The opposition to Perón and Peronism in Argentine politics, 1943-1951

Marcia García Sebastiani in her book Los antiperonistas en la Argentina peronista (2005) looks at the formation of the opposition to Juan Perón and Peronism in the years 1943-1951. A consolidation of the opposition to Peronism congealed behind the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). And that two-party alignment largely prevails in Argentine politics today. Of course, with many changes along the way.

The landmarks of the the period in which this oppositional alignment emerged include the following:

• 1943: the military coup which made Gen. Pedro Ramírez head of government. From 1941, Col. Juan Perón had led the secret GOU group (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos) of military officers who were responsible for the 1943 coup.

• 1945: October 17 and Perón's dramatic release from detention as the result of dramatic and massive popular demand

• February 1946: a few days before the national elections, the US releases its Blue Book against Perón as part of a scarcely concealed US regime-change effort spearheaded by Spruille Braden, US Ambassador to Argentina and later a member of the National Council of the early John Birch Society, the longtime mother ship of far-right conspiracy theories. (Braden Discloses He Quit Birch Post New York Times 03/19/2016)
  
  
• The US interference in Argentine politics had been so blatant that Perón made his central campaign theme "Perón o Braden" ("Perón or Braden"). After his election victory, Perón told a Brazilian paper, "I'm grateful to Braden for the votes he has given me... If I win two thirds of the electorate, a third would be due to the propaganda Braden made against me."

• The national elections of February 1946 were marred by violence and some dubious actions by the military government that interfered with the campaign activities of the opposition. But it was a free and competitive election and far cleaner than any since before the coup of September 1930, which had removed the elected President Hipólito Yrigoyen (UCR) and installed José Félix Uriburu as head of a provisional government.

• 1947: Women's suffrage approved by Congress. The UCR had long advocated it but opposed the law that actually enacted it when it was up for a vote in Congress.

• 1948: The police claim in September they have uncovered a plot to assassinate Perón

• 1949 - Constitution of 1949 approved, replacing that of 1853. The new Constitution allows Perón to run for re-election and reduces some of the features of Congress that the UCR had used to impede Peronist legislation

• 1951-As the parties prepare for a new Presidential election for 1952, Gen. Benjamin Menéndez leads a new coup attempt, which fails. Filipe Pigna writes that the intent of Menéndez in the coup was that he "wanted to disarm the Peronist state completely and take away from the worker all their social conquests, returning them to the regime of semi-slavery that rules before 1943." (Los mitos de la historia argentina 4. La Argentina peronista (1943-1955); translations from Pigna here are mine)

1951 ends the period on which Sebastiani's book concentrates.

In 1955, Gen. Eduardo Lonardi mounted a successful coup attempt in September that styled itself the Revolución Libertadora. Perón fled the country to asylum in Paraguay. In March 1956, the military government banned the Peronist Party and all explicitly Peronist political activity. The coup and the new military government and the ban on Peronism was supported by the UCR and the Socialists. Perón himself was unable to return to Argentina and stand for election again until 1973, when he was elected by a 62% majority.

Sebastiani provides a table (p. 90) showing the vote percentages of the various parties in the elections of 1946, 1948 (non-Presidential) and 1952. For the UCR and the Peronists, it shows the following.

1946: Peronista 50%, UCR 28%
1948: Peronista 61%, UCR 27%
1952: Peronista 62%, UCR 32%

The broad opposition front formed by the opposition leading up to the 1946 elections, bringing together the Radicals (UCR), the Socialists, the Communists, conservatives (Partido Demócrata Nacional/PDN) and center-right (Partido Demócrata Progresista/PDP), was called the Unión Democrática. They constructed their political identity are the rhetoric of democracy and political liberalism. They opposition under the military regime characterized the government as "fascist" and "Nazi." That characterization was encouraged by the United Nations powers in the Second World War because Argentina remained neutral in the Second World War until 1945, when the outcome of the war was all but certain. And when Perón had become Vice President and Minister of War.

There is an ongoing discussion on whether Perón's government should be classified as "fascist." I won't try to recapitulate it here. But I find that case unsustainable. Whatever authoritarian aspects his governments may have had, his goal from 1945 to his death in 1974 as President for a second time, his goal was to democratize the Argentine government. I would argue that the question of authoritarianism is more relevant to his brief 1973-4 government than to that of 1945-55. It was under his government that Argentine women won the vote. His policies strengthened the labor unions, mobilized a large number of people into an active involvement in politics and pursued economic policies that greatly increased the well-being of millions.

During the 1946-51 period, Peronist government and political movement took measures that restricted the opposition's freedom in various ways. It restricted the publication of opposition newspapers by limiting the amount of paper deliver to them for the publications and shutting some of the down or taking over publication. A few opposition leaders wer expelled from Congress. Ricardo Balbín, a key UCR leader, was jailed in 1950 for a five-year term. But the Perón government pardoned and released him in 1951 and he became the UCR's Presidential candidate that year. Pigna notes dryly of the expulsions and Balbín's imprisonment, "The governmental response to the Radicals' chicanery wasn't exactly democratic." (Los mitos de la historia argentina 4. La Argentina peronista (1943-1955))

Still, this was neither a dictatorship nor were the elections shams. Comparing the votes above in the Presidential and congressional elections of 1946, 1948 and 1952 don't give any obvious indication that the opposition was being suppressed. And, in fact, despite the restrictions mentioned, those elections were competitive and both sides were able to make their positions to the public. For better or worse, Perón understood his movement as revolutionary. And always would. But it was a revolutionary movement that was more committed to democratic processes than the governments of 1930-1943 had been.

The opposition was also willing to support the self-described Revolución Libertadora in 1955,aka, Lonardi's military coup. During Perón's elected governments, there was nothing approaching the complete ban of the Peronist party and even the use of Peronist slogans like the Revolución Libertadora initiated in 1956. Even tango dancing was discouraged because the new rulers identified it with the common people who supported Perón. As the election results above show, Peronism was a kind of politics with which a majority identified. So from 1955-1973, Argentina suffered a chronic crisis of governance because the party and movement speaking for the majority was suppressed. And no government in Argentine history was so brutal a dictatorship as the military government that was in power 1973-83.

Pigna mentions the following senior oppsotion politicians who had not only guilty knowledge and at least passively collaborated in the coup attempt of 1951 led by Menéndez: Arturo Frondizi (UCR), Américo Ghioldi (Socialists), Reynaldo Pastor (conservatives) and Horacio Thedy (center-right). Basically the entire opposition spectrum, in other words, except the Communist Party, which would join in with the opposition in supporting the 1955 coup.

Perón had very legitimate reason to fear violent, anti-democracy conspiracies against him. That is not a justification for bad acts. It's a description of a central political fact of that period. Sebastiani provides a useful account of the development of the anti-Peronist opposition and the ideological narratives they shaped for themselves. But that process and those ideologies are difficult to evaluate meaningfully if not understood in the context of the interests at work and the actors supporting them.

The narrative of Perón as a Nazi obscured much more than it clarified. Framing your opponent as Hitler can result in drastic threat.inflation. Or, rather, it almost always is threat inflation. (Which is why it's such a bad thing in US foreign policy that we try to make every adversary from Ho Chi Minh to Muammar Qaddafi the New Hitler.) Ironically, the cover features of photograph of a rally for the Unión Demócratica umbrella opposition group. I say it's ironic because it's from August 12, 1946 in the Plaza del Congreso in Buenos Aires. It features a sign saying "Contra el nazismo" (Against the Nazis).

That was three days after the bombing of Nagasaki. so the Second World War was still officially going on and Argentina was formally a belligerent on the United Nations' side. Germany had surrendered in May, so if the reference was meant to be a patriotic wartime one, the reference was already a bit anachronistic. It was actually directed at the military government, in which Perón as Vice President was the most popular leader at that point. But it was before the President, Gen. Edelmiro Farrell, ousted Perón and imprisoned him in early October. Popular pressure forced Perón's release and he returned in triumph to address the throng on October 17 in the famous Plaza de Mayo from the balcony of the Presidential palace, the Casa Rosada. October 17 is still celebrated today by the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ) as a major historical turning point they observe every year.

So under the military dictatorship, with no democratic elections scheduled, the umbrella opposition group Unión Demócratica was holding a rally in the federal capital in front of a major governmental building. In the actual Nazi regime of the Hitler government, such demonstrations in front of the Reichstag in Berlin were, it's safe to say, extremely rare. As in, non-existent after the imposition the Enabling Law in 1933 that established the dictatorship.

But the central opposition narrative was that they were standing for democracy against Perón's "Nazi-fascist" rule, even during his democratically elected governments. That same narrative continued to be used, including to justify the military coup of 1955. The UCR continued to describe their victory via military coup as having overthrown "Nazis."

Juan Perón and populism

One regime that pretty much everyone agrees was a "populist" one is that of Juan Perón in Argentina from 1945-55. The Oxford Reference article by Frederick C. Turner, Juan Domingo Perón, which apparently dates from the Presidency of Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-99), gives this account:

The most important and controversial political leader of twentieth-century Argentina, Juan Domingo Perón sharply divided Argentines during and after his lifetime over the issues of distribution of income and political power. In historical retrospect, he may be seen as a leader who wanted to extend to the lower classes the standard of living and the political enfranchisement that Hipólito Yrigoyen and the Unión Cívica Radical had brought to the Argentine middle classes earlier in the century. One of the few South American leaders to be known throughout the world, Perón championed a “Third Force” in world politics and encouraged wider political participation by Argentine women.

The prevailing American view of Perón during his first Presidency, promoted by the Truman Administration at the time, was that Perón's during his first Presidency, promoted by the Truman Administration at the time, was that his government was fascist. That view is unsustainable, largely for the reasons Turner summarizes in that paragraph.

Perón identified the political enemy within Argentina as the "oligarchy," a concept understood to mean the rural oligarchy and the magnates of industry, though the industrial component of the Argentine economy had declined under the policies during the "infamous decade" following the military coup of 1930. Promoting domestic industry was a main goal of the Peronist government.

There was an additional nationalist component to Perón's appeal. Spruille Braden was US Ambassador to Argentina in 1945 when Perón first became head of government and in 1946 when he successfully ran for President in a competitive democratic election. Braden was a classic One Percenter, as we say these days. He was the son of a wealthy mining family and held majority ownership in the Braden Copper Company in Chile. He served a director of the W. Averell Harriman Securities Corporation and was a member of the ultra-establishment Council on Foreign Relations. In the first half of the 1930s, he had been an agent of Standard Oil in South America. To top it off, he was also a significant stockholder of the United Fruit Company. All the ingredients to be a classic Ugly American south of the Rio Grande.

And that's exactly what he was in 1945-46. The military governments of 1940-1946 had been neutral in the World War until March 1945, when it was clear that Germany was losing. This had led the Roosevelt Administration to treat Argentina as de facto pro-German. So the "fascist" label seemed to be an obvious polemical label to use against them. The pro-Allies left parties in Argentina, the Socialist and Communist Parties, adopted the same label. Despite Perón's obviously distinct position from the more conservative elements in the military government, his local and international enemies found the label convenient to apply to Perón as well. The State Department Blue Book published in February 1946, after Perón's assumption of power but before the 1946 elections, portrayed both the previous military government and the current one of Perón were collaborators with the Nazis.

When Braden was appointed Ambassador in April 1945 and was distinctly hostile to the military government then in power and then to Perón's regime. Perón campaigned in the election 1946 on the theme "Braden or Perón," framing himself as the defender of the Argentine nation against foreign interference. This was another populist angle to Perón's politics, appealing to all classes in Argentina to support him against foreign adversaries. In 1946, against a specific image of the foreign adversaries, "Braden."

Turner also writes:

In 1946, Perón was elected to the Argentine presidency in one of the freest elections in Argentine history; he was elected to a second term in 1951. A military coup in 1955 deposed him, sending him into exile first in Paraguay and ultimately in Madrid. For many years, historians and political leaders in Argentina tried to write Perón off as a has-been, but this ultimately proved impossible. In 1973, he returned triumphantly to Argentina and to the presidency after eighteen years in exile.

The basis for Perón's power was the Justicialista (Peronist) Party. Multiclass in nature, ranging over the ideological spectrum from far right to far left, it was an archetypal example of populism. Peronism has been able to count consistently on support from ten percent of the upper classes and seventy percent of the lower classes. Perón built fierce and durable loyalty for the movement during his first presidency, during which he increased the proportion of national wealth going to the working class very substantially. ... More important than economic gains, members of the working class and trade unions had achieved a sense of political consciousness and economic entitlement that made them combative participants in Argentine politics for decades to come.

Juan Perón also had high ambitions in international politics. Quite accurately, he predicted that if the countries of Latin America did not join together, they would remain weak and put upon by more powerful nations. Often credited with originating the concept of the Third World, Perón after 1945 dreamed of a coalition of states allied to neither the Soviet Union nor the United States. Argentine yearning for leadership of this movement appears in one of the most common Peronist slogans: Ni yanqui, ni marxista—peronista (Neither Yankee, nor Marxist — Peronist). [my emphasis in italics]

And Turner describes the role of Eva Perón this way:

Her interest in politics and her influence increased decisively after Perón took office in June 1946. She began to meet daily with workers' delegations, union leaders, and officials of the Secretariat of the Labor Confederation, thus continuing the work that Perón did as secretary of labor. She frequently addressed Perón's supporters on his behalf and proved to be a rousing speaker. After a triumphant European tour which she undertook without Perón, she returned in time to urge the passage of a law granting women the vote.

Evita was never formally part of Perón's government, though she tried unsuccessfully to be the Peronist vice-presidential candidate in the 1951 elections. She was officially only Argentina's First Lady, but she was a one-woman propaganda ministry for Perón and his trusted liaison with labor. She was also president of the Eva Perón Foundation, a well-endowed social welfare organization. She used the foundation funds to build hospitals, schools, youth hostels, and low-income housing, and to buy thousands of goods that she distributed to the needy. In addition, she was president of the women's branch of the Peronist Party, which helped to reelect Perón in 1951 with an overwhelming female vote.

Evita's death from cancer on 26 July 1952 undermined the stability of Peronism. She was a crucial component of that political structure and irreplaceable—as Perón soon realized when his economic policies began to strain his relationship with the descamisados. On the other hand, her death transformed her into a powerful myth that became essential for the survival of Peronism after Perón's ouster in 1955 and, despite the repression of successive military dictatorships, its return to power in 1973 along with Perón's own reelection that same year.

The Oxford Reference entry on María Eva Duarte De Perón (2004) by Evita's biographer Marysa Navarro-Aranguren expands on her significance for Peronism:

Her interest in politics and her influence increased decisively after Perón took office in June 1946. She began to meet daily with workers' delegations, union leaders, and officials of the Secretariat of the Labor Confederation, thus continuing the work that Perón did as secretary of labor. She frequently addressed Perón's supporters on his behalf and proved to be a rousing speaker. After a triumphant European tour which she undertook without Perón, she returned in time to urge the passage of a law granting women the vote.

Evita was never formally part of Perón's government, though she tried unsuccessfully to be the Peronist vice-presidential candidate in the 1951 elections. She was officially only Argentina's First Lady, but she was a one-woman propaganda ministry for Perón and his trusted liaison with labor. She was also president of the Eva Perón Foundation, a well-endowed social welfare organization. She used the foundation funds to build hospitals, schools, youth hostels, and low-income housing, and to buy thousands of goods that she distributed to the needy. In addition, she was president of the women's branch of the Peronist Party, which helped to reelect Perón in 1951 with an overwhelming female vote.

Evita's death from cancer on 26 July 1952 undermined the stability of Peronism. She was a crucial component of that political structure and irreplaceable—as Perón soon realized when his economic policies began to strain his relationship with the descamisados. On the other hand, her death transformed her into a powerful myth that became essential for the survival of Peronism after Perón's ouster in 1955 and, despite the repression of successive military dictatorships, its return to power in 1973 along with Perón's own reelection that same year.

Pretty much everyone at least seems to agree that this political experience, Juan Perón's government and movement, was populist. It was and still is a very diverse phenomenon. Peronism is complicated.

Arturo Frondizi and the dilemma of Argentine governance, 1955-1974

Arturo Frondizi (1908-1995) was the civilian President of Argentina from 1958 to 1962. March 29 is the anniversary of Frondizi's overthrow by the military.

Cloumnist Mariano Caucino used the opportunity to praise Frondizi in El golpe contra Frondizi y una oportunidad perdida Infobae 29.03.2016. This is intriguing because he highlights the admiration that current President Mauricio Macri has expressed for Frondizi. Which makes me curious about the ways that Frondizi's image is being used in the present-day context. The politics of history is always intriguing.

Arthur Frondizi on the cover of Time (Mar. 30, 1962 edition)

Juan Perón's government was overthrown in 1955 by a military coup that billed itself as the "Revolución Libertadora." They established a military government that was briefly headed by General Eduardo Lonardi and then by General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu. (Aramburu was later kidnapped and assassinated by urban guerrillas from the pro-Peronist Montoneros group in 1971.)

In 1958, the military government transferred power to an elected civilian government headed by Frondizi. Frondizi was a member of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) and in 1946 was elected to Congress as a national deputy for the UCR, which despite its name had become the main political vehicle of the Argentine oligarchy which was intensely anti-Perón. Frondizi was the vice-presidential candidate in 1951 in which Ricardo Balbín was the unsuccessful presidential candidate. In the twists and turns that make politics and history so fascinating, both Frondizi and Balbín would make practical alliances with Juan Perón.

The UCR was very supportive of the 1955 coup. As were the Socialist Party and the Soviet-line Communist Party, which makes for a whole other story. In the excellent theatrical film Eva Perón (1996), Frondizi is shown taking part in the coup planning. That would be this one, BTW, whose screenplay was written by Argentine political theorist José Pablo Feinmann:

Felipe Pigna writes in his biographical article Arturo Frondizi El Historiador (n/d; accessed 03/30/2016):

Tras el bombardeo por la aviación naval de la Plaza de Mayo producido el 16 de junio de 1955, Frondizi fue detenido por la policía peronista por sospechárselo co-responsable de la conspiración. La quema de las iglesias provocada por grupos de peronistas la misma noche del 16, pareció ser el límite y la señal de largada del golpe cívico-militar en ciernes del que el radicalismo era una de las piezas clave. Frente al peligro, el gobierno peronista resolvió liberalizar el uso de los medios de comunicación que estaban monopólicamente bajo su control. En estas especiales circunstancias, Frondizi se dirigió por primera vez por radio al pueblo argentino el 27 de julio de 1955.

El 16 de septiembre de 1955 un golpe de estado, conocido como la Revolución Libertadora, derrocó a Perón, y el radicalismo, junto con otras fuerzas políticas como el socialismo democrático, se sumó al gobierno a través de una junta consultiva.

[After the bombardment of the Plaza de Mayo by naval planes which occurred the 16th of June, 1955, Frondizi was detained by the Peronist police under suspicion that he shared responsibility for the conspiracy. The burning of churches by groups of Peronists the same night of the 16th, it appeared to be the end and the signal for the start of the civil-military coup in the making of which radicalism [the UCR] was one of the key pieces. Facing the danger, the Peronist government resolved to liberalize the use of the communications media that had been under its [the government's] control. In these special circumstances, Frondizi spoke to the Argentine people for the first time by radio on the 27th of July of 1955.

On September 16, 1955, a coup d'état, known as the Revolución Libertadora, overthrew Perón. And radicalism [the UCR], together with other political forces like democratic socialism [the Socialist Party] joined the government via a consultative junta.]

The burning of churches was not some fit of secularism. Peronism had and has to this day a clear Catholic component. The current Pope was even affiliated with a Peronist group in the 1970s, albeit a rightwing one. (Peronism is complicated!)

But the Catholic hierarchy in Argentina has also had a deeply reactionary side. And reactionary Church officials also supported the coup. As the newspaper La Prensa reported at the time on the bombardment of the Plaza (Perón y el bombardeo del 16 de junio de 1955 El Historiador, quoting La Prensa 17.06.1955):

Era la primera capital de Sudamérica en ser bombardeada por sus propias fuerzas armadas. Los aviones atacantes, punta de lanza de un alzamiento en varios puntos del país, llevaban en sus colas una “V” y una cruz que señalaban “Cristo Vence”.

[It was the first capital of South America to be bombarded by its own armed forces. The attacking planes, the tip of the spear of a rebellion in various places in the country, bore on the tails a "V" and cross which was marked "Cristo Vence."]

Cristo Vence, "Christ victorious, was the slogan of the reactionary Catholics. Horacio Verbitsky's four-volume history of the Argentine Catholic Church is titled Cristo vence.

The Time magazine cover from the time of Frondizi's own overthrow as President shows Juan Perón looming in the background. It's an appropriate image for the dilemma of governance in Argentina from 1955 to 1974. Peronism was the most popular political movement in Argentina. But Peronism was banned from formally participating in elections or even operating and organizing openly. The Revolución Libertadora even tried to suppress the tango and the milongas, the popular dance clubs that were central to the tango scence, because the oligarchy associated tango with (in their eyes) dangerous low-class Peronist populism.

But the Peronist movement remained active. And Perón backed Frondizi in the 1958 election, in an agreement negotiated by his close collaborator Rogelio Frigerio, which included a development program amenable to the Peronists. His willingness to cooperate with Perón led to a split in the UCR, with Frondizi's faction becoming the Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente (UCRI). The other faction, the UCR del Pueblo (UCRP), was led by Ricardo Balbín.

Frondizi's Minister of Finance from 1958-1960 was Aldo Ferrer, one of Argentina's most distinguished economists who passed away earlier this month.. (The department was actually called the Ministry of "Economía y Hacienda" [Economy and Budget]). Javier Lewkowicz wrote in an obituary article on him (Faro para la heterodoxia económica Página/12 09.03.2016):

Ayer falleció el economista Aldo Ferrer. Vivió 88 años durante los cuales ocupó diversos cargos en la función pública, escribió libros célebres de la economía argentina, contribuyó a crear la escuela de pensamiento económico latinoamericana del estructuralismo, formó discípulos y se brindó a compañeros y amigos a quienes transmitió hasta sus últimos días su pasión y compromiso de lucha por una Argentina soberana. La comunidad política y académica manifestó su pesar por la enorme pérdida para el pensamiento nacional.

[The economist Aldo Ferrer died yesterday. He lived 88 years during which he occupied various posts in public service, wrote celebrated books about the Argentine economy, contributed to creating the Latin American school of economic thought of structuralism, won disciples and made himself available to comrades and friends to whom he transmitted his passion until his last days and commitment to fight for a sovereign Argentina. The political and academic community expressed its pain for the enormous loss for the national thought.]

Frondizi initially promoted a developmental policy to promote Argentine national energy and guard Argentine national sovereignty. In a 1954 book, Petróleo y Política, he had criticized the behavior of the extractive industries and advocated putting the control of Argentina's oil and gas resources under the control of the state-owned YPF company (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales).

But Frondizi was only able to pursue his preferred developmental policy for a year or so. Under increasing pressure from the oligarcy, the military and the Church hierarchy, he defaulted to the kind of policies generally acceptable to the IMF and the United States. In a program identified with with economist Álvaro Alsogaray, who, in Felipe Pigna's words "con su famosa frase 'hay que pasar el invierno' orientó la política económica a promover las exportaciones, limitar el proceso de industrialización y liberalizar las restricciones impuestas a las importaciones disminuyendo considerablemente la capacidad expansiva de la industria nacional" ("with his famous phrase, 'you have to get through the winter" oriented economic policy to promote exports, limit the process of industrialization and liberalize the tariff restrictions on imports, considerable diminishing the capacity of national industry to expand").

If Mauricio Macri identifies with Frondizi's presidential policies, it's surely this version rather than the initial national-development orientation of Frondizi's government.

By the 1960 election, Perón was no longer backing Frondizi. And although Frondizi strove to maintain good relations with Washington, he was also reluctant initially to cut off relations with Castro's new regime in Cuba. When the always-US-dominated Organization of American States (OAS) met in Argentina in early 1961, Frondizi invited Ché Guevara to come to Argentina and confer with him soon afterwards. Even though he eventually gave in to US pressure to break relations with Cuba, his early support for Cuban sovereignty in the face of American pressure made the military even more suspicious of him. When Peronists did very well in elections in Buenos Aires province in early 1962 after Frondizi's government had loosened restrictions on their electoral participation, the military moved to oust Frondizi in March, no longer confident he would sufficiently protect the oligarchy and conform to military demands.

This was the continuing dilemma of the oligarchy and the military during this period until Perón's return to Argentina in 1974. They couldn't rule effectively without allowing the Peronists to fully participate in elections. And they were too afraid of Peronism to allow it.

In the New York Times' not-very-adequate obituary for Frondizi (Arturo Frondizi, Argentine Chief In Time of Austerity, Dies at 86 04/19/1995), Robert McG. Thomas, Jr.wrote:

Taking office at a time of economic distress, he again put pragmatism first, this time above his own political popularity, imposing a series of austerity measures to curb inflation and attract foreign investment, primarily to the country's ailing oil industry.

His measures, including a currency devaluation, would eventually be credited with laying the groundwork for an economic resurgence, but the immediate effect was to put a serious burden on the poor and middle classes.

The result was an almost constant series of strikes, demonstrations and clashes with the police, requiring the intervention of the military.

His undoing, however, was not his economic measures, but keeping a political promise to lift the ban on Peronist candidates and parties.

When the Peronists won a series of congressional elections in early 1962, the military, which had also become alarmed after learning that Dr. Frondizi had met secretly with Che Guevara, an emissary of the Cuban dictator, Fidel Castro, withdrew its support, forcing Dr. Frondizi's resignation that March.

Impoverishing large numbers of people, giving up your country's chances for sovereign economic development, reduction of the standard of living of "the poor and middle classes," aka, the large majority, for the Times in 1995, that was a sign of "put[ing] pragmatism first." Awesome.

Ernesto Guevara and la Patria Grande (2 of 4): Che Guevera and Peronism

This is the second of four posts discussing Pacho O’Donnell’s Che: El argentino que quiso cambiar el mundo (Che: The Argentine Who Wanted to Change the World)(2003). All references are to the Sudamericana edition of 2012. All translations from the Spanish are mine unless otherwise indicated.

One Argentine political factor, whose influence on Che O’Donnell’s book emphasizes, is the most important political movement in Argentina during most of his life, Peronism.

During Juan Perón’s first Presidency (1946-1955), the young Ernesto was critical of Perón’s government, influenced in significant part by his mother’s traditional-left perspective. Peronism was and is a complicated movement. Despite the strong pro-labor and social justice emphasis of Juan and Eva Perón, the left parties in Argentina, both the Socialists and the Communists, joined the oligarchy consolidated around the UCR (Unión Cívica Radical) in opposing Perón’s government. And in supporting the self-described Revolución Libertadora that overthrew Perón in 1955. This “revolution” was actually a coup that by any reasonable standards was far more authoritarian and repressive than Perón’s first Presidency.

Juan Perón with “Evita” (Eva Perón) 1950

Ernesto took a position of critical opposition to Perón prior to 1955. But he recognized the fundamentally reactionary nature of the Revolución Libertadora. O’Donnell quotes from a letter of Ernesto’s to his mother just after the coup, in which he writes of the change, “Yo sé que tus amigos erstarán muy contentos, … pero sé también que para el pueblo argentine eso no significa una mejoría.” (“I know you and your friends will be very content, ... but I also know that for the people of Argentina this does not represent an improvement. “) (p.53) He also wrote to her, “La caída de Perón me amargó profundamente, no por él, sino por lo que significa para toda América.” (“The fall of Perón upsets me, not for his sake, but because of what it means for all of [Latin] America.”) (p. 318)

Although his party was outlawed for the better part of the following two decades, Perón remained the dominant figure in Argentine politics and worked incessantly from exile to legalize the Peronist party and return himself to the Presidency of Argentina, which he eventually achieved in 1973, the year before his death.

Often described as Machiavellian, Perón was a revolutionary pragmatist. He was not a Marxist and always expressed a kind of “third way” position between liberal capitalism of the American and European type, on the one hand, and Communism, on the other. And this had certain similarities with the position of the Non-Aligned Movement of developing nations that took shape in the 1950s and 1960s. As well as with the position of China, which also began in the late 1950s to take a position navigating between the US and the Soviet Union which eventually made possible the famous agreement with Nixon and Kissinger.

So it no surprise that Perón the master politician had connections with Guevara, who found himself in a position critical of the Soviet-line Communist Parties in Latin America and advocated a distinct perspective toward organizing revolution in the developing world. One of Perón’s key loyalist leaders, John William Cooke, was very much an admirer of the Cuban Revolution who lived in exile in Castro’s Cuba. O’Donnell writes that it was Cooke who convinced Che (p. 318):

... que ningún proyecto era viable sin el apoyo del general Perón, quien contaba con al idolatría de los sectores populares y de la mayoría de los poderosos dirigentes gremiales de su país, además de ser la indiscutida cabeza del partido political más numeroso.

[... that no project was viable without the support of General Perón, who could count on the idolatry of the popular sectors and on the majority of the powerful union leaders of his country, as well as being the indisputable head of the most numerous political party.]

O’Donnell cites the report of Julio Gallego Soto, another close collaborator of Perón’s, who claims that he saw Che in April 1964, when he was still part of the Cuban government, in Perón’s residence in Madrid. He was there to offer Perón millions of dollars from a Cuban “liberation fund.” Soto denied that he proceeded to administer the funds, but O’Donnell cites other indications that he may have done so. In any case, O’Donnell thinks that Perón’s contact with Guevara influenced his political rhetoric going forward. In any case, Perón both before and after this point considered political violence as a potential tool in his political arsenal. He eventually encouraged the Peronist guerrilla group known as the Monteneros, an alliance that proved both effective in assisting his return to power and deeply problematic for both him and them. O’Donnell also cites the former CIA officer Philip Agee as saying the CIA considered that there was an alliance between Perón and the Cubans.

O’Donnell also cites one of Perón’s secretaries, Enrique Pavón Pereyra, as saying that Guevara in 1966 had requested in person Perón’s support in his guerrilla project in Bolivia. According to Pavón, Perón didn’t support his plan. Not because he opposed the use of guerrilla warfare but because he thought the plan was unrealistic. Including because the dense jungle in the region Che was planning to operate would be particularly hard on his asthma. “Don’t commit suicide,” Perón told Pavón he had advised Guevara. Pavón saw Guevara there on this occasion, but was only present for the first part of his conversation with Gen. Perón. Perón told Pavón after the meeting, “Poor Guevara, they are going to leave him on his own.” Presumably referring to his judgment that Cuba would provide Guevara only limited support in Bolivia. Which turned out to be the case.

**********

Part 1: Che the Argentine
Part 2: Che Guevera and Peronism
Part 3: Arbenz and Guevara’s politicization
Part 4: Two, three, many Vietnams

Juan Domingo Perón (1895-1974) died 40 years ago

Today, July 1, is the 40th anniversary of the death of Juan Domingo Perón (1895-1974), legendary and controversial leader of Argentina, founder of a Peronist movement so diverse as to include over the decades unions, rightwing death squads, esoteric secret societies, neoliberals, social democrats (if not by that name), leftwing guerrillas, and fighting reformers of a New Deal tone like former President Néstor Kirchner and current President Cristina Fernández.

It was under Juan Perón's first Presidency that women's right to vote in Argentina was first recognized. And his second wife María Eva Duarte ("Evita") became a greater legend than her husband, a political leader in her own right and a lasting symbol of women's and labor rights.

Juan Domingo Perón and Evita

If his second wife Evita was an exceptional fortunate choice, his third wife Isabel (María Estela Martínez Cartas de Perón) was an exceptionally unfortunate one. She achieved an important milestone as the first female President in South America, having been elected as Perón's Vice President in 1973 and taking his place after his death at 78 in 1974. (Cristina in 2007 became the first directly elected.)

Isabel was not only unprepared to step into the Presidency, especially not in 1974 when the country was experiencing exceptionally challenging political strains. But her worst characteristic was her friend, confidant and political-religious guru, José López Rega, one of the most sinister figures in Argentine history. His nickname "El Brujo" (the warlock) was very appropriate, both because he actually was a devotee of esoteric lore but also because he was a genuinely manipulative, murderous man obsessed with power. López Rega basically acted as the functional President for the year after Perón died until he was forced out of the government by military and political pressure. He died in prison in 1989 after several years on the lam with one of his esoteric female fans.

José López Rega, "El Brujo" (the Warlock) (1916-1989)

Cristina commemorated the anniversary of Perón's death with a tribute to both him and Hipólito Yrigoyen (1852–1933), who served as President 1916-1922 and 1928-1930: "La historia sepulta a los traidores y a los mediocres" Pagina/12 01.07.2014. Yrigoyen died on July 3, which Cristina used as her reason for acknowledging them both.

Yrigoyen was the leader of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) party, which still today is the main opposition party to Cristina's Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ). The Peronists consider the UCR the main party of the "oligarchy," the large landowners and their business allies that are the traditional opponents of Peronism. Political theorist José Pablo Feinmann suggests that opposition to la oligarquía is the most defining factor in the historical continuity of the Peronist movement.

This is a surprising pairing. Yrigoyen was a liberal, meaning he was against the conservatives but also hostile to labor. His first Presidency, his government happily suppressed the massive labor protests that have gone down in Argentine history as the Semana Trágica (Tragic Week) of 1919. But Yrigoyen was also identified with efforts to democratize the political system. Pagina/12 reports of her speech:

La Presidenta definió al yrigoyenismo y al peronismo como una "continuidad histórica" en la que el "yrigoyenismo representa la defensa irrestricta de los intereses del pueblo de la Nación" y el peronismo el que, "con mayor profundidad y densidad, siguió ese ligado histórico".

Cristina recordó cómo ambos dirigentes fueron "hostigados por grandes medios de comunicación y por los intereses dominantes" y, a modo de ejemplo, apuntó que Perón, incluso, fue acusado "hasta de estupro". Sin embargo, advirtió que nadie recuerda a los detractores de Perón e Yrigoyen porque "la historia sepulta a los mediocres y a los traidores a la Patria"[.]

[The President defined yrigoyenismo and Peronism as an "historical continuity in which "yrigoyenismo represents the unrestricted defense of the interests of the people of the nation," and Peronism "with greater depth and density, continued this historical trend."

Cristina recalled how both leaders were "plagued by large communication media and by the dominant interests," and, by way of example, indicated that Perón was accused "even of child sex abuse." Nevertheless, she observed that no one remembers the detractors of Perón e Yrigoyen because "history buries the mediocre and traitors to the fatherland."]

This was obviously a political speech, not the reading of an historian's monograph: Visión 7 - Cristina: "El Judicial es el único poder que no sufrió derrocamientos" Visión 7 - Cristina: "El Judicial es el único poder que no sufrió derrocamientos" TV Pública argentina 01.07.2014:

Here are four additional videos from TV Pública argentina on Perón and his legacy. Visión 7 - Los cambios que promovió el Peronismo 01.07.2014:

Visión 7 - A 40 años de la muerte de Perón (1) 01.07.2014:

Visión 7 - A 40 años de la muerte de Perón (2)

Visión 7 - A 40 años de la muerte de Perón (3)

Additional articles on Perón:

Thomas F. McGann, Juan Perón Encyclopedia Britannica Online, accessed 07/01/2014

Martín Granovsky, La tristeza popular y el desastre nacion Pagina/12 01.07.2014: "La muerte de Juan Domingo Perón marcó una cuenta regresiva que terminaría el 24 de marzo de 1976, con el golpe militar más cruento de la historia argentina." ("The death of Juan Doming Perón started a countdown that ended the 24th of March, 1976, with the bloodiest military coup in the history of Argentina.")

Eduardo Anguita, Los ojos sobre Yrigoyen y Perón Infonews 01.07.2014

CFK heads Perón's 40th death anniversary ceremony Buenos Aires Herald 01.07.2014

Pablo Andisco, A 40 años de la muerte del hombre que cambió la historia Infonews 01.07.2014

Estela de Carlotto et al, Análisis y recuerdos Pagina/12 01.07.2014

Peron statue in Argentina's Buenos Aires still in limbo BBC News 06/30/2014

Carlos Romero, Perón, el líder que cambió la historia El Tiempo 01.07.2014

Sergio Wischñevsky, Llevó en sus oídos Pagina/12 01.07.2014

Recuerdos del día que murió Perón Infonews 01.07.2014

Tags: argentina, cristina fernández, evita, isabel perón, lópez rega, juan perón

Perón 1973 and the dark shadow of José López Rega

This is a video of Juan Domingo Perón from December 1973, just a few months before his death. Perón was at this time serving as Argentine President. Here he is speaking to the labor confederation CGT. He surveys the history of Argentine industrial development since his Presidency in the 1940s and 1950s and of the labor movement.

At around 17:30, he tells a story about a man in an audienceonce complaining that the workers were always looking to make more money. Perón says he responded, "You don't?" ("Tu no?")

He also talks in this speech about national debt problems involving the "hermanitos del Norte" ("little brothers in the North"), meaning the United States. He was also devaluing the Argentine peso at the time and explains his reasoning.

Archivo histórico - Perón en la CGT (diciembre de 1973) - (versión completa) TV Pública argentina 09.05.2014:

The video also has a reminder of the dark side of Perón's second turn at the Presidency at that time (1973-4). At just pass 1:00, we see an introduction of José López Rega (1916-1989), the Minister of Social Welfare, who was anything but a social-worker sort. Also known as El Brujo, the Warlock. The nickname had to do in part with his professed attraction for paranormal beliefs and practices. During the second Presidency of Juan Perón (1973-74) and that of Isabel Perón (1974-76), El Brujo became a powerful figure behind the scenes, extremely so during Isabel's term.

And in particular, he became head of the death squad known as the Triple A, from its name Alianza Anticomunista Argentina. Argentine justice is still trying to run down criminals who operated as part of the Triple A. See, for instance: Irina Hauser, El fantasma de la Triple A Pagina/12 11.05.2014; Los Juárez y la Triple A Pagina/12 22.05.2012.

President Cristina Fernández just this weekend made a tribute at the dedication of a monument to Padre Carlos Mugica, who was murdered by the Triple A in 1974. (Cristina, más papisa que nunca: "Nadie más permita dividir al pueblo de Dios" Diario Perfil 10.05.2014; Martín Granovsky, “Que nadie más permita dividir al pueblo de Dios” 11.05.2014) Gronovsky suggests that the appearance was also an attempt by Cristina to support reforms support by Argentine Pope Francis I/Jorge Bergoglio in reforms of the hierarchy that the conservative Argentine Church isn't entirely thrilled about.

TV Pública argentina·reports in Visión 7 - Cristina encabeza homenaje al Padre Mugica 10.05.2014:

This is a Spanish-language documentary by journalist Román Lejtman, Documenta - Lopez Rega, el brujo de Perón YouTube date 10/06/2011:

Thomas McGann's article for the Juan Perón entry in the Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite (2012) gives a good summary of that period:

While in exile Perón had wooed the left-wing Peronists and had supported the most belligerent labour unions. Once returned to power, however, he formed close links with the armed forces and other previously opposition right-wing groups. When he died in 1974, he left to his widow and successor as president an untenable situation. Isabel Perón failed to obtain the firm support of any power group, not even the labour unions. Terrorist activity and political violence increased. On March 24, 1976, the armed forces took power, removed Isabel Perón from office, and set up a military junta.

Peronism is one of the most complicated political movements to understand that I know of. The current President of Argentina, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, is a left Peronista and part of the Peronista Partido Justicialista. She pursues the kind of policies the Social Democrats in Europe might be pursuing if they weren't so dominated by corporate 'hos. Carlos Menem, the President who successfully pushed the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s that led to a eurozone-type disaster in 2001, was also a Peronista from the Partido Justicialista. Go figure.

As one might imagine, the exact role of Perón himself in the crimes of López Rega and the Triple A is disputed. Perón died on July 1, 1974. According to historian Ernesto Salas, "La ofensiva terrorista de la Triple A comenzó a hacerse sentir fuertemente en la segunda mitad del año [1974]" ["The terrorist offensive of the Triple A began to make itself strongly felt in the second half of the year {1974}"]. (Historian Ernesto Salas, Review of Organizaciones Político-Militares por Carlos Flaskamp Lucha Armado en la Argentina 1/1 2005)

As José Pablo Feinmann writes in La última hora de la Triple A Diario Perfil 31.12.2006 (reprinted o Feinmann website and on the website López Rega, la cara oscura de Perón Libreria Santa Fe n/d), the Triple A's origins can be traced to the assassination of José Ignacio Rucci, Secretary-General of the labor confederation CGT which the video above shows Perón addressing with López Rega nearby. This was in September 1973 about the same time Perón was elected President and Isabel Vice President. Rucci was an ally of Perón. The general assumption is that Rucci was assassinated by the Montoneros, one of the left Peronista guerrilla groups to which McGann alludes. But the actual persons who committed the murder have never been definitively identified publicly. (See Adriana Meyer, La eterna discusión sobre la causa Rucci Pagina/12 19.12.2012; Horacio Verbitsky, Lo que no pudo ser Pagina/12 27.04.2014)

According to Feinmann's account, this is when López Rega began pushing for a death squad to rein in the leftist Peronist guerrillas that would not submit themselves to Perón's orders. But he makes clear that Perón opposed the creation of a death squad and said so publicly at the time. But he also said in that statement, "Muchas veces me han dicho que creemos un batallón de la muerte como el que tienen los brasileños, o que formemos una organización para-policial para hacerle la guerrilla a la guerrilla" ("Many times I've been told that we should create a death batallion like the Brazilians have, or that we should form a para-political organization to act as guerrillas against the guerrillas"). Although Perón sais that he intended to stay with the rule of law, the question is obvious: why didn't he get whoever was making that suggestion out of his government? And as Feinmann notes, it was fairly obvious at the time that López Rega was the most likely to be making that suggestion.

Feinmann argues that Perón kept the homicidal tendencies of his long-time confidant López Rega in check during the short remainder of his lifetime. But he knew what López Rega intended. He also knew that his wife and Vice President Isabel was politically inexperienced and very much under López Rega's influence. So it's unquestionably a dark side of Perón's own legacy that he arranged such a lineup that would continue after his death.

Tags: argentina, cristina fernández, isabel perón, euro, juan perón, lópez rega, triple a

Peronism: Los tres peronismos

The Argentine political current of Peronism is difficult to define, much less understand. Embodied in the current ruling Partido Justicialista (PJ) of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, in the last two decades it has been the party that led Argentina to radical privatization and deregulation and then back to a period of Keynesian stimulus and assertive government direction of the economy.

Ricardo Sidicaro in his book Los tres peronismos: Estado y poder económico 1946-55/1973-76/1989-99 (2002) breaks the history of Peronism up until that point into the three periods in the subtitle. More precisely, he discusses the three periods of Peronist government during those periods.

The first Peronist government in Sidicaro's scheme was the civilian government of 1946-55 headed by Juan Perón as President. It succeeded a military government that had taken power in 1942 and in which Perón had achieved a leading role. Perón's government of 1946-55 had definite authoritarian tendencies but was a democratically legitimated civilian government.

Argentina had been ruled by military governments from 1930 to 1938, then again in 1942-46. Perón's first government came to power in an election permitted by the military. But soon thereafter he suppressed activity by other parties than his own the PJ, to a significant extent. He was considered a "populist" because he made special appeals to workers in class-based terms, with effective public assistance from "Evita", who was especially popular among workers and unionists.

But he also ran his government on a corporatist basis, using large economic organizations both to direct the economy but they also functioned to give direction to the state. This first Peronist period was heavily influenced by Mussolini's corporate-state ideas and was regarded by the US at the time as a fascist regime. Which is probably largely correct, though Sidicaro doesn't go into the vexed questions of defining fascism and situating Perón's first government in relation to it.

Juan and Eva Perón.

In that first Peronist government, the main industrial representative group was the Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA), which was superceded by the Conferación Económica (CGE) in 1952. The Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires was also a key group. The institution which the government used to regulate agricultural prices was the Instituto Argentino de Promoción del Intercambion (IAPI), whose formation preceded Perón's government.

The rural capitalists, i.e., the large landowners and the meat-processing industry, were the chief opponents of Peronism. Perón called them "the oligarchy". The opposition of the rural "oligarchy" is one of the strongest continuities in Peronism from 1946 until today. The landowners' brand of conservatism was expressed from the 1930s through the fiasco of El Proceso of 1976-83 in support for military governments.

During this period, the Confederación General de Trabajo (CGT) was the umbrella labor organization, which was indirectly run by the Peronist state along corporatist lines..

The second Peronist period was 1973-76, under Presidents Héctor José Cámpora (1973), Perón himself (1973-74) and Perón's widow, María Estela Martínez de Perón aka, Isabelita. It also replaced a military government, and was overthrow by the brutal military junta which ruled from 1976-83, the members of which are still being prosecuted for the crimes they committed while in office.

The third Peronist period which Sidicaro discusses is that of the Presidency of Carlos Menem. With a brief interlude, the Peronist party, the Partido Justicialista (PJ), returned to power in early 2002. Fortunately, none of those changes of government since 1983 have involved military rule either before or after a new administration takes power.

President Cristina Fernández stands before a photo of Eva Perón with children

The post-2001 period of Peronism is qualitatively different enough from Menem's administration that it could probably be considered a "fourth Peronism" in Sidicaro's terms. Cristina Fernández' late husband Néstor Kirchner Presidency together with Cristina's have created a new variety of Peronism, which is commonly referred to as "kirchnerismo". The nature of kirchnerismo is the topic of some interesting analyses by Argentine political thinkers. Qué es el kirchnerismo: Escritos desde un época de cambio (2011) by Nicolás Freiburn et al is one of several examples of this, which I plan to discuss in later posts.

Tags: argentina, juan perón, kirchnerismo, peronism, ricardo sidicaro