Showing posts with label kosovo war. Show all posts
Showing posts with label kosovo war. Show all posts

Sunday, February 19, 2017

Uncertainties in the Balkans with the new Trump Presidency and the Russians

"Political instability in the Balkans is the last thing the EU needs when it is already faced with geopolitical uncertainty from Brexit, the Trump administration, and the diplomatic conflict with Russia over the war in Eastern Ukraine," writes Wolfgang Münchau in Watch out for instability of the Balkans Eurointelligence 02/17/2017.

Linking to the articles below, he gives this analysis:

In principle, Trump is good news for Putin because he prefers to deal with strong-leder types than with multinational organisations like the EU - or even NATO which Trump has even called obsolete. Possible flashpoints include the increasingly tense relations between Serbia and Kosovo; and the breakdown of Bosnian intercommunity relations as the Serb entity the Republika Srpska increasingly contests Bosnia's constitutional court. The situation in Bosnia directly involves the EU as it oversees the application of the Dayton agreement through its high representative. Montenegro, on the other hand, appears strongly committed to both EU and NATO membership. The US is favourable to Montenegro's accession to NATO, which woud be a setback for Russian designs in the region.
The Balkan Wars of the 1990s sent many refugees into other European countries, who are right now struggling with a major refugee crisis that has been going on since at least 2011. One of the more important inflection points in US-Russia relations was the Kosovo War of 1999. Russia saw Serbia as an ally and having NATO effectively detach the province of Kosovo was by all accounts I've seen interpreted as a serious setback in Russian foreign policy. It didn't help matters that the Kosovars later carried out similar ethnic cleansing actions in the province against Serbs that NATO was intervening to stop when the Serbs were carrying it out against the ethnic-Albanian Kosovars.

As Alberto Call observed in a 2001 essay ("Kosovo and the Moral Burdens of Power" in War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, eds.):

The only power that historically would have had the ability and the inclination to frustrate NATO's actions in Kosovo, Russia, was politically and economically weak and ultimately dependent on Western goodwill. Throughout the crisis, it could play no more than a mildly obstructionist role and, in the end, it encouraged Serbia to give in to Western demands.
The articles Münchau links include:

Dejan Anastasijevic warns about what he sees as pessimistic and alarmist articles in mainstream publications about the possibility of new Balkan Wars in Stirring up the Spectre of New Balkan Wars Balkan Insight 01/30/2017: "the Serbian Army held ten times as many exercises with NATO members than it did with Russia last year."

Leonid Bershidsky, Russia Re-Enacts the Great Game in the Balkans Bloomberg View 01/19-20/2017:

Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Putin's Security Council, recently named a potential expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia among the biggest Western threats to Russia. The Kremlin has already seen Bulgaria, once a key Balkan ally, join NATO and the EU -- and watched it scupper a major Russian natural gas pipeline project.
Florian Bieber, Trump and the Balkan Princes: What Trump’s presidency means for South East Europe EUROPP 02/06/2017:

The shift of thinking, acting and writing about the Balkans from focusing on EU integration, democracy and norms to geopolitical influence, national interests and foreign actors began before Trump, but his presidency has accelerated it. The weakness of the EU has made individual member states broker deals, like Austria in closing the Western Balkan route in Macedonia for refugees, which have little to do with EU integration and more with “good old” national interest.

The emphasis on national interests over norms, shared ideas of democracy and rule of law is giving rise to dangerous pyromaniacs, like Timothy Less in his piece for Foreign Affairs arguing for a redrawing of the borders. Others have since followed suit. They all appear to believe that with Trump in power, there is an opening for a grand redesign.
(For more on the Austrian diplomatic action Bieber references and its political context in Austria, see: Claus Heinrich, Österreich: Neutral und rechts? Blätter 2:2017)

Salvador Llaudes, Los Balcanes Occidentales en la era de Trump por Elanco 15/02/2017, recommends caution at this point in assuming that Trump's well-known present fondness for Vladimir Putin will necessarily translate into common US-Russian positions on the ever-complicated problems in the Balkan states.

John R. Schindler, one of the analysts Dejan Anastasijevic challenges in the article linked above, President Trump’s First Foreign Policy Crisis: Balkan War Drums Beat Again Observer 01/25/2017: "Although most of the world recognizes Kosovo’s independence, Serbia does not. Tensions are on the rise thanks to Belgrade’s mounting provocations."

Sunday, July 03, 2016

Hillary and peace politics

Tom Hayden (even-the-Hillary-supporter-Tom-Hayden!) is not happy with the foreign policy perspective of the Democratic candidate he endorsed during the primaries. He writes in America Needs a New Peace Movement—Especially if Clinton Wins in November The Nation 06/30/2016:

In the campaign — and, if Hillary Clinton wins, during her presidency — Senator Bernie Sanders’s legions should be outspoken against regime change and demand that a new peace-and-diplomacy bloc be forged in Congress. ...

Someone like Representative Barbara Lee will revive a peace-and-diplomacy caucus in the Democratic Party, either as a new leverage point or an extension of the existing Congressional Progressive Caucus. Along with President Obama and Senator Sanders, Lee is pushing hard for a new Authorization to Use Military Force against ISIS, with important incentives for diplomacy and fixed limits on US ground troops. Only the exhaustion of sectarian parties representing Saudi Arabia and Iran will lay the conditions for a stable peace in Syria. As the major powers and their proxies continue bleeding, peace advocates should keep urging a political settlement, including a possible partition.
Hayden sounds somewhat resigned on the prospects for limiting what he calls the 15-year Long War, presumably dating from 9/11:

The real choices now are between a limited and secretive US war against terrorism, which at least preserves most of the New Deal legacy of Social Security, community colleges, and public schools, on the one hand, and expanded funding of Medicare, Medicaid, and Obamacare, including a revived public option. The fight to save the planet from fossil fuels will lead to a final showdown with Big Oil and the denying, lying fundamentalists. The Republicans are gnashing their teeth to destroy those vital social programs during their march to war. The war-presidency model of Franklin Roosevelt could be the best-case scenario for a renewed peace struggle in the midst of new opportunities for labor, environmentalists, and communities of color.
David Bromwich, who has been very perceptive in his criticism of President Obama's obsession for bipartisanship, gives some more specific criticisms of Hillary Clinton's foreign policy perspective in The Roots of Hillary's Infatuation with War The National Interest 07/29/2016. He argues that Hillary has a foreign policy outlook very favorable to so-called humanitarian intervention, including covert regime-change operations. The example of Libya is a key one:

The NATO action to overthrow Muammar el-Qaddafi, in which Clinton played so decisive a role, has turned out to be a catastrophe with strong resemblances to Iraq—a catastrophe smaller in degree but hardly less consequential in its ramifications, from North Africa to the Middle East to southern Europe. The casus belli was the hyperbolic threat by Qaddafi to annihilate a rebel force in Benghazi. His vow to hunt down the rebels “like rats” door to door could be taken to mean a collective punishment of inhabitants of the city, but Qaddafi had marched from the west to the east of Libya, in command of an overwhelming force, without the occurrence of any such massacre, and the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence assigned low credibility to the threat. Clinton took more seriously an alarmist reading of Qaddafi by Bernard-Henri Lévy, Nicolas Sarkozy, David Cameron, Susan Rice and Samantha Power, and chose to interpret his threat as a harbinger of “genocide.”

Landler, in his book Alter Egos on the Clinton-Obama relationship, joins the consensus that has lately emerged from the reporting of Patrick Cockburn, Anne Barnard and other journalists on the ground. “Libya,” Landler writes, “has descended into a state of Mad Max – like anarchy”; the country is now “a seedbed for militancy that has spread west and south across Africa”; it “has become the most important Islamic State stronghold outside Syria and Iraq”; “it sends waves of desperate migrants across the Mediterranean, where they drown in capsized vessels within sight of Europe.” Clinton’s most recent comments, however, leave no doubt that she continues to believe in the healing virtue of smart power. The belief appears to be genuine and not tactical.
The fact that Hillary would take seriously anything Bernard-Henri Lévy has to say about foreign policy is scarcy in itself! Glenn Greenwald memorably described BHL as "France's most celebrated (and easily the world’s most overrated) public intellectual." (France Arrests A Comedian for His Facebook Comments, Showing the Sham of the West's "Free Speech" Celebration The Intercept 01/14/2015)

We have a genuinely bipartisan foreign policy problem in the United States. The US is the most powerful country militarily in the world. And we are operating on a foreign policy strategy that aims at maintaining not just defense of the US, not just being the militarily most powerful country, but at being overwhelmingly the most powerful country. IN foreign policy lingo, it's a hegemonic strategy, very different from a potent but more modest alternative like the off-shore balancing advocated by adherents of the "realist" foreign policy school like Stephen Walt.

Republican foreign policy generally draws more directly on the frankly imperialist "neoconservative" ideas, the Democrats more on the humanitarian interventionist outlook identified with officials like Samantha Power, currently Obama's Ambassador to the United Nations. But part of what we see in Bromwich's analysis is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to tell the practical differences between those two approaches.

Bromwich makes an important point that liberal interventionsists take the Kosovo War as a kind of ideal success story for the humanitarian hawk approach. Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen edited a collection of essays, War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (2001), that give a very different picture from the success story that the Kosovo War is often taken to be in American commentary. Bromwich observes:

The truth is that the pretext for military intervention was almost as thin in Yugoslavia as it was in Libya. There, too, genocide was said to be in progress—the slaughter of tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians—but the reports were chimerical. In First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, David Gibbs concluded that approximately two thousand had been killed before the NATO bombing; whereas, during the bombing itself and in retaliation for it, Serbian security forces killed approximately ten thousand. Given the status of the episode in liberal mythology, the treatment of Kosovo in Living History is oddly minimal: less than a paragraph, all told, scattered over several chapters. Living History was published in 2003; and it seems possible that Clinton had an inkling of the mob violence that would break out in March 2004 in the nationwide pogrom against the Serbs of Kosovo—violence that would lead in early 2016 to the construction of tent cities in the capital, Pristina, and the firing of tear gas canisters in parliament to protest the abridgment of the political rights of the remaining ethnic minority. The aftermath of the Kosovo intervention has recently entered a new chapter. “How Kosovo Was Turned Into Fertile Ground for ISIS” was the astute headline of a New York Times story by Carlotta Gall, on May 21, 2016. Gall’s opening sentence offers a symptomatic tableau:

“Every Friday, just yards from a statue of Bill Clinton with arm aloft in a cheery wave, hundreds of young bearded men make a show of kneeling to pray on the sidewalk outside an impoverished mosque in a former furniture store.”
In his concluding paragraph, Bromwich writes, "An incorrigible belief in the purity of one’s motives is among the most dangerous endowments a politician can possess. Her sentences about NATO could have been written by Tony Blair; and this explains why at least three neoconservatives — Eliot A. Cohen, Max Boot and Robert Kagan, in ascending order of enthusiasm — have indicated that a Clinton presidency would be agreeable to them. She is a reliable option for them."

Bromwich also makes this speculative observation, "Both Clintons have felt pressed to perform supererogatory works to show that liberals can be tough. For Mrs. Clinton, there is the additional need — from self-demand as much as external pressure — to prove that a female leader can be tougher than her male counterpart." This is certainly a common assumption among our punditocracy, that a female President would especially need to show her toughness through military action. But our star pundits also tend consider war as just a normal policy option, not as a failure of foreign policy, as an older formulation had it. There's some reason to believe that Presidents feel a need to show their willingness to use force early in their Presidencies. At this point, I don't see any reason to assume that pressure would be more or less for a female Executive.

Also in The National Interest, Paul Pillar took a look a month ago at The Safety and Sameness of Hillary Clinton's Foreign Policy 06/02/2016, just after Hillary's major foreign policy speech of June 2. Since Pillar is critical of reckless military interventions, he has concerns about Hillary's approach. He concludes on a somber note:

This election year evidently is not going to be the year for positive redirection of U.S. national security policy. The first priority needs to be to keep dangerous incoherence out of the White House, because that is where the biggest potential damage to U.S. interests lies. Staying stuck in the rut of conventional wisdom is the relatively safer choice, although it's too bad we won't have a chance for something better.
Yes, it really is too bad.

That's why we really need to kind of robust peace activism that Tom Hayden advocates.

Wednesday, April 02, 2014

Confederate "Heritage" Month 2014, April 2: trying to define the politics of the white South

It's no secret that today's Republican Party is very conservative, reactionary even, and very white and very Southern. The Republicans have basically recreated the Solid South voting bloc that the Democrats had during the Segregation 1.0 decades after the Southern Reconstruction government were overthrown in the 1870s.

Defining more specifically just what is that "Southern" political component becomes a difficult challenge.

CJ Wurleman takes a stab at it in The GOP’s perpetual war drum explained: Why are Republicans so eager for conflict? Salon 04/01/2014. (The article says it first appeared on Alternet but I was unable to locate it there.) He makes this argument about the "Southern" attitude and war:

The Republican Party is the party of the South. The Republican congressional delegation is disproportionately southern, and unsurprisingly a majority of the party’s leaders talk with a southern accent. If you want to know why there has never been a war the Republican Party didn't want another person’s kid to fight, it’s the Republican Party's slavish devotion to the monolithic South. In Better off Without ‘Em: A Northern Manifesto for Southern Secession, Chuck Thompson writes, “The southerner’s enthrallment with war and bloodshed, his veneration of defeat and disaster, his zeal for religious crusade, and easy compliance with the corporate profit motive, has repeatedly dragged the nation into unnecessary wars.”

The GOP and the South can't stand the fact that Obama seeks diplomacy, or occasionally walks back from his own self-imposed "red lines." They view his hesitancy to use military force as weakness, while at the same time forgetting the blood and treasure this country has forfeited in its previous rush to war; an invasion and occupation that cost 186,000 Iraqis and 5,000 Americans their lives. While also not forgetting that misadventure came with a $3 trillion pricetag and an immeasurable moral cost.

Interestingly, a 2003 Pew Research Poll showed that Southerners were by far the most supportive of the Iraq invasion, with 77 percent believing it was the right choice, as opposed to barely half of Americans in general. In fact, Southern whites expressed the strongest support for military action in Iraq with 83 percent saying it was the right decision. [my emphasis]
Wurleman seems to be trying to make a package that's neater than the messy facts will really allow. To say "there has never been a war the Republican Party didn't want another person’s kid to fight" sounds right in terms of the last 13 years or so. But during the Kosovo War, which has been in the news lately in terms of how Russian leaders perceived it, we had Yankee Republican and alleged moderate John McCain cheering for the war and rightwing white supremacist Mississippi Senator Trent Lott leading the antiwar opposition in the Senate.

This is why people need to be careful about drawing too easy generalization about the South in terms of the Republican Party.

Even in terms of straight segregationist sentiment, it's worth remembering that before the Roberts Court gutted the election provisions of the Voting Rights Act, the only states outside the former Confederacy that were covered under those provisions were Arizona and Alaska. (By strange coincidence, the states from which the 2008 Republican nominees for President and Vice President came.)

I would suggest that the characteristics of the South that relate to phenomenon Wurleman is analyzing would include:

  • Their history of de jure segregation and Jim Crow laws
  • Authoritarianism
  • Poverty
  • A higher rate of criminal violence that other parts of the country
  • Widespread white Christian fundamentalism married to politics

All of these conceivably contribute to a more enthusiastic support for war among Southern whites. But Wurleman just leaves us with a gripe that white Southerners are somehow more fond of cheering for wars than anyone else in America, but the reasons for why this may be so are left in the clouds.

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Tuesday, July 12, 2011

Libya War: expect to be there a long time

Stephen Walt writes in Whatever happened to the war in Libya? Foreign Policy 07/11/2011:

... back when NATO first got involved [in the Libya War], a number of people made the obvious comparison to the 1999 war in Kosovo. Both wars were launched on impulse, there were no vital strategic interests involved, and both wars were fought "on the cheap" through the use of air power. NATO leaders expected the targets to succumb quickly and were surprised when their adversaries (Milosevic in 1999, Qaddafi today) hung on as long as they did.

But there's another parallel that deserves mention too. Serbia eventually surrendered, and I expect that Qaddafi or his sons will eventually do so too. But in the case of Kosovo, NATO and the U.N. had to send in a peacekeeping force, and they are still there 10 years later. And Kosovo has only about 28 percent of Libya's population and is much smaller geographically (some 10,000 square kilometers, compared with Libya's 1,800,000 sq. km.). So anybody who thinks that NATO, the United Nations, or the vaguely defined "international community" will be done whenever Qaddafi says uncle (or succumbs to a NATO airstrike) should probably lower their expectations and prepare themselves for long-term involvement in a deeply divided country. [my emphasis]
And they are likely to encounter some problems in that longer mission; see C.J. Chivers, Reporter’s Notebook: Reading the Rebels in Western Libya, Pt. I New York Times 07/10/2011.

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Monday, June 20, 2011

Juan Cole and the complications of "humanitarian" war

Juan Cole was an enthusiastic supporter of the NATO intervention in the Libyan civil war. I wouldn't call his essay Top Ten Mistakes in the Libya War Informed Comment 06/19/2011 so much a rethinking of his position as continuing to think. But it's hard to imagine in reading it that the events of the real existing Libya War have given him a more sober viewpoint on the conflict:

War excites a lot of passions, as it should since it is so serious a matter. But it also excites a lot of black and white thinking, which is bad. Either you are for wholeheartedly or against. Some will take my essay today as a sign that I have become diffident. Not true. As I said, I think the UNSC did the right thing, and that those NATO and Arab League countries that have stepped up to the challenge are acting in accordance with international law, and that, whatever their ultimate motives, the side effect of their intervention has in fact been the salvation of thousands of lives and of a political movement for a freer Libya. But I think we would have all been better off if the emphasis had remained on civilian protection first and foremost, if better coordination with locals had be achieved more quickly, if the US component had comported with the US constitution, and if the Arab League had not lacked the courage of its convictions. If you go back through my previous essays on these subjects, I think you will find that I have been consistent on these emphases. [my emphasis]
The Kosovo War of 1999 created a lot of illusions: that "humanitarian" wars could be quick and effective; the air war could be a magic weapon; that a major intervention could be carefully limited in scope and costs; and, that a democracy could be established by external intervention quickly after the end of hostilities.

That Kosovo success story was a major boost for supporters of "humanitarian" war. In my view of the Kosovo War, it served a vital interest of the NATO countries by limiting the potential of the Balkan conflict spreading beyond the former Yugoslavia, with the real potential of NATO members Greece and Turkey intervening on opposite sides. It has never been that tempting to me to generalize much beyond the particular issues at stake in that conflict.

Which would be my main response to Cole's implied challenge here:

I think the UNSC did the right thing in calling for international intervention here. I can’t understand why the same people who have complained endlessly about the West, or the world, standing by while large numbers of people were killed in the Congo, Rwanda, Darfur, etc., are now cavilling that something practical has been done to stop the crushing of Benghazi et al.
I've always been highly skeptical of the potential for outside military intervention in those conflicts to have achieved constructive results. One of the lessons I took for the postwar experience in Kosovo is that even with the generally highly favorable conditions there for establishing a stable democracy, the presence of NATO troops is required there even today, the actual democratic government established has had severe corruption problems, and the Albanian majority there would up driving out a large portion of the ethnic Serbian minority.

One of Cole's criticisms of NATO's conduct of the Libya War is:

NATO (and this where the Arab League could have helped) has been incredibly slow in developing the ability to coordinate with Free Libya forces, who are the ones who must necessarily assert themselves against Qaddafi's special forces and mercenaries.
Here again, the downsides of the experience in Kosovo illustrate the hazards of bringing a group of rebels to power about whose intentions relatively little is known. NATO held the strange collection of armed rebels known as the Kosovo Liberation Army at arm's length in the Kosovo War. But it was obvious that expelling Serb forces would likely give that motley crew an enhanced role. Stéphanie Maupas writes in her article, "The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal" in Roy Gutman, et al, eds, Crimes of War 2.0 (2007):

... the first trial of members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has also taken place, ending in two acquittals and one guilty verdict. At the beginning of March 2005, the Prime Minister of Kosovo and former member of the KLA Ramush Hardinaj was finally indicted by the tribunal's current Cief Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, despite political pressure against the move. [my emphasis]
Cole also writes as a criticism of NATO's intervention:

NATO put its emphasis on taking out command and control in the capital instead of vigorously protecting civilian cities under attack. The sieges of Misrata and of the Western Mountain regions went on for weeks with very limited NATO intervention. It is incredible that Qaddafi could roll tanks across the open desert and then concertedly shell noncombatants in cities without it being possible to intervene aerially.
This result should actually not be that surprising. The same thing occurred in Kosovo. The mission there actually had a limited immediate goal of protection Kosovar Albanians from ethnic cleansing actions of the Serbian army. The Serbian army continued its ethnic cleansing during the air war. Only with the final capitulation of the Serbian regime - in face of a credible threat of NATO intervention with ground troops - was NATO able to stop the ethnic cleansing actions. They were not so successful in restraining the Albanian majority with the Serbians minority, as noted above. Continuing with his argument:

The US should have already recognized the Transitional National Council in Benghazi. What, are we vacillating about whose side we are on?
This rebel force has a poor fighting record so far. Their victory over the Libyan government is by no means inevitable. And they can scarcely be considered at this point to have secure control over even the territories from which they operate. All those are good reasons to show some diplomatic restraint about recognition. We've refused recognition to the Cuban regime for five decades and it's still around. Switching formal diplomatic recognition from the current Libyan regime to a highly dubious group of rebels is unlikely to add much effect clout to Qaddafi's opposition.

Cole also writes:

That the Libyan intervention is legal does not mean that the war has been prosecuted wisely. I urged after the UNSC resolution that it be a limited intervention aiming at protecting civilians from Muammar Qaddafi’s vicious attacks on innocent crowds and reckless endangerment of non-combatants in the tenement buildings being shelled by his tanks and cluster bombs, and from his forces’ relentless rolling of tanks on Free Libya cities. ...

NATO has focused on a ‘shock and awe’ strategy of pounding the capital, Tripoli, especially targetting [sic] the compound of dictator Muammar Qaddafi. Shock and awe does not work, and to the extent that it looks like a targeted assassination, it raised questions in critics’ minds about the purpose of the intervention. If command and control is being hit to protect noncombatants from military operations against them, this should be explained more clearly by NATO generals and specifics given.
Cole makes important and legitimate points there. It testifies to his willingness not simply to act as a cheerleader in a war he supports that he is willing to see and articulate those problems.

But what else did he really expect? Honestly. This is how NATO makes war. That's what it's equipped and trained for: bombing the bejeezus out of the Soviet Union that hasn't existed in two decades. And if NATO decides to make a "humanitarian" intervention in Syria or (God forbid!) Iran, they will do it in the same way. And it was no different in the model "humanitarian" war in Kosovo. Anatol Lieven wrote in"Hubris and Nemesis", Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, eds, War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (2001):

Mogadishu — along with Beirut, Grozny and other battlefields — suggests that the locus of political and military struggle is shifting from the mountains and jungles of the past, into the "urban terrain" of Third World cities — conditions unfavorable to the style of warfare preferred by American or Western European forces. Within those cities, the most dangerous enemy is not the general schooled in the conventions of traditional warfare, but the cunning, charismatic irregular who combines in one person the terrorist, ward politician, clan leader, criminal warlord, and gang boss. To defeat such an adversary requires an intimate knowledge of local conditions, exceptionally difficult for the "imperial police" to acquire. It may also demand commanders who themselves manifest the gang leader's mix of flexibility and utter ruthlessness — not qualities nurtured in the officer corps of the typical Western democracy. In the movie Casablanca, the character played by Humphrey Bogart taunted a German officer, "Major, there are parts of New York I wouldn't advise you to try and invade." In the decades since, New York may have been (partially) pacified, but Western nations contemplating intervention in quarters disordered by civil war, ethnic conflict, or massive violations of human rights would do well to heed Bogart's warning.
The UN Security Council resolution authorized only a no-flight zone. But this was a real act of war. The no-flight zone the US and Britain maintained over Iraq throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century was a continuing combat operation that made a recurrence of the Gulf War of 1991 far more likley.

One can't help but notice that the first in Cole's list of criticisms of NATO's Libya War is the contempt for Constitutional legality shown by the Obama Administration:

President Barack Obama should have gone to Congress for authorization to stay in the Libya war. Not doing so weakened the legitimacy of the war in the US public, and involved his setting aside the legal advice he received from government lawyers. He could have set a precedent for the return to constitutional rule in the US, but tragically declined to take up that opportunity. (I have held this position from the beginning, by the way). But a corollary I am not sure American nationalists will accept is that even if Congress authorizes a war, in the absence of an attack on the US, that would be illegal in international law unless the UNSC signed off on it. That is what did not happen with regard to Iraq. Those criticizing Obama now often did not criticize W., and often still do not, for a much more important legal violation.
I'm sure the recent revelation that the Cheney-Bush Administration demanded that the CIA conduct a smear campaign against Cole himself re-enforced his awareness of the importance of legal conduct in national security affairs. He blogged about it in Ret'd. CIA Official Alleges Bush White House Used Agency to "Get" Cole 06/16/2011 and in several subsequent posts.

I don't say that as any kind of criticism of Cole's critical post on NATO's war in Libya. Although I imagine that his somewhat defensive parenthesis "I have held this position from the beginning, by the way" reflects some sensitiveness on that point. What the Bushies wanted to do to Cole is a disgrace. Cole has been consistently critical of the many abuses of law and human rights that came along with the post-9/11 incarnation of the national security state. The revelation about the Cheney Administration targeting him that way should be a strong reminder not only to him but to all of us that the kind of national security and permanent war state we have in incompatible with the maintenance of a Constitutional democracy. And in reality, important parts of the Constitutional order - including Congressional war powers - have already been sacrificed to it.

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Monday, April 04, 2011

The ghosts of wars past and not-yet-passed: Libya, Kosovo, Afghanistan

This report by Kim Sengupta, Rebels die as victims of their own disarray The Independent 04/03/2011 illustrates one of the limitations of air power in the Libya War:

The rebel fighters were celebrating "victory" in their usual wasteful way, loosing off round after round into the air, using up ammunition in short supply. But this time it was a suicidal mistake: seconds later their vehicles, and an ambulance parked near by, were destroyed in an attack arriving with shattering explosions.

Air strikes had been carried out by a pilot from the international coalition who then thought an anti-aircraft barrage was being directed at him. Fifteen people, including three members of medical staff, were killed instantly when the warplane, believed to be an A-10 Tankbuster, responded with its devastating firepower.

These were the second set of "collateral casualties" in two days: eight others died in another bombing aimed at a regime convoy passing through the village of Argobe, near Ajdabiya. It ignited ammunition, spraying shrapnel into nearby houses. Four of those killed were female, including three girls aged 12 to 16 from the same family; two others were teenage boys.
This 04/02/2011 report from Aljazeera English reports on the same two incidents:



Initially, the US-French-British approach in Libya sounded a lot like their approach in the Kosovo War. I've speculated that Juan Cole's enthusiasm for the intervention in Libya was largely based on an optimistic view of the Kosovo War. In a post of 04/01/2011, Defections, US Withdrawal Point to Political Solution in Libya Informed Comment, he seemed to confirm this:

US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates clearly has a model in his mind somewhat like Serbia in 1999-2000. In spring 1999 Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic sent troops into Kosovo, which began committing a massacre. NATO intervened to roll that back. During that war, Milosevic was indicted at the International Criminal Court for war crimes.

Milosevic's attempt to tinker with the presidential election of October 1999 provoked massive street protests against him. His military informed him that they would not support him. By spring of 2001 he was arrested by his own people and that summer he was surrendered to the United Nations.

NATO's aerial bombing missions were what stopped the advance into Kosovo of Serbian troops. But it was the world community's relegation of Milosevic to pariah status that helped the Serbian elite turn against him.
There are two problems with this. It's an unrealistic view of the Kosovo War, and the Western strategy in the Libya War is starting to look more like Rummy's fanciful approach in Afghanistan.

What we saw in the Kosovo War of 1999 was that air power can inhibit the use of ground troops but didn't prevent it. Cole writes, "NATO's aerial bombing missions were what stopped the advance into Kosovo of Serbian troops." But in fact, Serbian troops intensified their ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars after the bombing campaign began. William Arkin in "Operation Allied Force: 'The Most Precise Application of Air Power in History'," from Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, eds, War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (2001) explains:

From the perspective of allied pilots, attacking forces in Kosovo translated into huntng down and hitting individual vehicles - with negligible effect on the progress of Operation Horsehoe [the ethnic cleansing campaign Serbia launched in March 1999 just before the NATO bombing began]. [US Defence] Secretary [William] Cohen would later claim that the attacks proceeded according to plan, creating the conditions that shifted the "balance of power" toward the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). NATO, he said after the war, had been "creating the possibility that the military efforts of the Kosovar Albanians, which were likely to grow in intensity as a result of Milosevic's atrocities in Kosovo, might be a more credible challenge to Serb armed forces." But that is patent nonsense. In claiming that its Phase 2 efforts [which started after the initial 48-hour Phase 1 bombing] constituted a serious effort to stop ethnic cleansing by killing its perpetrators, NATO (and by extension the Clinton administration) was being either stupid or disingenuous.
NATO initially hoped that Serbia would relent on the ethnic cleansing campaign after the Phase 1 bombing campaign of the first 48 hours had taken place. That didn't occur. NATO then had to extend the bombing into Serbia proper and strike urban targets. The air war began on March 25. Arkin relates:

Toward the end of May, with the support of American intelligence and Albanian artillery, the KLA mounted a counteroffensive. "The is the beginning of a new phase of aggression, the so-called land operation," Major General Vladimir Lazarevic, commander of the Yugoslav Pritina Corps, said. Regardless of the ferocious debate inside NATO about the need for a ground war, Belgrade saw threatening signs that suggested NATO preparations for just that contingency.
NATO shored up their international diplomatic support with the crucial backing of Russia, which had been Serbia's supporter. There was also increasing anger among the Serbian public toward Milosevic. The combination of these factors persuaded him to call off the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and leave the area, which was a part of the nation of Serbia, as a de facto NATO protectorate.

Milošević, like Muammar Qaddafi more recently, was indicted for war crimes and thus faced the prospect of criminal prosecution under UN auspices, it's highly questionable whether this makes the leaders more likely to capitulate in an immediate conflict, whatever its value may be in the larger scheme of things. Ousting Milošević was never a war aim of the Kosovo War. Had NATO had to send in ground troops, Milošević had to calculate that it might become the goal. Combined with the internal political pressure in Serbia, Milošević could and apparently did calculate that he was more likely to survive in power - and stay out of the hands of international prosecutors - if he capitulated to NATO on Kosovo.

Its now obvious that regime change is the goal of the US-French-British forces in Libya. More is on the line for Qaddafi and his close supporters in this war than there was for Milošević in the Kosovo War in 1999.

But we also now know that the CIA, the British MI6 and Western Special Forces are operating on the ground, giving military direction to rebel fighters and coordinating air strikes. This sounds far more like the approach that the Cheney-Bush Administration used under Rummy's direction in 2001 in the initial stage of the ongoing Afghanistan War. The idea was to use the CIA, Special Forces and air power to support the Northern Alliance forces to take power in Kabul.

That strategy worked in Afghanistan to put the Northern Alliance in power in Kabul. It didn't work so well in bringing maximum power to bear directly against Bin Laden's Al Qa'ida, although the damage done to Al Qa'ida seems to have been very substantial. In a grim irony, advocates of permanent war want to pretend that the bogeyman of Al Qa'ida is a greater threat to the United States than the nuclear-armed Soviet Union was, so even a decade later, it's hard to tell from the information in the public record just how far-reaching the damage to Al Qa'ida was in 2001-2.

But the "Afghanistan model" for the Libya War looks to me like an even grimmer prospect that the Kosovo War model. With bombing and no-fly zones, the external powers have the option to limit their involvement or to pull back, however complicated that might be in practice. It's not so easy to do when the US is so deeply involved in the Libya civil war as we've becoming in the last three weeks (and maybe earlier than that?).

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Monday, March 28, 2011

Juan Cole's defense of the Libya War to "the Left"

Juan Cole has posted a personal manifesto of sorts, An Open Letter to the Left on Libya Informed Comment 03/27/2011 defending the so-called humanitarian war in Libya. Cole's value in commentary on the Middle East and the Muslim world has been in his depth of knowledge of Islam and of the area and his attention to facts and their meaning in context. And that continues to be so in the Libya War.

But in justifying the Libya War on essentially the same grounds as the Obama Administration, he allows himself to float off into careless abstractions. One is a classic example of a sophomoric argument:

The United Nations Security Council authorization for UN member states to intervene to forestall this massacre thus pitched the question. If the Left opposed intervention, it de facto acquiesced in Qaddafi's destruction of a movement embodying the aspirations of most of Libya's workers and poor, along with large numbers of white collar middle class people.
The historian Henry Steele Commager used to be fond of quoting James Madison saying that "theory" can lead us astray, so experience should be our guide. As a general position, it's a little to Lockean for my taste. But it applies well to Cole's particular argument. We could just as easily say that because Juan Cole isn't in Los Angeles shooting it out with the Crips and Bloods, he de facto supports violent urban street gangs.

It's true that the UN Security Council action makes the intervention legal in international law. It does not in itself make it a good idea. It does not mean that the United States has to take part in implementing this good idea; France and Britain were both eager to do humanitarian service by shooting down planes and bombing and rocketing military sites. No doubt their bombs and rockets, like our own, carefully distinguish between Bad People and those deserving to live.

In the real world of week before last, what happened was that the United States pushed hard for UN authorization for the war against Libya. It did not push for war against Yemen or Bahrain, where protesters are also being killed by their governments. It did not push for UN Security Council authorization to overthrown the government of Saudi Arabia to end its abuses of human rights. Are we to conclude that this means the Obama Administration therefore approves of the Wahhabi version of Islamic law in Saudi Arabia? Or that it approves of repression and human rights abuses in Yemen and Bahrain? Obviously not. It's a silly, sophomoric argument and I'm surprised to see him using it.

Very relevant in terms of politics in the Middle East and the Muslim world especially - but not only there - is the painfully obvious fact that for decades, the United States has acquiesced in and in many ways actively supported Israel's overt violations of occupation law and their targeting of civilians in their wars, even though US policy officially condemns at least the settlement policy. In this case, the support is not passive in the sophomoric sense of "you don't support international intervention to overthrow the Israeli government so therefore you support everything it does." It is active support and could scarcely be more obvious. Israel is the largest recipient of US foreign aid, with Egypt the second largely because of its peace policy toward Israel. Right or wrong, practical or not, this is a real contradiction in US foreign policy with real consequences. It ought to be enough to discourage adults from making the sophomoric argument. But obviously it isn't.

Cole implicitly recognizes that such generalizations as he makes in the sophomore argument are irrelevant. Because he goes on to explain how particular conditions in Libya make its situation different than those in other countries currently involved in the Middle East/North African wave of hopefully-democratic revolution and also different from Darfur. I heard a commentator on Aljazeera English yesterday referring to the rebels fighting in Libya as the "democratic" forces; I hope they are.

He also falls into some careless historical analogies. The Kosovo War is the most relevant recent historical example, though thinking by analogy is tricky, in fact one of the worst problems in American foreign-policy making. The only good news on that score - and one that really amazes me - is that I've yet to hear of anyone invoking "Munich" or warning about the dangers of "appeasement." Nor any comparison of Qaddafi to Hitler. Amazing! Although Cole makes some not-very-useful general comments about the Spanish Civil War of 1936-9 and the Second World War

I'm guessing based on his various comments that Cole is working from a very optimistic set of lessons from the Kosovo War. The more relevant lessons from it would be: air power inhibited the use of ground troops against civilians but didn't prevent it; initial expectations of a quick capitulation by Serbia turned out to be dead wrong; "strategic bombing" of Serbian cities was soon added to the campaign (Chinese Embassy! Oops!); Milošević didn't accede to NATO demands on Kosovo until he thought he would soon face a ground campaign; and, regime change in Belgrade was never part of the war aim.

Helena Cobban also reminds us about the eventual outcome here 12 years later:

Now, it is extremely unclear what the political upshot of all this will be in Libya. In Kosovo, Washington ended up midwifing a tiny, landlocked little statelet that is a hub of organized crime at the heart of the Balkans, and whose people have a very stunted quality of life.
Cole makes this reference early in his piece:

I am unabashedly cheering the liberation movement on, and glad that the UNSC-authorized intervention has saved them from being crushed. I can still remember when I was a teenager how disappointed I was that Soviet tanks were allowed to put down the Prague Spring and extirpate socialism with a human face. Our multilateral world has more spaces in it for successful change and defiance of totalitarianism than did the old bipolar world of the Cold War, where the US and the USSR often deferred to each other’s sphere of influence.
There was no way in the world that the United States in 1968, at the height of the Vietnam War, was going to blast its way into Eastern Europe and go to war with the Soviet Union over the Warsaw Pact intervention in what was then Czechoslovakia. Nor did it have the power to do so. Even aside from the huge commitment of resources to the Vietnam War, US Cold War military strategy in Europe was defensive, based on repelling a Soviet invasion, and was based on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. It was never part of the military assumption there that US conventional forces would be able without nukes to defeat a Soviet invasion of western Europe. That's a huge part of the reason that the US refused to adopt a no-first-use policy on nukes. It would have been an enormous investment in arms, personnel and defensive military installations to have made a conventional defense (i.e., not using nukes) of western Europe possible against the Red Army.

Cole may have been a kid in 1968. But he's all grown up now. Is he seriously suggesting that the world would be better off today if the US had initiated a war with the Warsaw Pact in 1968 that would have involved nuking East Germany? What the hell kind of humanitarian notion is that? Whatever the motivations, it made no practical sense then, and it's pure fantasy now to suggest that it did.

Cole's comparison of the international legitimacy of the Libya War in comparison to the Iraq War is good. And it has practical relevance, because the international legitimation affects the course of the war and its repercussions for the United States. But again, that fact that it's legal doesn't mean its a good idea. To use a homey example, it's legal to invest your retirement savings in blackjack games in Las Vegas, but that doesn't mean it's a good idea. Nor does it mean that it's a good idea for the United States at this particular time.

I haven't seen Cole grappling with the very real risks of the Libya War yet. I fully expect him to as they arise. And let's stipulate that something very close to miracles do happen, even in war. Muammar Qaddafi could decide to stop down tomorrow and Libya could establish a democracy modeled on the United States Constitution. I would recommend they be careful of the Supreme Court, though. And that might want to tighten up the Article 1 war powers clauses. Failing that, though, here are some of the problems:

  • Smart as our humanitarian bombs are, they kill people and inevitably kill civilians. The longer the war continues, the more they are likely to kill. (Note to Christian Rightists: our freedom bombs kill unborn babies, too.)
  • According to Steven Metz, whether Qaddafi stays or goes in the short term, "there is no place on earth more likely to experience an insurgency in the next few years than Libya." That's more than a trivial consideration.
  • Republican warmongers, bless their cold little hearts, actually have a point that an intervention like this doesn't make sense if regime change isn't part of the war aim.
  • Who in the name of the Prophet are we supporting in Libya? Call it whatever you like, we're backing one side in a civil war. Who.Are.They? Cole addresses that question this way, "The question is what kind of leadership was emerging in places like Benghazi. The answer is that it was simply the notables of the city." Wouldn't those same notables have been supporting the Qaddafi regime for decades? It's possible they have sterling democratic credentials. But do we the American public have any good reason to think so?
  • Nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation should be the highest strategic priority for United States foreign policy; it's hard to imagine that the Libya intervention - after years of rewarding Qaddafi's regime for going along with US policy on nonproliferation - doesn't significantly set back nuclear nonproliferation. A nuclear weapon is the best insurance against being invaded by the United States, UN authorization or not.
  • I'm convinced that for the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) to ever become a meaningful standard for military intervention, it would have to be done by an independent military force, responsible directly to the UN and not to individual countries. Otherwise, it becomes an excuse to cover for cold power politics.
  • There are also real limits to United States power. That applies to "humanitarian" wars as well as to Cheney wars.
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Monday, March 21, 2011

Kosovo and Libya Wars

The Kosovo War is a model for the Libya War in a number of ways. One thing to keep in mind about the Kosovo War, which is rightly seen as a NATO success, is that it took place in 1999. Today, in 2011, in a friendly ("permissive" in military jargon) environment for NATO after a successful war, the presence of a small number of NATO forces is still requires. As the NATO website reports (n.d., accessing 03/20/2011):

NATO has been leading a peace support operation in Kosovo since June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area.

Today, some 8,700 troops from the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), provided by 32 countries (24 NATO and 8 non-NATO), are still deployed in Kosovo to help maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin.
John Mearsheimer rightly characterizes the Obama Administration's general foreign policy approach as the liberal imperialist variant of a "global dominance" strategy, which the Clinton Administration also pursued. The Cheney-Bush Administration's version of the global dominance strategy was more a neoconservative-militarist one.

One distinction of the liberal-imperialist approach to war is touched on by The Atlantic's James Fallows in On Libya: 'What Happens Then?' 03/20/2011:

[I]t cannot reassure anyone who cares about America's viability as a republic that it is entering another war with essentially zero Congressional consultation or "buy-in," and with very little serious debate outside the Executive Branch itself. And there the debate was, apparently, mostly about changing the President's own mind. I recognize that there are times when national safety requires an Administration to respond quickly, without enduring the posturing and institutionalized dysfunction that is the modern Congress. Without going through all the arguments, I assert that this is not such a moment. To be more precise: the Administration has not made the public case that the humanitarian and strategic stakes in Libya are so unique as to compel intervention there (even as part of a coalition), versus the many other injustices and tragedies we deplore but do not go to war to prevent. I can think of several examples in my current part of the world. [He's writing from China.] [my emphasis]
None of these observations in themselves imply ill-will among the policymakers. Experience shows that ill-will and unworthy are never lacking in decisions to go to war. But the effects of these actions are not dependent on the goodwill or lack thereof of the policymakers.

Andrew Bacevich in " Neglected Trinity: Kosovo and the Crisis in U.S. Civil-Military Relations", his essay in the collection War Over Kosovo (2001), edited by himself and Eliot Cohen, talks about the "remarkable trinity" identified by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), whose work enjoys something like canonical stature with the US military today. For Clausewitz, this trinity of "reason, primordial violence, and chance" (Bacevich's summary) were three major tendencies affecting war.

Bacevich in that essay picks up a different "trinity" from a separate essay by Cohen and talks about how that played out in the US conduct of the Kosovo War. In Bacevich's short version, the new trinity was (1) the "geopolitical upheaval caused by the end of the Cold War," which among other things allowed the US to assert a far bigger military role in the Arab world; (2) "a redefinition of U.S. grand strategy," i.e., the strategy of global dominance begun by the Old Man Bush Administration and continued by the three succeeding Presidential Administrations; and, (3) "a novel conception of warfare that itself is a product of powerful technological and cultural influences have all contributed to this transformation," which in practice involved heavy reliance on airpower.

The latter consideration is focused on the idea of minimizing US casualties. This comes from a flawed but widespread assumption among military and foreign policy theorists that US casualties are the main reason the US public turns against wars, maybe the only reason. As Bacevich describes the approach that played out in several military situations but most especially in the Kosovo War:

... Clinton the commander in chief fashioned doctrine for employing American military power that bridges the gap between his grand strategic objectives and the public's limited willingness to exert itself on behalf of those objectives. The military component of Clinton's strategy requires minimal blood and only modest treasure - indeed, the cash flow on balance may be positive. And it does not unduly tax the nation's attention span. Finessing the deficit between ends and means, the new postliberal civil-military relationship that Clinton ushered into existence seemingly reconciles the irreconcilable. For this achievement, Bill Clinton, in his own way, deserves to rank alongside FDR and Reagan as one of the most influential commanders in chief in modern American history.
Initially, it appears to me that the Obama Administration is trying to pull off something like this in Libya. I doubt it will work very well.

Another similarity to the Clinton Administration's procedure on the Kosovo War: The Kosovo War occurred in 1999. In March 1999, the House voted a nonbinding concurrent resolution to authorize US peacekeepers for Kosovo. The Senate passed a nonbinding concurrent resolution authorizing air and missile operations against Serbia. "The war against Yugoslavia began on March 24 without any statutory or constitutional support," wrote Louis Fisher in Presidential War Power, 2nd edition (2004).

Republican Congressman Ernest Istook of Oklahoma said at the time, "President Clinton asked many nations to agree to attack Yugoslavia, but he failed to get permission from one crucial country, America."

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Wednesday, August 19, 2009

Operation Desert Fox 1998 and the "other war of 1999"

Historian Andrew Bacevich in "Neglected Trinity: Kosovo and the Crisis in U.S. Civil-Military Relations", his contribution to the collection of essays edited by himself and Eliot Cohen, War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (2001) includes a brief discussion of the series of US aerial attacks on Iraq that began with Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and continued in 1999:

The best illustration of the postliberal civil-military relationship in action is the Clinton administration's other war of 1999, the yearlong bombing of Iraq. [He means it was the "other" war besides the Kosovo War.]

What war? In the administration's view, needless to say, the ongoing hostilities against Iraq, launched in December 1998 with a four-day air offensive known as Operation Desert Fox, failed to qualify as actual war. Indeed, the White House barely acknowledged that military action continued thereafter. This, despite the fact that, in the twelve months after Desert Fox, U.S. and British warplanes unloaded nearly 2,000 missiles and precision-guided bombs against several hundred targets scattered throughout Iraq.

According to administration officials, the aim of U.S. policy was to contain Iraq and prevent it from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, while ultimately removing Saddam Hussein from power. [my emphasis in bold]
Bacevich's particular point in that essay focused on how the bombing of Iraq proceeded with little public and Congressional notice, much less criticism or debate.

Links to analyses by Tony Cordesman on Desert Fox:

The Military Effectiveness Of Desert Fox: A Warning About the Limits of the Revolution in Military Affairs and Joint Vision 2010 by Anthony H. Cordesman (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]) 12/26/1998

The Military Effectiveness Of Desert Fox: A Warning About the Limits of the Revolution in Military Affairs and Joint Vision 2010 by Anthony H. Cordesman (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]) (labled 12/26/1998; CSIS Web site gives 01/31/1999

Iraq in Crisis: A History from Desert Fox to June 1999 by Anthony Cordesman (CSIS) 07/01/1999

The Air Defense War Since Desert Fox: A Short History by Anthony Cordesman (CSIS) 07/01/1999

The Lessons of Desert Fox: A Preliminary Analysis by Anthony Cordesman (CSIS) 02/16/1999

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Thursday, October 16, 2008

Restraining Executive war powers

I don't want to get overoptimistic here. But restraining Presidential power to make war is an important priority. A goal that's likely to have more success in an Obama administration than in a McCain government.

But no President is likely to volunteer to give up war powers that have accrued to Presidents over the years. With the exception in Obama's case of blatantly illegal and immoral things like the torture policy, which Cheney and Bush justified as part of the President's war powers. Not even that can be expected from McCain, who believes "America is the greatest force for good in the history of the world", as he said in his 10/07/08 debate with Obama.

Louis Fisher in the 2nd edition of his Presidential War Power (2004) discusses military interventions during the Clinton administration that deserve a fresh look by the Democratic base in the light of the Cheney-Bush foreign policy disasters. Fisher's focus is on the Constitutional issues of Executive authority on war. Whether or not the action was taken in a Constitutional way is not the same as whether a military action was advisable or not.

It does affect consideration of whether an action is moral. Classical Just War theory considers one of the key elements of a just war is that the war must be prosecuted by a legitimate, duly-consituted authority. If the President is prosecuting a war without Constitutional authority to do so, that is grounds for arguing that the war is not a just one. (Today's Republicans, of course, sneer at the concept of "just war". But that's another story.)

Clinton maintained the no-fly zones of questionable legitimacy that Bush had established over northern and southern Iraq that involved more-or-less continuous bombing of that country. The Gulf War of 1991 left long-standing commitments in its wake, which contributed to the events leading to the Iraq War of 2003-????, in no small part by effectively institutionalizing the notion that US military action against Iraq was neeeded. On the other hand, these no-fly zones were also a part of the successful disarming of Iraq of its "weapons of mass destruction". But, as we know only too well now, this didn't stop Cheney and Bush from invading Iraq under false claims about those WMDs anyway.

Clinton launched cruise missiles onto Baghdad in 1993 in retaliation for an alleged Iraqi plot to assassinate Old Man Bush. Twenty-three cruise Tomahawk missiles were aimed against Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad. There was no Cogressional approval and no prior consultation with Congress by the Clinton administration.

Old Man Bush began the intervention in Somalia in 1992 with no prior Congressional approval. Congress in February 1993 failed to pass a joint resolution approving of the intervention. Again, a military commitment had been created and the Clinton administration judged it necessary to prolong it. Once the notorious "Black Hawk Down" incident occurred in Mogadishu, Congressional Republicans began demanding immediate withdrawal of American troops. In October 1993 (the month of the incident), Clinton set a date for withdrawal of combat troops by the end of October 1994. He compromised with Congress on appropriation language specifying that withdrawal timeline.

Clinton initiated an humanitarian mission to Haiti in 1993. Congress passed a non-binding "sense of Congress" resolution that prior Congressional approval would be needed to send combat troops, with qualifying language for emergencies. In 1994, Congress passed another nonbinding resolution with an even broader exception clause for "national security".

In September 1993, Clinton announced he was ready to use force in Haiti. A hostile landing of American forces was averted only by the last-minute success of a Jimmy Carter-led peace mission. Congress passed legislation effectively saying Clinton's intention to use force was unauthorized, saying "the President should have sought and welcomed Congressional approval before deploying United States forices to Haiti".

NATO air strikes in Bosnia began in 1995. Congress passed another nonbinding sense-of-Congress resolution in 1993 saying Clinton should seek Congressional approval before committing US forces to enforce a Bosnian peace deal. In February 1994, US jets shot down four Serbian bombers. In April 1994, the US began air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces. When the NATO air strikes began in 1995, Clinton claimed United Nations authority for US participation in the action.

Clinton decided in 1995 to commit ground troops to Bosnia. Congress passed some non-binding limits. Clinton sent 20,000 troops in December. Some troops remained there until 2004. Congress did not formally authorize the action.

The Clinton administration launched more cruise missiles against Iraq in 1996. They claimed a highly dubious Congressional authority based on the 1991 Gulf War statute.

The spectacularly ill-named Operation Desert Fox took place in December, 1998. Mark Conversino of the Air War College writes in some detail about that operation in Operation DESERT FOX: Effectiveness With Unintended Effects Air & Space Power Journal 07/13/05. He calls the 4-day heavy bombardment a "major armed confrontation" between the US/Britain and Iraq. I posted about the operation in The secret and not-so-secret air war against Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion 02/22/07.

After Operation Desert Fox, writes Fisher, "the United States and Britain conducted repeated air strikes against Iraq, firing more missiles and hitting more targets than during the four-day operation in December 1998".

The infamously ill-fated cruise-missile attack on a chemical factory in the Sudan took place in 1998, based on very sloppy intelligence.

Clinton launched a major cruise missile attack on Afghanistan in 1998, attempting thereby essentially to assassinate Osama bin Laden.

Clinton in late 1998 authorized NATO to bomb in suport of Kosovars in Serbia (Kosovo was then part of Serbia). Italy, Germany and other parliaments voted to authorize their countries' approval. The German debate was very serious. By contrast, writes Fisher, "The U.S. Congress, supposedly the strongest legislature in the world, watched from the sidelines".

The Kosovo War occurred in 1999. In March 1999, the House voted a nonbinding concurrent resolution to authorize US peacekeepers for Kosovo. The Senate passed a nonbinding concurrent resolution authorizing air and missile operations against Serbia. "The war against Yugoslavia began on March 24 without any statutory or constitutional support," writes Fisher.

Republican Congressman Ernest Istook of Oklahoma said at the time, "President Clinton asked many nations to agree to attack Yugoslavia, but he failed to get permission from one crucial country, America."

Fisher summarizes, "Clinton's military initiatives were remarkable both for their frequency and the absence of any institutional checks, either legislative or judicial."

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Friday, August 01, 2008

Samantha Power on the Dems and national defence


Samantha Power: Dems need to be aggressive in talking about the disaster of the Cheney-Bush foreign policy

Samantha Power has a good article in the current issue of the New York Review of Books, The Democrats & National Security 07/17/08 (08/14/08 issue). It begins with a conventional recitation of the notion that voters trust Republicans more than Democrats on "national security".

But then she goes on to analyze why the Dems shouldn't be intimidated by this assumption and offers some concrete suggestions that Obama and the Democrats can use that combine good policy with smart, aggressive politics. Reviewing a book by Peter Scoblic on hardline Republican foreign policy, she writes about how reckless and foolish "tough on defense" Republicans have often been, especially under the Cheney-Bush administration:

Having suffered through what one diplomat called the "enemy deprivation syndrome of the 1990s," September 11 gave hard-line conservatives an opportunity to apply their pre-hatched theories; and from the start they sought to unshackle the United States from international agreements and to reduce reliance on diplomatic engagement. When the Bush administration scored a rare recent diplomatic success, convincing North Korea to open up some of its nuclear records, Vice President Cheney was so disgusted by his own administration's pragmatic decision to take Pyongyang off the US terrorist blacklist that he snapped at reporters, "I'm not going to be the one to announce this decision. You need to address your interest in this to the State Department." He then abruptly ended the press encounter, and left the room.

What is striking about Scoblic's account of the hard-line conservatives' disdain for diplomacy and pragmatism is the resilience of the central tenets of their ideology. As they ridicule Senator Barack Obama's willingness to engage in negotiations with America's enemies, they seem unchastened by recent history. In 2003, for instance, when the reporter Jeffrey Goldberg told Douglas Feith, undersecretary of defense, that US troops in Iraq had not been greeted with flowers, Feith said that the Iraqis had been too spooked by the presence of Saddam supporters to show their true emotions. "But," he said, "they had flowers in their minds."
She also addresses the issue of how to handle the dangers to Iraqi civilians as the US withdraws from Iraq, recognizing that the Republicans will do all they can to blame the Democrats for anything bad that happens in that regard. As she points out, Obama has been addressing that issue, though our lazy media can hardly bother to notice:

Prominent Democrats must drive home the continuing costs of remaining in Iraq - costs to Iraq, the region, Afghanistan,[9] US military readiness, and national security as a whole - while describing the specific ways an Obama administration would limit the harmful consequences of withdrawal. (In fact, Obama outlined such plans in a speech last year but it got little attention and needs reinforcement from the Democratic echo chamber.)

Obama has long stated his intention to retain a Quick-Reaction Force in the region to carry out counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda and other such networks. He has made clear his concern for Iraqi civilians in mixed neighborhoods who might be more vulnerable following a withdrawal of US combat brigades. He would offer these civilians fair notice of US plans and would be open to relocating those who would feel more secure if they moved. He has promised $2 billion to assist the two million Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries. He would establish a war crimes commission to gather the testimony of survivors and put militia leaders on notice that they may eventually be prosecuted. Obama's plan to meet with the region's heads of state is the first of many steps that will be required to prevent regional conflict. (my emphasis)
Her article also has some useful thought about comparisons between the Kosovo War and the Iraq War (as an "humanitarian hawk", Power was a supporter of the Kosovo War, as I was, too, though I don't consider myself an "humanitarian hawk"):

We don't know how events in 2003 would have progressed without the Kosovo war, but it is hard to imagine that President Bush - a man who repudiated five treaties in his first year in office[7] and has consistently ridiculed the UN - would have been deterred in any way by the absence of past precedent.

Moreover, while some prominent "liberal hawks" favored the Iraq war, plenty of those who had supported NATO action in Kosovo for humanitarian reasons opposed the war in Iraq on those or other grounds. [Matt] Yglesias wrongly implies that support for one war inevitably entailed support for the other; he also unfortunately lends credence to the surprisingly prevalent fiction that Bush invaded Iraq for humanitarian purposes.

Still, NATO action in Kosovo did make UN Security Council authorization seem more optional than it had in the past. Also, the Kosovo war helped build support for the invasion of Iraq by contributing to the false impression that the US military was invincible. The mistaken recollection that the US victory over the Serbs was nearly effortless, combined with the Bush administration's quick initial overthrow of the Taliban, caused many Democrats to agree with the Republican claim that the war in Iraq would in fact be the "cakewalk" that Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz promised. (my emphasis)
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Monday, February 25, 2008

Why we need an "Iraq syndrome"

Andrew Bacevich states the case concisely in The plan for what comes after Iraq Boston Globe 02/24/08. He describes the way in which "humanitarian" intervention helped paved the wave for the Bush Doctrine of preventive ("aggressive", illegal) war:

The United States once adhered to principles that were both sound and eminently straightforward. As recently as the 1970s and 1980s, the so-called Vietnam syndrome exercised a restraining influence. Americans saw military power as something to be husbanded. The preference was to use force as a last resort, employed to defend vital interests. Overt aggression qualified as categorically wrong.

After the Cold War, enthusiasm for precision weapons and a brief infatuation with "humanitarian interventionism" eroded those principles. During the 1990s, the use of force, usually on a small scale, became increasingly commonplace. The lessons of Vietnam lost their salience. Then came the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, which prompted the Bush administration to jettison those lessons in their entirety.

In their place, the administration substituted a breathtakingly ambitious new framework. Through the use of preventive war (the Bush doctrine) the United States set out to transform the greater Middle East (the freedom agenda), thereby liberating the people of the Islamic world and preventing further terrorist attacks. Rather than a last resort, force became a preferred instrument. Given the right motives, aggressive war became justifiable and even necessary.
My qualification to this would be that it was Old Man Bush's Gulf War of 1991 that did the most to further the notion that war would be quick and easy. Certainly, the seeming success of air power in the Kosovo War of 1999, whose consequences we're still seeing directed against the United States, added a great deal to that deadly notion. And, while their were humanitarian issues involved in the Balkan Wars, there was also a very real strategic concern about the spread of unrestrained warfare and the creation of massive waves of refugees.

But Bacevich is certainly right in saying, "Although the White House may pretend otherwise, the Bush doctrine and the freedom agenda [i.e., wars of liberation to install friendly regimes] have failed their trials."

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Wednesday, February 13, 2008

Kosovo independence

I supported the Kosovo War at the time (1999). But I've never thought it was the role of responsible citizens to just mindlessly cheer forever for a war that you supported. War always brings bad results, even in the occasional case where the good outweighs the bad.

Robert Marquand reports for The Christian Science Monitor on the rocky state of affairs in Kosovo even now, as Kosovo tries to launch independence softly 02/14/08 (accessed 02/13/08):

Kosovo's independence closes a chapter of grief and genocide in the Balkans dating from 1992. Analysts concerned about a "domino effect" of a bloody re-ordering of ethnic borders see Kosovo's peaceful evolution as a test for EU and US resolve in southern Europe. But the province's independence is bitterly opposed by Serbia, which enjoys at least rhetorical backing from Russia.

Since 2000, the EU has spent $4 billion here and will send its largest ever (1,800) civil and police mission in days.

Serb Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica stated Tuesday, "We shall not allow a fictitious state to exist for a minute on Serbian territory. It has to be legally annulled."
Kosovo is routinely considered a success story of American intervention. It was a success, in that stopped Serbia from applying massive ethnic cleansing in the long run in Kosovo, which up until now has been a province of Serbia. And it kept Milosovich's Serbia contained and avoided the danger that separatist fighting could spread to wider parts of southern and eastern Europe, with maybe a war between Greece and Turkey in the mix.

But in the short run, the air strategy that NATO applied allowed Serbia to accelerate ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians in the short run. They were mostly able to return. But even the NATO peacekeeping force was unable to prevent the Albanians from largely running ethnic Serbs out of the province. NATO has had to keep some troops there, and the EU is sending in more personnel for aid. And Serbia may start a new war.

And this is an intervention success story!

The seemingly brilliant success in Kosovo in 1999 also provided evidence in the minds of great geopolitical strategists like Rummy and Dick Cheney that the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) had created a new era in warfare. Briefly put, the lesson was that since we can blow hell out of anybody with our air power, the United States can do whatever we want in the world.

Anatol Lieven described the risks a bit more diplomatically in a 2001 collection, War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, edited by Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen. As he put it, "in the estimation of many well-informed analysts, the war for Kosovo provides the first real example of victory achieved through air power alone, a war won without having to engage in ground combat operations." His essay was written before the 9/11 attacks and the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. But the risk to which he pointed is being borne out daily in both wars:

Urban combat against well-armed and fiercely committed, but politically amorphous bands constitutes the kind of warfare that over the next two generations will pose the greatest challenge to Western armed forces. By contrast, major wars between the West and large opposing states are less likely. ... Unless the United States hopelessly mismanages relations with Russia, China or both, it is difficult to see why these or other states would risk directly confronting U.S. military power. ...

Most of the thinking being done by the U.S. armed forces is wholly irrelevant to such conflicts, and the lessons learned from Kosovo have been enitrely the wrong ones. The chief result, as evidenced by the 2000 military budget and the proposed reforms of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, appears to have been even more spending on the airforce and high technology. This spending has gone in part to "smart" weapons, which however useful against enemy armor in the open field, are next to useless in cities and in partisan warfare. The "lesson" of Kosovo has also translated into further development of the joint strike fighter, a weapon designed to fight above all against sophisticated, well-trained, large scale enemy air forces of a kind which simply do not exist in the world today. (my emphasis)
So how are we fighting counterinsurgency wars today?

Well, like this Feb. 11 airpower summary: F-15Es deter enemy activity Air Force Link 02/12/08:

In Iraq, Navy F/A-18 Super Hornets dropped guided bomb unit-38s onto an enemy vehicle that had been destroyed by coalition forces helicopters near Balad. A JTAC declared the mission a success.
Yes, you read that correctly. The bombed an enemy vehicle that had already been destroyed. When the Air Force's press releases from this site say "near Balad" that also means that they could have been inside the named city. Most them I've seen says "near" such-and-such a city, never in. But this next one is an exception(Feb. 10 airpower summary: A-10s conduct shows of force) 02/11/08:

In Basrah, Navy F/A-18 Super Hornets dropped a guided bomb unit-12 and guided bomb unit-38s onto locations containing enemy weaponry. The JTAC confirmed the missions as successful.
In Basra. That would be the large city of Basra, the key port city in the Shi'a south. The Basra that has been safely pacified by the British. The Basra that lies along the main withdrawal route for American troops out of Iraq.

The bombs in those two excerpts are the GBU-38 and the GBU-12, both 500 lb. bombs. Is it any surprise that dropping bombs like this is urban areas cause civilian casualties on a regular basis? The fact that they may be very accurate doesn't decrease the liklihood of civilian casualties. In fact, in urban environments the enhanced accuracy makes civilian casualties more likely.

But the lesson that air power conquers all and quickly was reinforced by the widespread interpreation of the results of the Kosovo War. Still, the neocons' Trotskyist fantasy that bad regimes can be swept away by purging, cleansing violence and a democratic paradise created in a matter of months is not aligned with reality. At least not earthly reality. Maybe in that 13 billion-year-old galaxy that astronomers just discovered. But not here.

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Saturday, November 17, 2007

Kosovo

Remember the Kosovo War? The one that NATO won in 1999? The one where Trent Lott was the leader of the antiwar faction in the Senate?

Kosovo was then and still is legally part of Serbia, though since the war it has operated as de facto independent, with a significant NATO force still stationed there.

Now a former guerrilla with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has won the presidential election there: Hashim Thaci, de guerrillero a primer ministro de Kosovo El Mundo 18.11.2007.

Now he says he intends to declare Kosovo and independent country, which supposedly would be named Kosova (don't ask me what the difference is). Serbia has said they would do whatever they have to in order to block formal Kosovar independence. The Russians have been backing Serbia on this. They prevented a recent UN Security Council vote on the subject.

It's a reminder that even clear successes in these "small wars" leave a lot of complications to be unraveled. Actually, the immediate goal of that war, stopping the Serbian ethnic cleansing of Kosovars, was not immediately achieved, and there is a lot to criticize about that war in retrospect. But in the United States and Europe, it was and is seen as a success.

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Monday, August 27, 2007

Rush Limbaugh and "humanitarian" war

OxyContin (the physical kind)

This little bit of trash in the flotsam and jetsam that flows daily from the rightwing noise machine will likely be swallowed by the news and polemics about the departure of Abu Gonzales the Torture Guy. But I wanted to take note of it while the flows by.

Digby and Steve Benen have called attention to junkie bigot Rush Limbaugh's comment on the air that Democrats support an intervention to stop the killing in Darfur because, he asked, what color are the people in Darfur? "It's black. And who do the Democrats really need to keep voting for them? If they lose a significant percentage of this voting bloc, they're in trouble."

Mr. OxyContin is not known for his thoughtful commentary on foreign policy, and that crack was no different. Rush's fans can't repeat it enough to themselves: black people vote for Democrats, the Democrats are the party of black people, Democrats do things that black people support. And Rush is one of the favorite political commentators among Republicans. On the one hand, we don't need to invest Rush's OxyContin-soaked ravings with more weight than they deserves. On the other, we don't have to go along with the notion that this is "political humor" or pretend that the Republican rank-and-file don't like Rush's bigoted talk. A very substantial portion of them do.

Rush's Darfur comment was meant to be a racial sneer, and that's about all it is.

However, the caller who was calling in trying to sound like a smart-ass dittohead managed, against the odds, to ask a real question:

Hey, Rush. It's great to talk to you. I talked to you once before. I've been listening to you for a couple of years now, and I think I'm getting brighter, but there's a lot to be learned. I know I'm no expert in foreign affairs, but what really confuses me about the liberals is the hypocrisy when they talk about how we have no reason to be in Iraq and helping those people, but yet everybody wants us to go to Darfur. I mean, aren't we going to end up in a quagmire there? I mean, isn't it - I don't understand. Can you enlighten me on this?
In OxyContinLand, everyone "knows" that The Liberals are hypocrites and The Liberals are liars. And this caller was likely trying to toss a softball to give Rush a chance to rave once again about liberal hypocrisy.

I should mention here that I'm not aware myself of any groundswell of enthusiasm among The Liberals for military intervention in Darfur. But OxyContin Vision reveals things to its practitioners that are hidden to us grubby news readers.

But when the caller asked, "I mean, aren't we going to end up in a quagmire there?", he/she managed to touch on a legitimate concern. I don't know if OxyContin Man went on to address that or not.

But one thing that Democrats do need to rethink after the experience of the Iraq War is the whole notion of "humanitarian intervention", or in its variant name, "humanitarian war". Helena Cobban has pointed out what should have been obvious to everyone, but it wasn't really to me before I saw her comment. That is, "humanitarian war" is a grotesque concept, downright Orwellian, actually.

War is about killing people. Bombing and shooting and displacing people. We should never lose sight of the fact that war is about killing people. Sadly, it's all too human to forget it, though. Which is a big part of why wars continue: people listen to sentimental drivel about the glories of war and forget what's really involved.

War is not "humanitarian". A war can be just, it can be necessary, it can have useful or positive or even noble aims, though the latter typically dissolve in the clouds of death and destruction that war involves. But war is not humanitarian. It's about killing and hurting people.

One of these days I'm going to post about the Kosovo War, which I supported at the time, and its aftermath. Although the strategic purpose had to do with controlling the destabilizing effects of Serbian military aggression and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, it is often thought of as a "humanitarian war" because the most immediate problem was the ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars by Serbian forces. Given the devastated state of our Establishment press, most Americans probably think of the Kosovo War as a brilliant success. Since it was fought heavily by bombing, air power zealots have a particular stake in making it sound like a brilliant success.

But, as Jeffrey Record says, the only legitimate goal of war is to establish a better peace. Whether that has been achieved in Kosovo (or "Kosova" as independence advocates prefer) is still in question. The International Crisis Group (ICG) recently issued a report on the political state of Kosovo that presents something other than undiluted optimism, Breaking the Kosovo Stalemate: Europe’s Responsibility 08/21/07. The IGC warns in the executive summary:

The risks to Europe of inaction are substantial. Before the end of the year, Kosovo Albanian leaders will be under what is likely to be irresistible internal pressure to declare independence, with or without external support. If they act and are not supported, Kosovo would fracture: Serbia reclaiming the land pocket north of the Ibar River, Serbs elsewhere in Kosovo fleeing, and eight years of internationally guided institution-building lost. The implosion would destabilise neighbouring countries, increasing pressure for further fractures along ethnic lines. The EU would quickly experience refugee flows and feel the impact of the boost that disorder would give to organised crime networks in the Balkans that already distribute most of Europe’s heroin, facilitate illegal migration and are responsible for nearly 30 per cent of women victims of the sex trade worldwide.
Has that "humanitarian war" succeeded in establishing a better peace? It arguably has for the past eight years, though it didn't prevent widescale Albanian ethnic cleansing against Serbs in Kosovo after the cessation of hostilities with Serbia.

My point is not that the Kosovo War was wrong. I'm not willing to judge it in a simplistic framework of good war/bad war.

My point is that even the best-intentioned military intervention carries substantial risks. Even in a situation like Kosovo, where a substantial multinational coalition was acting (via NATO) and the international environment was substantially permissive, there is far more involved than dropping some bombs, making the bad guys give up, and leaving. A significant-sized NATO force has been present in Kosovo ever since the conclusion of the war. They haven't faced anything like the resistance seen in Iraq. But even that could change if some mutually satisfactory compromise over Kosovar independence from Serbia isn't worked out relatively soon. (Kosovo was and is legally a part of Serbia.)

Violent resistance. A protracted, expensive and frustrating occupation. Potential long-term damage to a country's international position. These are all risks involved in "humanitarian" interventions just like any other kind. And that's true whether the lead party in the intervention is the US, NATO, the UN or anyone else.

The United States is involved in one losing war (Iraq) more-or-less on our own. We're involved in a second losing war (Afghanistan) formally as part of NATO. And even Dick Cheney may not know how many covert interventions we have going, any one of which could blow up into more complications. I don't see right now as a good moment to be searching for other places to send US soldiers to fight.

After the Kosovo War and before the Scalia Five selected Cheney and Bush to be President, there was serious consideration being giving by the major powers to coming up with an improved international legal and political framework to conduct military interventions with UN approval in cases where genocidal killing was being carried out.

That was one of the casualties of the Iraq War. Not that the need is going away, or efforts to deal with it. But the Iraq War created a new context, along with the unilateralist approach of the Cheney-Bush administration, which was far more interested in shredding international frameworks than building them.

Colonialist rhetoric from Spain and Britain and France to the Cheney-Bush administration always promises to bring the blessings of civilization, including democracy these days, to the people who are being bombed, shot and tortured into accepting such blessings. So it's worth remembering in connection with the "humanitarian" Kosovo War that the neoconservatives generally supported it, while the Congressional Republicans were highly critical and even actively opposed. In those days the Reps didn't seem to think it was "aiding the enemy" to criticize the foreign policy of a sitting President, Bill Clinton in that instance.

Seeing the role that the neocons played in agitating for the Iraq War and now for expanding the war to Iran, it's hard not to conclude that for the neocons, the shaky status of the Kosovo War in international law was an appealing aspect of that war. And that they saw that validating the humanitarian justifications for the Kosovo War could prove useful in their already-active agitation for the Iraq War.

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