Showing posts with label saudi arabia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label saudi arabia. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 23, 2017

Trump vs. Iran in Saudi Arabia

The opening portion on Trump's current international tour show has not been encouraging.

Fred Kaplan writes of the President's speech on Islam while he was in Saudi Arabia (Trump’s Sunni Strategy Slate 05/22/2017):

... read closely, without a grading curve, the speech was by turns shallow, clichéd, and repellent. Even the few times when its authors approached a bold theme, they veered away, lest it soften the visit’s three main missions: to assure the region’s Sunni leaders that they can run their countries and oppress their critics with no finger-wagging from Washington; to wrap up a massive $110 billion sale of American weapons; and to declare war on Iran, or at least unabashed hostility toward its regime.
Haroon Moghul also has some harsh words for it in While Trump Ingratiates Himself With Saudi Extremists, U.S. Muslims Are Abandoned Haaretz 05/21/2017:

Trump praised Saudi Arabia while denouncing Iran, even as millions of Iranians participated in an election which makes that country more democratic, at least, than almost any of the countries that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council. A speech that began ostensibly with a message of peace and love ended by arguing for the isolation and demonization of Iran.
Far from actually fighting terrorism, Trump’s speech promises to make conditions in the Middle East worse for everyone.
Trump professed love, the common roots of the Abrahamic faiths, and called us the children of God. Unless, of course, you’re a refugee, in which case Trump wants to slam the door shut in your face. He made no mention of banning citizens of Muslim-majority nations from traveling to the United States, either.
Terrorism is not a cause of the Middle East’s backwardness. It is a symptom. Terrorism is a non-state response to overly centralized states, which leave no room for political, religious or social diversity.
That Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric was not merely campaign bluster is clear in the policies he’s proposed and supported: Islamophobic, homophobic, misogynistic, xenophobic, anti-immigrant and anti-science.
... we are doubling down on an historic American-Saudi partnership that has not only prevented the rise of extremism, but has been unable to prevent the fracture of the Middle East.

This is where somebody says, "Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the play?"

Jaun Cole was also not impressed with the content of Trump's speech (Trump on Islam: Neo-Orientalism and anti-Shi’ism 05/22/2017):

Trump seems to think that pumping $110 bn in new shiny weapons into a volatile Middle East will lead to peace! If there is any sure correlate of war, it is massive purchases by one regional power of new armaments. You have to use them while you have the advantage or your rivals also acquire them.

For Trump to attack Iran, which just had a popular election where the electorate bucked the choice of the Leader, from Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy where the populace have no rights, is weird.

The American Right is deeply implicated in radicalizing Muslims. Afghan Islam was radicalized by the Reagan jihad against the Soviet Union. Eisenhower and Reagan both attempted to enlist Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism against Communism. Most Palestinians were secular or mainstream until the Israelis cultivated Hamas as an alternative to the PLO.

Sunday, July 17, 2016

Saudi Arabia and 9/11: the "28 Pages"

The "28 pages" on Saudi Arabia from the 9/11 Commission report just released on Friday make interesting reading!

Although the released document that can be found here actually constitutes 29 pages plus a cover page, with the transmittal letter for this release included.

A character named Osarna Bassnan was a Saudi national who had worked for the Saudi Arabian Education Ministry and an "FBI asset" reported that Bassnan told him he had aided the 9/11 hijackers. The fact that Bassnan, uh, lived across the street in San Diego from two of the hijackers (Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar) could have it convenient to do.

The twenty-nine "28 pages" also say, that Bassnan and his wife "have received financial support from the Saudi Ambassador to thye United States and his wife." That Ambassador was Bandar bin Sultan, who was so close to the Bush family they nicknamed him "Bandar Bush." Bandar Bush is now head of Saudi intelligence.

Charlie Pierce comments in What We Know from the 28 Pages Esquire Politics Blog 07/15/2016.

Murtaza Hussain comments on them in Saudi Ties to 9/11 Detailed in Documents Suppressed Since 2002 The Intercept 07/15/2016:

One of the most notable figures mentioned is Omar al-Bayoumi, alleged by the report to have likely been a Saudi intelligence agent. Al-Bayoumi was in close contact with hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar, providing them financial assistance during their time in the United States and even helping them find an apartment. Bayoumi in turn is believed to have been on the payroll of the Saudi Ministry of Defense and was regularly in receipt of large lump sums of money from the Saudi Ministry of Finance and other undisclosed arms of the government.

Another figure highlighted in the documents is Osama Bassnan, a Saudi citizen who was an associate of al-Bayoumi and lived in an apartment nearby al-Hazmi and al-Midhar. According to the report, Bassnan “made a comment to an FBI source after the attacks suggesting that he did more for the hijackers than al-Bayoumi did.” Bassnan and his wife received regular payments from the wife of Bandar bin Sultan. On one occasion, Bassnan is said to have received a check directly from Bandar’s account.

Fahd al-Thumairy, a former Saudi consular officer in the United States who served as an imam at a mosque attended by al-Hazmi and al-Midhar, is also mentioned briefly, as is Saleh al-Hussayen, who is described in the report as a “Saudi Interior Ministry employee/official.” Al-Hussayen stayed at the same hotel as one of the hijackers in the days before the attack. While being interviewed by FBI agents after the attacks, al-Hussayen “either passed out or feigned a seizure,” causing the interview to be terminated. He later managed to successfully flee the country.
Marcy Wheeler blogs on it in FBI Established Saudi Task Force Just before Joint Inquiry Release Emptywheel 07/15/2016: "The pages are actually more damning than I expected. It lays out many damning details we already knew of: including that Bandar bin Sultan’s wife was providing money to one of the suspect Saudi intelligence people, several Saudi apparent agents provided support for the hijackers, and an apparent dry run for the attack was conducted by someone paid by the Saudis."

Friday, December 20, 2013

From the "I'm so glad we didn't go to war there" files

Patrick Cockburn has some useful and important information on the state of the opposition in the Syrian civil war in which we thankfully have, so far, avoided direct intervention. From Amy Goodman and Nermeen Shaikh, Saudi Arabia Is Funding Jihadists In Syria — And the U.S. Isn't Doing Anything About It AlterNet 12/18/2013, quoting Cockburn:

Oh, it is clearly a proxy war. I mean, this may have started off as a popular uprising in Syria, but by now it has four or five different conflicts wrapped into one, that — and you have an opposition, but an opposition which is fragmented and really proxies for foreign powers, notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar. Turkey plays a role. What has changed recently, since midsummer, is that Saudi Arabia is becoming the main financier for the rebel military groups inside Syria. Qatar is playing a lesser role. And the Saudis are trying to develop a Sunni Islamic force that is against the Assad government in Damascus, but is also against al-Qaeda. But this is, even so, very much a sectarian force, which is already being blamed for sectarian attacks on Christians and Druze and Alawites. There, then, of course, you also have the United States and Britain and France. A recent defector from the Free Syrian Army, who joined the al-Qaeda affiliate, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, said he was continually attending meetings — I don’t know — he didn't say where, but probably in Turkey — in which always representatives of foreign intelligence services turned up, and at one moment while being presided over by the Saudi deputy defense minister. [my emphasis]
He's indicating what has been obvious from other reports, as well, that the US is playing a significant role covertly.

This is also important. I always wondered how much the slick, media-savvy face of the Syrian opposition for the Western media was a US/NATO front group, more-or-less:

NERMEEN SHAIKH: Well, Patrick Cockburn, could you explain what exactly happened to the Syrian National Coalition and the Free Syrian Army, the main opposition group that the U.S. and Britain and other countries in the West were backing and hoping would be a legitimate replacement, possibly, in the future to the Assad regime?

PATRICK COCKBURN: Yeah, there was always an element of pretense in this, pretending that the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian National Coalition were — represented Syrians inside the country. It was always very much an outside exile development. And, you know, they never really controlled much on the ground. And what they did control is now very little. That’s—you know, the headquarters was overrun by the Islamic Front, which is a sort of combination of Sunni groups, appears to be backed by Saudi Arabia. So, basically, it’s been a disaster. So these so-called sort of moderate elements don’t— have never had much influence inside Syria and now seem to be sort of almost completely marginalized. [my emphasis]
I am so glad the US didn't directly intervene in this war, i.e., didn't commit regular troops and airpower to direct combat.

Cockburn talks at more length about how Saudis seem to be the main financiers of radical Islamist terrorist groups in the Middle East today: "The main backers for al-Qaeda-type organizations of Sunni-organized fanatical jihadi groups is Saudi private donors in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf." He notes sourly, "many of the facts about Saudi Arabia’s relationships to al-Qaeda and to Sunni jihadi organizations don’t require any investigation. I mean, you know, they’re admitted. They’re in plain view."

Even Cockburn follows the convention of talking about present-day violent Sunni fundamentalist groups as Al Qa'ida. It's become a common convention, though I still don't like it. Because even the present-day groups adopting that label for themselves apparently have little or no direct organizational connection to Osama bin Laden's organization of that name. It's become a general ideological name, like "conservative" or "liberal."

Cockburn also writes about the theme of Saudi funding in Mass murder in the Middle East is funded by our friends the Saudis The Independent 12/08/2013:

Evidence for this is a fascinating telegram on "terrorist finance" from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to US embassies, dated 30 December 2009 and released by WikiLeaks the following year. She says firmly that "donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide". Eight years after 9/11, when 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis, Mrs Clinton reiterates in the same message that "Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support for al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, LeT [Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan] and other terrorist groups". Saudi Arabia was most important in sustaining these groups, but it was not quite alone since "al-Qa'ida and other groups continue to exploit Kuwait both as a source of funds and as a key transit point".

Why did the US and its European allies treat Saudi Arabia with such restraint when the kingdom was so central to al-Qa'ida and other even more sectarian Sunni jihadist organisations? An obvious explanation is that the US, Britain and others did not want to offend a close ally and that the Saudi royal family had judiciously used its money to buy its way into the international ruling class. Unconvincing attempts were made to link Iran and Iraq to al-Qa'ida when the real culprits were in plain sight.
Another reminder of how many business and political scams find a happy home in the War on Terror.

But he also points out that while US policy may be cynical in this regard, it's not entirely with calculated purposes of state:

But there is another compelling reason why the Western powers have been so laggard in denouncing Saudi Arabia and the Sunni rulers of the Gulf for spreading bigotry and religious hate. Al-Qa'ida members or al-Qa'ida-influenced groups have always held two very different views about who is their main opponent. For Osama bin Laden the chief enemy was the Americans, but for the great majority of Sunni jihadists, including the al-Qa'ida franchises in Iraq and Syria, the target is the Shia. It is the Shia who have been dying in their thousands in Iraq, Syria, Pakistan and even in countries where there are few of them to kill, such as Egypt. [my emphasis]
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Friday, June 17, 2011

US dependence on Saudi Arabia: oil and security

Courtesy of Wikileaks and McClatchy's Kevin Hall in WikiLeaks cables show worry about Saudi oil security McClatchy Newspapers 06/13/2011, we get a glimpse of US dependence on Saudi Arabian oil and therefore on the House of Saud:

When al Qaida suicide bombers tried on Feb. 24, 2006, to blow up Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq oil processing facility, arguably the world's most important petroleum hub, it was taken as a sign of strength that internal security had foiled the attack.

Secret U.S. State Department cables obtained by WikiLeaks and shared with McClatchy and other news organizations show otherwise.

Even though 70 percent of Saudi Arabia's oil exports flow through the Abqaiq facility, Saudi security forces were woefully ill prepared to defend it, investigations into the attack found, according to the cables. Efforts to fix the problems were hampered by bickering between the Saudi state oil company and the country's Ministry of the Interior, the cables indicate.
This is an important piece of news, and one that Wikileaks was able to overcome one more piece of secrecy and concealment from the Cheney-Bush Administration, even if it's five years later. With the Obama Administration pursuing even more stringent secrecy policies, it's more important than ever to have news organization like Wikileaks at work.

The precarious security of Saudi oil fields ought to be a central part of the public discussion on US Middle East policy. Partisans of the House of Saud like the Bush family would presumably use it as a reason to pursue an even closer alliance with the repressive, conservative monarachy. But it also should be an argument for aggressive development of renewable energy sources and a reminder of the urgency of drastically reducing US dependency on oil as an energy source.

US oil companies, of course, like to make the argument about reducing US dependence on foreign oil. It's a perpetual pitch of theirs against environmental and other regulatory restrictions.

But, as Hall reports, the Saudi monarchy currently looms very large in the American oil picture:

Saudi Arabia, with 12 percent of the world's oil supply, remains the key to the West's ability to influence oil prices. Last week, when members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries failed to increase production in a move that Western officials had hoped would help curb rising crude oil prices, Saudi Arabia announced it would unilaterally pump more oil. Crude prices immediately dropped.

A successful terrorist attack on Saudi oil facilities would wreak havoc on the kingdom's ability to take a similar step in the future.
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Sunday, June 12, 2011

Saudis threaten US over Palestinian state

Such diplomatic pieces are never entirely what they seem on the surface. But former Saudi Arabian intelligence chief and one-time Ambassador to the US Turki al-Faisal (Prince Turki bin Faisal bin Abdul Aziz al Saud) threatens the US with serious negative consequences if the Obama Administration vetoes UN recognition of a Palestinian state this fall in Failed favoritism to Israel Washington Post 06/10/2011:

As the main political and financial supporter of the Palestinian quest for self-determination, Saudi Arabia holds an especially strong position. The kingdom's wealth, steady growth and stability have made it the bulwark of the Middle East. As the cradle of Islam, it is able to symbolically unite most Muslims worldwide. In September, the kingdom will use its considerable diplomatic might to support the Palestinians in their quest for international recognition. American leaders have long called Israel an "indispensable" ally. They will soon learn that there are other players in the region - not least the Arab street - who are as, if not more, "indispensable." The game of favoritism toward Israel has not proven wise for Washington, and soon it will be shown to be an even greater folly.

Commentators have long speculated about the demise of Saudi Arabia as a regional powerhouse. They have been sorely disappointed. Similarly, history will prove wrong those who imagine that the future of Palestine will be determined by the United States and Israel. There will be disastrous consequences for U.S.-Saudi relations if the United States vetoes U.N. recognition of a Palestinian state. It would mark a nadir in the decades-long relationship as well as irrevocably damage the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and America's reputation among Arab nations. The ideological distance between the Muslim world and the West in general would widen - and opportunities for friendship and cooperation between the two could vanish.

We Arabs used to say no to peace, and we got our comeuppance in 1967. In 2002 King Abdullah offered what has become the Arab Peace Initiative. Based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, it calls for an end to the conflict based on land for peace. The Israelis withdraw from all occupied lands, including East Jerusalem, reach a mutually agreed solution to the Palestinian refugees and recognize the Palestinian state. In return, they will get full diplomatic recognition from the Arab world and all the Muslim states, an end to hostilities and normal relations with all these states.

Now, it is the Israelis who are saying no. I'd hate to be around when they face their comeuppance. [my emphasis]
Prince Turki is currently head of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Saudi Arabia. One presumes this is a semi-official statement of Saudi policy.

One doesn't have to be any kind of fan or supporter of Israeli intransigence or their West Bank settlement policy to resent what can hardly be taken as anything other than a reactionary monarchy threatening trying to dictate US foreign policy.

But that's also the world in which we live. And as long as the United States retains its dependence on oil, Saudi Arabia will be in a position to make such threats with credibility, whatever the real meaning of this one is. That's no secret. It's been painfully obvious ever since the Arab oil embargo of 1973-75. And both political parties have in practice accepted that as a feature of our national position and our foreign policy ever since. And there's no sign the Obama Administration has the intention of trying to change that in any substantial way.

MJ Rosenberg suggests in a tweet that this may in part represent an effort by the Saud family to avoid a spread of the Arab Awakening to their kingdom: "Saudi understand the easiest way to secure regime is to be the ones who deliver Pal state. Smart." In another, he reminds us that the Saudis have enough power if they choose to use it to make Turki al-Faisal's threat more than hot air: "Guess what? US and US president need Saudis a lot more than either needs AIPAC."

The Bush family has long been very close to the Saudi royal family, as Craig Unger explained in some detail in his House of Bush, House of Saud (2004.) Maybe the two former Presidents Bush will intercede with their old friends to get them to back the hell off from threatening the Untied States. We can take it for granted that both Bushes would put American patriotism ahead of any vulgar financial considerations, can't we?

This is a video of an hour and 40 minutes of a lecture Prince Turki gave 04/23/2009 at Cornell, What We Expect From America: A Saudi Perspective:



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Saturday, November 27, 2010

"The Kingdom" busts accused terrorists - and 60,000 beggars

Saudi Arabia claims that over the past eight months, they have arrested dozens of "Al Qa'ida" militants planning terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia and other misdeeds. Caryle Murphy reports in Saudi Arabia arrests 149 Al Qaeda militants GlobalPost 11/26/2010:

Saudi Arabian authorities have arrested 149 alleged Al Qaeda activists organized into 19 different cells – many of them linked to Al Qaeda’s Yemen-based branch, one of the terrorist movement’s most aggressive affiliates, security officials said Friday. ...

"The majority had links with Al Qaeda in Yemen," Interior Ministry Spokesman Gen. Mansour al Turki told reporters. In most cases, he added, the organization recruited Saudis who "were supposed to carry out plots designed by Al Qaeda in Yemen to be executed inside Saudi Arabia." ...

The arrests sent a dual message. On the one hand, they demonstrate the continuing appeal of Al Qaeda's extremist ideology for some Saudis, as well as the determination of Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, known as AQAP, to strike inside the kingdom.

On the other hand, the arrests suggest that Saudi security forces are managing to detect militant activities before they become fully operational.
It's hard to know what connection if any these claimed Al Qa'ida members have with Bin Laden's original organization.

These 149 arrests apparently include 100 from last March. See Foiled 'terror' plots in 2010 Aljazeera English 11/27/2010.

Juan Cole adds:

Aljazeera Arabic is reporting that some intended to hit petroleum facilities but Saudi officials are downplaying that charge. (Oil investors are nervous creatures and Riyadh doesn’t want a spike in petroleum futures that would accelerate even further the rush to build wind turbines in the West.

I found it amusing that the Aljazeera Arabic report says that the suspects were accused by Saudi officials of spreading hate speech and encouraging the denunciation of other Muslims as infidels. In the 18th century, the Wahhabi school of Islam was denounced by the urbane Ottoman sultans in Istanbul on precisely these grounds. But Wahhabism is changing, and trying to escape the shadow of al-Qaeda. For one thing, Wahhabis have had a more than two century-old alliance with the Saudi dynasty, whereas al-Qaeda wants to overthrow it.
See also Abdul Nabi Shaheen, Saudi forces hailed for foiling attacks Gulf News 11/28/2010;

Also in Saudi Arabian news: Saudi Arabia police round up 60,000 beggars Gulf News 11/25/2010.

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Saturday, November 21, 2009

Saudia Arabia, Yemen and Shi'a-Sunni tensions

The Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram Weekly Online reports in Sectarian rifts appear by Omayma Abdel-Latif (11/19-25/09 edition) that Saudi Arabia's military campaign against Shi'a rebels in Yemen is really ticking off Iran and Saudi Shiites, the latter composing 1/3 or so of the Saudi population. It also says Al Qa'ida implicitly supported the Saudi attacks by issuing a statement condemning the Shi'a Al-Houthi group the Saudis are targeting.

Gee, hyper-Sunni cult Al Qa'ida hates Iranian-backed Shi'a group? Who could have guessed? (Yes, that's meant to be sarcastic.)

The Al-Houthis "are Zaidis, a branch of Shiism closest to Sunni doctrine". Like the other Shi'a, the Zaidis (also Zaidiya, Zaydīyah, Zaidīs, Zaydis) recognize the primacy of the fourth caliph ‛Alī ibn abī Tālib to follow the Prophet Muhammad as the leader of the Muslim community. But unlike most Shi'a, the Zaidis do not regard the first three caliphs, Abū Bakr, ‛Umar and ‛Uthmān, as usurpers.

The name of the sect comes from Zayd ibn ʿAlī (d. 740), the grandson of Shi'a martyr Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī (626-680), the son of the fourth caliph. The Zaidis are commonly known as the Fiver Shi'a because they recognize Zayd as the fifth Imam, which other Shi'a do not. Their interpretations of Islāmic law have often been close to those of Sunni jurists.

Oxford Islamic Studies Online gives this discription of Zaidi distinctiveness:

Although they have their own school of law based on the legal interpretations of Zayd and his successors, the Yemeni Zaydīs are otherwise the closest of all Shīʿī factions to the Sunnīs (and most particularly to the Ḥanafī school of Sunnī jurisprudence); this has often been interpreted by Western scholars to mean that they are “moderate” or practical. The Zaydīs differ from other Shīʿī denominations in that they accept the legitimacy of the caliphates of Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, and, at least partially, ʿUthmān. Moreover, in contrast to certain other Shīʿī groups, the Zaydīs do not view the imam as infallible, nor as a quasi-divine, inspired, or supernaturally endowed person representing God on earth, and, again unlike other factions, they do not require that he be divinely designated in any way. In Zaydī belief, the qualifications for the imamate include: descent from ʿAlī and Fāṭimah (though they do not require that it pass from father to son), absence of physical imperfections, and personal piety. The imam must be able to take up the sword, either offensively or in defense, which rules out infants as well as “hidden imams” of the type acknowledged by the Ismāʿīlīyah and the Twelvers. [my emphasis]
That latter point indicates that they also lack the messianic/apocalyptic element that characterizes Twelver Shiism. The Zaidis generally reject mystical approaches to the faith.

The article quotes the head of the Lebanese Hizbullah party on the sectarian implications:

Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah called for rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Nasrallah said there is a tendency today to put a gloss of sectarianism on every conflict in the region, and that this was meant to break up Muslim nations into small entities. This, he said serves Israel.

"Every conflict in our region is being interpreted only from the perspective of the Sunni-Shia divide," he said in his latest speeches commemorating the Day of the Martyr. "It is being said that Turkey, the Sunni state, is engaging in the Middle East to take the role of Iran, the Shia state." Nasrallah called on Iran to make a rapprochement towards Saudi Arabia and vice versa. "There should be an initiative from any Arab or Muslim nation to bring those two big and important nations together to dialogue in order to put out the sectarian fire."
The fighting has spilled over into Saudi Arabia, as reported in Saudi villages evacuated due to violence in Yemen, UNICEF says Today's Zaman (Turkey) 11/14/09.

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Sunday, May 04, 2008

Saudi Arabia, Iran and Shi'a Iraq

I need to be more attentive to Joschka Fischer's Monday columns because they're consistently better than 99% of the nonsense you hear on the TV news, and better than almost as big a percentage of what our Big Pundits have to tell us.

His column for this past week is Konfrontation am Golf Die Zeit 28.04.2008 focusing particularly on the current foreign policy concerns of Saudi Arabia.

Fischer argues that Saudi Arabia has become the most influential Sunni power in the Middle East for the moment, due to its current windfall in oil revenues, to the current weakness of Egypt and the self-imposed isolation of Syria. The Saudis are taking it for granted that nothing like Victory is going be the end result of the Cheney-Bush-McCain adventure in Iraq. Fischer writes, "Diese Chance wurde seit Langem vertan, wenn sie denn je bestanden hat." (This chance was missed a long time ago, if it ever existed.)

One of the basic realities in the Middle East now is that by removing the secular Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and turning Iraq for the (extended) moment into a failed state, Iran is increasingly becoming the dominant power in that region. (Israel's military power and nuclear arsenal are unequaled by any of its opponents in the Middle East. But that hasn't translated into great influence or constructive relations with most of its neighbors in the region. The big exception has been Egypt, with whom Israel concluded a peace treaty.)

The Saudis are not happy about Iran's new dominance, nor about the fact that their former Sunni-dominated neighbor Iraq is now dominated by the Shi'a, who are on good terms with Iran.

Fischer's take on the influence of Iran is important. Between our daffy Establishment press and the current administration's desire to lump all its enemies together, it's not very clear in American discussions of Iran that the Iraqi government we support is very close to Iran and that boosting Iran's influence was an all-but-inevitable outcome of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Just in the last few days, for instance, an official Iraqi delegation went to Teheran, supposedly to challenge Iran's support for anti-government militias in Iraq. The Iraqi and Iranian governments made another deal to work together to improve security in an atmosphere of friendly cooperation. Tina Susman and Ramin Mostaghim report in Iran promises Iraq it will help 'stabilize security' Los Angeles Times 05/04/08):

Khalid Attiya, deputy speaker of Iraq's parliament, said the five-member delegation "sensed a positive stance" from Iranian officials. "The two sides have agreed to keep up efforts to stabilize security," he said.

Attiya made no mention of the recent accusations by the U.S. government, charges that the Pentagon has been leveling for years. U.S. military and political officials have been more vocal about the allegations since late March, when Maliki launched the Basra offensive against Shiite militias.

The United States blames much of the fighting since the offensive on Iranian-backed extremists. Iran says the United States is using it as a scapegoat for its problems in Iraq.

The heightened tensions have put Iraq in an uncomfortable position as it is pressured by Washington to be more aggressive toward Iran, with which it shares a long border and has strong economic and religious ties. Iraq's main Shiite group, the powerful Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, is allied with Maliki's Islamic Dawa Party and with the United States, but it also has close ties to Tehran.

The group's chief advisor in Iran, Mohsen Hakim, refused to discuss the allegations against Iran in an interview Saturday, saying there was "no official declaration about that from the Iraqi government."
Fischer notes than when our Dear Leader Bush travels to Iraq, he has to keep the visit a top secret. But when Iranian President Ahmadenijad visited earlier this year, the visit was not only announced in advance but he was cheered by crowds as he appeared in public. Fischer writes:

Trotz mehr als 160.000 amerikanischer Soldaten im Land muss sich der amerikanische Präsident jedes Mal durch die Hintertür ins Land stehlen. Ganz anders der iranische Präsident. Dessen Besuch in Bagdad war ein Wochen vorher angekündigtes, öffentliches Ereignis.

[Despite more than 160,000 American soldiers in the country [not counting mercenaries], the American President has to sneak into the country through the back door every time. Totally different for the Iranian President. His visit to Baghdad was announced a week beforehand and was a public event.]
Fischer says that the Saudis see Iranian support behind not only the Iraqi government, dominated by the SIIC and Dawa parties (principally the former), but also with Muqtada al-Sadr and his JAM militia and to some extent with the Kurds in northern Iraq.

While the Saudis are very unhappy over a Shi'a-dominated Iraq in any case, they are especially disturbed by the prospect of an effectively autonomous Shi'a province in southern Iraq, which the Iraqi government seems to be trying to enable at the moment. It's a little hard to tell to what extent Fischer is implying the Saudi view is accurate on the following point, but he seems to think it is. The Saudis see the Iranians supporting the Maliki government's crackdown on JAM because they, like SIIC, want to see Muqtada's organization weakened in the south leading up to the provincial elections currently expected in October (but they can be postponed).

The Saudis don't like the Shi'a militant Muqtada. But Muqtada is a nationalist opposed to the more drastic federalist schemes favored by the leading Kurdish parties and SIIC but opposed by the Sunni. The Saudis would prefer a unified Shi'a dominated Iraq to a Shi'a dominated Iraq with an automomous southern Shi'a province.

Fischer reminds us that part of the danger of war with Iran is that the Saudi-led Sunni coalition would push to create some kind of intensified confrontation, though the Saudis are fearful of the implications of outright war. Still, he sees the Saudis as determined not to accept the reality that the Cheney-Bush administration has created on the ground by the invasion of Iraq, i.e., Iranian hegemony in the region.

In discussing Europe's position toward the current situation in the Gulf region, he notes that most of the European public was sensibly opposed to participating in the invasion of Iraq. And he stresses that it would be a big mistake for Europe to allow itself to be drawn directly into a military conflict there.

I saw Fischer speak live in San Francisco about this time last year. He expressed the view that the US and Europe had to assume that Iran was pushing for a nuclear weapons capacity and that intensive diplomatic efforts were needed to prevent such a development. Someone asked his opinion on military action against Iran, and he just shook his head in apparent dismay and said he did not see that as a practical option.

Fischer describes the difference between the Saudi and American viewpoints on Iraq-Iran this way:

Die saudische Sicht auf den aktuellen Stand des Kriegs im Irak und seinen Fortgang unterscheidet sich strategisch diametral von der amerikanischen Sicht. Nur bei der Erklärung für den Rückgang der Gewalt im Irak gibt es noch große Übereinstimmung. Hauptursache für den Rückgang ist demnach das sogenannte „Sunni Awakening“, das zu einer weitgehenden Trennung des sunnitischen Widerstands von al-Quaida und zu einer Unterstützung des amerikanischen Militärs geführt hat. Hinzu kommen die Tatsache, dass Teheran gegenüber der schiitischen Miliz des Muktada al Sadr seine Politik geändert und einen Waffenstillstand durchgesetzt hat sowie die amerikanischen Truppenverstärkungen und das Faktum, dass die innerirakische ethnische und religiöse Säuberung in den umkämpften Gebieten weitgehend als abgeschlossen gilt.

[The Saudi view of the present state of the war in Iraq and its continuation is strategically the diametrical opposite of that of the Americans. Only in the explanation for the reduction in violence [in late 2007 and early 2008, a reduction that is no longer so apparent - Bruce] is there still great agreement. The main reason for the reduction is, according to them, the so-called "Sunni Awakening", which led to a far-reaching split of the Sunni resistance from Al Qa'ida and to the support of the American generals [for the "Awakening"]. In addition, Teheran changed its policy toward the Shi'a militia of Muqtada al-Sadr and arranged a cease-fire [in Basra and the surrounding area], there was the increase in American troops, and there was the fact that the inner-Iraq ethnic and religious cleansing in the disputed district was to a large degree completed.]
But the Saudis are fundamentally opposed to the current Iraqi government and the increasinly stregthened position of Iran. They and allied Sunni states see themselves as having a stake in provoking further tensions between the US and Iran, though the Saudis are highly concerned about the negative consequences of an possible war between the US and Iran.

Fischer notes that the Saudis share a common interest with Israel in this matter:

Eine solche Hegemonie würde von Riad als existenzielle Bedrohung des Königreichs und seiner territorialen Integrität angesehen werden. Hier gibt es eine mit den Händen zu greifende Interessenidentität zwischen Saudi-Arabien und Israel, die allerdings durch den anhaltenden Konflikt zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern politisch kaum Form annehmen kann. In Riad wird diese Position ... von Regierungsseite ... offen ausgesprochen. Saudi-Arabien hält eine militärische Konfrontation der USA mit Iran in den Folgen für kaum kontrollierbar und deshalb für hoch gefährlich.

[Such an [Iranian] hegemony [in the region] is seen by Riad as an existential threat to the kingdom and its territorial integrity. Here there is a very obvious identity of interests between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which nevertheless can scarcely take concrete political form due to the continuing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. In Riad, this position is openly expressed by the government. Saudi Arabia considers the consequences a military confrontation between the USA and Iran to be scarcely controllable and therefore highly dangerous.]
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Wednesday, November 21, 2007

This qualifies as barbaric

Saudi rape victim to challenge sentence of six months in prison and 200 lashes by Agence France Presse (AFP) Daily Star (Lebanon) 11/22/07 reports:

A Saudi woman sentenced to six months in jail and 200 lashes after being gang raped has vowed to challenge the ruling in a case that has received wide publicity, embarrassing the Saudi government. The case "sums up the major problems that the Saudi judiciary faces," said the young woman's lawyer, Abdel-Rahman al-Lahem.

Saudi Arabia ... applies a rigorous doctrine of Sunni Islam.

It imposes strict segregation of the sexes and a host of restrictions on women, who may not mix with men other than relatives or drive cars.

The 19-year-old's identity has not been revealed but she has become known as "Qatif girl," after the Shiite-populated area of Al-Qatif in the Eastern Province she hails from.

After the rape in October 2006, she was sentenced to 90 lashes for having been in a car with a man who is not a relative.

The Higher Judicial Council granted a retrial but, on November 14, a court toughened her sentence to six months in jail and 200 lashes.
This is a case where basic human rights considerations should take precedence over whatever hidebound reactionary interpretation of Islam or Saudi considerations of "traditional values" lead to such a thing. The rape victim is Shi'a, the rapists Sunni.

Here is a recent New York Times report on the case, Ruling Jolts Even Saudis: 200 Lashes for Rape Victim by Rasheed Abou-Alsamh 11/16/07

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Wednesday, August 01, 2007

More arms to the Saudis - is this really a good idea?

Kolonial-Krieger Spende (Saving for the Colonial Fighters): German poster from the First World War

I certainly understand that foreign policy can be a real tangle. Only rarely are issues clear-cut in international disputes. And their resolution involves some sort of compromises.

I posted yesterday about Gary Sick's analysis of the complicated arms deals involving Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt (plus five other Arab countries). As tangled as that round of deals is, Sick finds hope in it that it can help avoid war with Iran during the Cheney-Bush administration's remaining months in office.

William Arkin, who's always on the lookout for a chance to be contrarian, has posted about this on his Early Warning blog, in A New Mideast Military Alliance? 07/31/07 and Middle East Alliance 2.0 02/01/07. He thinks it looks a lot like an attempt to set up Iran as a common enemy for everyone involved. But that it could more likely wind up being a way to ignore "the roots of instability that exist in countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia".

Arkin speculates that the Cheney-Bush administration sees the new semi-official alliance of which these deals are a part as serving two purposes: making it more difficult for the next President to extract the US from the Iraq War and legitimizing war with Iran.

He describes the line-up:

The new military alliance even has a temporary name: GCC+2. Yesterday, [Secretary of State Condozeeza] Rice and [Defense Secretary Robert] Gates met with the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council of six nations: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates - plus Egypt and Jordan.
Arkin thinks the administration envisions this as a kind of Middle East NATO.

This is one more development that Congress should really be on top of, and should be surfacing the issues involved. Is it worth even saying that it would be desirable for our "press corps" to pay more attention to it? I didn't think so.

Meanwhile, Robert Scheer at his Truthdig.com Web site, is taking a dimmer view of the project in Bush Keeps Israel Close, Saudi Arabia Closer 07/31/07. It's refreshing to see someone use the descriptive phrase, "war profiteers". Because yes, Virginia, there are such things. He writes:

Go figure: From the White House comes the news that self-styled anti-terrorism crusader George Bush wants to sell $20 billion in high-tech military equipment to Saudi Arabia, the source of most of the financing, and 15 of the 19 hijackers, for the Sept. 11th terrorist attacks on the United States. The justification can’t be that this is yet another boondoggle for the military-industrial complex—the big winner in the war on terror—so we are told instead that the Sunni-dominated Saudi kingdom needs this weaponry to withstand a future challenge from those dastardly Shiite fellows in Iran.

Yes, the very same extremists whose surrogates are now, as a consequence of the U.S. invasion, pretending to be the indigenous government of Iraq. Recall that the Shiite militants who rule Tehran, along with the Sunni nuts around Osama bin Laden, were both the sworn enemy of Saddam Hussein. Now both of those forces are the main players, according to the Bush administration, vying for power in "liberated" Iraq, and our president is in the inane position of playing one group of fanatics against the other in the name of securing Iraq as a democratic haven.
That's a pretty good definition of how screwy the arrangement looks on its face. And I agree with his conclusion:

What a deal! The Saudis pony up billions in cash, American taxpayers come up with an amount more than twice as high to keep the Israelis and Egyptians happy, and U.S. war profiteers, Bush’s most reliable core constituency group, make out like bandits. Hey, it’s only money, and the only real cost might be to folks who get caught in the line of fire of those weapons in wars to come for generations. But not to worry, most of them don’t vote in U.S. elections anyway. (my emphasis)
I have another issue with this, which Scheer's article touches on but doesn't address directly. We know that Saudi Arabia is aiding Sunni rebels fighting the pro-American and pro-Iranian government which we support in Baghdad. Some of the "foreign fighters" that the administration now prefers to call just "Al Qa'ida" are apparently infiltrating from Saudi Arabia. At any rate, as Scheer observes, "half of the foreign suicide bombers [in Iraq] have been Saudi nationals".

Even if "half" is a bit of an uncertain estimate, it brings up an important point. Scheer puts it in terms of the arms sales rewarding Saudi refusal to cooperate with the US adequately on anti-terrorism issues.

But apart from the uncertain application of diplomatic incentives involved, isn't there something wrong with supplying additional weapons, and more high-tech weapons, to a country that is directly aiding groups fighting Americans in Iraq? Are there any structred quid pro quo requirements placed on this with the Saudis? Will they be required to achieve any "benchmarks"? Will those benchmarks be taken more seriously than the one the Iraqi government is failing to meet?

I'm not getting a warm and fuzzy feeling about this whole thing.

(If anyone is wondering what the illustration at the top has to do exactly with the topic of this post, well, it's not very exact. It's mainly because I just stumbled onto the Library of Congress' online collection of German First World War posters. The connection, though, is the money for colonial wars part, in this case a potential war against Iran.)

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Monday, July 30, 2007

Middle East policy confusion

The United States needs a foreign policy that puts a heavy emphasis on reaching a peace agreement and a permanent territorial settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. And that means, among other things, supporting an Israeli pullout from the occupied territories, because everyone knows that any peaceful settlement will involved such a withdrawal.

Otherwise, our Middle East policy will continue to promote instability and help breed war in the region. It also leaves a major grievance of the Muslim and Arab worlds to fester, as it has for the last 40 years since the 1967 war. The fact that cynical politicians encourage and support that sentiment for their own purposes doesn't make it any less of a widely-felt concern.

Currently, our Middle East policy is inevitably self-contradictory - not an unheard-of condition in foreign affairs - and often extremely so. The latter is the case with the US contribution to the latest round of the conventional arms race in the region. Consider the following news stories:

Bush to Urge Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia, Gulf States by Holly Rosenkrantz, Bloomberg.com 07/28/07:

Included in the package are advanced satellite-guided bombs, fighter-aircraft upgrades and new naval vessels. The administration also plans to announce a new 10-year military aid package to Israel and Egypt. The steps are part of an effort by the Bush administration to counter Iran's rising influence.
US: Saudi Arabia destabilising Iraq Aljazeera 07/29/07:

The US ambassador to the United Nations has accused Saudi Arabia and other US allies in the Middle East of undermining efforts to curb violence in Iraq.

Zalmay Khalilzad's comments, during a CNN interview on Sunday, follow reports that the US is set to announce the proposed sale of $20bn in weapons to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

Khalilzad said he was also referring to Saudi Arabia when he wrote in an opinion piece in the New York Times last week that "several of Iraq's neighbours - not only Syria and Iran but also some friends of the US - are pursuing destabilising policies".

"Yes, well, there is no question that ... Saudi Arabia and a number of other countries are not doing all they can to help us in Iraq," Khalilzad, the former US ambassador to Iraq, said.
EE UU multiplica la ayuda militar a Israel para que afiance su poder en la región de Sal Emergui El País 30.07.07

En los últimos meses y lejos de la atención mundial, Israel y Estados Unidos han mantenido agrias diferencias que estuvieron a punto de derivar en una crisis bilateral. El motivo fue la intención del Pentágono de vender abundante y moderno material militar a otro gran aliado, Arabia Saudí. Israel, que había expresado su temor a que dicha ayuda pusiera en peligro su superioridad bélica en la zona, arrancó finalmente una suculenta promesa del presidente norteamericano, George W. Bush: algo más de 22.000 millones de euros de ayuda militar en los próximos 10 años.

[In recent months and outside the attention of the world, Israel and the United States have bitter differences that were at the point of causing a bilateral crisis. The reason was the Pentagon's intention to sell large quantities of modern military material to another important ally, Saudi Arabia. Israel, which had expressed its concern that such support would endanger its military superiority in the region, in then end won a lucrative pledge from the American President, George W. Bush: over 22 billion euros [roughly $32 billion] of military assistance in the the next 10 years.]
The Cheney-Bush administration has agreed to sell Saudi Arabia a new round of high-tech military equipment. To counter the growing influence of Iran.

The influence of Iran has grown for several reasons in recent years, by far the biggest being the US invasion of Iraq, which removed Iran's most immediate enemy, the Iraqi Baath Sunni regime, and replaced it with a very pro-Iranian Shi'a regime.

The Iran that meantime, the administration has been threatening with war off and on since the 2004 Presidential election.

At the same time, UN Ambassador Khalilzad is criticizing Sunni Saudi Arabia for not supporting the US-backed pro-Iranian regime in Baghdad. It's not just a matter of not supporting the Iraqi Shi'a regime. Saudi Arabia is helping to fund the Sunni resistance. And from the national origins of prisoners taken in Iraq, Saudis may be the most numerous among the foreign fighters that are considered, with some good reason, to be connected to Osama Bin Laden's Al Qa'ida.

Still, when the United States withdraws from Iraq - January 2008, July 2009, whenever it happens - and the Iraqi civil war escalates in violence as it likely will, the US will need to work with the neighboring countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan) to contain the violence and hopefully prevent the Iraqi civil war from becoming a full-blown regional war. So arming Saudi Arabia makes some sense from that perspective.

Except that the administration is threatening to go to war with Iran and already conducting a covert war against it. And doesn't even want to talk to Syria.

Israel, our closest ally in the Middle East (closer even than the pro-Iranian Shi'a regime that depends on American backing to survive), objected to the new weapons being given to its enemy Saudi Arabia. Understandably so.

So we're boosting military aid to Israel, increasing the incentive for other Middle East states to increase and upgrade their arsenals. And further angering Arabs and Muslims already angry about American aid to Israel. And increasing the already strong impression that the Cheney-Bush administration is essentially supporting Israel down the line, which reduces the United States' credibility to broker an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement.

The US and Israel were at the point of a "bilateral crisis", and our diligent American press corps didn't pick up on it and report it? Not surprising, I guess, given the sadly dysfunctional state of the American press. Still, I don't recall seeing anything about that. Maybe it was out there; I don't scour the news for specific information about US-Israeli relations on a daily basis. But I would think that would be big news. It's always possible that the "bilateral crisis" bit was a negotiating ploy by either or both sides.

It's a mess. The three things that would most help the US to achieve an optimal situation for US interests in the Middle East are all things the Cheney-Bush administration have no intention of doing: achieving an Israel-Palestine permanent peace agreement; getting US troops out of Iraq; and, make serious and major efforts to convert to alternative fuels and reduce American dependence on oil.

Not going to war with Iran would also be a very good idea.

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Wednesday, April 04, 2007

With friends like these...

Douglas Farah reports in The End of the Line in Pakistan? 04/02/07 at his blog on a presentation he attended by Alexis Debat of the Nixon Center and Seth Jones of Rand Corporation:

The conclusion was that the alliance of necessity and convenience between the United States and Pakistan has reached its useful end. Pakistan’s national interests diverge widely from U.S. and European interests in fighting Islamist militants and creating a stable, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. Pakistan is no longer an ally, but takes a direct hand in fomenting the Taliban and al Qaeda, while happily taking the billions of dollars in US aid that continue to flow.

... Both [presenters] have recently spend time on different sides of the Pakistan/Afghan border. Jones has written an article on his finding ..., where he concludes that "there is significant evidence that the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIC), al Qaeda and other insurgent groups use Pakistan as a sanctuary for recruitment and support. In addition, there is virtual unanimity that Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has continued to provide assistance to Afghan insurgent groups." ...

From the other side of the border, Debat found that there are now about 25 insurgent groups in Waziristan alone, and that the old Saudi/Gulf pipeline of funds, coupled with a significant flow of cash from Malaysia and protection from Pakistan, have allowed these groups to flourish. (my emphasis)
Say what? Our good friends the Saudis are funding Sunni jihadists in Afghanistan? In addition to the Sunni guerrillas they're funding in Iraq? But that latter one's okay because there our real enemies are the Iranians and their Shi'a allies in Iraq. No, wait, that's not quite it. Our enemies are the Iranians in Iran but their Iraqi Shi'a allies are our friends because we're helping them fight the Sunni insurgents. The ones our friends in Saudi Arabia are funding.

But Pakistan is helping us fight those bad Iranians by sending in Pakistani terrorists - no, they're on our side so they're "militants" - Pakistani militants to kill and capture Iranian soldiers, according to this report, Pakistani militants staging raids inside Iran ABC News 04/04/07:

The U.S. has been secretly advising and encouraging a Pakistani militant group that has carried out a series of deadly guerrilla raids inside Iran, ABC News reported on Tuesday, citing U.S. and Pakistani intelligence sources.

The raids have resulted in the deaths or capture of Iranian soldiers and officials, ABC reported.

The group, members of the Baluchi tribe, operates from Pakistan's gas-rich province of Baluchistan, just across the border from Iran, the report said. (my emphasis)
So that's good. Except when Pakistan helps the Al Qaida type groups that are killing NATO soldiers in Afghanistan and, you know, supposedly started this whole war on terror thing by the 9/11 attacks and are our main enemies. Well, our main enemies except maybe for the Iranians who helped us in our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq until we decided they were bad guys and are a bogeyman for us now.

Gee, you would think that the fools who came up with the Iran-Contra scheme were running Middle East and South Asia policies! Oh, wait...

Fortunately for us, there's always soothing PR to ease our troubled minds: 60 dead in Pakistan border fighting by Ishtiaq Mahsud, AP 04/04/07; Tribesmen’s call to arms Dawn (Pakistan) 04/03/07.

See, Pakistan is helping is go after Uzbek foreign fighters. Because they are said to be agents of, well, the United States, Israel and Russia:

Meanwhile, the jirga authorised the tribal lashkar to capture dead or alive the Uzbek militants operating under the command of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader, Tahir Yuldeshiv.

Sources said that volunteers of the lashkar would be dispatched to Zera Lota, Azam Warsak, Shin Warsak, Ghwakhwa, Jaghundai and other areas and would coordinate with the supporters of Maulvi Nazir. ...

“Tahir is the agent of the CIA, KGB and MOSAD. His men have killed around 200 innocent in South Waziristan,” said a pamphlet. (my emphasis)
Okay, maybe not so soothing.

Still, it's nice to have friends in the world? Right? I mean, if they weren't our friends they might start helping the jihadists who are out to kill Americans.

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