense of potential allies, it's important for American leaders to recognize that the Georgian leadership initiated offensive military action in a situation in which they had no rational reason to believe they would prevail. Before the US and other NATO countries sign up for a mutual defense treaty with them, this is something that needs to be taken fully into account.

I don't want to be alarmist. But the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan should be showing us that we need to dial back our willingness to go to war and our inclinations to make risky alliances (e.g., Pakistan) without taking adequate account of the risks.

This op-ed in the war-friendly Washington Post, Black Sea Watershed by Ronald Asmus and Richard Holbrooke 08/11/08, uses a formula I'm going to start watching for now. It goes, "no one wants a new Cold War, but ..." Here are two examples of that usage in this one op-ed:

While no one wants a return to Cold War-style confrontation, Moscow's behavior poses a direct challenge to European and international order.
While Western military intervention in Georgia is out of the question - and no one wants a 21st-century version of the Cold War - Moscow's actions cannot be ignored.
Russia is claiming that the US has arranged for as many as 3,000 mercenaries, directed by US military experts, to fight in the Georgian army against the Russian Army. Before our obedient Establishment press dismisses those claims as propaganda, maybe they should look into it a bit more closely. The "War on Terror" became Cheney's and Bush's excuse to green-light all sorts of secret missions. And we know from the experience of Blackwater in Iraq that there are issues with using mercenaries. Not least of them is that it allows the Executive to more easily avoid Congressional and legal oversight.

Seriously, this credibility/integrity/influence approach to foreign policy with a President like McCain will lead to even bigger trouble than we're already dealing with in Iraq and Afghanistan. And that's a lot.

Tags: , ,